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ABSTRACT 
The t h e s i s i s an enquiry i n t o the nature o f urban geography, 
i n t o how we are pr o p e r l y to understand and e x p l a i n the p a t t e r n s we 
f i n d w i t h i n a c i t y . I n P a r t I the c h a r a c t e r s o f both human geography 
and s c i e n t i f i c method a re explored and the q u e s t i o n , "Can we study 
human geography s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ? " i s posed. The answer given i s a 
neg a t i v e one and much o f the d i s c u s s i o n i s devoted to making p l a i n the 
way i n which i t i s a r r i v e d a t . The i m p l i c a t i o n s o f not adopting a 
s c i e n t i f i c mode of thought i n the study o f urban and human geography 
are then t r a c e d . The use o f models and a n a l o g i e s as t h e o r e t i c a l t o o l s 
i s examined and the e s s e n t i a l s of theory formulation explored. 
P a r t 2 i s concerned with the p a r t i c u l a r problems of the urban 
geographer - how he i s to determine h i s o b j e c t of study and what use 
he can l e g i t i m a t e l y make of q u a n t i t a t i v e t e c h n i q u e s . I t ends with the 
p o s i t i v e recommendation t h a t urban geography be s t u d i e d h i s t o r i c a l l y 
f o r , i t i s argued, urban geography i s urban h i s t o r y . 
L a s t l y , P a r t 3 i s devoted to V i c t o r i a n Edinburgh between the 
y e a r s 1851 and 1891. I t i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of how the h i s t o r i c a l 
account of a c i t y i s to be c o n s t r u c t e d . The nature o f h i s t o r i c a l 
e x p l a n a t i o n i s f u r t h e r explored i n the context of t h i s s p e c i f i c example. 
"....the p r a c t i c a l danger of an erroneous 
theory i s not t h a t i t may persuade people 
to a c t i n an u n d e s i r a b l e manner, but t h a t 
i t may confuse a c t i v i t y by p u t t i n g i t on 
a f a l s e s c e n t . " 
M. Oakeshott (1962) p.89 
PREFACE 
The major questions of t h i s t h e s i s a r e methodological ones, 
questions about modes of thought and methods of a n a l y s x s . The 
purpose of any academic study i s to i n c r e a s e man's knowledge and 
understanding of the world about him and the e x p e r i e n c e s he has of 
i t . Geography i s , by t r a d i t i o n , the academic s u b j e c t which has the 
s u r f a c e of the e a r t h as i t s o b j e c t of study. Within geography 
c e r t a i n s p e c i a l i s a t i o n s have emerged and the d i v i s i o n between p h y s i c a l 
geography ( d e a l i n g with n a t u r a l landforms) and human geography ( d e a l i n g 
with man-made landscape f e a t u r e s ) has become a popular one. Thus we 
have urban geography, a s u b j e c t w i t h i n a s u b j e c t , p l a c e d f i r m l y on the 
human s i d e o f the geographical d i v i d e . We can ask, then, how we are 
to study urban geography and which a n a l y t i c a l methods w i l l i n c r e a s e our 
knowledge and understanding of the c i t y as a landscape phenomenon. 
T h i s i s a question about methodology. Some of the methodological 
problems o f urban geography are problems f o r the whole of human geography. 
I n e x p l o r i n g the nature o f urban geography, then, questions of a much 
wider methodological r e l e v a n c e a l s o r e q u i r e to be asked. 
Any methodological i n v e s t i g a t i o n p r e s e n t s one s~pecial d i f f i c u l t y 
to the r e s e a r c h e r , f o r almost every p i e c e of l i t e r a t u r e i n the s u b j e c t 
as a whole i s of p o t e n t i a l r e l e v a n c e . Every a r t i c l e and every book, i f 
i t i s not i t s e l f a methodological t r e a t i s e , r e v e a l s the way i n which the 
author has approached h i s s u b j e c t matter and t e l l s us something about 
the methods he has used. Where then i s the r e s e a r c h e r to begin and 
upon which c r i t e r i a i s he to s e l e c t h i s m a t e r i a l ? I n t h i s t h e s i s I 
have t r i e d to cover the major approaches e v i d e n t i n the urban l i t e r a t u r e 
of t h e p a s t two decades. The o r g a n i s a t i o n of the t h e s i s does not 
n e c e s s a r i l y p l a c e t h e s e i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l order, however, f o r the 
primary concern i s to p r e s e n t a s y s t e m a t i c methodological argument which 
i v . 
t r a c e s the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the s u b j e c t matter of human 
and urban geography and r e l a t e s them to d i f f e r e n t modes of thought 
and methods o f a n a l y s i s . Because the t a s k o f the t h e s i s i s to 
e s t a b l i s h the fundamental nature of urban geography, I have chosen 
wherever p o s s i b l e i l l u s t r a t i o n s from the geographical l i t e r a t u r e 
which r e v e a l the b a s i c f e a t u r e s o f the methods being used. Such 
works are not always the b e s t known. Of a l l the works I have 
c o n s u l t e d two deserve s p e c i a l mention. R i c h a r d Hartshorne's The 
Nature o f Geography and h i s l a t e r P e r s p e c t i v e on the Nature of Geography 
not only f i r e d my enthusiasm f o r methodological enquiry but a l s o presented 
a p a r t i c u l a r c h a l l e n g e to my own conception of the nature o f the s u b j e c t . 
Together these two works prompted s e v e r a l of the que s t i o n s of t h i s t h e s i s . 
At a more p e r s o n a l l e v e l I owe much to my c o l l e a g u e s and e r s t w h i l e 
t e a c h e r s a t the U n i v e r s i t y o f S t . Andrews f o r f o s t e r i n g my i n t e r e s t i n 
methodological questions and, l a t e r , f o r so generously making a v a i l a b l e 
the f a c i l i t i e s without which the completion of t h i s t h e s i s would have 
been a f a r more d i f f i c u l t t a s k . My thanks must a l s o go to the 
postgraduates and s t a f f , e s p e c i a l l y my s u p e r v i s o r Dr. Douglas Pocock, o f 
the Department of Geography i n the U n i v e r s i t y o f Durham where I spent 
t h r e e y e a r s i n f u l l - t i m e r e s e a r c h . D i s c u s s i o n s and seminars i n both 
these departments have helped me c o n s i d e r a b l y i n the formulation o f the 
argument of t h i s t h e s i s . I am, of course, r e s p o n s i b l e f o r any 
weaknesses t h a t remain. 
I am a l s o indebted to the s t a f f of the Edinburgh Room, George IV 
Bridge L i b r a r y and o f R e g i s t e r House, Edinburgh f o r t h e i r c o o p e r a t i o n , 
to Mr. C. B. Bremner f o r h i s advice and help i n compiling the maps and 
other i l l u s t r a t i o n s and to Miss Joyce MacAlindin f o r her most e f f i c i e n t 
t y p i n g of the s c r i p t . 
L a s t l y , the w r i t i n g o f the t h e s i s would have been f a r l e s s 
e n j o y a b l e without the d i s t r a c t i o n of my f a m i l y . I am p a r t i c u l a r l y 
g r a t e f u l to my husband Gordon who both c o r r e c t e d the t y p e s c r i p t 
and took a l i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n s e v e r a l of the t o p i c s t h e r e i n . The 
many f r u i t f u l d i s c u s s i o n s we have had have g r e a t l y aided the 
completion of the t h e s i s . To him and to my c h i l d r e n , Murray and 
L i n d s a y , go my thanks f o r a l l t h e i r p a t i e n c e . 
V I 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
A P R O B L E M I N G E O G R A P H Y 
I t i s the purpose o f t h i s t h e s i s to explore the whole que s t i o n 
of e x p l a n a t i o n i n the f i e l d of urban geography i n order to c l a r i f y 
both the nature of the questions the urban geographer might wish to 
ask and the ways i n which such questions might l e g i t i m a t e l y be 
answered. The c o n s i d e r a b l e volume of l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t e d to the 
study of urban p l a c e s r e v e a l s a g r e a t d i v e r s i t y of approach to the 
problems posed and t h i s must s u r e l y p r e s e n t the novice r e s e a r c h e r 
w i t h a d i f f i c u l t , i f not i m p o s s i b l e ,choice. I t i s my i n t e n t i o n to 
examine c r i t i c a l l y t hese approaches themselves and i n so doing to 
a s s e s s t h e i r l o g i c a l s t a t u s i n r e l a t i o n to the questions they 
purport to answer; i . e . to examine the coherence of each approach 
i n terms of the answer provided to a c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n or s e t of 
q u e s t i o n s . Thus an enormous v a r i e t y o f t o p i c s w i l l be touched upon 
i n the course of the d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s . The t h e s i s , however, 
i s intended as a whole with the one main argument being developed and 
pursued throughout. The s u c c e s s o f such a methodological e n t e r p r i s e 
must l i e not i n an i n c r e a s e d knowledge of f a c t s about the world, but 
r a t h e r i n an i n c r e a s e i n understanding; a g r e a t e r a p p r e c i a t i o n of what 
urban geography i s and how i t might l e g i t i m a t e l y be s t u d i e d . 
P a r t s 1 and 2 of what f o l l o w s w i l l be e n t i r e l y methodological, 
and P a r t 3 w i l l s e r v e as an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the ma3or c o n c l u s i o n s of 
the methodological d i s c u s s i o n as w e l l as p r o v i d i n g a s p e c i f i c urban 
context i n which the argument can be f u r t h e r developed. As R i c h a r d 
Hartshorne t a k e s c a r e to p o i n t out i n h i s P e r s p e c t i v e on the Nature 
of Geography , 
the purpose of methodological w r i t i n g i s 
n e i t h e r the a s s e r t i o n of independent opinion 
nor contentious argumentation, but r a t h e r 
the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of problems of mutual 
concern. T h i s purpose n e c e s s a r i l y 
i n v o l v e s l o g i c a l d i s p u t a t i o n 1 
So we a r e i n v o l v e d here w i t h l o g i c , w i t h the coherence or 
l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y of v a r i o u s c l a i m s about human geography and 
about the methods employed i n i t s study. The arguments presented 
are matters of l o g i c and i f they are sound the c o n c l u s i o n s f o l l o w 
from the premises. I f the c o n c l u s i o n s themselves are to be 
c h a l l e n g e d , then the onus i s upon the r e a d e r to demonstrate the 
f a l s e n e s s of a premise or the f l a w i n the argument. I t i s not 
my concern here to o f f e r an opinion or even a v a r i e t y of opinions 
on the t o p i c s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , but r a t h e r to p r e s e n t arguments 
which n e c e s s a r i l y l e a d to c e r t a i n c o n c l u s i o n s . As Hartshorne 
comments " t h i s i s a d i f f e r e n t l e v e l o f r a t i o n a l thought than mere 
d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n " 2 . I t would not be enough to o b j e c t to the 
c o n c l u s i o n s of t h i s t h e s i s simply by v o i c i n g an o p i n i o n t o , or 
b e l i e f i n , the c o n t r a r y . Matters of l o g i c a r e open to r a t i o n a l 
d i s p u t e i n a way t h a t matters of opinion are not and thus the former 
and not the l a t t e r a r e proper to an academic d i s c u s s i o n . 
So f a r we may agree with Hartshorne as to the fundamental 
nature of methodological argumentation, but, although the problems 
in v o l v e d are s i m i l a r , i t i s not the i n t e n t i o n of the p r e s e n t w r i t e r 
to f o l l o w the approach evident i n e i t h e r the o r i g i n a l The Nature of 
Geography or the l a t e r P e r s p e c t i v e on the Nature of Geography. 
Indeed I would take i s s u e w i t h Hartshorne when he supposes t h a t 
1 R. Hartshorne (1960) p.7 
2 I b i d p.8 
"Geography i s what geographers have made i t " 3 and t h a t thus h i s 
task i s p r i m a r i l y one of e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h . The problem of 
determining the nature, scope and purpose o f geography would,on 
t h i s reckoning,be reduced to the d e t a i l i n g and perhaps c l a s s i f i c a t i o n 
of a l l a v a i l a b l e w r i t t e n works by those c a l l i n g themselves geographers. 
These need not have much or anything i n common save the l a b e l a t t a c h e d 
to t h e i r a u t h o r s . On t h i s account too, the nature o f Geography 
could change o v e r n i g h t a t the whim of the geographic community. 
Hartshorne h i m s e l f might di s p u t e t h i s account o f h i s conception of 
the problem t a c k l e d i n h i s famous works by p o i n t i n g out t h a t h i s 
cl a i m i s 'Geography i s what geographers have made i t ' and t h a t i n 
order to q u a l i f y as a geographer a person would have to demonstrate 
an i n t e r e s t i n geographic t h i n g s such as the landscape. I f a 
geographer wrote an a r t i c l e on 'how to b u i l d your own canoe' we 
should not mistake t h i s f o r geography. Indeed we shouldn't, but 
t h i s i s merely to admit the a b s u r d i t y o f the o r i g i n a l c l a i m , whatever 
the emphasis, f o r of course we do have some conception of what 
Geography i s , or should be, which enables us to d i s t i n g u i s h 
g e ographical w r i t i n g from say, works i n p h y s i c s o r chemistry without 
knowing anything about the author. To admit t h a t t h i s conception i s 
vague i s merely to emphasise t h a t t h e r e i s a problem i n determining 
the nature and scope of geography, but i t cannot be s o l v e d by merely 
l o o k i n g a t what 'geographers' have w r i t t e n because both the determin-
a t i o n o f who i s to count as a geographer and which o f t h e i r w r i t t e n 
works i s to count as geo g r a p h i c a l r e q u i r e some preconception of the 
nature of the s u b j e c t . Thus the nature i t s e l f being presupposed 
cannot subsequently be determined. 
I b i d p.8 
So I take i t t h a t the s u b j e c t of t h i s t h e s i s , namely the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the nature and scope of urban geography, i s not 
p r i m a r i l y an e x e r c i s e i n e m p i r i c a l r e s e a r c h . The l i t e r a t u r e o f 
urban geography m u l t i p l i e s each y e a r and although i t might be 
i n t e r e s t i n g to c h a r t the many d i f f e r e n t a r e a s such r e s e a r c h has 
covered t h i s would not i n i t s e l f be p e r t i n e n t here, f o r the questions 
of t h i s t h e s i s a r e of a fundamental nature concerning the l o g i c a l l y 
n e c e s s a r y f e a t u r e s o f the study o f human geography; i . e . those 
f e a t u r e s which s e t i t a p a r t from other academic e n q u i r i e s . 
Nor can we d i s m i s s such methodological q u e s t i o n s a s unimportant 
or contemplate them merely as an a f t e r t h o u g h t , f o r i f g e o g r a p h i c a l 
r e s e a r c h i s to be s u c c e s s f u l i n i t s aim or t h e o r e t i c a l i n i t s 
approach, then we must f i r s t understand, and understand c l e a r l y , 
which methods a re a p p r o p r i a t e to t h i s aim and how we can v a l i d l y 
a chieve a t h e o r e t i c a l approach to our s u b j e c t matter. As 
Lukermann remarks, 
geographers cannot avoid t h e i r 
methodology or l a c k of i t . One 
cannot do s u b s t a n t i v e r e s e a r c h without 
knowing how one e x p l a i n s , and how one 
e x p l a i n s i s methodology. ^ 
So t h i s t h e s i s w i l l c oncentrate on e x p l a n a t i o n i n human geography, 
on the fundamentals o f how one e x p l a i n s . 
I t would not be i r r e l e v a n t a t t h i s j u n c t u r e , I t h i n k , to 
mention c e r t a i n background d e t a i l s concerning the manner i n which 
s e v e r a l problems encountered a t an e a r l y stage of i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
prompted the methodological d i s c u s s i o n which f o l l o w s . T h i s w i l l 
F. Lukermann (1961) p.5 
put the r e a d e r i n the p i c t u r e so t h a t the d i f f i c u l t i e s I 
encountered i n i t i a l l y can b e t t e r be a p p r e c i a t e d as such. We begin 
w i t h Edinburgh, a l a r g e and i n t e r e s t i n g c i t y v a r i e d i n both i t s form 
and the s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of i t s i n h a b i t a n t s . T h i s i s to be 
the focus of our study and the i n t e n t i o n i s to look i n some d e t a i l 
a t the urban s t r u c t u r e of the S c o t t i s h c a p i t a l . I n p a r t i c u l a r 
two f e a t u r e s of the urban form seem of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t . 
F i r s t , the d i s t r i b u t i o n of house-types, a d i s t r i b u t i o n of immense 
v a r i e t y not l e a s t i n the c o n t r a s t between the elegant geometry of 
the c r e s c e n t s and squares of New Town houses and the towering 
i r r e g u l a r i t y of the Old Town tenements. And secondly, the 
r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of v a r i o u s s o c i a l groups; t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n 
being r e v e a l e d by the c i t i z e n s themselves i n t h e i r acknowledgement 
of c e r t a i n d i s t r i c t s as p r e s t i g e a r e a s and other d i s t r i c t s as q u i t e 
the r e v e r s e . Would i t not, one might suppose, be of i n t e r e s t and 
v a l u e to i n v e s t i g a t e these two d i s t r i b u t i o n s and, i f p o s s i b l e , 
d i s c o v e r the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them. T h i s was never conceived 
as a s m a l l t a s k , but the more thought t h a t was given to the manner 
i n which the d i s t r i b u t i o n s were to be " i n v e s t i g a t e d " and to the way 
i n which any r e l a t i o n s h i p between them was to be e s t a b l i s h e d and 
expressed, the g r e a t e r the problems t h a t seemed to a r i s e . I t 
became c l e a r t h a t questions of a more g e n e r a l nature would have to 
be r a i s e d p e r t a i n i n g not only to the study of Edinburgh, nor only to 
the study o f urban geography, but r a t h e r questions concerning the 
v e r y nature of the whole e n t e r p r i s e of human geography i t s e l f . I f 
we want to ask why a p a r t i c u l a r group l i v e s i n t h i s a r e a or a t t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l o c a t i o n w i t h i n the c i t y , how would we s e t about answering 
such a question? Again i f we want to c o n s t r u c t a model of the urban 
form of the S c o t t i s h c a p i t a l on what c r i t e r i a a r e we to d i v i d e up the 
urban mosaic? Could we r e l a t e types o f housing t o the s o c i a l 
groupings o f t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s ? I f so, i n what way? The 
questions we might want t o ask about any urban centre are many and 
v a r i e d , as are the answers we might provide. I t i s not the content 
of the answer which i s o f methodological i n t e r e s t , however, but only 
the form. I f we wish t o e x p l a i n we must understand what i s t o 
count as an explanation. Without f i r s t a r r i v i n g a t some c l e a r 
conception o f the nature and scope o f explanation i n human geography 
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the urban s t r u c t u r e o f Edinburgh cannot proceed. 
So the main concern o f t h i s t h e s i s i s t o c l a r i f y the way i n 
which explanation can l e g i t i m a t e l y be achieved i n human geography, 
t o attempt t o l a y bare the form such explanation must take. The 
urban s t r u c t u r e o f the S c o t t i s h c a p i t a l then provides both context 
and content f o r our methodological discussions. We s t a r t and end 
w i t h Edinburgh, but the t h e s i s being advanced i s more fundamental 
t o the subject o f Geography than the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f even t h a t 
great c i t y alone. 
CHAPTER I 
BEHAVIOUR AND LOCATION 
I n t h i s f i r s t chapter I wish t o examine what I s h a l l c a l l the 
' c e n t r a l problem' of l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , i n order t o see i n what 
manner the major t h e o r e t i c a l statements i n urban geography deal 
w i t h t h i s problem, and indeed whether they recognise i t as a 
problem a t a l l . This s e c t i o n o f the l i t e r a t u r e o f urban geography 
was found t o be unable t o provide a s u i t a b l e framework f o r the study 
of the urban s t r u c t u r e o f the c i t y o f Edinburgh and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , 
t o be devoid o f any s u b s t a n t i a l and a p p l i c a b l e g u i d e l i n e s as t o the 
proper method o f e x p l a i n i n g the a r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f house types 
and s o c i a l groups. I t i s our task here t o discover the source of 
t h i s i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y , and indeed t o c l a r i f y the extent t o which 
such approaches themselves could ever be expected t o throw l i g h t 
upon the urban s t r u c t u r e o f any p a r t i c u l a r town or c i t y . This b r i e f 
c r i t i c a l review w i l l take as i t s y a r d s t i c k questions concerning the 
two a r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s , and the emphasis throughout w i l l be on 
explanation. 
The c e n t r a l problem o f l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s : 
I t i s always wise t o s t a r t w i t h the simple and progress t o the 
more complex. Let us t h i n k , then, o f an everyday s i t u a t i o n i n which 
the l o c a t i o n o f something i s explained. We might ask,'why i s t h i s 
b i c y c l e i n the kitchen'". This i s c e r t a i n l y a question about the 
b i c y c l e , but not a question which could be answered by o f f e r i n g a 
more precise d e s c r i p t i o n o f the b i c y c l e ' s l o c a t i o n . The k i n d o f 
r e p l y which would s a t i s f y the questioner would be, f o r example, 
'Johnny l e f t i t there because i t was r a i n i n g o u t s i d e ' . But what 
k i n d of explanation i s t h i s 9 At f i r s t s i g h t the connection may 
be supposed t o be between the meteorological f a c t s and the 
l o c a t i o n , but t h i s i s t o miss out the e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r , namely 
Johnny. I t was he who put the b i c y c l e i n the p o s i t i o n which 
prompted the question i n the f i r s t p lace, and the explanation 
provided was then i n terms o f h i s reasons f o r so a c t i n g . I s 
t h i s not the case w i t h the l o c a t i o n o f any human a r t i f a c t ? I t s 
l o c a t i o n may be a c c i d e n t a l i n the sense t h a t i t i s not the outcome 
of an i n t e n t i o n a l a c t , but i n every case some human agency w i l l be 
invo l v e d . And where the act o f l o c a t i n g i s i n t e n t i o n a l , no matter 
how much we may suppose t h a t n a t u r a l f a c t o r s ( o r economic f a c t o r s 
or whatever) may have i n f l u e n c e d the choice, t h i s i s only t o say 
t h a t such f a c t o r s c o n s t i t u t e d very good reasons f o r the agent 
a c t i n g i n t h a t manner. Most urban a r t i f a c t s are o f e x a c t l y t h i s 
n a t u r e , t h e i r l o c a t i o n being the d e l i b e r a t e d e c i s i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r 
person or body o f persons, and so i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g i f we are 
forced t o conclude t h a t any adequate explanation o f the l o c a t i o n o f 
any such a r t i f a c t would r e q u i r e reference t o human agency and reasons 
f o r a c t i n g . I t i s the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
human behaviour and the s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f human a r t i f a c t s which 
I take t o be the c e n t r a l problem of l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . I t must be 
noted, however, t h a t i t i s only a problem which a r i s e s i f one i s 
concerned t o e x p l a i n l o c a t i o n s or analyse the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
a r t i f a c t s . I t i s not a problem f o r those who seek only d e s c r i p t i o n s , 
however d e t a i l e d . I can describe the l o c a t i o n of the b i c y c l e 
a c c u r a t e l y w i t h o u t ever mentioning the f a c t t h a t Johnny had l e f t i t 
t h e r e . Indeed t o mention Johnny a t a l l would not be t o add t o the 
l o c a t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i o n . 
Curiously, t h i s c e n t r a l problem has not been recognised as such 
i n much o f the l i t e r a t u r e i n t h i s sphere, and i t i s , I t h i n k , 
p r e c i s e l y because o f t h i s omission t h a t the major t h e o r e t i c a l 
statements about urban s t r u c t u r e have f a i l e d as explanations• I t 
i s , t h e r e f o r e , both i n t e r e s t i n g and i n s t r u c t i v e t o examine c l o s e l y 
the ways i n which human behaviour has been ignored or 'dealt w i t h ' 
i n such statements and the types o f answer they have attempted t o 
provide. F i r s t , however, i t i s necessary t o c l a r i f y the nature 
o f the questions being asked by l o c a t i o n a l t h e o r i s t s i n order t o 
judge whether the p r o f e r r e d answers are indeed adequate and 
acceptable. 
The i n t e r e s t s o f the geographer i n t h i s sphere are, i t seems, 
f i r m l y rooted i n the s p a t i a l aspects o f the urban scene or o f 
settlement groups. That i s t o say, t h a t he i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p a t t e r n s created, a t l e a s t a t the t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l , 
r a t h e r than i n the l o c a t i o n o f any one phenomenon alone. I t would, 
of course, be o f geographical relevance t o study the growth and 
development o f one p a r t i c u l a r c i t y , and i t s s i t e and s i t u a t x o n could 
be adequately d e t a i l e d and explained w i t h only secondary reference 
t o surrounding settlements; l i k e w i s e the s i t e and s i t u a t i o n o f a 
si n g l e b u i l d i n g , e s p e c i a l l y i f i t i s a b u i l d i n g o f some importance 
as, f o r example, Edinburgh Castle. The t h e o r e t i c a l work i n urban 
geography, however, c o n s t i t u t e s an attempt t o move away from t h i s 
preoccuption w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r m order t o Drovide some general 
statements concerning e i t h e r the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f settlements or the 
i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c i t y . C h r i s t a l l e r ' s work on Central Place 
Theory i s one o f the most i n t e r e s t i n g and complete examples o f the 
former, but f o r present purposes we must concentrate on the l a t t e r 
as i t i s the i n t e r n a l urban s t r u c t u r e o f Edinburgh which we wish t o 
ex p l a i n and i t i s the t h e o r e t i c a l statements concerning the i n t e r n a l 
s t r u c t u r e o f a c i t y which were o r i g i n a l l y found t o be u n h e l p f u l 
i n t h i s context. I t i s t h i s p u r s u i t o f the general i n the s o c i a l 
sciences a t l a r g e which w i l l form a c e n t r a l theme o f t h i s t h e s i s . 
The urban geographer, then, w i l l ask such questions as 'why 
has t h i s p a t t e r n o f urban l a y o u t or t h i s p a t t e r n o f settlement 
emerged?'. I t ought t o be pointed out immediately t h a t even a t 
the l e v e l o f the p a r t i c u l a r t h i s i s by no means a simple question 
as the problem of s p e c i f y i n g what the urban s t r u c t u r e a c t u a l l y i s -
i . e . i d e n t i f y i n g the elements o f i t - has f i r s t t o be solved. 
Nevertheless, assuming f o r the present t h a t we are able t o make 
sense o f t h i s question by overcoming t h i s problem, then the 
question can be seen t o have the same form as the simple question 
'why i s t h i s b i c y c l e i n the k i t c h e n 9 ' and hence demand the same s o r t 
o f answer; t h a t i s an answer which includes reference t o people's 
motives and reasons f o r a c t i n g . To examine p a t t e r n may complicate 
ttie issue, e s p e c i a l l y i f , as m most urban s i t u a t i o n s , the o v e r a l l 
p a t t e r n as such i s not d e l i b e r a t e l y created, but the question or 
ser i e s o f questions o f i n t e r e s t t o the urban geographer w i l l a l l be 
o f the same type as the simple l o c a t i o n a l question discussed e a r l i e r . 
Also i t must be noted t h a t t o give an answer i n terms o f someone's 
reasons f o r a c t i n g does not n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e knowing who the agent 
was. For example, we may wonder what a b i c y c l e i s doing i n the 
k i t c h e n and the r e t o r t 'someone put i t there because i t was r a i n i n g ' 
would answer our o r i g i n a l question. I t may not be an e n t i r e l y 
s a t i s f a c t o r y answer and i t may prompt questions as t o who the 
someone was, but nevertheless an answer has been provided t o the 
question concerning l o c a t i o n and an answer which made no reference 
t o a p a r t i c u l a r person. Thus knowledge of who the agent was may 
help us t o provide a more s a t i s f a c t o r y answer ( i . e . one which does 
not encourage f u r t h e r questions) but lack o f such knowledge (a 
s i t u a t i o n which might be expected t o occur a l l too f r e q u e n t l y i n 
urban geography) does not i n v o l v e the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r o v i d i n g 
an answer i n terms o f the reasons and motives o f human agents. 
Bearing t h i s i n mind we can now t u r n t o the e x i s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l 
l i t e r a t u r e r e l a t i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y t o the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e of the 
c i t y under two main headings, the e c o l o g i c a l school and the land 
economists, i n order t o examine the ways i n which the c e n t r a l 
problem o f l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i s r e s o l v e d , i f a t a l l , and the 
s o r t s o f explanation these general statements attempt. 
The E c o l o g i c a l School: 
The work o f the e c o l o g i c a l school w i l l be f a m i l i a r t o most 
geographers, although i n f a c t the founder members regarded themselve 
as s o c i o l o g i s t s and thexr work reveals a wider v a r i e t y o f i n t e r e s t s 
than would concern the l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s t , or even the urban 
geographer. Their diagram o f the concentric r i n g model of urban 
growth now appears i n most i n t r o d u c t o r y urban textbooks. I t s 
p r o p e r t i e s i f not i t s o r i g i n s are thus w e l l known. O r i g i n a l l y 
formulated over f i f t y years ago i t appears i n a c o l l e c t i o n o f essays 
by Park, Burgess and McKenzie. "The c h a r t " , Burgess claims, 
"represents an i d e a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the tendencies o f any town or 
c i t y t o expand r a d i a l l y from i t s c e n t r a l business d i s t r i c t " 1 . This 
chart i s then a p p l i e d t o Chicago i n order t o give a general p i c t u r e 
o f the urban areas o f t h a t c i t y , (see F i g . l ) . The authors, however 
claim a more widespread a p p l i c a b i l i t y f o r t h e i r model. I n the 
i n i t i a l study o f the present day s t r u c t u r e o f the c i t y o f Edinburgh, 
and a f t e r a ttempting t o s o r t out the various zones as they appear i n 
R.E.Park, E.W.Burgess and R.D.McKenzie (1925) p.50 
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general r a t h e r than a p a r t i c u l a r l y d e t a i l e d f a s h i o n , i t was found 
t o be impossible t o derive any p a t t e r n which even approximated t o 
concentric r i n g s . I t was the apparent i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f the 
model i n t h i s context which l e d t o the present i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f 
the method i t s e l f . So l e t us now take a closer look a t the 
p a r t i c u l a r methodology which u n d e r l i e s the work o f any urban 
e c o l o g i s t . 
Much i s revealed by the way i n which Park, Burgess and 
McKenzie present t h e i r t h e o r i e s , and t o i l l u s t r a t e t h i s p o i n t , I 
wish t o consider several e x t r a c t s from t h e i r work. F i r s t a passage 
r e l a t e d t o F i g . l a : 
This c h a r t b r i n g s out c l e a r l y the main 
f a c t of expansion, namely the tendency 
o f each inner zone t o extend i t s area by 
the invasion o f the next outer zone. 
This aspect o f expansion may be c a l l e d 
succession, a process which has been 
stu d i e d i n d e t a i l i n plant ecology. 2 
Here Burgess uses the language o f p l a n t ecology i n h i s c l a x ' i f i c a t i o n 
o f what the chart i s intended t o show and the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the 
chart i t s e l f i s based on the concepts provided by such language. 
Making reference t o the urban areas o f Chicago as i l l u s t r a t e d by h i s 
model ( F i g . l b ) Burgess explains t h a t " I n the expansion of the c i t y a 
process o f d i s t r i b u t i o n takes place which s i f t s and s o r t s and r e l o c a t e s 
i n d i v i d u a l s and groups by residence and occupation." 3 Again the 
in f l u e n c e o f p l a n t ecology i s e v i d e n t ; a f a c t indeed which i s 
e x p l i c i t y recognised and commended by a l l three w r i t e i 3 . Now i t seems 
t h a t what Park and h i s colleagues are t r y i n g t o do when they ask us t o 
t h i n k o f the c i t y as a l i v i n g organism i s t o provide,by using t h i s 
analogy, some i n s i g h t i n t o the workings o f the c i t y , and then by 
extending the i n i t i a l l y appealing p a r a l l e l , t o employ the concepts 
2 I b i d p.50 
3 I b i d p.54 
and language o f n a t u r a l ecology i n an explanation of human behaviour 
i n an urban environment. Thus human groups, l i k e species o f t r e e 
or p l a n t are seen as f o l l o w i n g the laws of Darwinian b i o l o g y , and 
hence t h e i r behaviour can e a s i l y be c h a r a c t e r i s e d by such notions as 
' s u r v i v a l of the f i t t e s t ' , ' invasion', 'succession' e t c . "These 
s p a t i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s of human beings," remarks McKenzie, "are the 
products of competition and s e l e c t i o n , and are continuously i n process 
of change as new f a c t o r s enter t o d i s t u r b the competetive r e l a t i o n s or 
t o f a c i l i t a t e m o b i l i t y " . 4 
I t f o l l o w s from t h i s p a r t i c u l a r explanation o f human behaviour, 
or so the e c o l o g i s t s c l a i m , t h a t a concentric p a t t e r n o f urban 
expansion w i l l emerge, and t h e i r diagram of Chicago was drawn t o 
i l l u s t r a t e i f not t o prove the p o i n t . But how i s human behaviour 
l i n k e d t o the s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n o f phenomena ( o r indeed s o c i a l groups) 
i n the e c o l o g i c a l approach'' At the heart o f the approach l i e s a view 
o f the c i t y as a s o c i a l organism, a view o r i g i n a l l y pat forward by Park 
as e a r l y as 1916. By such reasoning, as Reissman comments, "the study 
o f s o c i e t y would become a f i n a l e x t r a p o l a t i o n o f what was at r o o t a 
b i o l o g i c a l datum". 5 Thus, although the e c o l o g i s t does not deny t h a t 
people are m f a c t motivated, can m f a c t produce reasons f o r a c t i n g 
i n the way they d i d , t h i s i s e i t h e r i r r e l e v a n t or secondary t o the 
more general u n d e r l y i n g causes of a c t i o n . S o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n can 
then be d i v i d e d i n t o the b i o t i c and the c u l t u r a l and although these 
are i n t e r - r e l a t e d , they are a n a l y t i c a l l y separable and the former i s 
both more important and more amenable t o a n a l y s i s . I n f a c t the e a r l y 
e c o l o g i s t s d i d l i t t l e more than mention the existence of a ' c u l t u r a l 
l e v e l ' , f o r t h e i r studies were f i r m l y based on the b i o t i c l e v e l where, 
I b i d p.614 
L. Reissman (1964) p.96 
i t i s claimed, as m the n a t u r a l environment, competition i s the 
g u i d i n g f o r c e . Even when w r i t e r s e x p l i c i t l y recognise the 
i n f l u e n c e of f a c t o r s such as the s o c i a l value invested i n a piece 
o f l a n d , they c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y f a i l t o include such influences i n 
t h e i r e c o l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s . 6 
So can t h i s e c o l o g i c a l account o f the processes a t work i n 
an urban area help m the s o l u t i o n of the c e n t r a l problem of l o c a t i o n a l 
a n a l y s i s 9 Can the e c o l o g i s t s help i n the explanation of human a c t i o n s 9 
C l e a r l y the t h e o r e t i c a l framework of urban ecology i s i n c o n f l i c t w i t h 
our e a r l i e r account.of the way i n which simple l o c a t i o n questions can 
be answered. Such a framework does not provide a reason-giving 
explanation but r a t h e r appeals t o what are construed as more basic or 
u n d e r l y i n g f o r c e s . I t i s t h i s c o n f l i c t w i t h what could be c a l l e d 
the common-sense view o f l o c a t i o n which encourages doubt as t o the 
v a l i d i t y of the e c o l o g i c a l claim and i n v i t e s f u r t h e r examination of 
the e c o l o g i c a l methodology. Not s u r p r i s i n g l y , the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n 
o f human behaviour embodied i n t h i s methodology has brought 
considerable c r i t i c i s m from other w r i t e r s . The e c o l o g i s t s have 
been condemned as b i o l o g i c a l d e t e r m i n i s t s , and indeed any attempt 
t o p o r t r a y human behaviour as subject t o the o p e r a t i o n o f basic laws 
o f whatever k i n d can h a r d l y avoid the d e t e r m i n i s t t r a p . As Rugg 
comments, "....although the schemes o f Burgess and Hoyt have c o n t r i b u t e d 
t o urban s t u d i e s , both are r e l a t i v e l y u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , and acceptable 
only t o those who also support the d e t e r m i n i s t i c s o r t i n g - o u t o f 
s o c i e t y which i s i m p l i e d i n each." 7 
6 
see, f o r example, R.A.Murdie (1969) 
7 
D.S.Rugg (1972) p.214 
And as Gans remarks, "Ec o l o g i c a l explanations of s o c i a l l i f e are most 
a p p l i c a b l e i f the subjects under study lack the a b i l i t y t o make 
choices." 8 I t i s , I w i l l argue l a t e r , p r e c i s e l y because of the 
nature of human behaviour t h a t no such laws can apply. At present, 
however, i t i s o f i n t e r e s t t o note t h a t n e i t h e r Park, Burgess nor 
McKenzie make any attempt t o j u s t i f y the analogy, the concepts and 
language o f which they u t i l i s e so f u l l y . Indeed a t the beginning 
of h i s well-known essay Park s t a t e s , as i f i t were a matter o f f a c t 
r a t h e r than an hypothesis t o be j u s t i f i e d , t h a t "there are forces a t 
work w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f the urban community which tend t o b r i n g 
about an o r d e r l y and t y p i c a l grouping o f i t s po p u l a t i o n and i n s t i t u t i o n s . " 9 
I n other words the claim o f the human e c o l o g i s t s i s much the same as 
t h a t o f the n a t u r a l e c o l o g i s t s ; i . e . by l o o k i n g a t the spread or 
decline o f a p a r t i c u l a r community i n t h i s way we can make more sense 
of i t . But the l a t t e r can produce numerous reasons or 'evidence' t o 
j u s t i f y the a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f T h e i r e c o l o g i c a l perspective while the 
former, r a t h e r than e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s relevance t o t h e i r problem, appear 
t o adopt the perspective i n the hope t h a t i t w i l l a f f o r d some i n s i g h t s i n t o 
the e v o l u t i o n o f c i t y s t r u c t u r e . Human behaviour, then, i s seen by the 
e c o l o g i s t s as sets o f responses t o c e r t a i n basic s t i m u l i , and as such i s 
thought t o be p r e d i c t a b l e i n the same way as the spread of any other 
e c o l o g i c a l community. The many and, i t i s claimed, insuperable 
problems o f t h i s viewpoint w i l l be discussed a t len g t h i n the chapters 
which f o l l o w . 
The Land Economists: 
The second type o f approach i n t h i s sphere has come mainly 
8 H. J. Gans i n A.M.Rose (1962) p.639 
9 
R.E.Park e t a l , o p . c i t . p . l 
from those w i t h an i n t e r e s t m economics and bears some s i m i l a r i t y 
t o other branches of economic theory. There are several w r i t e r s , 
however, who attempt t o combine an e c o l o g i c a l approach w i t h the 
analysis o f economic v a r i a b l e s , but they may f o r our present 
purposes be mentioned only b r i e f l y since t h e i r methodology i s open 
to the same c r i t i c i s m s as t h a t o f the e c o l o g i c a l school i t s e l f . 
Here I am t h i n k i n g p r i m a r i l y o f Homer Hoyt, although H a r r i s S Ullman 
and Davie have also attempted t o analyse the land-use p a t t e r n o f the 
c i t y i n t h i s way. These t h e o r i s t s a l l emphasise the search f o r 
p a t t e r n , although Davie recognises e x p l i c i t l y and H a r r i s & Ullman 
i m p l i c i t l y t h a t there i s no u n i v e r s a l c i t y land use p a t t e r n , not 
even o f an i d e a l type. As Fi r e y has pointed out i n a discussion 
of Hoyt's model, "nowhere i n the theory i s there a d e f i n i t e statement 
of the modus operandi by which people and groups are p r o p e l l e d t o 
t h e i r appointed niches i n space" 1 0; or t o put t h i s another way, Hoyt 
simply ignores the c e n t r a l problem of the r e l a t i o n s h i p between human 
behaviour and the s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n o f phenomena. Although such 
w r i t e r s do i n f a c t u t i l i s e economic v a r i a b l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y income 
s t a t i s t i c s , t h e i r t h e o r i e s are not p r i m a r i l y economic t h e o r i e s . 
This p o i n t i s brought out by Alonso who l a b e l s the Burgess-Hoyt 
explanations as h i s t o r i c a l theory t o d i s t i n g u i s h them from h i s own 
s t r u c t u r a l theory which does not e x p l a i n m terms o f the passage o f 
time and i s thus methodologically a l i g n e d t o standard economic theory 
I n a sense the main t h e s i s o f the e c o l o g i c a l explanation i s a 
p r o p o s i t i o n about human behaviour and,although I w i l l argue t h a t the 
ec o l o g i s t s have come up w i t h the wrong answer, i t must nevertheless b 
admitted t h a t they do recognise a t l e a s t p a r t of the problem.Such 
cannot be s a i d o f the f i r s t group o f economists I wish t o consider. 
W. F i r e y (1947) p. 7 
These p r o f f e r what may be c a l l e d C h r i s t a l l e r - t y p e t h e o r i e s , and 
t h e i r e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e i s t h a t they concentrate on the examination 
of the p a t t e r n produced i n the landscape t o the e x c l u s i o n o f any 
d e t a i l e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the processes involved i n i t s c r e a t i o n . 
Thus the language t h a t they use tends t o be t h a t o f geometry which 
m i s o l a t i o n c e r t a i n l y does not lead t o explanation but a t best 
t o more precise d e s c r i p t i o n . Other w r i t e r s , l i k e C h r i s t a l l e r 
h i m s e l f , have combined geometrical concepts w i t h economic po s t u l a t e s 
concerning t h r e s h o l d s i z e , number and k i n d o f economic a c t i v i t i e s 
e t c . , and e i t h e r f a i l t o mention human behaviour a t a l l or else subsume 
i t under some 'law' such as Z i p f ' s ' p r i n c i p l e of l e a s t e f f o r t ' . We 
are a l l f a m i l i a r w i t h the hexagonal model o f Central Place Theory. 
Again, the f o l l o w i n g discussion w i l l consider m some d e t a i l the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between behaviour and l o c a t i o n and I s h a l l argue t h a t 
t h i s i s a r e l a t i o n s h i p which cannot v a l i d l y be ignored i n l o c a t i o n a l 
a n a l y s i s . Further, I s h a l l contend t h a t because of the very nature 
of human behaviour i t s e l f i t i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o t a l k o f laws governing 
such behaviour i n the way t h a t these w r i t e r s wish t o do. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note, however, t h a t both the e c o l o g i s t s 
and t h i s group of economists have e i t h e r e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y 
assumed t h a t the aspects o f human behaviour of i n t e r e s t t o l o c a t i o n a l 
a n a l y s i s are governed by laws of some k i n d . These are seen as 
having the same s c i e n t i f i c s t a t u s as, f o r example, the laws o f motion 
i n physics. C h r i s t a l l e r does momentarily doubt t h i s s t a t u s when he 
remarks t h a t these 'special economic geographical laws' would perhaps 
be more conveniently designated as tendencies, "because they are not 
so inexorable as n a t u r a l l a w s " . 1 1 But h i s c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f them 
W. C h r i s t a l l e r (1966) Central Places i n S. Germany, p.3. 
as 'determining' the s i z e , d i s t r i b u t i o n and number o f towns, and 
h i s subsequent ' s c i e n t i f i c ' treatment o f them i n h i s study o f 
southern Germany overshadows the o r i g i n a l doubt. C h r i s t a l l e r ' s 
p a r t i c u l a r concern i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f settlements r a t h e r than 
t h e i r i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e and thus h i s c e n t r a l place theory could 
not be of d i r e c t relevance t o the proposed study o f Edinburgh. 
His methodology, however, i s of much more general i n t e r e s t both as 
one o f the e a r l i e s t t h e o r e t i c a l statements i n t h i s sphere and f o r 
the considerable i n f l u e n c e i t has had on other geographers concerned 
w i t h the problems o f l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . 
A more recent development i n the f i e l d of s p a t i a l economics 
has brought the a n a l y s i s o f urban s t r u c t u r e even c l o s e r t o t r a d i t i o n a l 
economic theory. An extension of p a r t o f the theory of the f i r m t o 
r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n decisions has r e s u l t e d i n a complicated body o f 
l i t e r a t u r e discussing i d e a l i s e d ( o r economically r a t i o n a l ) p a t t e r n s 
of l o c a t i o n i n the context of an i n f i n i t e homogeneous p l a i n . I t i s 
not always c l e a r whether, as I s a r d would c l a i m , the t h e o r e t i c a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n provides an i d e a l a t which we should aim, or whether 
the theory i t s e l f i s o f f e r e d as "an e x p l a n a t i o n . I f i t i s 
p r e s c r i p t i v e then c l e a r l y i t cannot i n t e r e s t us i n the present 
discussion. I f t h i s i s what we should be doing then i t cannot be 
used t o e x p l a i n what we have done i n the past although i t might 
serve t o assess i t . I f , on the other hand, i t i s an attempt at 
explanation then i t can be seen t h a t these s p a t i a l economists,in 
t h e i r zest f o r q u a n t i f i c a t i o n , h a v e avoided any discussion o f the 
problem o f r e p r e s e n t i n g human behaviour by i n s t i t u t i n g the elaborate 
design technique o f the u t i l i t y curve, p l a y i n g o f f , f o r example, l o t 
size against t r a n s p o r t costs. Thus the behaviour o f economic man 
becomes p r e d i c t a b l e w i t h the ' r a t i o n a l ' d e c i s i o n being t h a t which 
minimises costs or maximises u t i l i t y . Such models o f the land market 
f o l l o w c l o s e l y the o r i g i n a l f o r m u l a t i o n by Von Thunen o f the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f land uses i n a g r i c u l t u r a l r e g i o n s , 1 2 although both 
Alonso and Muth, 1^ f o r example, recognise the more complex nature o f 
the operation of the urban land market. Nevertheless the c e n t r a l 
notions employed are those of the maximisation of r e n t s , the optim a l 
l o c a t i o n o f a c t i v i t i e s and the maintenance o f e q u i l i b r i u m . This 
approach has been c r i t i c i s e d by several w r i t e r s . Greer-Wootten, 1 4 
f o r example, maintains t h a t the f a c t o r of t r a n s p o r t cost at the centre 
o f Von Thunen's theory has l i t t l e relevance i n modern economics. My 
own c r i t i c i s m i s , perhaps, more fundamental. These land economists 
recognise a t l e a s t i m p l i c i t l y t h a t land use pa t t e r n s r e s u l t from a 
mu l t i t u d e o f decisions made by i n d i v i d u a l s about l o c a t i o n , but does 
the r a t i o n a l economic behaviour which they assume r e a l l y apply t o 
r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n s 9 And does the u t i l i t y curve framework 
r e a l l y help these models t o overcome the defects of the s t r i c t l y 
economic assumptions 9 Even as a behavioural p o s t u l a t e i n the theory 
of the f i r m , t h i s l a t t e r c o n s t r u c t i s apparently unable t o overcome 
the problem of the less than p e r f e c t s t a t e o f knowledge m the r e a l 
w orld. I would suggest t h a t i t i s even less able t o deal w i t h other 
l o c a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s i t u a t i o n s . The dubious concept of a s p e c i f i a b l e 
u t i l i t y curve, w h i l s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y r e c o g n i s i n g the f a c t t h a t decisions 
w i l l not always be 'economically r a t i o n a l ' though a t the same time they 
need c e r t a i n l y not be i r r a t i o n a l , i n e v i t a b l y ends up as a cost minimising 
cons t r u c t and as such defeats i t s o r i g i n a l purpose. T h i s , i t appears, 
1 2 Von Thunen, J.H.(1826) 
1 3 see W. Alonso (1964a)and R.F.Muth (1962) 
l k see B. Greer-Wootten (1972) 
i s because o f the n o n - q u a n t i f i a b l e nature o f the non-economic 
decision elements the u t i l i t y curve was designed t o i n t r o d u c e . 
The s a c r i f i c e , t h e r e f o r e , must e i t h e r be one o f exactness (which i s 
r a r e l y the case) or o f the u t i l i t y concept i t s e l f (which i s r a r e l y 
admitted t o be the case). Alonso himself recognises the l i m i t e d 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of h i s model t o the operation o f any p a r t i c u l a r land 
market when he declares, " I t i s an economic model, i t speaks of 
economic men and i t goes with o u t saying t h a t r e a l men and s o c i a l 
groups have needs, emotions and desires which are not considered 
h e r e . " 1 5 The question whether t h i s type o f model can, nevertheless, 
be s a i d t o provide a t h e o r e t i c a l explanation must be l e f t t o l a t e r i n 
the discussion. 
Despite, then, the r e c o g n i t i o n of the importance of the 
l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n i t s e l f , t h i s group o f economists emerges as unable 
t o provide any explanation of the p a t t e r n s o f urban s t r u c t u r e or 
settlement as they appear i n the landscape. The t i g h t l o g i c o -
deductive nature o f t h e i r argument may ensure t h a t t h e i r conclusion 
f o l l o w s from t h e i r premises, but the g r o s s l y u n r e a l i s t i c nature o f 
these premises i n t u r n ensures t h a t t h e i r account bears no r e l a t i o n 
t o observable phenomena and t h a t i t s s t a t u s i s problematic. What 
they t r y i n f a c t t o do i s t o reduce a l l l o c a t i o n decisions t o a 
common denominator by s p e c i f y i n g the t r a d e - o f f nature of the u t i l i t y 
curve. Rather than i n t r o d u c i n g u n d e r l y i n g i n f l u e n c e s on behaviour, 
however, t h i s does, i m p o r t a n t l y , include - a l b e i t u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y -
the a c t u a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n . Thus the answer t o any l o c a t i o n 
question on t h i s account i s i n terms o f peoples' a c t i o n s or decisions 
which profoundly d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from any attempt a t l a w - l i k e 
5 W.Alonso (1960) p.150 
statements. The g u l f between the t h e o r e t i c a l and the e m p i r i c a l 
may appear unbridgeable w i t h i n the present frame of economic theory 
but nevertheless the s h i f t from laws of human nature t o a u t i l i t y 
curve d e c i s i o n framework i s , I t h i n k , a s i g n i f i c a n t one. 
Thus i t can be seen t h a t as research i n t h i s and r e l a t e d 
f i e l d s has progressed there has been a gradual move away from the 
bo l d and o f t e n unsupported t h e o r e t i c a l statements t o some attempt 
a t explanations which can be seen t o bear some r e l a t i o n t o 
observable phenomena and common human experience. Despite t h i s , 
however, the c e n t r a l problem o f l o c a t i o n a l a nalysis which we o u t l i n e d 
at the beginning o f t h i s chapter remains l a r g e l y undiscussed. What 
i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s p a t i a l p a t t e r n s and the act i o n s and 
decisions o f the i n d i v i d u a l s i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r creation? Neither 
the e c o l o g i s t s nor the land economists have provided an answer. 
The p o s s i b i l i t y o f other approaches ; 
This review o f a s e c t i o n o f the cu r r e n t t h e o r e t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e 
has revealed an o v e r r i d i n g concern w i t h the pat t e r n s created and i t i s 
suggested t h a t t h i s concern i t s e l f may be misplaced. The purpose of 
t h i s chapter has been simply t o i n d i c a t e some possible inadequacies 
o f these t h e o r i e s as w e l l as t o h i g h l i g h t the way i n which they 
attempt t o e x p l a i n . The various methodological problems i n v o l v e d w i l l 
be d e a l t w i t h i n depth i n the subsequent chapters and an attempt w i l l 
be made t o c l a r i f y the nature o f explanation appropriate i n the s o c i a l 
sciences. 
From the review, then, i t emerges t h a t some c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of 
human behaviour - whether i n l a w - l i k e statements or i n a d e c i s i o n 
framework - un d e r l i e s a l l t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s m l o c a t i o n a l 
a n a l y s i s . And ye t none o f the w r i t e r s whose work we have considered 
makes s p e c i f i c mention o f the human agent and h i s a c t u a l d e c i s i o n t o 
l o c a t e . 1 6 I t i s ha r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h e r e f o r e t h a t even amongst 
geographers themselves a l t e r n a t i v e approaches have been sugggested, 
the most important of which may be characterised as behavioural 
geography. Such an approach begins by recognising t h a t a c t u a l 
behaviour d i f f e r s , i n many cases r a d i c a l l y , from t h a t o f economic 
man and thus focuses d i r e c t l y on the c e n t r a l problem of l o c a t i o n a l 
a n a l y s i s . I t i s the behavioural approach which provides the s t a r t i n g 
p o i n t f o r the discussions o f Part 1. 
I take i t t h a t 'economic man' i s an i d e a l , and t h a t i n any 
theory or explanation based on the assumption o f p e r f e c t (economic) 
r a t i o n a l i t y the reference i s t o an i d e a l r a t h e r than an a c t u a l 
d e c i s i o n . 
P A R T I 
HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN GENERAL 
26. 
The three chapters o f Part 1 w i l l be concerned w i t h several 
methodological problems r a i s e d by the s o c i a l sciences. The aim i s t o 
provide a general examination o f the various approaches which have 
been t r i e d i n geography and t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e i r adequacy or otherwise 
as bases f o r the study o f human behaviour. C l e a r l y the behavioural 
approach i t s e l f i s o f great importance i n t h i s context. I t s promise 
o f sound theory has a t t r a c t e d many geographers and produced a l a r g e 
body o f diverse l i t e r a t u r e . Some aspects o f t h i s l i t e r a t u r e w i l l be 
examined i n d e t a i l . 
The p o i n t o f Part 1 , as o f the whole t h e s i s , i s t o c l a r i f y the 
nature o f urban geography, the way i n which such a subject may be 
coherently s t u d i e d , and the k i n d o f explanation appropriate t o i t . 
The discussion must, however, range over the l i t e r a t u r e o f many s o c i a l 
sciences and indeed o f the philosophy o f science, f o r i n an examination 
o f the methodology of any academic subject i t i s the mode o f t h i n k i n g 
i n v o l v e d i n i t s research which i s most important. Such a methodology 
i s n othing other than a d i s c i p l i n e o f thought and may be common t o more 
than one s u b j e c t , the subject i t s e l f being the a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h a t 
d i s c i p l i n e d mode o f t h i n k i n g t o one area o f study. This d i s t i n c t i o n 
between subject and d i s c i p l i n e must be kept c l e a r l y i n mind. 
Science, as a d i s c i p l i n e o f thought, i s f r e q u e n t l y advanced as 
the methodological b l u e p r i n t f o r geography. Because o f t h i s , i t i s 
v i t a l t o explore the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f science i n an attempt t o 
e s t a b l i s h whether or not human geography i s a s c i e n t i f i c enquiry. Any 
conclusion on t h i s question p l a i n l y has important consequences f o r 
f u t u r e research work i n human geography, but i t w i l l also provide an 
i n d i c a t i o n of how (and whether) geographical theory i s t o be formulated. 
I t may be t h a t human geography can never be t h e o r e t i c a l even i f i t 
j o i n s the model b u i l d i n g e n t e r p r i s e s o f systems research. 
The c r u c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p i n a l l t h i s i s t h a t between what i s 
s t u d i e d ( t h e subject matter) and how i t i s t o be understood and 
explained. We must ask, "Given the character of human behaviour, 
can s c i e n t i f i c method help us t o understand i t and i t s s p a t i a l 
repercussions?" The a s p i r a t i o n s o f many, perhaps most, urban 
geographers are t w o f o l d . F i r s t , they seek t o provide a t h e o r e t i c a l 
basis f o r t h e i r s u b j e c t . Secondly, they seek t o replace mere 
d e s c r i p t i o n w i t h explanation. ( I t has been s a i d t h a t , "Usually i t i s 
b e t t e r geography which leads t o the e x p l a n a t i o n s . " 1 ) I n both these 
a s p i r a t i o n s geographers look t o the n a t u r a l sciences. But i n f a c t , 
when he adopts s c i e n t i f i c method, the geographer produces t h e o r i e s 
which do not e x p l a i n . The next three chapters w i l l serve t o resolve 
t h i s conundrum. 
J. W. Watson (1955) p.3 
CHAPTER 2 
BEHAVIOUR AND PERCEPTION 
I f one looks a t the e a r l i e r l i t e r a t u r e i n behavioural geography-
i t i s evident t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r approach t o the subject arose out 
of a c e r t a i n d i s q u i e t w i t h the d e t e r m i n i s t i c t h e o r i e s and l a w - l i k e 
statements produced both by economists and by those who sought t o 
borrow models from the p h y s i c a l sciences and apply them i n human 
geography. The common element m the work o f the behavioural 
geographers l i e s i n the attempt t o t a c k l e problems a t a m i c r o - a n a l y t i c 
l e v e l . understanding i s t o be gained by examining the d e c i s i o n 
process o f the i n d i v i d u a l and t h i s , i t i s claimed, provides a r a d i c a l 
a l t e r n a t i v e t o approaches such as those of the e c o l o g i s t s and land 
economists. For example, Wolpert i n h i s paper on 'Behavioural Aspects 
of the Decision t o M i g r a t e ' 1 i s concerned t o p r e d i c t m i g r a t i o n v i a an 
understanding of the m i g r a t i o n process as i l l u s t r a t e d by the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
d ecision t o migrate. This approach has been understood as profoundly 
d i f f e r e n t from previous methods of p r o j e c t i n g past ( s t a t i s t i c a l ) trends 
i n t o the f u t u r e . Again, i n h i s study of Middle Sweden's farming 
p o p u l a t i o n 2 Wolpert was concerned t o demonstrate how a c t u a l behaviour 
d i f f e r s from t h a t o f economic man and t o promote the behavioural concept 
o f bounded r a t i o n a l i t y . Goals, he argues, are l i k e l y t o be m u l t i -
J. Wolpert (1965) 
J. Wolpert (1964) 
dimensional and the c r i t e r i o n of o p t i m i s a t i o n i r r e l e v a n t . 
I n a paper on 'Inference Problems i n L o c a t i o n a l A n a l y s i s ' 3 , 
Olsson gives a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n o f the d i s t i n c t i v e nature o f the 
behavioural approach. He suggests t h a t i t provides a d i f f e r e n t 
s o l u t i o n t o the geographical inference problem of form and process. 
The s p a t i a l analysts (and I take these t o include the t h e o r i s t s o f 
Chapter 1 ) , he p o i n t s o u t , attempt t o i n f e r i n d i v i d u a l behaviour from 
knowledge o f a given s p a t i a l p a t t e r n w h i l e the b e h a v i o u r a l i s t argues 
f o r reasoning the other way round. He concludes, "large-scale p a t t e r n s 
should be deduced from e x p l i c i t statements about i n d i v i d u a l behaviour 
r a t h e r than the other way round."^ This i s a d i f f e r e n t way of l o o k i n g 
a t landscape p a t t e r n s f o r i t emphasises the p a r t played by the 
i n d i v i d u a l . What a behavioural approach t o l o c a t i o n a l problems 
e x p l i c i t l y recognises i s t h a t the s t r u c t u r e o f an urban area i s 
simply a r e f l e c t i o n of a m u l t i t u d e o f i n d i v i d u a l decisions and i t i s 
the basis o f these decisions and the -relationship between d e c i s i o n 
making and the subsequent l o c a t i o n a l behaviour which becomes the c e n t r a l 
concern. What i s s i g n i f i c a n t about behavioural s t u d i e s , t h e r e f o r e , i s 
the focus-on-explanation and understanding and the proposal t o analyse 
a t the l e v e l of the i n d i v i d u a l . 
I t might be thought t h a t we have now found a methodology which 
addresses i t s e l f s p e c i f i c a l l y t o our c e n t r a l problem o f l o c a t i o n and 
t h a t a l l t h a t remains t o be done i s t o proceed apace w i t h the 
e x p l o r a t i o n of the urban s t r u c t u r e of the c i t y o f Edinburgh. This i s , 
however, not the case,for where i s the body o f behavioural theory t o 
which we may r e f e r ? I t appears from a perusal o f the l i t e r a t u r e t h a t 
G. Olsson i n K. R. Cox and R. G. Golledge (1969) 
I b i d p.21 
the development of such theory i s as y e t i n the i n i t i a l stages and 
t h a t there i s s t i l l considerable dispute as t o how t o go on. 
Harvey's comment t h a t "Human geographers have long recognised t h a t 
geographical p a t t e r n s are the end product o f a l a r g e number o f 
i n d i v i d u a l decisions made a t d i f f e r e n t times f o r o f t e n very d i f f e r e n t 
reasons" 5 may be taken as a note o f foreboding. This i n i t i a l stage 
has l a s t e d more than ten years and many researchers seem un c e r t a i n o f 
the next stage. A mood o f pessimism i s apparent m a recent discussion 
o f behavioural processes by Amedeo and Golledge. They conclude on t h i s 
sombre note: 
I n n e i t h e r example d i d we a r r i v e a t any s i g n i f i c a n t 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . This s t a t e i s very d e s c r i p t i v e 
of geography today, f o r much o f the d i s c i p l i n e ' s 
research e x i s t s m an incomplete form, being 
inadequately reasoned w i t h l i t t l e scope f o r g e n e r a l i t y , 
but associated w i t h some f a s c i n a t i n g and r e l e v a n t 
problems. I n some cases our a n a l y t i c a l methods and 
our symbolic models add l i t t l e i n the way o f increased 
e x p l a n a t i o n ; i n other cases even our most complex and 
complete methods and our most r i g o r o u s reasoning e f f o r t s 
have c o n t r i b u t e d l i t t l e to our general understanding 
and knowledge o f phenomena.6 
What these w r i t e r s are h i g h l i g h t i n g i s the lack o f progress made by the 
behavioural geographers i n the understanding and explanation o f the 
phenomena they study. The method which promised so much has i n f a c t 
produced very l i t t l e . T h i s , i t i s suggested, i s because there s t i l l 
e x i s t methodological confusions w i t h i n behavioural a n a l y s i s which on 
occasion have l e d research i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n . The complexity of 
the i n d i v i d u a l l o c a t i o n d e c i s i o n and the f u r t h e r problems involved i n 
r e l a t i n g a host o f such decisions t o l o c a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s are c e r t a i n l y 
daunting. By a c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the nature o f these problems, 
however, we can perhaps achieve some understanding o f how they might 
5 D. Harvey (1969a)p.119 
6 D. Amedeo and R. G. Golledge (1975) p.420 
l e g i t i m a t e l y be resolved. The heart o f the matter i s i l l u s t r a t e d 
by the f o l l o w i n g passage from the e d i t o r i a l i n t r o d u c t i o n t o a 
c o l l e c t i o n o f papers from a symposium on behavioural problems i n 
geography: 
The use of s o c i o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e s , however, 
while e x p l a i n i n g some o f the discrepancies 
between the r e a l world and a s p a t i a l theory 
based on economic man assumptions, i s bound 
t o be less than p e r f e c t i n the sense t h a t 
i n f o r m a t i o n i s r a r e l y received i n the same 
form i n which i t i s t r a n s m i t t e d . I n t e r v e n i n g 
between the sending of i n f o r m a t i o n and the 
dec i s i o n t o l o c a t e are perceptions of i n f o r m a t i o n . 7 
I t i s the problems and confusions surrounding notions of perception 
which we must examine f i r s t . For i t i s commonly supposed t h a t 
l o c a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s , and hence l o c a t i o n a l behaviour, cannot be 
understood or explained unless we know how the agent or agents 
involved perceive the world. 
T 
J . 
PERCEPTION STUDIES IN GEOGRAPHY: 
Few geographers today would, I t h i n k , doubt the importance o f 
studies o f d i f f e r e n t i a l perception and many w r i t e r s i n t h i s f i e l d 
would agree w i t h Harvey t h a t , "The problem o f p e r c e p t i o n , f o r example, 
i s basic t o e v e r y t h i n g we do and t h i n k and i t i s basic t o our under-
standing of knowledge i t s e l f . " 8 And yet the considerable l i t e r a t u r e 
on t h i s t o p i c , f a r from r e s o l v i n g the 'problem', reveals a growing 
confusion as t o the nature o f some o f the concepts employed and t h e i r 
i m p l i c a t i o n s . I t i s the purpose o f t h i s s e c t i o n t h e r e f o r e t o explore 
a few of these concepts and, most i m p o r t a n t l y , t o tr a c e some of t h e i r 
l o g i c a l consequences i n an attempt t o discover whether the l a t t e r do 
7 K. R. Cox and R. G. Golledge (1969) p.6 
8 D. Harvey i n K. R. Cox and R. G.Golledge (1969) p.64 
not prove very much less p a l a t a b l e than the o r i g i n a l concepts themselves. 
As the f i e l d o f behavioural studies extends beyond the reaches o f 
geography the discussion w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be centred on one small corner. 
I t w i l l be seen, however, t h a t the methodological conclusions are not 
r e s t r i c t e d t o what has been c a l l e d the approach's "most developed 
component"^, pe r c e p t i o n . This i s because o f the fundamental nature o f 
such a n o t i o n . Harvey s t a t e s : 
We know t o o , t h a t mental processes may mediate the 
flo w o f i n f o r m a t i o n from the environment i n such a 
way t h a t one i n d i v i d u a l perceives a s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r e n t l y 
from another even though the e x t e r n a l s t i m u l i are e x a c t l y 
the same. Each i n d i v i d u a l may be thought o f as making 
decisions w i t h respect t o h i s a t t i t u d e s and i n the context 
of h i s p e r c e p t i o n s . 1 0 
I f he i s r i g h t then we could not begin t o understand an i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
d ecision unless we f i r s t understood how he perceived the world. 
Perception and o b s e r v a t i o n a l s k i l l : 
What i s perception? Strangely, perhaps, t h i s seems a d i f f i c u l t 
question t o answer and i t i s the concepts and notions embodied i n the 
answers p r o f f e r e d by geographers which are surrounded by considerable 
confusion. "Decision makers", we are l e d t o b e l i e v e , "....base t h e i r 
decisions on the environment as they perceive i t , not as i t i s " 1 1 ; and Tuan 
asks, "What i s the nature of the o b j e c t i v e space over which human beings 
have v a r i o u s l y p r o j e c t e d t h e i r i l l u s i o n s ? " 1 2 Many s i m i l a r quotations 
could be c i t e d , but e s s e n t i a l l y they are a l l making the same claims. 
F i r s t , t h a t t h e re i s somehow a r e a l environment on the one hand and a 
9 P. Sarre (1973) p.7 
1 0 D. Harvey i n K.R.Cox and R.G.Golledge (1969) p.36 
1 1 H.C.Brookfield (1969) p.53 
1 2 Yi-Fu Tuan (1974) p.215. I n t h i s essay Tuan introduces the 'phenomenological 
p e r s p e c t i v e ' , a s o p h i s t i c a t e d v e r s i o n o f d i f f e r e n t i a l p e r c e p t i o n . I n making 
s i m i l a r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , however, (such as "Mental maps d i f f e r from person 
t o person") Tuan's phenomenology i s also open t o the c r i t i c i s m s below. 
perceived or s u b j e c t i v e environment on the ot h e r ; and secondly, t h i s not 
always being e x p l i c i t , t h a t , as B r o o k f i e l d has i t , geographers study 
r e a l i t y . The nature o f the dichotomy becomes c l e a r e r i n the f o l l o w i n g 
e x t r a c t : 
Environmental perception i s the c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r i n g 
of the p h y s i c a l and s o c i a l environments i n which the 
a c t u a l or o b j e c t i v e world i s replaced by a simpler 
s u b j e c t i v e l y perceived environment. 1 3 
But what i s t h i s o b j e c t i v e world t h a t has been d i s p l a c e d 9 And how then 
do we apprehend t h i s r e a l i t y w i t h o u t f a l l i n g i n t o the t r a p o f 
s u b j e c t i v i t y ? The s u b j e c t i v e environment appears as a s i m p l i f i c a t i o n 
of the o b j e c t i v e environment. Goodey notes several meanings of 
perception and concludes t h a t "most workers would probably support the 
second ( i . e . 'The awareness o f o b j e c t s or other data through the medium 
of the senses') as o f f e r i n g the best simple statement of the process t h a t 
they are seeking, i n various ways, t o examine." 1 4 To take the example 
of a p a i n t i n g t h e r e f o r e , the t o t a l p a i n t i n g i n a l l i t s d e t a i l might be 
c a l l e d the o b j e c t i v e environment, and t h a t p a r t o f the p a i n t i n g on which 
one i n i t i a l l y focuses one's eyes might be the s u b j e c t i v e environment. 
This analogy would f i t w e l l w i t h such comments as "only a f r a c t i o n o f 
the t o t a l s t i m u l i i s consciously selected and processed" and "the 
capacity o f the b r a i n i s g e n e t i c a l l y l i m i t e d " . 1 5 But i f t h i s i s what 
i s meant by ' s u b j e c t i v e ' then what we are t a l k i n g about i s o b s e r v a t i o n a l 
s k i l l . I f two people are given f i v e minutes t o look at t h i s p i c t u r e and 
then recount what they have seen, the accounts w i l l most probably vary i n 
a number o f ways. For example, where A w i l l have n o t i c e d b i r d s s i t t i n g 
on the telegraph wires i n the d i s t a n c e , B w i l l perhaps have concentrated 
D. C. D. Pocock (1972) p.115 
B. Goodey (1971) p.3 
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on the c l o s e r features and describe i n d e t a i l the elaborate l a y o u t 
o f an ornamental garden i n the foreground. This does not mean t h a t 
the two people i n any sense see the scene d i f f e r e n t l y , f o r i f A pointed 
at h i s b i r d s on the telegraph w i r e , B's a t t e n t i o n would then be d i r e c t e d 
towards them and he might comment t h a t he hadn't n o t i c e d them. 
Secondly, B might r e c a l l having seen three cows i n the meadow, w h i l s t 
by A's account there were f o u r . Here e i t h e r one was mistaken i n which 
case a recount would s e t t l e the matter, or one of them had simply f o r g o t t e n 
how many cows were m f a c t t h e r e . E i t h e r way the dispute can e a s i l y be 
s e t t l e d w i t h reference t o the o r i g i n a l p a i n t i n g . The 'subjective 
environment', on t h i s account then, can be seen t o be an i d i o s y n c r a t i c 
s e l e c t i o n of what i s there t o be seen. But given the development o f 
appropriate o b s e r v a t i o n a l s k i l l s , one could, given long enough, note 
every d e t a i l o f the p a i n t i n g i n which case the o b j e c t i v e / s u b j e c t i v e 
d i s t i n c t i o n breaks down and i t becomes a matter of the extent o f one's 
obsei'vational s k i l l . Whax one sees i s whar i s rhere t o be seen; the 
p o i n t i s t h a t one doesn't see the whole o f i t at once. I n no sense 
i s t h i s a ' s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y ' . I f , however, t h i s s e l e c t i o n i s what 
i s meant by perception being s u b j e c t i v e , then what problems does i t pose 
t h a t could be o f i n t e r e s t t o geographers? Could i t ever be u s e f u l t o 
know t h a t A saw the b i r d s on the t e l e g r a p h wire and B didn't? Or more 
p e r t i n e n t , could i t be a phenomenon worth e x p l a i n i n g 9 One could 
envisage circumstances where impact studies could have some s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
We are a l l f a m i l i a r w i t h the a d v e r t i s i n g t r i c k s where 'free glasses' 
appears i n enormous c o l o u r f u l l e t t e r s and only on a much cl o s e r i n s p e c t i o n 
does i t emerge t h a t one must f i r s t purchase s i x packets of t h a t p a r t i c u l a r 
product. I t i s t r u e t h a t i n t h i s s o r t o f case one can make g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s 
about l a r g e l e t t e r s being more n o t i c e a b l e than small ones. I m p o r t a n t l y 
however, t h i s i s a comment about the signs and not the s e e r s . 1 6 
Again i t might be extremely important, e.g. i n court cases, t o 
know what p a r t of a p a r t i c u l a r scene a witness saw, and t h i s knowledge 
may even help t o e x p l a i n h i s subsequent a c t i o n s . For example, t h a t 
the witness saw a c h i l d l y i n g i n a pool o f blood on the road would 
e x p l a i n h i s running t o the nearest telephone and c a l l i n g an ambulance. 
I f one asks the f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n , however, 'why d i d he see what he saw 9', 
I am not a t a l l sure what s o r t of answer one would be l o o k i n g f o r . I t 
i s worth n o t i n g t h a t the s e l e c t i o n i s not a conscious s e l e c t i o n i n the 
sense t h a t we chose t o look a t c e r t a i n t h i n g s r a t h e r than others. I t 
i s p ossible i n many cases t o e x p l a i n why someone d i d not see something, 
e.g. because a bus stood between them and whatever they f a i l e d t o see, 
and even i n a l i m i t e d number o f cases t o suggest why someone's a t t e n t i o n 
was a t t r a c t e d , e.g. by the noise o f the crash. I n general, however, I 
would suggest t h a t one cannot e x p l a i n why a c e r t a i n person saw what they 
saw, but merely note t h a t they d i d . An account of what someone saw 
would be d e s c r i p t i v e and not explanatory, although the account i t s e l f 
might be used as an explanation o f something e l s e , f o r example, the 
subsequent actions of t h a t person. 
Perception and language. 
I n the previous s e c t i o n we have seen t h a t i f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
perception i s simply t h a t p a r t o f r e a l i t y he happens t o n o t i c e then what 
we have i s o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y on the one hand and the f a c t t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s 
u s u a l l y only observe p a r t s o f i t on the othe r . There i s no room i n these 
circumstances f o r the term 'subjective r e a l i t y ' . And y e t many geographers 
claim t h a t what they are t r y i n g t o t h e o r i s e 
1 6 Likewise, Lynch (1960) i s concerned w i t h the v i s u a l q u a l i t i e s or 
the l e g i b i l i t y o f the American c i t y r a t h e r than w i t h the seers. The 
main elements which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s ( t h e paths, edges, d i s t r i c t s , 
nodes and landmarks) are a l l signs which, t o g e t h e r , make up the 
" p u b l i c image" o f the c i t y . 
about i s p r e c i s e l y s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y . I t must be, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t 
they hold a very d i f f e r e n t n o t i o n o f what perception i s . I t seems 
a t t h i s j u n c t u r e b e n e f x c i a l t o r e f l e c t b r i e f l y on the nature of 
perception. When we see an obje c t e.g. a c h a i r , there are two thi n g s 
i n v o l v e d . F i r s t a c t u a l l y seeing the o b j e c t , and secondly i d e n t i f y i n g 
the o b j e c t as a c h a i r . For many objects t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s automatic. 
Even small c h i l d r e n have no problems i d e n t i f y i n g c h a i r s , t a b l e s e t c . I t 
simply r e q u i r e s having l e a r n t how t o apply the r u l e s of the language i n 
which they express themselves. I t must be noted, however, t h a t i n order 
t o claim t h a t one sees a c h a i r , f o r example , the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s j u s t 
as important as the p h y s i c a l act o f seeing. I n t h i s simple case i f there 
i s a dispute about whether a c e r t a i n o b j e c t i s a c h a i r or a t a b l e , i t 
could a r i s e f o r one of two reasons. E i t h e r one or both disputants 
cannot see the o b j e c t c l e a r l y enough (they have bad eyesight or the 
obj e c t i s too d i s t a n t ) or one or both has not l e a r n t how t o apply, f o r 
example, the word t a b l e according t o the r u l e s o f the English language, 
and has mistakenly supposed t h a t a t a b l e i s also something one s i t s on. 
I n other words there i s something preventing the p h y s i c a l process of 
seeing p r o p e r l y , or there i s some mistake i n i d e n t i f y i n g the p a r t i c u l a r 
o b j e c t . I t i s the l a t t e r which seems the more i n t e r e s t i n g case. To 
take a more complex example; l e t us suppose t h a t two people come across 
some o b j e c t h a l f b u r i e d i n the sand and c l e a r l y worn i n places through 
having been exposed t o the elements. They might indeed ask, 'what i s 
i t ? ' , and each might attempt t o i d e n t i f y the r e l i c . Person A might 
judge i t t o be the frame o f a b i c y c l e , w h i l s t person B claims t h a t i t 
appears t o him more l i k e some s o r t o f o l d fashioned plough. Both A 
and B could t r y t o support h i s claim by c i t i n g various pieces o f evidence, 
or attempt t o r e f u t e the other claim by p o i n t i n g t o counter-evidence. 
Of course one or both o f them nust be wrong and although the matter might 
never be s e t t l e d , given f u r t h e r i n f o r m a t i o n i t i s most l i k e l y t h a t i t 
would be. For example, a f t e r f i n d i n g two r u s t y b i c y c l e wheels a 
few f e e t away both A and B would no doubt be prepared t o agree t h a t 
the o r i g i n a l o b j e c t was a b i c y c l e frame. The problem here has been 
one o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , o f which word t o apply t o the obje c t t h a t was 
found. Where such a problem a r i s e s i t appears t h a t we do weigh up 
the evidence and make a k i n d o f judgement as t o what the o b j e c t could 
be. Nevertheless, i m p o r t a n t l y , the judgement i t s e l f must be made 
w i t h i n the r u l e s of the language; i t i s a judgement about how t o apply 
c e r t a i n words or phrases o f the English language and t h i s i s c e r t a i n l y 
not a r b i t r a r y . Goodey w r i t e s : 
Perceiving the environment through a l l h i s senses, 
man i s r e q u i r e d t o i n t e r p r e t the various components 
which appear i n the perceptual f i e l d . Hypotheses 
are formulated concerning each component and these 
are accepted or r e j e c t e d on the basis of experience 
and i n t u i t i o n . 1 7 
But surely t h i s i s not so. I f we are t a l k i n g about what people see 
etc. we can only do so i n terms of the concepts the English language 
allows and according t o the r u l e s f o r t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n . Experience 
plays a p a r t i n i n c r e a s i n g the number of concepts w i t h which we are 
f a m i l i a r , but we cannot accept or r e j e c t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s 'locked i n our 
own environment' or as fancy takes us. We are not i n other words a t 
l i b e r t y t o assert c o r r e c t l y t h a t an animal i s a g i r a f f e i f i n f a c t i t 
i s more the shape o f a horse and i s covered i n black and white s t r i p e s . 
The problems o f pe r c e p t i o n , i t seems, a r i s e e i t h e r i n the p h y s i c a l 
processes o f seeing, hearing e t c . , or i n the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f what i s 
being seen, heard e t c . , and i t i s only the l a t t e r t h a t could be of 
i n t e r e s t t o the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . The former i s commonly the concern 
o f the o p t i c i a n . F urther, notions of the ' s u b j e c t i v i t y ' of such 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s amount t o the i n d i s p u t a b l e f a c t t h a t i n some cases 
B. Goodey, o p . c i t . p.4 
people make mistakes or are u n c e r t a i n when i d e n t i f y i n g . Thus no 
co n t r a s t can be made between s u b j e c t i v e impressions i n t h i s sense 
and an o b j e c t i v e world 'out t h e r e ' which can only be apprehended 
s u b j e c t i v e l y . I f t h i s i s what i s meant by s u b j e c t i v e we cannot 
sensibly speak o f 'the world as i t i s ' versus 'the world as i t i s 
seen'. I d e n t i f i c a t i o n s can c e r t a i n l y be mistaken, but mistaken they 
are and not i d i o s y n c r a t i c views of the world. 
Mental images and mental maps. 
I would l i k e now t o t u r n t o Sarre's discussion o f perception i n 
the Open U n i v e r s i t y p u b l i c a t i o n on the subject and consider h i s account 
i n the l i g h t o f the foregoing observations. The term p e r c e p t i o n , we 
are t o l d , i s used m two senses. 
(1) a process i n which an i n d i v i d u a l receives 
s t i m u l i from the environment through h i s 
senses and stores some of them i n h i s b r a i n . 
(2) a model o f the environment which i s b u i l t up 
over time i n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s b r a i n . 1 8 
These w i l l be discussed separately. The f i r s t , i t seems, i s what I 
have noted as the p h y s i c a l processes o f seeing, hearing e t c . For 
example, i n s i g h t the chain process is " l i g h t waves t r a v e l from the 
o b j e c t , s t r i k e the r e t i n a of the eye and produce chemical changes i n 
i t : these m t u r n cause impulses t o t r a v e l along the o p t i c nerve t o an 
area o f the b r a i n where they set up a c t i v i t y which spreads also t o 
c e r t a i n associated a r e a s . " 1 9 Thus a complex system o f lightwaves, 
sometimes emitted by the ob j e c t but normally a d i f f e r e n t i a l r e f l e c t i o n 
o f l i g h t from the o b j e c t ' s surface, t r a v e l s from the o b j e c t t o the 
p e r c i p i e n t ' s eye. One could f u r t h e r explore the process and discover, 
f o r example, t h a t each r e t i n a has a mosaic o f over 120 m i l l i o n receptors 
1 8 P. Sarre, o p . c i t . , p.16 
1 9 R. J. H i r s t (1965) p.10 
w h i c h a r e a c t i v a t e d by t h e l i g h t c a s t on them. The main p o i n t 
however i s t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f how we see t h i n g s i s a p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
one and p r i m a r i l y t h e domain o f t h e n e u r o l o g i s t . I t i s c e r t a i n l y n o t 
an area geographers a r e equipped t o e x p l o r e and n o t , I t h i n k , an a s p e c t 
o f p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h i s o f r e l e v a n c e t o t h e development o f t h e o r y r e l a t e d 
t o human b e h a v i o u r . That an i n d i v i d u a l i s b l i n d w i l l c e r t a i n l y 
i n f l u e n c e h i s b e h a v i o u r , b u t even i f we a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n t h i s 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ' s b e h a v i o u r , t o know t h a t he i s b l i n d i s s u f f i c i e n t . 
We do n o t need t o know t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l causes o f h i s b l i n d n e s s . 
The second d e f i n i t i o n o f f e r e d by S a r r e i s a t once m i s l e a d i n g and 
c o n f u s i n g , b u t i t i s one e n t e r t a i n e d by a number o f g e o g r a p h e r s . Harvey 
t a l k s o f p e r c e p t i o n as " t h e c e n t r a l node i n a n e t w o r k whxch b r i n g s 
t o g e t h e r c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s e s and e n v i r o n m e n t a l s t i m u l i and w h i c h p r o j e c t s 
t o t h e a c t o f d e c i s i o n " 2 0 and Pocock r e f e r s t o " t h e o u t p u t f r o m t h e 
p r o c e s s i n g c e n t r e - t h e i m a g e " . 2 1 These c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s o f p e r c e p t i o n 
have b u i l t i n t o them c e r t a i n c o n cepts such as ' c e n t r a l node' w h i c h 
a r e t h emselves h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c and t h u s i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h e s e 
c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n s w h i c h r e q u i r e s u p p o r t o r r e f u t a t i o n . 
We can I t h i n k s a f e l y c l a i m t h a t ah i n d i v i d u a l w i l l have a 
c o n c e p t u a l schema w h i c h he uses t o r e f e r t o t h e s u r r o u n d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t 
and i n t e r m s o f w h i c h he can make sense o f t h a t e n v i r o n m e n t . He can, 
f o r example, t a l k o f slum a r e a s , t h e h i s t o r i c c e n t r e , t h e main s h o p p i n g 
s t r e e t e t c . and d e s c r i b e h i s own i n t r a - u r b a n movements w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o 
t h e s e . To f u r t h e r c l a i m t h a t t h e s e c o n c e p t s a r e somehow b u i l t up o v e r 
t i m e i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s b r a i n i s a t b e s t t o obscure t h e i s s u e . Does 
one r e a l l y s t o r e t h e t e r m 'slum a r e a ' i n one's b r a i n ? O b v i o u s l y we 
must remember how t o a p p l y t h e t e r m b u t s u r e l y t h i s does n o t c o n s t i t u t e 
s t o r i n g i n t h e b r a i n . I f , however, t h e c l a i m i s t h a t we b u i l d up an 
D. Harvey i n K.R.Cox and R.G.Gollege (1969) p.52 
D.CD.Pocock (1973) p.6 
image o r a p i c t u r e o f a slum a r e a i n o u r b r a i n and use t h i s i n t h e 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f slum areas t h e n I t h i n k i t i s s i m p l y f a l s e . The 
c o n t i n u e d use o f language depends on t h e f o l l o w i n g o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e 
l i n g u i s t i c r u l e s and n o t on any i d i o s y n c r a t i c n o t i o n s o f what a 
p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t a p p l i e s t o . B e s i d e s , what i s i m p o r t a n t i s t h e 
knowledge o f how t o a p p l y t h e c o n c e p t s , o f how t o i d e n t i f y slum a r e a s , 
and n o t whether t h e s e concepts are s t o r e d i n s i d e t h e head. 
The use o f t h i s n o t i o n o f m e n t a l s t o r a g e i s , however, w i d e s p r e a d ; 
w i t n e s s t h e i n c r e a s i n g l i t e r a t u r e on m e n t a l images and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
m e n t a l maps. Goodey, i n t r o d u c i n g h i s r e v i e w o f t h e p e r c e p t i o n 
l i t e r a t u r e w r i t e s , " S t a t e d s i m p l y t h i s paper i s concerned w i t h t h e 
w o r l d o u t s i d e and t h e images i n o u r heads . ,.." 2 2 And Downs 
c h a r a c t e r i s e s t h e p r o c e s s o f p e r c e p t i o n by what he c a l l s an i n t e r r e l a t e d 
system, t h u s : 2 3 
p e o p l e 
+ ( 1 ) 
images ( 3 ) ->• b e h a v i o u r 
+ ( 2 ) 
e n v i r o n m e n t 
Here we have 'images' p l a y i n g a key r o l e . L.J.Wood f o l l o w s Downs when 
he comments, " i n o r d e r t o break i n t o t h e system one must s t u d y t h e 
images, w h i c h a r e t h e p o i n t s o f c o n t a c t between p e o p l e and t h e i r 
e n v i r o n m e n t ." 2 t t F i n a l l y Bordessa c o n f i r m s t h i s p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h 
images when he w r i t e s . "The p e r c e p t i o n o r m e n t a l image o f t h e w o r l d 
t h a t i s h e l d by i n d i v i d u a l s i s a t t h e r o o t o f a l l s t u d i e s o f p e r c e p t i o n 
c onducted by g e o g r a p h e r s . " 2 5 Thus i f 'mental image' i s e i t h e r a vacuous 
concept i n i t s e l f o r i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e s t u d y o f geography t h i s has 
o b v i o u s and i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e f u t u r e d i r e c t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n 
B. Goodey, o p . c i t . , p . l 
2 3 R. M. Downs (1967) 
2 4 L. J . Wood (1970) p.131 
2 5 R. Bordessa (1969) p . l 
s t u d i e s i n o u r s u b j e c t . 
What t h e n a r e m e n t a l maps'5 We u n d e r s t a n d w e l l what maps a r e , 
b u t what i s t h e f o r c e o f c a l l i n g them 'mental' maps? S e v e r a l 
a r t i c l e s have been w r i t t e n on t h e s u b j e c t o f m e n t a l maps and I s h a l l 
f i r s t t u r n t o them f o r an answer. There a r e , i t seems, a t l e a s t two 
t y p e s o f m e n t a l map. On t h e one hand t h e r e a r e t h e maps p u r p o r t i n g 
t o i l l u s t r a t e i s o - p e r c e p t s o r l i n e s o f e q u a l p e r c e p t i o n . Gould and 
White have c o n s t r u c t e d such maps f o r t h e B r i t i s h I s l e s a f t e r i n t e r -
v i e w i n g groups o f B r i t i s h s c h o o l l e a v e r s and t h e y suggest t h a t t h e 
r e s u l t s o b t a i n e d f o r a sample group i n Bournemouth b e s t i l l u s t r a t e 
t h e g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s f o u n d i n B r i t i s h p r e f e r e n c e maps: 
S t a r t i n g f r o m a r i d g e o f h i g h d e n s i t y a l o n g t h e 
e n t i r e s o u t h c o a s t , t h e s u r f a c e f a l l s s t e e p l y t o 
a s i n k h o l e c e n t r e d o v e r t h e m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a . 
However two prongs o f r e s i d e n t i a l d e s i r a b i l i t y 
e x t e n d t h r o u g h East A n g l i a and t h e c o u n t i e s 
b o r d e r i n g Wales t o produce a 'mental c i r q u e ' 
i n t h e M i d l a n d s . G e n e r a l l y t h e e n t i r e s u r f a c e 
d e c l i n e s w i t h a c o n s i d e r a b l e degree o f r e g u l a r i t y 
n o r t h w a r d s to S c o t l a n d , w i t h a m a j o r anomaly o f a 
m e n t a l dome c e n t r e d o v e r t h e Lake D i s t r i c t . 6 
Or as A b l e r Adams and Gould p u t i t i n one o f t h e i r examples, " L i k e a 
c o n t o u r map whose l i n e s c o n n e c t p o i n t s o f a c e r t a i n h e i g h t above sea 
l e v e l , so t h e p e r c e p t i o n s u r f a c e shows t h e h i l l s and v a l l e y s o f 
r e s i d e n t i a l d e s i r a b i l i t y f o r a p a r t i c u l a r group o f p e o p l e . " 2 7 Of 
c o u rse t h e r e i s n o t h i n g d i r e c t l y ' mental' about t h e s e maps: t h e y a r e 
drawn u s i n g i n k , paper e t c . i n e x a c t l y t h e same way as o t h e r maps. 
At most i t i s what t h e y c l a i m t o measure - i f t h i s i s n o t a c o n t r a d i c t i o n 
i n i t s e l f - i . e . t h e i r c o n t e n t , t h a t b e a r s any r e l a t i o n t o m e n t a l 
p r o c e s s e s . 
The o t h e r t y p e o f m e n t a l map appears t o s p r i n g more d i r e c t l y f r o m 
2 6 P. Gould and R. White (1968) pp.165-6 
2 7 R. A b l e r , J.S.Adams and P.Gould (1971) p.519 
t a l k o f images. Thus i n Stea we f i n d a " m e n t a l map" as "an image" 
f i l t e r i n g and c o d i n g o f sen s o r y d a t a and i s something s u b j e c t i v e , 
p r i v a t e , u n i q u e . I n p r a c t i c a l terms we a r e t o l d " i t p r o v i d e s f o r t h e 
o r i e n t a t i o n , c o m f o r t and movement o f man w i t h x n h i s e n v i r o n m e n t , " 2 9 
and as one o f t h e consequences o f b e i n g w i t h o u t a m e n t a l map i n a busy 
o r u n f a m i l i a r c i t y i s s a i d t o be t h e f e e l i n g o f uneasiness e x p e r i e n c e d , 
i t w ould appear t h a t knowledge o f t h e a r e a concerned i s a key f a c t o r i n 
t h e f o r m a t i o n o f such maps. And y e t t h i s c r e a t e s many p r o b l e m s , f o r how 
do we o b t a i n t h e s e maps? How many do we h a v e 7 And where do we s t o r e 
t h e ones we have? J u s t how much knowledge o f an a r e a do we r e q u i r e 
b e f o r e we can o b t a i n o r r e t a i n a m e n t a l map 9 Can I be s a i d t o have a 
m e n t a l map o f Newcastle i f I v i s i t e d t h e c i t y f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e l a s t 
week 9 Or does i t t a k e a number o f v i s i t s b e f o r e I can c l a i m t o have 
formed a m e n t a l s p a t i a l schema? I f so, how many 9 A g a i n , my 
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h a c e r t a i n town may have been c o n s i d e r a b l e b u t because 
I have n o t v i s i t e d t h a t a r e a a t a l l i n t h e l a s t t e n y e a r s , I m i g h t i f 
I d i d r e t u r n be u n a b l e t o e a s i l y f i n d my way a b o u t . How can t h i s be 
e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f m e n t a l maps? " R e t e n t i o n o f t h e m e n t a l image", 
we are t o l d , "depends on t h e r e l a t i v e r a t e s o f i n f o r m a t i o n r e n e w a l and 
decay, f o r t h e m e n t a l map undergoes c o n t i n u o u s r e n e w a l . " 3 0 But how 
does t h i s d i f f e r f r o m s i m p l y remembering somewhere? And can I l o s e my 
m e n t a l map? 
I f h a v i n g a m e n t a l map i s t o have some i d e a o f t h e l a y o u t o f a 
p l a c e , can t h e s e be d e r i v e d f r o m second hand k n o w l e d g e 9 i . e . can m e n t a l 
o f t h e l a r g e r e n v i r o n m e n t . 28 T h i s r e s u l t s a p p a r e n t l y f r o m t h e m e n t a l 
28 D. Stea i n K.R.Cox and R.G.Golledge (1969) p.229 
29 D.C.D.Pocock (1972) p.115 
30 I b i d . p.123 
maps be d e r i v e d f r o m r e a l maps 9 A g a i n i f Mr. Brown g i v e s me 
d i r e c t i o n s f o r c r o s s i n g t h e c e n t r e o f a c i t y u n f a m i l i a r t o me, and 
I f o l l o w h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s p e r f e c t l y , have I been f o l l o w i n g h i s m e n t a l 
map 9 These q u e s t i o n s may appear t r i v i a l o r o u t w i t h t h e scope o f 
geography, b u t i f we a r e t o make sense o f t h e c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f 
m e n t a l maps as images i n t h e head, t h e n we must a t l e a s t be a b l e t o 
i n d i c a t e what k i n d o f answers would be a p p r o p r i a t e . 
I w i l l t a k e one p a r t i c u l a r s e t o f c l a i m s t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e 
n a t u r e o f t h e problem i n v o l v e d ; namely c l a i m s about where we keep o u r 
m e n t a l maps. Consider m e n t a l maps as b e i n g s t o r e d i n t h e b r a i n . 
T h i s seems t o i m p l y some s o r t o f image o r p i c t u r e o f , f o r example, 
Durham which can be s a i d t o be l o c a t e d i n s i d e t h e head. But s u r e l y 
images a re n o t t h e s o r t s o f t h i n g s w h i c h have a l o c a t i o n i n space; 
t h e y a r e n o t i n f a c t m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s a t a l l . 'Image', l i k e ' t h o u g h t ' 
and 'memory' i s a concept w h i c h has no independent e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e 
t h e l i n g u i s t i c framework. An image i s s i m p l y one i n c i d e n c e o f i m a g i n i n g 
i n t h e same way as a memory i s one i n c i d e n c e o f remembering. To ask 
f u r t h e r , 'what i s i t t o remember?', i f one i s n o t s i m p l y l o o k i n g f o r 
e l u c i d a t i o n such as - one m i g h t f i n d i n a d i c t i o n a r y , i s t o l o o k f o r an 
answer i n terms o f t h e c e r e b r a l p rocesses i n v o l v e d when one i s remembering 
i . e . i n terms o f p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s . I t i s n o t o n l y t h a t as Stea p o i n t s 
o u t " i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l f a c t , we do n o t know t h a t such maps e x i s t . We 
have no re a s o n t o suppose t h a t we w i l l f i n d p a t t e r n s i s o m o r p h i c t o t h e 
l a r g e r w o r l d o r p o r t i o n s o f t h e l a r g e r w o r l d , on t h e c e r e b r a l c o r t e x " , 3 1 
b u t t h a t i t does n o t make sense even t o suppose t h a t we m i g h t f i n d such 
p a t t e r n s i m p r i n t e d on t h e b r a i n . Maps are n o t t h e s o r t s o f t h i n g s t h a t 
one f i n d s d u r i n g a s u r g i c a l o p e r a t i o n . 
D. S t e a , o p . c i t . , p.230 
Not many g e o g r a p h e r s , i t may be o b j e c t e d , w o uld want t o c l a i m 
t h a t t h e y a r e , and y e t 'mental images' and ' s t o r e d i n t h e head' make 
f r e q u e n t appearances i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e . What t h e n can t h e y mean? 
' C i t y o f t h e M i n d ' , 3 2 t h e t i t l e o f a r e v i e w o f m e n t a l maps p r e s e n t s 
us w i t h a n o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y . M e n t a l images i t seems a r e i n f a c t 
s t o r e d i n t h e mind. But where t h e n i s t h e mind l o c a t e d 9 I n t h e 
b r a i n 9 And i f m e n t a l phenomena c a n ' t be s a i d t o have p h y s i c a l 
e x i s t e n c e what t h e n i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s 
o f s e e i n g w h i c h t a k e s p l a c e i n t h e b r a i n , and t h e supposed s i g h t image 
as s t o r e d i n t h e m i n d 9 S u r e l y t h e mind cannot be s a i d t o have m a t e r i a l 
e x i s t e n c e , i . e . e x i s t e n c e i n space, and i t i s j u s t because o f t h i s t h a t 
i t does n o t make sense t o ask what m i g h t be f o u n d i n s i d e i t . S p a t i a l 
v o c a b u l a r y has no r e l e v a n c e t o n o n - s p a t i a l c o n c e p t s . 
The e l i c i t a t i o n o f m e n t a l maps 1 
D e s p i t e t h i s , many geographers appear i n t e n t on t r y i n g t o expose 
t h e g e o g r a p h i c c o n t e n t o f p e o p l e ' s m e n t a l images. Because o f t h e way 
t h e y c h a r a c t e r i s e t h i s ' b l a c k box' phenomenon however, I suggest t h a t 
t h e y i n f a c t s t a r t w i t h a concept w h i c h can o f l i t t l e use t o them. Each 
person's m e n t a l image i s a p p a r e n t l y u n i q u e : i . e . " h i s own p r i v a t e 
g e o g r a p h y " , 3 3 and t h u s t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l geographer i s l e f t e n t i r e l y 
dependent on t h e g o o d w i l l , c o o p e r a t i o n , and i n t e g r i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s 
whose m e n t a l maps he wishes t o examine. But t h a t i s n o t t h e end o f t h e 
m a t t e r . F o l l o w i n g K l e i n 3 4 t h e r e appear t o be a t l e a s t f o u r ways i n 
w h i c h i n d i v i d u a l s c o u l d communicate t o t h e geographer t h e f e a t u r e s o f 
h i s p r i v a t e image: 
3 2 D.CD.Pocock (1972) 
3 3 P. S a r r e , o p . c i t . , p.18 
3 k H . J . K l e i n i n E . J . B r i l l (1967) pp.286-306 
( 1 ) Free v e r b a l d e s c r i p t i o n 
( 2 ) S e l e c t i o n o f l o c a t i o n s f r o m a l i s t 
( 3 ) The s o r t i n g o f c a r d s c a r r y i n g t h e names o f l o c a t i o n s 
( 4 ) d r a w i n g a map 
As what i s under d i s c u s s i o n here i s t h e communication o f a m e n t a l map, 
t h e l a t t e r would seem t o be t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e f o r m o f p o r t r a y a l . 
I n d e e d P o c o c k 3 5 p r e s e n t s us w i t h f o u r s k e t c h e s o f ' p e r c e i v e d s t r e e t 
p a t t e r n ' i n c e n t r a l Dundee. A group o f s t u d e n t s were each g i v e n an 
o u t l i n e o f one s t r e e t i n t h e c e n t r e o f Dundee and asked t o complete 
t h e a rea w i t h i n a c i r c l e . I n what way c o u l d t h e s e s k e t c h e s p o s s i b l y 
be d u p l i c a t e s o f some m e n t a l i m a g e 9 And i f t h e y a r e how do we know 
t h a t t h e y a r e c o r r e c t ? I may, f o r example, have a m e n t a l map o f Dundee 
w h i c h c l o s e l y resembles an a c t u a l map o f P e r t h , b u t because I am such a 
bad c a r t o g r a p h e r , when I a t t e m p t t o draw my m e n t a l map i t c l o s e l y 
resembles an a c t u a l map o f Dundee. How t h e n i s t h e geographer t o know 
t h a t my m e n t a l map i s c l o s e r t o t h e map o f P e r t h ? One t h i n g t h a t would 
c e r t a i n l y c o m p l i c a t e t h i s method o f communicating m e n t a l maps w o u l d be 
v a r i a t i o n i n c a r t o g r a p h i c s k i l l s . F u r t h e r , i f one asked t h e same 
group t o s k e t c h t h e c e n t r e o f Dundee t h e f o l l o w i n g week o r even t h e 
f o l l o w i n g day t h e i r maps w o u l d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y d i f f e r f r o m t h e i r l a s t 
a t t e m p t . What t h e n w o u l d be t h e v a l u e t o t h e geographer o f t h e s e v e r y 
t e m p o r a r y m e n t a l images? 
Stea a t t e m p t s t o a v o i d some o f t h e s e problems by c l a i m i n g t h a t 
t h e s t u d y o f m e n t a l maps need n o t n e c e s s a r i l y be 'geography i n t h e head' . 
" I t m a t t e r s n o t a w h i t , " he adds, " t h a t we cannot d i r e c t l y observe a 
'mental map 1 o r even t h a t we cannot know f o r sure t h a t i t i s a c t u a l l y 
' t h e r e ' ; i f a s u b j e c t behaves as i f such a map e x i s t e d , i t i s s u f f i c i e n t 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e m o d e l . " 3 6 But t h i s i s no s o l u t i o n , f o r i n o r d e r 
3 5 D.CD.Pocock (1972) p.118 
3 6 D. S t e a , o p . c i t . , p.135 
t o know t h a t someone i s b e h a v i n g as i f he were f o l l o w i n g a m e n t a l map 
we must f i r s t know what i t w o uld be f o r someone t o be f o l l o w i n g a 
m e n t a l map and t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what we c o u l d n o t make sense o f i n 
t h e f i r s t p l a c e . The coherence o f t h e remark 'he r u s h e d up t h e 
s t r e e t as i f he were b e i n g p u r s u e d by t h e p o l i c e ' depends e n t i r e l y 
upon t h e coherence o f t h e remark 'he r u s h e d up t h e s t r e e t pursued by 
t h e p o l i c e 1 . I f t h e l a t t e r i s u n i n t e l l i g i b l e t h e n so i s t h e f o r m e r . 
I n t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r i t appears t o be no h e l p a t a l l 
t o a p p e a l t o m e n t a l maps. I may make my way f r o m A t o B by a 
c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e , b u t t h a t b e h a v i o u r i s n o t i n any way e x p l a i n e d by 
r e m a r k i n g t h a t I was f o l l o w i n g my m e n t a l map. I f t h i s m e n t a l image 
i s some s o r t o f p e r s o n a l i d e a o f t h e l a y o u t o f a c i t y , t h e n i n any 
p a r t i c u l a r case we can n e v e r t e l l i f someone i s f o l l o w i n g h i s p r i v a t e 
map o r n o t . I f , on t h e o t h e r hand, i t i s i m p o s s i b l e f o r him n o t t o 
f o l l o w i t t h e n how c o u l d we d i s t i n g u i s h between h i s m i s t a k e s and t h e 
i d i o s y n c r a s i e s o f h i s p e r s o n a l iamge? Suppose t h a t i n t a k i n g a 
c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e f r o m A t o B, I had i n f a c t made a m i s t a k e and had 
imag i n e d t h a t t h e r o u t e I had t a k e n was t h e s h o r t e s t one between t h e 
two p o i n t s . I f we a r e t o c l a i m t h a t I was a t t h e same t i m e f o l l o w i n g 
my m e n t a l map - t h i s was what I supposed t o be t h e s h o r t e s t p a t h - t h e n 
e i t h e r t h e r e i s no room f o r s u g g e s t i n g t h a t I made a m i s t a k e ( a nd t h i s 
w o u l d seem a b s u r d as I m i g h t be aware even b e f o r e a r r i v i n g a t B t h a t I 
had n o t a c t u a l l y chosen t h e s h o r t e s t r o u t e ) , o r we would have t o say 
t h a t my m e n t a l map i t s e l f was m i s t a k e n , and t h i s , a p a r t f r o m r e d u c i n g 
t h e c l a i m s o f d i f f e r e n t i a l p e r c e p t i o n t o 'some p e o p l e a c t on wrong 
i n f o r m a t i o n ' i s s i m p l y a m i s l e a d i n g way o f s a y i n g t h a t I f o r g o t o r 
d i d n ' t know about t h e s h o r t e r r o u t e . What d i f f e r e n c e w o u l d i t have 
made t o t h e f o u r maps o f c e n t r a l Dundee o f f e r e d by Pocock i f t h e 
s t u d e n t s had s i m p l y been asked t o draw what t h e y remembered o f t h e 
l a y o u t o f t h e c e n t r e o f t h e c i t y 9 None. And y e t an account based 
on what i s remembered does n o t r e q u i r e p r o b l e m a t i c c l a i m s c o n c e r n i n g 
' s u b j e c t i v e r e a l i t i e s ' . 
The f o r m o f e x p l a n a t i o n a p p r o p r i a t e t o a c t i o n s o f t h i s s o r t i s 
t h e advancement o f reasons f o r a c t i n g , and t o c l a i m t h a t I went f r o m 
A t o B by some ro u n d a b o u t way because I was f o l l o w i n g my m e n t a l map 
i s t o f a i l t o meet t h e b a s i c c r i t e r i a o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . We a l l know 
what i t i s t o remember because we a r e always remembering p l a c e s we have 
seen, t h i n g s we have done e t c . We c e r t a i n l y f i n d o u r way around a 
town s u c c e s s f u l l y because we have remembered t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e p l a c e s 
we wished t o v i s i t , b u t t h e n t h i s i s no g r e a t r e v e l a t i o n f o r we cannot 
a c t upon i n f o r m a t i o n we have f o r g o t t e n . We a l s o u n d e r s t a n d w e l l what 
i t i s t o have a s l i p o f memory o r t o be m i s t a k e n about something we 
c l a i m e d t o remember; so t h i s a c c o u n t copes b e t t e r w i t h such everyday 
occurrences t h a n does t h a t o f t h e m e n t a l map. 
We have seen t h a t t h e c l a i m t h a t a p e r s o n can be s a i d t o have o r 
possess, i n some s t r o n g sense, a m e n t a l map, cannot be r e n d e r e d c o h e r e n t , 
f o r t h e n o t i o n o f p o s s e s s i o n i s o n l y a p p r o p r i a t e i n r e l a t i o n t o m a t e r i a l 
o b j e c t s . The f a c t - t h a t we can see o b j e c t s and hear sounds a t one t i m e 
and r e c a l l them l a t e r does n o t i m p l y t h a t t h e y must have been s t o r e d 
somewhere i n between t i m e s . I f one asks 'where does a f l a m e come f r o m 
when we s t r i k e a match?', c l e a r l y we a r e n o t l o o k i n g f o r an answer i n 
terms o f a p h y s i c a l l o c a t i o n , f o r f l a m e s a r e n o t t h e s o r t o f t h i n g s t h a t 
c o u l d be s t o r e d anywhere. I n t h e same way memories a r e n o t t h e s o r t s o f 
t h i n g s about w h i c h i t makes sense t o c l a i m t h a t t h e y a r e s t o r e d somewhere. 
Because o f t h i s t h e conce p t o f a m e n t a l map l o s e s much o f i t s a p p e a l and 
i s reduced t o t h e weaker c l a i m about p e o p l e b e h a v i n g as i f t h e y were 
f o l l o w i n g such a map. As we have seen t h i s a v o i d s none o f t h e p r o b l e m s , 
f o r i f t h e s t r o n g e r c l a i m i s t o be d e c l a r e d i n c o h e r e n t t h e n so a l s o must 
t h e weaker c l a i m . E x p l a n a t i o n i n t h e sphere o f s p a t i a l b e h a v i o u r g a i n s 
n o t h i n g by a p p e a l i n g t o n o t i o n s o f image s t o r a g e . I n everyday l i f e 
we know v e r y w e l l how t o e x p l a i n p e o p l e ' s b e h a v i o u r . We do i t a l l 
t h e t i m e . I f t h e n we a r e t o a t t e m p t g e n e r a l i s e d e x p l a n a t i o n s about 
such b e h a v i o u r s u r e l y t h e y must embrace t h e same f o r m as t h o s e we 
a l r e a d y use. 
We have seen t h a t f o r sense p e r c e p t i o n t h e o b j e c t i v e / s u b j e c t i v e 
d i s t i n c t i o n b r e a k s down. What we see, h e a r , t o u c h e t c . j u s t i s t h e 
m a t e r i a l w o r l d , a l b e i t n o t i n e v e r y d e t a i l . The problems w h i c h a r i s e 
i n t h i s sphere a r e ones o f i d e n t i f y i n g o b j e c t s ; t h a t i s ones c o n c e r n i n g 
use o f language. Many geographers have b u i l t i n a number o f 
d i f f i c u l t i e s t o t h e i r i n i t i a l d e f i n i t i o n s o f p e r c e p t i o n and have 
a p p a r e n t l y f a i l e d t o r e a l i s e t h a t i t i s t h e s e b a s i c n o t i o n s o f what 
p e r c e p t i o n i s t h a t r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . There appear t o be two 
a s p e c t s t o p e r c e p t i o n s t u d i e s . The f i r s t concerns t h e p h y s i c a l 
p r o c e s s e s i n v o l v e d , and i s t h e domain o f t h e n e u r o l o g i s t . The second 
concerns ~che c o n c e p t u a l schema w h i c h an i n d i v i d u a l uses boxh t o make 
sense o f what he sees and t o communicate h i s p e r c e p t i o n s t o o t h e r s . 
I t i s t h e l a t t e r w h i c h must be t h e concern o f e x p l a n a t i o n s o f b e h a v i o u r , 
and t h e concepts o f w h i c h a r e t h e ~ c o n c e p t s o f t h e language he speaks. 
The s t u d y o f m e n t a l maps as s p a t i a l images i s , i t seems, c o u n t e r -
p r o d u c t i v e i f one i s concerned t o d e v e l o p b e h a v i o u r a l t h e o r y . 
P e r c e p t i o n and s i g n i f i c a n c e : 
What t h e n i s l e f t o f p e r c e p t i o n s t u d i e s 9 L o o k i n g a t t h e 
l i t e r a t u r e t h e r e seems t o be y e t a n o t h e r a s p e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n , b u t an 
a s p e c t w h i c h has become so i n t e r w o v e n w i t h t h e s u b j e c t i v e / o b j e c t i v e 
d i s t i n c t i o n and t h e e l i c i t a t i o n o f images, t h a t i t has become submerged 
i n t h e g r o w i n g c o n f u s i o n . B e f o r e a t t e m p t i n g i t s e l u c i d a t i o n , however, 
i t seems w i s e t o d w e l l b r i e f l y on t h e r e l e v a n c e o f such s t u d i e s t o 
human geography. What i s i t t h a t we a r e t r y i n g t o e x p l a i n and i n what 
way c o u l d p e r c e p t i o n s t u d i e s a i d o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g ? Geographers 
w r i t i n g m t h i s a r e a appear t o e n t e r t a i n few doubts as t o t h e r e l e v a n c e 
o f t h e i r work t o b e h a v i o u r a l s t u d i e s . S o n n e n f e l d r e m a r k s , " u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
o f t h e sources o f v a r i a n c e i n e n v i r o n m e n t a l p e r c e p t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l t o an 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f man's e n v i r o n m e n t a l b e h a v i o u r s , " 3 7 and L.J.Wood w r i t e s 
i n t h e same v e i n , " t h e e x p l a n a t i o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e v a s t range 
o f m a t e r i a l w h i c h human geographers s t u d y .... can be g r e a t l y i n c r e a s e d 
by c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f h i s e n v i r o n m e n t . " 3 8 
F i n a l l y Bordessa c o n f i r m s t h i s c o n f i d e n c e when he d e c l a r e s " t h e b a s i c 
r e a s o n f o r t h e development o f p e r c e p t i o n s t u d i e s i n Geography i s t o a i d 
i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g s p a t i a l b e h a v i o u r . " 3 9 Few w r i t e r s , however, have 
a t t e m p t e d t o s p e c i f y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p e r c e p t i o n s and t h e 
r e s u l t a n t a c t i o n s o r ' o v e r t r e s p o n s e ' . S a r r e c o m p l a i n s t h a t a l t h o u g h 
Gould (1966) c o n c e n t r a t e d on e v a l u a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n d e s c r i p t i o n , and 
a l t h o u g h t h i s i s c o n c e p t u a l l y c l o s e r t o b e h a v i o u r t h a n some o f t h e 
d e s c r i p t i v e c o n c e p t s , he made no a t t e m p t t o l i n k responses o p e r a t i o n a l l y 
w i t h any f o r m o f b e h a v i o u r . Gould's approach, however, appears t o be 
u n a b l e t o advance t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f m i g r a t i o n and t h u s i t s u s e f u l n e s s 
f o r p r e d i c t i o n i s s e v e r e l y l i m i t e d . S a r r e c l a i m s t h a t "we a r e c l o s e r 
t o b e i n g a b l e t o p r e d i c t w hether a pe r s o n w i l l go t o r e s o r t A o r B f o r 
h i s h o l i d a y i f we know t h a t he p r e f e r s A t o B t h a n i f we know he t h i n k s 
A i s i n t h e south-west w h i l e B i s i n t h e s o u t h - e a s t . " T h i s w o u l d be 
t r u e o f co u r s e o n l y i f we knew t h a t t h e p e r s o n p r e f e r r e d A as a h o l i d a y 
r e s o r t t o B as a h o l i d a y r e s o r t . I f however an academic p r e f e r r e d A 
because i t p r o v i d e d t h e b e t t e r l i b r a r y f a c i l i t i e s , t h i s m i g h t p r o v e a 
3 7 J . S o n n e n f e l d (1967) p.42 
3 8 L.J.Wood (1970) p.129 
3 9 R. Bordessa (1969) p.3 
v e r y good reason f o r h i s n o t g o i n g t h e r e f o r a h o l i d a y . I f t h e n t h e 
q u e s t i o n e r must ask w h i c h h o l i d a y r e s o r t an i n d i v i d u a l p r e f e r s i n o r d e r 
t o p r e d i c t where he w i l l go f o r h i s h o l i d a y s , one wonders why, i n t h e 
f i r s t p l a c e , he doesn't s i m p l y ask t h e i n t e r v i e w e e where he i s g o i n g 
f o r h i s h o l i d a y s and s e t t l e t h e m a t t e r . 
There a r e many i n c i d e n c e s o f human b e h a v i o u r t h a t geographers 
m i g h t be concerned t o u n d e r s t a n d o r e x p l a i n , and t h e r e has been a r e c e n t 
and g r o w i n g p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h t h e development o f t h e o r y i n t h e s t u d y o f 
l o c a t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r . I t i s n o t any i n c i d e n c e o f human b e h a v i o u r w h i c h 
i s o f i n t e r e s t h e r e , b u t o n l y such b e h a v i o u r ( e . g . r e s i d e n t i a l c h o i c e ) 
as would r e l a t e t o t h e w i d e r g e o g r a p h i c a l c o n c e r n o f s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s . 
F u r t h e r , t h e common s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h o s e who seek a t h e o r e t i c a l base f o r 
t h e i r s u b j e c t i s t h a t t h e y must f i r s t supercede t h e i d i o s y n c r a c i e s o f t h e 
u n i q u e . T h i s r e s u l t s i n s e v e r a l problems f o r t h o s e who have adopted a 
b e h a v i o u r a l approach. Having s t a r t e d w i t h t h e u n i q u e o r i n d i v i d u a l 
d e c i s i o n they mub, L t h e n , a p p a r e n t l y , move t o somexhing more g e n e r a l . I t 
i s i n t h e l i g h t o f t h i s n o t i o n o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l t h a t we can d i s c u s s t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f an approach h i n t e d a t by many ge o g r a p h e r s . 
What we have examined i n t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h i s s e c t i o n i s sense 
p e r c e p t i o n , i e . s e e i n g , h e a r i n g , t o u c h i n g , s m e l l i n g , t a s t i n g , and i t 
appears t h a t t h e r e l e v a n t problems i n t h i s f i e l d a r e t h o s e connected 
w i t h t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f o b j e c t s , i e . w i t h t h e use o f language. And 
y e t t h e r e appears t o be an a s p e c t o f p e r c e p t i o n i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e w h i c h 
does n o t f i t i n w i t h t h i s a n a l y s i s . Pocock w r i t e s "an a t t i t u d e d i s p o s e s 
an i n d i v i d u a l t o behave o r p e r c e i v e s i t u a t i o n s i n a p a r t i c u l a r w a y . " 4 0 
But t h i s i s a use o f p e r c e p t i o n o t h e r t h a n t h a t o f a p p r e h e n s i o n by t h e 
senses. I f one a s k s , 'do you see t h e d i s t i n c t i o n ' ' ' , t h i s i s n o t t o use 
D.CD.Pocock (1973) p.5 
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'see' i n t h e l i t e r a l sense, b u t r a t h e r t o use t h e word m e t a p h o r i c a l l y . 
D i s t i n c t i o n s cannot be seen m t h e same way as cha x r s and t a b l e s . 
L i k e w i s e t h e word ' p e r c e p t i o n ' has o f t e n been used m e t a p h o r i c a l l y b u t , 
because t h e c o n t e x t has n o t been so a p p a r e n t as i n t h e case o f 'se e i n g 
a d i s t i n c t i o n ' , many w r i t e r s have t r e a t e d t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s l i t e r a l l y . 
T h i s has been, p o s s i b l y , t h e l a r g e s t s o u r c e o f c o n f u s i o n i n p e r c e p t i o n 
s t u d i e s . To a v o i d f u r t h e r m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , we s h a l l a v o i d 
u s i n g t h e word p e r c e p t i o n m t h i s p o t e n t i a l l y m i s l e a d i n g way, and t a l k 
i n s t e a d o f s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
We have seen t h a t sense p e r c e p t i o n s depend on t h e r u l e s o f language 
and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f phenomena a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s e r u l e s . I n t h i s 
t h e r e can be n o t h i n g u n i q u e about each man's 'image'. What can v a r y , 
however, a r e t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f c e r t a i n c o n c e p t s o r t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
l e n t t o them. T h i s has n o t h i n g t o do w i t h sense p e r c e p t i o n as such. 
Prokop has come c l o s e s t t o r e c o g n i s i n g t h i s v a r i a b i l i t y : 
The image w h i c h a c i t y d w e l l e r possesses o f n i s own 
c i t y ( a nd o f o t h e r c i t i e s ) i s s t r u c t u r e d by h i s own 
a c t i v i t i e s , by t h e frames w h i c h h i s membership groups s e t 
f o r h i m , and by t h e f u n c t i o n s w h i c h t h e c i t y o r p a r t s o f 
t h e c i t y f u l f i l l f o r h i m , f o r h i s g r o u p s , and f o r o t h e r 
groups ( o r s o c i e t i e s ) . Many o f h i s a c t i v i t i e s a r e 
i n f l u e n c e d by h i s s o c i a l s t a t u s o r c l a s s - and t h e r e a r e 
o t h e r s t a t u s e s t o o , and as a consequence t h e a c t i v i t i e s 
o f o t h e r c l a s s e s r e m a i n unknown t o him: so do t h e p l a c e s 
where t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e s e s o c i a l l y i n v i s i b l e groups 
o r s t r a t a t a k e p l a c e . 1 * 1 
I n o t h e r words t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f v a r i o u s p a r t s o f t h e c i t y changes 
depending on one's r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h them. For t h e Dundee j u t e m i l l 
w o r k e r t h e m i l l a r e a w i l l n a t u r a l l y have p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e as w i l l 
t h e u n i v e r s i t y a r e a f o r t h e s t u d e n t , t h o u g h each may be u n f a m i l i a r w i t h 
o r unaware o f t h e o t h e r ' s p l a c e o f work. I n t h e same way t h e 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f a r u r a l l andscape w i l l change depending on whether one 
D. Prokop (1967) p.28 
i s s u r v e y i n g i t as a g e o m o r p h o l o g i s t o r as a camper. On t h e one hand a 
v a l l e y may be o f i n t e r e s t as e v i d e n c e o f g l a c i a t i o n , w h i l e on t h e o t h e r 
i t s s i g n i f i c a n c e may be as a s h e l t e r e d s p o t f o r s e t t i n g up camp. I n 
t h i s example t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e scene t o each i n d i v i d u a l i s 
d i f f e r e n t . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s o u r c e o f v a r i a n c e , however, i t 
i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l as a g e o m o r p h o l o g i s t o r as a camper t h a t we must 
c o n s i d e r . F o l l o w i n g Prokop i t may be contended t h a t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
d e r i v e s f r o m t h e frames w h i c h an i n d i v i d u a l ' s membership groups s e t f o r 
him. Thus i t i s n o t t h e i n d i v i d u a l as such i n w h i c h we s h o u l d be 
i n t e r e s t e d b u t r a t h e r t h e group o f g e o m o r p h o l o g i s t s o r t h e group o f 
campers. An i n d i v i d u a l ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r scene, o r t h e 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i t has f o r him, can t h e m s e l v e s b e s t be u n d e r s t o o d by 
t h i n k i n g o f him as a member o f a group and d i s c o v e r i n g t h a t group's 
frame o f r e f e r e n c e . Of course one i n d i v i d u a l i s l i k e l y t o be a member 
o f more t h a n one group. For example, he c o u l d be b o t h a g e o m o r p h o l o g i s t 
and a camper. T h i s w o u l d i n no way i n v a l i d a t e t h e f o r m o f t h e a n a l y s i s 
f o r one s t i l l r e q u i r e s r e f e r e n c e t o group s i g n i f i c a n c e s . I f t h e a c t i o n 
we a r e s e e k i n g t o e x p l a i n i s t h e p i t c h i n g o f t h e t e n t ( i e . i f we want t o 
answer t h e q u e s t i o n 'why d i d he p i t c h h i s t e n t on t h a t s p o t 9 ' ) what we 
would be i n t e r e s t e d i n i s how e x p e r i e n c e d a camper t h e p e r s o n i s and t h e 
s o r t s o f t h i n g s campers f i n d s i g n i f i c a n t eg. f l a t , s h e l t e r e d s p o t s above 
t h e f l o o d l e v e l o f t h e r i v e r o r s t r e a m . To know t h a t t h i s man i s a l s o 
a g e o m o r p h o l o g i s t i s u n l i k e l y t o h e l p i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r e x p l a n a t i o n . 
We w ould need t o d i s c o v e r , t h e r e f o r e , n o t o n l y w h i c h groups t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
may be a member o f , b u t more i m p o r t a n t l y w h i c h groups a r e r e l e v a n t t o any 
p a r t i c u l a r e x p l a n a t i o n . 
Suppose, i n t h e sphere o f u r b a n geography a g a i n , t h a t one i s t r y i n g 
t o e x p l a i n changes i n t h e r e s i d e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c i t y , d e f i n e d i n 
terms o f s o c i o - e c o n o m i c g r o u p s . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e s h i f t s o f 
t h e s e groups i n t h e s e terms one must f i r s t t h i n k o f t h e s o c i a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f v a r i o u s p a r t s o f t h e c i t y ; t h a t i s , t h e frames w i t h i n 
w h i c h each s o c i a l group o p e r a t e s . Such an approach i s n o t new f o r 
i t has been t h e p r a c t i c e o f s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s f o r o v e r a c e n t u r y t o 
t a l k i n t h i s way. The u r b a n geographer m i g h t f i n d i t e q u a l l y f r u i t f u l 
t o t u r n h i s a t t e n t i o n i n a s i m i l a r d i r e c t i o n . H i s concern w o u l d t h e n 
be t o examine r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n and d e c i s i o n making a c c o r d i n g t o t h e 
d i f f e r i n g p e r s p e c t i v e s o f v a r i o u s s o c i a l g r o u p i n g s and t o e x p l a i n 
o b s e r v e d r e g u l a r i t i e s t h e r e b y . For example, i t may be t h a t t h e 
p r o s p e c t o f a c q u i r i n g a home has v a r y i n g g e o g r a p h i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l g r o u p s . To t h e u r b a n w o r k i n g c l a s s t h e r e s i d e n t i a l 
g e o g r a p h i c a l h o r i z o n s may be l i m i t e d by t h e f a c t t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s o f 
a c q u i r i n g a home c o n s i s t s s i m p l y i n j o i n i n g t h e c o u n c i l h o u s i n g l i s t . 
T h i s w o u l d a l m o s t c e r t a i n l y n o t be t h e case f o r t h e company d i r e c t o r . 
What i s i m p o r t a n t h e r e i s n o t i d i o s y n c r a t i c p e r c e p t i o n b u t t h e f a c t 
t h a t g e o g r a p h i c a l areas have s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . 1 * 2 C r u c i a l , t h e n , 
TO any e x p l a n a t i o n o f changes i n t h e r e s i d e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f a c i t y 
w i l l be t h e h i s t o r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e ch a n g i n g s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f p a r t s o f t h a t c i t y . I n such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t e r e s t would f o c u s 
upon t h e grcfup and n o t t h e i n d i v i d u a l , as t h e u n i t o f s t u d y , and 
c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e s t u d y o f i n d i v i d u a l 
d e c i s i o n s w o u ld be a v o i d e d . 
Would t h i s be an a c c e p t a b l e approach? To abandon t h e i n d i v i d u a l 
may d i s p e n s e w i t h c e r t a i n c o m p l e x i t i e s , b u t do we n o t embrace o t h e r s 
when we a t t e m p t t o d e l i m i t t h e r e l e v a n t g r o u p s 9 S a a r i n e n comments 
t h a t p e r c e p t i o n " a l s o v a r i e s w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s p a s t h i s t o r y , and 
p r e s e n t ' s e t ' o r a t t i t u d e a c t i n g t h r o u g h v a l u e s , needs, memories, moods, 
4 2 ' S o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e ' need n o t be u n d e r s t o o d m e r e l y as ' p r e s t i g e 
v a l u e ' . V a r i o u s areas o f t h e c i t y w i l l n o t appear as r e s i d e n t i a l 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o v a r i o u s s o c i a l groups f o r many r e a s o n s , n o t a l l 
o f w h i c h w i l l be concerned w i t h t h e s t a t u s o r p r e s t i g e o f t h e s e 
a r e a s . 
54. 
s o c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s and e x p e c t a t i o n s " . 3 I t i s t h e needs o f t h e 
moment, t h e " h a s t e , a n g e r , hunger, i l l n e s s , f o r i n s t a n c e , " w h i c h we 
a r e t o l d , "would h i g h l y c o l o u r t h e response t o a p a r t i c u l a r 
e n v i r o n m e n t . " 4 4 I f , however, we a r e n o t concerned w i t h t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n i t s e l f , t h e p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s 
c a nnot be o f g e n e r a l r e l e v a n c e . Nor i s i t e v i d e n t t h a t t h o s e a c t i o n s 
w h i c h s p r i n g f r o m t h e i n d i v i d u a l m o t i v e s o f anger, h a s t e e t c . , o f t e n 
have m a j o r g e o g r a p h i c a l r e p e r c u s s i o n s . Though t h e approach we have 
i s o l a t e d may reduce t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f s t u d y i n g such a wide v a r i e t y 
o f b e h a v i o u r a l r e s p o n s e s , i t remains t o be seen whether i t s o l v e s t h e 
problem w i t h w h i c h t h e t h e s i s began. 
I n t h i s p a r t o f Chapter 2 we have t r i e d t o make sense o f t h e 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t p e o p l e 'see' t h e c i t y d i f f e r e n t l y and have c o n c l u d e d 
t h a t t h i s cannot be done by a p p e a l i n g t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n p e r c e p t i o n as 
i t i s commonly u n d e r s t o o d . R a t h e r , our c o n c e r n must be w i t h t h e 
v a r i a t i o n i n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f c e r t a i n p a r t s o f t h e c i t y t o p a r t i c u l a r 
groups o f p e o p l e . I f we a r e t r y i n g t o d e v e l o p ways o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g and 
e x p l a i n i n g changes i n ~ t h e r e s i d e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c i t y , " we must 
a t t e n d t o t h e a s p e c t s o f t h e c i t y o r t h e h o u s i n g market w h i c h may be o f 
s i g n i f i c a n c e i n t h e c h o i c e o f r e s i d e n c e . These s i g n i f i c a n c e s w o u ld n o t 
be i d i o s y n c r a t i c f o r t h e y a r e dependent upon group norms and group 
p e r s p e c t i v e s . Our s t u d y w o u l d r e q u i r e , f i r s t , t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f 
t h e r e s i d e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e f r o m e x i s t i n g e v i d e n c e ( e g . census r e t u r n s ) 
and t h e d e t a i l i n g o f i t s changes f r o m one p e r i o d t o t h e n e x t . And, 
s e c o n d l y , t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e p e r s p e c t i v e s o r frames o f t h e v a r i o u s 
groups w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e i r r e s i d e n t i a l b e h a v i o u r , t h e d i s c o v e r y o f 
t h e i r needs, e x p e c t a t i o n s and perhaps even t h e i r moods, and t h e 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f ' t h e p l a c e o f r e s i d e n c e ' and 
1 + 3 T.F.Saarinen (1969) p. 5 
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' a c q u i r i n g a home' f o r these various groups. The study o f urban 
geography, t h e r e f o r e , would become a t once h i s t o r i c a l and conceptual. 
I I 
THE STUDY OF THE INDIVIDUAL: 
I t may seem t h a t the conclusions of the previous s e c t i o n accord 
w e l l w i t h the behavioural methodology. Many geographers would claim 
t h a t the development o f behavioural theory depends on studying the 
i n d i v i d u a l not as a unique agent but as a member o f a group o r , perhaps, 
as the paradigm case o f a type o f person. They f u r t h e r suppose t h a t i f 
we can o u t l i n e the mechanics o f i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n making we are w e l l 
on our way t o e x p l a i n i n g ' a c t i o n p a t t e r n s ' . The u l t i m a t e concern of 
the geographer would be w i t h such general p a t t e r n s . This i s the 
methodology o f f e r e d t o us by most behavioural t h e o r i s t s . 4 5 I t i s a 
framework which re q u i r e s f u r t h e r examination, however, f o r what i s the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l and the 
behavioural p a t t e r n o r c o l l e c t i v e action? How f a r can we go i n 
e x p l a i n i n g the actions of i n d i v i d u a l s , and what s o r t o f grouping of 
human agents would a t h e o r e t i c a l analysis o f behaviour require? I t 
i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l agent 
and more general statements concerning a c t i o n p a t t e r n s which provides the 
theme o f t h i s s e c t i o n . This r e l a t i o n s h i p i s widely recognised as being 
problematic. Hudson, f o r example, i n a recent a r t i c l e , discusses one 
method o f 'Linking studies o f the i n d i v i d u a l w i t h models of aggregate 
4 5 See, f o r example, Wolpert (1965). His i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the common 
components o f m i g r a t i o n behaviour although h i s a n a l y s i s concerns the 
i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n t o migrate. 
And Harvey (1970 p.57) makes a s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n when he suggests 
t h a t " i n d i v i d u a l s possess some p r o p o r t i o n (as y e t undetermined) of 
'common image' derived from some group norms , and a p r o p o r t i o n 
o f 'unique image' which i s h i g h l y i d i o s y n c r a t i c and unp r e d i c t a b l e " . 
b e h a v i o u r ' 4 5 and, a f t e r an e m p i r i c a l examination o f the behaviour of 
shoppers, recognises the serious problems i n v o l v e d i n "attempting t o 
combine such people i n t o groups t h a t were homogeneous w i t h respect t o 
t h e i r choice p r o c e s s " . 4 7 Whatever the r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s problem, 
however, the geographer w i l l s t i l l experience l i m i t s t o h i s a b i l i t y 
t o e x p l a i n and these l i m i t s w i l l be set by the nature of the task i n 
hand. 
The i n d i v i d u a l and the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f evidence: 
I n l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s i t must be allowed t h a t p a r t i c u l a r a ctions 
of a s p e c i f i c nameable i n d i v i d u a l may provide f i t subject matter f o r the 
human geographer. I f one i s puzzled by, f o r example, the existence of 
a c e r t a i n type o f b u i l d i n g i n an area which has been designed as a 
whole (eg. the New Town o f Edinburgh) then t o r e f e r t o the a r c h i t e c t ' s 
reasons f o r i n c l u d i n g such a b u i l d i n g i n h i s o r i g i n a l plan _is_ t o e x p l a i n 
i t s p o s i t i o n and i t s design. Such reasons could be a r c h i t e c t u r a l . I t 
could be pointed o u t , f o r example, t h a t the low e l e v a t i o n allows a 
panoramic view from the opposite side of the s t r e e t . Or they could be 
pragmatic. Perhaps money was short and a b u i l d i n g o f low e l e v a t i o n i n 
t h i s p o s i t i o n allowed a considerable saving. I f the a r c h i t e c t i s w e l l 
known then there i s l i k e l y t o be a considerable body of evidence 
r e l a t i n g t o h i s a r c h i t e c t u r a l achievements. This could include d i a r i e s , 
memoires and the o r i g i n a l documents presented t o the town c o u n c i l 
d e t a i l i n g the p r o j e c t e d scheme. I t i s evidence o f t h i s s o r t which must 
provide the m a t e r i a l f o r our explanation i n a l l cases where we are not 
d e a l i n g w i t h the a c t i o n s of l i v i n g i n d i v i d u a l s . The extent of t h i s 
• u ft 
p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g evidence imposes l i m i t s on our explanation. ° This 
1 + 6 R.Hudson (1976) p.159 
h l I b i d . 
4 8 The d i s t i n c t i o n between e x i s t i n g evidence and a v a i l a b l e evidence i s 
an important one and one t o which we w i l l r e t u r n i n Part 3. 
does not mean t h a t we cannot have i n s p i r e d guesses where the evidence 
i s not conclusive, but only t h a t our explanation must i n some way be 
supported by evidence. Further i t must not be i n c o n f l i c t w i t h any 
known piece o f r e l e v a n t evidence. 
Most of the human agents whose actions are o f i n t e r e s t t o the 
urban geographer, however, w i l l never have enjoyed such prominence as 
the a r c h i t e c t s o f Edinburgh. Their actions are u n l i k e l y t o have been 
documented and the evidence which endures o f what they d i d and why they 
d i d i t may be very scanty indeed. Explanations o f the form suggested 
i n Chapter 1 ( i e . i n terms o f reasons f o r a c t i n g ) are, t h e r e f o r e , 
l i k e l y t o prove d i f f i c u l t . I n f o r m a t i o n about the actions o f or d i n a r y 
people i s f r e q u e n t l y gained only by knowing them personally or 
questioning them d i r e c t l y . Such personal f a m i l i a r i t y cannot be 
sought on a scale s u f f i c i e n t f o r the an a l y s i s o f an urban area, and i t 
i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t behavioural geographers have c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
used questionnaire techniques t o gain the necessary i n f o r m a t i o n about 
t h e i r subjects o f study. There i s p r e s e n t l y much discussion about the 
problems o f survey design and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and f o r those i n v o l v e d i n 
survey work these considerations are c e r t a i n l y important. For the 
urban geographer, however, the p o s s i b i l i t y o f questionnaire work may 
not even present i t s e l f . The layo u t o f many pa r t s o f an urban area 
w i l l have been shaped by people long since dead and they, o b v i o u s l y , 
cannot be questioned d i r e c t l y . I f , then, i t i s the actions o f such 
o r d i n a r y people t h a t are of importance i n urban geography and many other 
areas o f human geography, what evidence o f t h e i r reasons f o r a c t i n g i s 
a v a i l a b l e t o the geographer 9 I f they have not kept d i a r i e s or published 
t h e i r memoirs must we abandon our explanatory e n t e r p r i s e and content 
ourselves w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e or p r e s c r i p t i v e studies? 
The temptation i s t o answer the l a s t question i n the a f f i r m a t i v e 
and declare t h a t the form of explanation a p p r o p r i a t e i n l o c a t i o n a l 
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analysis cannot be r e a l i s e d i n p r a c t i c e . And y e t t h i s i s t o f o r g e t 
one important aspect o f our answers t o simple l o c a t i o n questions. 
We can and do formulate such answers i n terms of reasons f o r a c t i n g 
w i t h o u t r e f e r r i n g t o s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s . Thus i n the case of the 
b i c y c l e i n the k i t c h e n we may simply suppose t h a t someone put i t there 
because i t was r a i n i n g . We may i n f a c t be wrong. Our agent may 
never have n o t i c e d t h a t i t was r a i n i n g and i f t h i s l a t t e r f a c t ever 
came t o l i g h t we would c e r t a i n l y have t o change our account i n the 
face o f the counter-evidence. U n t i l such time, however, t h a t i t is_ 
r a i n i n g provides some support f o r our explanation. As we have seen 
befo r e , the explanation i t s e l f may not be an e n t i r e l y s a t i s f a c t o r y one 
but i t i s an ex p l a n a t i o n , i t does answer our question, and i t i s not 
demonstrably f a l s e . Thus, although evidence i n d i a r y or memoir form 
i s l i k e l y t o be r e s t r i c t e d f o r the o r d i n a r y i n d i v i d u a l , other evidence 
becomes more important, evidence of what could have provided a reason 
f o r X t o act i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. Such evidence i s i n an important 
way impersonal. The claim i s not t h a t a c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l f a c t could 
have provided Napoleon, or Mr. Brown, w i t h a reason f o r a c t i n g i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r way, but t h a t i t could be construed as a reason f o r so a c t i n g 
by anyone i n t h a t s i t u a t i o n . And t h i s i s t o say t h a t i t i s an 
i n t e l l i g i b l e reason. Nevertheless, the explanation i s s t i l l l i m i t e d by 
the extent o f present evidence r e l a t i n g t o the p a r t i c u l a r a ctions i n 
which we are i n t e r e s t e d . 
Two p o i n t s emerge here. F i r s t , i f we are concerned t o make 
general or t h e o r e t i c a l statements about urban s t r u c t u r e then we need not 
be concerned w i t h s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s , although t h e i r a ctions may s t i l l 
be o f i n t e r e s t i n so f a r as they may be regarded as t y p i c a l . And, 
secondly, the present behavioural l i t e r a t u r e could be of use t o the 
l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s t only i n so f a r as the geographic p a t t e r n o f concern 
i s o f recent o r i g i n , f o r the behavioural methodology i s best s u i t e d t o 
contemporary s i t u a t i o n s where the agents i n v o l v e d can themselves be 
questioned. This i s c e r t a i n l y the most d i r e c t manner o f d i s c o v e r i n g 
why i n d i v i d u a l s acted i n a c e r t a i n way. Even here, however, the 
researcher cannot avoid problems and i t w i l l be d i f f i c u l t i n p r a c t i c e 
t o provide an explanation i n terms o f an i n d i v i d u a l ' s reasons f o r 
a c t i n g , not l e a s t when one recognises the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 'hidden' 
reasons. 1* 9 Even when agents can be questioned d i r e c t l y t h e i r own 
explanation o f t h e i r d e c i s i o n or a c t i o n need not be the r i g h t one and 
t o judge t h i s an extended f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h a t agent i s , a p parently, 
a necessity. Hidden reasons w i l l always be d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n . 
The prospects f o r the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t seem grim indeed, f o r he cannot 
p o s s i b l y enjoy the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n o f an observer o f the general 
conduct o f a l l the i n d i v i d u a l s whose decisions and actions he wishes t o 
study. I t would take considerable time and e f f o r t t o become acquainted 
w i t h one man i n order the b e t t e r t o e x p l a i n h i s a c t i o n s , f a r less w i t h 
the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l s who take p a r t i n shaping an urban area. 
Even face t o face i n t e r v i e w s cannot solve a l l the problems a researcher 
w i l l encounter i n the f i e l d o f behavioural s t u d i e s . 
For example, i t would be d i f f i c u l t t o cope w i t h p e r f e c t l y acceptable 
explanations o f the s o r t : 'Joe Smith moved from d i s t r i c t A o f the c i t y 
t o d i s t r i c t B because a number o f Asian immigrants had r e c e n t l y moved 
i n t o d i s t r i c t A', even though Joe Smith h o t l y denied t h a t t h i s had 
anything t o do w i t h h i s d e c i s i o n t o move. That we would not n e c e s s a r i l y 
b e l i e v e Joe Smith i n t h i s case i s apparent. And i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
note t h a t a t t h i s l e v e l i t i s not only the reasons f o r a c t i n g provided 
by the subject h i m s e l f which form the e x p l a n a t i o n , but r a t h e r t h a t the 
way i n which we judge the explanation t o be a good one or a bad one i s 
by an appeal p a r t l y t o such p r o f f e r e d reasons, but more i m p o r t a n t l y t o 
the conduct o f the subject h i m s e l f i n r e l a t i o n t o these s t a t e d reasons. 
Thus Joe Smith may claim t h a t he j u s t thought he would l i k e a change. 
I f we know, however, t h a t he has erected a high fence between h i s garden 
and t h a t o f h i s new neighbours and has been heard, on occasion, t o p r o t e s t 
about the i n f l u x o f Asians, we would be j u s t i f i e d i n d i s b e l i e v i n g t h i s 
c l a i m . Our explanation o f t h e d e c i s i o n t o move, then, would include 
reference t o a c e r t a i n d i s l i k e o f immigrants whether or not Joe Smith 
agreed w i t h our account. 
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That explanations o f human actions w i l l vary i n t h e i r completeness 
i s obvious. Correspondingly some w i l l be more s a t i s f a c t o r y than o t h e r s , 
prompt fewer f u r t h e r questions than others. The behavioural t h e o r i s t 
may argue t h a t the l i m i t s t o such explanatory e n t e r p r i s e s impinge only 
m a r g i n a l l y on h i s work. Whilst he i s concerned t o understand i n d i v i d u a l 
behaviour i t i s only as a step towards understanding a more complex 
whole and i t i s not necessary t o know the m i n u t i a ^ o f p a r t i c u l a r 
decisions i n order t o make general statements about, f o r example, mig r a t i o n 
streams. The extent t o which t h i s does avoid the problems already 
o u t l i n e d must remain an open question f o r i t i s the jump (from d e t a i l e d 
p a r t i c u l a r t o general p a t t e r n ) on which a t t e n t i o n can be most p r o f i t a b l y 
focussed. How are we t o a r r i v e a t general p r o p o s i t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o 
human behaviour? W i t h i n behavioural geography there are two ways m 
which the questions o f the i n d i v i d u a l ' s d e c i s i o n t o act can be approached 
i n order t o y i e l d general statements i n terms o f reasons f o r a c t i n g . 5 0 
We could attempt general statements by t h i n k i n g i n a general manner o f 
any i n d i v i d u a l ' s decision t o change, f o r example, h i s place o f residence. 
We could ask, "What s o r t s o f t h i n g s would someone (anyone) take i n t o 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n when~he wished t o move house?". Or we could s t a r t w i t h 
the p a r t i c u l a r and subsequently attempt t o derive general p r o p o s i t i o n s . 
For example, we could question a s i g n i f i c a n t sample of some po p u l a t i o n 
and then make statements about t h a t p o p u l a t i o n as a whole based on the 
questionnaire r e t u r n s . Both these approaches r e q u i r e more c a r e f u l 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 5 1 
5 0 Our i n t e r e s t being i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the d e c i s i o n t o act 
and the s p a t i a l repercussions o f t h a t d e c i s i o n , a l l we need t o know 
i n order t o e x p l a i n the a c t i o n i s why the agent decided t o act i n t h a t 
manner. We do not need t o know, f o r example, how i n f o r m a t i o n i s 
c o l l e c t e d . I n t h i s way I take work on search behaviour, such as t h a t 
of J.A.Silk (1971), t o be beside the p o i n t i n the present discussion. 
5 1 I t should be noted t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between these two approaches 
does not correspond t o the d e d u c t i v e / i n d u c t i v e dichotomy. 
General statements from general observations: 
Wolpert i n h i s paper 'Behavioral Aspects o f the Decision t o 
M i g r a t e ' 5 2 provides us w i t h a good example o f the former. He does 
not consider a p a r t i c u l a r set of questionnaire r e t u r n s but a r r i v e s 
a t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l framework a f t e r a much more general r e f l e c t i o n on 
the s u b j e c t . Wolpert reveals h i s desire f o r g e n e r a l i t y by suggesting 
t h a t , 
understanding and p r e d i c t i o n of m i g r a t i o n 
streams r e q u i r e determining o f the constants i n 
m i g r a t i o n behavior and d i s t i n g u i s h i n g these from 
the v a r i a b l e s w i t h respect t o p o p u l a t i o n 
composition and place c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which evolve 
d i f f e r e n t i a l l y over t i m e . 5 3 
There are three elements t o Wolpert's framework: place u t i l i t y , search 
behaviour and l i f e c y c l e . The l a t t e r i nvolves the n o t i o n t h a t a t 
c e r t a i n stages i n the l i f e cycle human agents w i l l be more l i k e l y t o 
migrate. The young and unmarried are l i k e l y t o be adventurous m t h i s 
respect and f r e q u e n t l y r e t i r e m e n t i s a time when the i n d i v i d u a l moves 
house. Such general p r o p o s i t i o n s are h a r d l y c o n t e n t i o u s , but over the 
whole l i f e span the p a t t e r n i s vague and p o s s i b l y changes r a p i d l y . 
The economic climate of the time w i l l c e r t a i n l y have an i n f l u e n c e here. 
Wh i l s t Wolpert has pointed t o what may be a r e g u l a r i t y i n m i g r a t i o n 
behaviour the n o t i o n of l i f e cycle as presented i s of minimal use i n 
e x p l a i n i n g such behaviour. I t may make the researcher aware ( i f he 
was ever unaware) o f the f a c t t h a t there are c e r t a i n circumstances i n 
which i n d i v i d u a l agents are l i k e l y t o f i n d i t easier t o move, f o r 
example when ]ob or f a m i l y t i e s are broken. This i n i t s e l f , however, 
only prompts us t o look f o r c e r t a i n s o r t s o f reason r a t h e r than others 
5 2 J. Wolpert (1965) 
5 3 I b i d . p.160 
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and cannot provide us w i t h a ready explanation. 
The second element of Wolpert's model i s search behaviour. 
This appears as a d e s c r i p t i o n o f how an i n d i v i d u a l gains i n f o r m a t i o n 
about other places and i s s a i d t o lead t o the d e l i n e a t i o n of ' a c t i o n 
space'. This, l i k e the work o f S i l k , i s beside the p o i n t i n the 
present d i s c u s s i o n , f o r i t i s not o f relevance t o the explanation o f 
a c t i o n s . We can only attempt t o e x p l a i n actions which have already 
taken place and a c t i o n space as Wolpert conceives i t would be used t o 
p r e d i c t where a person might move i n the f u t u r e . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g 
t o note i n passing, however, t h a t i n p r a c t i c e the d e l i n e a t i o n of the 
a c t i o n space o f one man would be an impossible task f o r the geographer 
f o r again i t would r e q u i r e an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n t o be 
able t o p l o t every s i g n f i c a n t s p a t i a l movement o f an i n d i v i d u a l 
throughout h i s l i f e t i m e . 
The t h i r d and most important element i s place u t i l i t y . T h i s , 
l i k e the economist's n o t i o n o f u t i l i t y , i nvolves a con s i d e r a t i o n o f 
the value an i n d i v i d u a l places on, i n t h i s case, a place. The greater 
the value or u t i l i t y an i n d i v i d u a l considers h i s place o f residence t o 
have the less l i k e l y he i s t o move, and Wolpert supposes t h a t i t i s 
possible t o i s o l a t e the f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e an i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
assessment o f t h i s place u t i l i t y . But the g e n e r a l i t y here i s s u p e r f i c i a l . 
The i n f l u e n c i n g f a c t o r s may vary w i d e l y and, as i t stands, t h i s t h i r d 
element seems t o amount t o the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t , " I f we know t h a t a person 
a t Place A l i k e s another place b e t t e r then we can say t h a t he i s l i k e l y t o 
move, and v i c e versa." C l e a r l y t h i s i s not going t o advance p r e d i c t i o n . 
Could i t ever help t o e x p l a i n m i g r a t i o n , however 9 Wolpert might argue 
w i t h some j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t , f o l l o w i n g the form o f explanation of human 
ac t i o n s o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 1 o f t h i s t h e s i s , the reasons which 
i n d i v i d u a l s have f o r moving house f r e q u e n t l y f a l l i n t o two cat e g o r i e s . 
There w i l l be a set o f reasons f o r l e a v i n g Place A and th e r e w i l l be 
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another set o f reasons f o r choosing place B as the new l o c a t i o n . Both 
o f these sets could be thought of as making up the i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
assessment o f the u t i l i t y o f the p a r t i c u l a r place. I m p o r t a n t l y , 
however, the set o f reasons comes before the n o t i o n o f place u t i l i t y 
here and i t i s these reasons, under whatever heading, t h a t provide the 
i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the explanation. One i s l e f t wondering how the place 
u t i l i t y element could be other than superfluous. 
This, then, i s Wolpert's framework, and one measure o f i t s worth 
must su r e l y l i e i n the extent o f i t s a p p l i c a b i l i t y . S u p e r f i c i a l l y the 
g e n e r a l i t y seems complete. Everybody makes assessments o f places and 
chooses ( i n so f a r as i t i s a matter o f choice) new r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n s 
a c c o r d i n g l y . But would anyone ever have doubted t h i s 9 I t takes no 
ex p e r t i s e whatever t o make general observations a t t h i s l e v e l . We do 
not need t o have undertaken research t o know t h a t most people weigh up 
the pros and cons before making m i g r a t i o n decisions. Wolpert i s not 
alone h e r e , 5 ^ but h i s work i l l u s t r a t e s w e l l the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d 
i n making general statements o f any substance w i t h o u t reference t o the 
s p e c i f i c . Such statements are always i n danger o f being so general as 
t o be t r i v i a l . 
General statements from p a r t i c u l a r observations: 
The a l t e r n a t i v e approach o f attempting t o generalise from a 
l i m i t e d number o f p a r t i c u l a r instances which have been examined i n d e t a i l 
has been adopted by many w r i t e r s . The adaptation of K e l l y ' s 'Personal 
Push/pull models such as t h a t suggested by E.S.Lee (1966) may be 
s a i d t o have been derived from the same general observation as t h a t 
o f Wolpert's n o t i o n o f place u t i l i t y . Both are subj e c t t o the 
c r i t i c i s m p r e s e n t l y advanced. 
Construct Theory' (P.C.T.) f o r use w i t h i n human geography provides 
us w i t h a good example o f such an approach. Those geographers who 
advocate i t s adoption suggest t h a t i t can be app l i e d i n a wide v a r i e t y 
of behavioural contexts. Attempts have been made t o analyse the 
s p a t i a l behaviour o f shoppers, f o r example, w i t h the a i d o f Ke l l y ' s 
t h e o r y . 5 5 K e l l y h i m s e l f , however, being a p r a c t i s i n g p s y c h i a t r i s t , 
i s concerned t o understand the actions o f s p e c i f i c i n d i v i d u a l s . 
He s t a r t s from the premise t h a t i n order t o understand a person's 
ac t i o n s we must f i r s t understand the way i n which t h a t person i n t e r p r e t s 
the various s i t u a t i o n s i n which he f i n d s h i m s e l f . 5 7 F u r t h e r , he 
contends t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l comes t o understand a s i t u a t i o n by e r e c t i n g 
constructs which i n v o l v e s i m i l a r i t y and c o n t r a s t . By drawing on hi s 
previous experience o f s i t u a t i o n s and events, the i n d i v i d u a l notices 
f e a t u r e s which c h a r a c t e r i s e some such s i t u a t i o n s but are u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of o t hers. A l l c o n s t r u c t s , according t o K e l l y , are b i - p o l a r f o r they 
r e l y on c o n t r a s t . This p o l a r i t y has given r i s e , w i t h i n geography, t o 
the technique o f the r e p e r t o r y g r i d on which constructs can be p l o t t e d . 
P.C.T. was, t h e r e f o r e , o r i g i n a l l y developed i n a p r a c t i c a l context. 
K e l l y ' s i n t e r e s t i s i n the 'whole man' and h i s concern i s very much w i t h 
the mental h e a l t h and welfare o f each of h i s p a t i e n t s . As f a r as the 
theory i s concerned i t stands or f a l l s according t o the improvement or 
5 5 see G. K e l l y (1955). P.C.T. i s s a i d t o be a theory about the 
way i n which a person comes t o understand h i s r e a l i t y . I t was 
o r i g i n a l l y developed f o r use i n a psychotherapeutic context but 
has no s i t u a t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i c content. 
5 5 see, f o r instance, R. Hudson (1976) 
This question o f i d i o s y n c r a t i c or personal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f 
s i t u a t i o n s i s a contentious one and one which i s examined i n 
more d e t a i l i n Chapter 3. 
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otherwise i n the c o n d i t i o n o f these p a t i e n t s . For the geographer 
i n t e r e s t e d i n p a t t e r n s of s p a t i a l behaviour the s i t u a t i o n i s r a t h e r 
d i f f e r e n t . He has no such c r i t e r i o n f o r judging the success or 
f a i l u r e o f personal construct methodology i n the new context. 
Further, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note i n passing t h a t i f a l l constructs 
are indeed personal i n the way K e l l y suggests i t i s at l e a s t c o n t r a r y 
t o the s p i r i t of P.C.T. t o attempt t o make general statements about the 
construct employed i n s p e c i f i c behavioural s i t u a t i o n s . Geographers 
do attempt such general statements, however, and i t i s i n s t r u c t i v e t o 
examine both the r e l a t i o n o f P.C.T. t o the explanation of a c t i o n 
p a t t e r n s and the way i n which general statements are derived from 
p a r t i c u l a r instances. 
Researchers who adopt t h i s methodology r e l y h e a v i l y on 
questionnaire surveys and t h i s c l e a r l y r e s t r i c t s the scope of t h e i r 
work t o contemporary s i t u a t i o n s . Such questionnaires need t o be 
c a r e f u l l y designed as the e l i c i t a t i o n o f constructs i s not w i t h o u t i t s 
problems. I t i s not at a l l evident t h a t people do order t h e i r under-
standing according t o simple c o n t r a s t s o f the form good/bad, k i n d / c r u e l 
e t c . 5 8 And even i f i t could be shown t h a t a l l e v a l u a t i o n s , f o r example, 
are reducable t o these b i - p o l a r constructs i t i s c l e a r t h a t few, i f any, 
undirected answers t o the geographer's questions would be given i n such 
a form. The geographer who adopts the P.C.T. methodology i s then faced 
Many o f K e l l y ' s f o l l o w e r s suppose t h a t the c o n t r a s t i n the 
b i - p o l a r c o n s t r u c t i s a personal one; I might evaluate a s i t u a t i o n 
i n terms o f k i n d / c r u e l whereas your c r i t e r i a might be k i n d / c r i t i c a l . 
The proponents o f P.C.T. are force d i n t o an untenable p o s i t i o n here 
i f they want t o claim t h a t the c o n t r a s t i s e n t i r e l y a personal 
matter. I t i s no accident t h a t both ' c r u e l ' and ' c r i t i c a l ' can be 
construed as 'unkind'. We are bound by the meanings o f the words 
and must s u r e l y be prepared t o dismiss a kind/purple c o n s t r u c t , say, 
as nonsense. 
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w i t h the task o f i n t e r p r e t i n g more d e t a i l e d answers i n b i - p o l a r terms. y 
Again i t would seem t h a t i f constructs r e a l l y are personal the geographer 
i s i n no p o s i t i o n t o make a pronouncement about someone else's. More 
important i n the present context, however, i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
the body o f evidence (as t o the reasons f o r the a c t i o n ) and the personal 
constructs which are also thought t o help i n the understanding o f the 
a c t i o n . The answers given t o survey questions would provide us w i t h 
the former. These answers, however they are presented, c o n s t i t u t e 
some o f the a v a i l a b l e evidence from which the explanation o f the a c t i o n 
can be pieced together. Personal constructs i n so f a r as they have t o 
be derived from such answers must be subsequent t o them. And being 
subsequent t o r a t h e r than p a r t o f the body o f evidence i t s e l f , personal 
constructs are t h e r e f o r e superfluous t h e o r e t i c a l devices, since actions 
can be explained p r i o r t o t h e i r f o r m u l a t i o n . 
I t might be objected t h a t personal constructs are no more than a 
s i m p l i f i e d but u s e f u l way o f l i s t i n g the c r i t e r i a one i n d i v i d u a l uses 
to evaluate a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n . I t would not matter, then, i f the 
man i n the s t r e e t were unable t o produce a l i s t of h i s c o n s t r u c t s when 
asked, f o r these would merely be the geographer's shorthand. Even 
supposing we allow a r e v i s i o n o f the o r i g i n a l P.C.T. however, what does 
t h i s imply f o r the understanding o f human a c t i o n s 9 I f we knew t h a t a 
man evaluated a c e r t a i n s i t u a t i o n i n terms o f a cheap/expensive const r u c t 
would we n e c e s s a r i l y know anything about h i s shopping behaviour 9 I f the 
a c t i o n o f i n t e r e s t t o us has already taken place we may f i n d t h a t our 
agent bought h i s g r o c e r i e s , f o r example, i n a supermarket because of the 
cash saving t h i s allowed; t h a t i s , he went t o the supermarket because i t 
A l t e r n a t i v e l y he can, o f course, d i r e c t h i s subjects t o answer 
according t o the b i - p o l a r format. But the theory would thus become 
s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g and as such o f l i t t l e i n t e r e s t . 
was cheaper. This i s a p e r f e c t l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d explanation o f 
h i s a c t i o n and the 'shorthand' method o f rep r e s e n t i n g i t cannot 
enhance our understanding of the s i t u a t i o n . 
I f not e x p l a n a t i o n , what about prediction'' I s t h i s not perhaps 
a sphere i n which P.C.T. can be o f use? Some t h e o r i s t s would argue 
t h a t i f we examine r o u t i n e s i t u a t i o n s m which an i n d i v i d u a l uses a 
construct or set o f constructs again and again, then, once the 
constructs are known, a l l subsequent behaviour of the same k i n d could 
be understood and indeed forecasted. I n p r i n c i p l e i t would be impossible 
t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t the set of constructs would remain unchanged even i n 
r o u t i n e s i t u a t i o n s . And once one allows t h a t the constructs may change, 
the p r e d i c t i o n o f subsequent behaviour i s no longer p o s s i b l e . F u r t h e r , 
even i f an i n d i v i d u a l could be sai d t o employ a constant set of constructs 
i n a given s i t u a t i o n i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r t h a t anything f o l l o w s 
n e c e s s a r i l y f o r h i s f u t u r e b e h a v i o u r . 6 0 P.C.T. cannot help us i n the 
e x p l a i n i n g or f o r e c a s t i n g of the behaviour o f i n d i v i d u a l s . I f i t i s 
u s e f u l , then i t s use must l i e outside the sphere of human geography. 
I f the personal construct methodology cannot help us i n the o v e r a l l 
task o f t h i s t h e s i s ( t h e search f o r ways i n which we can understand and 
exp l a i n human behav i o u r ) , i t can provide us w i t h an i l l u s t r a t i v e example 
o f the way i n which general statements have been derived from p a r t i c u l a r 
observations. The t h e o r i s t employing P.C.T. i s r a r e l y content w i t h the 
c o l l e c t i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n on, say, the shopping behaviour of a number of 
i n d i v i d u a l s . What he wishes t o do i s t o f i n d some way of grouping such 
6 0 An i n d i v i d u a l may always evaluate shops according t o whether they 
are cheap or expensive and may ge n e r a l l y choose the cheap shops 
because they are cheap. We cannot exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y , however, 
t h a t on some occasion he may choose the expensive shop because i t i s 
expensive. 
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i n d i v i d u a l s i n order t o r e v e a l the behavioural p a t t e r n . A f t e r the 
s o r t i n g out o f the questionnaires, the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the r e p e r t o r y 
g r i d and the a p p l i c a t i o n of a s t a t i s t i c a l grouping technique, however 
complex, what emerges are behavioural sub-sets grouped according t o 
shared reasons. These could be reasons f o r choosing c e r t a i n shops r a t h e r 
than o t h e r s , or c e r t a i n shopping centres r a t h e r than others. We would 
thus have a group of people who look mainly f o r c u t - p r i c e shops, another 
group whose primary concern i s w i t h personal s e r v i c e , e t c . General 
statements could be made as t o the percentage of the p o p u l a t i o n i n each 
category and a l i s t could be drawn up o f the main c r i t e r i a used by 
shoppers t o evaluate t h e i r places o f purchase. Such general statements 
would n e c e s s a r i l y be of l i m i t e d g e n e r a l i t y , however, f o r they r e f e r only 
t o the p o p u l a t i o n questioned. Or more c o r r e c t l y , the sphere of reference 
i s l i m i t e d t o the set o f questionnaire r e t u r n s . 6 1 N o n - t r i v i a l statements 
of wider a p p l i c a b i l i t y cannot be generated from such a study. This i s 
because o f the problems involved i n i d e n t i f y i n g the 'same' s i t u a t i o n i n a 
wider context. I t i s t o be noted, however, t h a t when adopting t h i s 
s t r i c t l y i n d u c t i v e reasoning, the groupings on which general statements 
would be based are derived~from professed reasons o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s 
f o r a c t i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner. We have already seen the l i m i t s 
imposed on explanation here f o r a simple i n t e r v i e w does n o t , and cannot, 
take any account of hidden reasons. 
The general and the t r i v i a l : 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n we have discussed the many problems i n v o l v e d i n the 
6 1 The question of the s i z e of sample which can be s a i d t o be 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a p a r t i c u l a r p o p u l a t i o n i s indeed problematic. 
I n the present context i t i s enough t o note t h a t general statements 
about a sample w i l l be a p p l i c a b l e t o the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n only i n so 
f a r as the sample i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h a t p o p u l a t i o n . F u r t h e r , 
since the sample popul a t i o n could e i t h e r misunderstand the questionnaire 
or d e l i b e r a t e l y mislead the researcher, any general statements w i l l be 
d e s c r i p t i v e o f the questionnaire r e t u r n s r a t h e r than o f the i n d i v i d u a l s 
themselves. 
explanation of the actions o f even one i n d i v i d u a l . And the f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f general statements about human behaviour i s no less problematic. 
There are two p o i n t s of primary importance. F i r s t , i n the explanation 
o f human actions the extent t o which we can discover the reasons f o r a 
p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n i s most l i k e l y t o vary according t o whether the agent 
i s a contemporary or an h i s t o r i c a l f i g u r e ( i e . according t o whether he 
can be questioned or not.) The form o f the explanation remains the same, 
however, and the purpose w i l l be t o render the a c t i o n i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The agenfs own account o f h i s reasons f o r a c t i n g need not be d e f i n i t i v e 
(he could be l y i n g , have f o r g o t t e n why, or perhaps even be unaware of the 
' r e a l ' reasons). Thus h i s account i s merely one more piece o f evidence 
which can be used i n support o f the explanation. I t i s i n the judgement 
o f the v a l i d i t y or otherwise o f t h i s account t h a t d i r e c t q u e s t i o n i n g 
provides a considerable advantage. A face t o face i n t e r v i e w f a c i l i t a t e s 
the d e t e c t i o n o f d e l i b e r a t e omissions or misrepresentations, as w e l l as 
p e r m i t t i n g a much f u l l e r e l u c i d a t i o n than i s l i k e l y t o be found i n an 
h i s t o r i c a l document. Nevertheless, the form o f explanation i s h i s t o r i c a l 
and the explanation i t s e l f w i l l be h y p o t h e t i c a l , being supported by the 
a v a i l a b l e evidence. " I f ^ ^ n t ^ e r - e v i c i e n c e were subsequently discovered 
the explanation would have t o be a l t e r e d accordingly or abandoned. The 
l i m i t s t o explanation here, then, are the l i m i t s set by the e x i s t i n g 
evidence. 
Secondly, i t i s apparent t h a t statements o f any g e n e r a l i t y cannot 
be r e a d i l y formulated from such explanations o f the p a r t i c u l a r . General 
conclusions drawn from questionnaire surveys have a r e s t r i c t e d reference 
The nature o f h i s t o r i c a l explanation i s discussed i n Part 2. 
e s p e c i a l l y when expressed i n percentage terms. d Any attempt t o 
extend the scope o f such conclusions e i t h e r i nvolves the researcher 
i n unwarranted inferences or runs a r e a l r i s k o f being t r i v i a l . A 
conclusion such as, "Other t h i n g s being equal ( o r mostly) people w i l l 
choose the cheaper shop r a t h e r than the more expensive one", t e l l s us 
noth i n g t h a t we d i d not know before the in t e r v i e w s took place. Nor 
does the more general s p e c u l a t i o n seem t o add much, f o r i t i s speculation 
and by the very nature o f reasons, o f human a c t i o n s , and o f s o c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n s , one could go on s p e c u l a t i n g ad i n f i n i t u m about why people 
might be l i k e l y t o move house or whatever. Such t r u l y general statements 
as we can make (eg. people move house from A t o B e i t h e r because t h e r e are 
some negative f a c t o r s o p e r a t i n g a t A, some p o s i t i v e f a c t o r s o p e r a t i n g a t B, 
or a combination o f the two i n which the l a t t e r outweighs the former) are 
i n a good sense t r i v i a l . I t takes no ex p e r t i s e t o observe t h a t , i n general, 
people move house e i t h e r because they don't want t o be where they are, or 
because they wanx TO be where they are not. The apparent s o p h i s t i c a t i o n 
of many push/pull p r o p o s i t i o n s i s only apparent and the jargon can only 
deceive the u n r e f l e c t i v e . That many, i f not a l l , general statements 
attempted by geographers espousing the behavioural methodology are of 
t h i s k i n d is'beyond doubt. And i t i s t h i s i n a b i l i t y t o formulate the 
k i n d o f general statements thought t o be necessary f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
of a body o f behavioural t h e o r y , w i t h o u t recourse t o the t r i v i a l , which 
c a l l s i n t o question the search f o r g e n e r a l i t y i t s e l f . 
I n t h i s chapter we have examined the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a behavioural 
approach t o human geography. Over a decade ago the i n e p t i t u d e o f 
6 3 A researcher might c a l c u l a t e t h a t 90% of those i n t e r v i e w e d p r e f e r 
supermarkets t o corner shops because the former are cheaper and o f f e r 
a wider range o f goods. Conclusions o f t h i s s o r t , presented i n 
numerical or percentage terms, r e f e r only t o the sample p o p u l a t i o n . 
economic formulae t o capture the e s s e n t i a l features of human behaviour 
i n a geographical context l e d t o a worthwhile change o f emphasis w i t h i n 
the s u b j e c t . The 'human element' was t o be t a c k l e d d i r e c t l y and no 
longer was r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n t o be thought o f , u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y , i n 
s o l e l y economic terms. Study was t o be concentrated on the a c t u a l 
behaviour o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n order t o gain an understanding of the 
s p a t i a l outcome of t h a t behaviour. Despite the optimism which 
accompanied the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the behavioural methodology, however, 
o r i g i n a l promises o f a substantive body o f behavioural theory have never 
been f u l f i l l e d . Pessimism has replaced optimism, and the enthusiasm 
amongst behavioural researchers appears t o have faded. Why should t h i s 
be so? I t may w e l l be the r e s u l t o f misdirected energies, many o f the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s having ended up i n methodological cul-de-sacs. I t i s 
the behavioural t h e o r i s t ' s f a i l u r e t o consider the coherence o f h i s 
c e n t r a l concepts f i r s t which has l e d him t o t h i s impasse. And any 
an a l y s i s based on the incoherent guaranrees from the outsex The 
i n v a l i d i t y o f i t s r e s u l t s . The n o t i o n o f 'perception' i s a good 
example here. Widely used i n the l i t e r a t u r e , i t i s a n o t i o n which, 
nevertheless, require~s f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h " i t s coherence. 
I f we were 'shut i n our own l i t t l e worlds' i n any strong sense, then 
t h i s would c e r t a i n l y have many i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the understanding and 
e x p l a i n i n g o f human behaviour. On r e f l e c t i o n , however, one cannot avoid 
the conclusion t h a t we do not a l l 'see' t h e world d i f f e r e n t l y i n any 
l i t e r a l sense, f o r what we see depends on the frame o f the language which 
we speak and t h a t i s , and must be, shared. As Winch s u c c i n c t l y puts i t : 
Our idea o f what belongs t o the realm of r e a l i t y i s 
given f o r us i n the language t h a t we use. The 
concepts t h a t we have s e t t l e f o r us the form o f 
the experience we have o f the world. I t may be 
worth reminding ourselves of the t r u i s m t h a t 
when we speak o f the worl d , we are speaking 
o f what we i n f a c t mean by the expression 
'the w o r l d ' . 6 4 
This does not mean t h a t people's opinions of places, other people 
or whatever cannot and do not d i f f e r . F u rther, t h a t people do act upon 
such opinions i s apparent, but opinions are not perceptions. And even 
i f i t was considered important t o discover what people thought o f a 
p a r t i c u l a r place, event or person i n order t o understand t h e i r 
subsequent a c t i o n , i t would s t i l l have t o be admitted t h a t not a l l 
actions are opi n i o n informed i n t h i s way. I f Johnny put the b i c y c l e 
i n the k i t c h e n because i t was r a i n i n g , i t i s q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t t o the 
explanation o f t h a t a c t i o n t h a t Johnny was pleased or otherwise about 
the s t a t e of the weather. The explanation here would be q u i t e 
i n t e l l i g i b l e w i t h o u t any reference t o opinions. Even where the 
i n c l u s i o n o f such a reference i s e s s e n t i a l t o the understanding o f the 
a c t i o n , the explanatory mode would not d i f f e r from the common sense view 
examined i n Chapter 1. From day t o day we are used t o e x p l a i n i n g the 
actions o f those who surround us i n terms of the reasons they had f o r so 
a c t i n g . Any departure from t h i s form o f ex p l a n a t i o n , i n order t o be 
j u s t i f i e d , would have t o provide a demonstrable increase i n understanding 
The understanding sought by most behavioural geographers, however, 
i s not o f the p a r t i c u l a r decision ( o r a c t i o n ) o f one human agent but i s 
more general i n nature. We have seen the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d i n 
t r y i n g t o formulate general p r o p o s i t i o n s about human behaviour w i t h o u t 
recourse t o the t r i v i a l . Yet the search f o r g e n e r a l i t y dominates 
behavioural studies and i s c l o s e l y associated w i t h the declared aim o f 
developing a body of theory. By theory here i s meant, apparently, a 
set o f i n t e r - r e l a t e d statements or laws very much l i k e those o f the 
n a t u r a l sciences. The model which informs the behavioural researcher's 
n o t i o n o f theory i s a s c i e n t i f i c one. The general i s equated w i t h the 
6 4 P. Winch (1958) p.15 
t h e o r e t i c a l and the hope i s f o r the discovery of laws of human 
behaviour. The very p a u c i t y o f the general statements contained i n 
the present l i t e r a t u r e , however, c a l l s i n t o question the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of producing substantive s c i e n t i f i c theory. Could 'laws' of human 
behaviour ever be equivalent t o the laws o f physics, or are the 
behavioural geographers employing the wrong model 9 I n order t o 
answer thxs question we r e q u i r e a more d e t a i l e d account of the nature 
o f human a c t i o n and the s o r t s o f explanation appropriate t o i t . We 
must also i n v e s t i g a t e the nature o f s c i e n t i f i c method and examine the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s of a s c i e n t i f i c approach t o the study o f human a f f a i r s . 
This t w o - f o l d i n t e r e s t provides the subject matter f o r Chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 3 
SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 
Most contemporary geographers, accepting the q u a n t i t a t i v e 
r e v o l u t i o n as a f a i t accompli, i d e n t i f y t h e i r s ubject w i t h the 
sciences r a t h e r than w i t h the humanities. Even urban geographers, 
and i n p a r t i c u l a r urban t h e o r i s t s , t h i n k of themselves as s c i e n t i s t s . 
This i s apparent from the attempts at theory c o n s t r u c t i o n which have 
f r e q u e n t l y been modelled upon the t h e o r e t i c a l f o r m u l a t i o n s o f the 
p h y s i c a l sciences. Despite t h i s , however, there i s a c e r t a i n 
vagueness about what being a ' s c i e n t i s t ' means and an u n c e r t a i n t y as 
t o what ' s c i e n t i f i c method' i s and how i t should be ap p l i e d . ""It "is 
the concern of t h i s chapter t o examine the d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s of a 
s c i e n t i f i c mode of understanding the world i n order t o judge i t s 
relevance t o the subject matter o f human geography. Can s c i e n t i f i c 
method help us t o understand and e x p l a i n the phenomena o f the s o c i a l 
world? This question i s an important one f o r Geography at the present 
t i m e , and one which can only be answered a f t e r a c a r e f u l examination of 
the nature o f science and o f the s o c i a l world. 
75. 
I 
THE NATURE OF SCIENCE: 
Sometimes the words 'science 1 and ' s c i e n t i f i c ' are used i n a 
very general way t o convey the idea o f d i s c i p l i n e d t h i n k i n g . Thus 
t o c a l l a study u n s c i e n t i f i c i n any academic sphere would be t o 
condemn i t as d i s p l a y i n g u n d i s c i p l i n e d t h i n k i n g and t h e r e f o r e not 
acceptable as a piece of academic work. I n t h i s sense a l l academic 
p u r s u i t s must be s c i e n t i f i c f o r , t o be regarded as academic i n the 
f i r s t place, they must i n v o l v e d i s c i p l i n e d t h i n k i n g . When geographers 
claim t h a t the methodology most s u i t a b l e t o t h e i r s tudies i s t h a t o f 
science, however, they are not simply m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t , i n order t o 
study geography, we are r e q u i r e d t o t h i n k i n a d i s c i p l i n e d manner. 
Indeed, who would doubt tha t ? Rather, these w r i t e r s wish t o a l i g n 
themselves not w i t h academic p u r s u i t i n general but w i t h the more 
popular n o t i o n o f science, namely n a t u r a l or p h y s i c a l science. Thus 
the methodology which they advocate and employ i s t h a t o f the p h y s i c a l 
sciences. And i f we ask 'what i s science?', i t i s some account of 
"this methodology which would answer our question. 
What s o r t o f account would t h i s be 7 C l e a r l y we could describe 
the s o r t s o f t h i n g s s t u d i e d i n departments o f physics and, e q u a l l y , the 
very d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o f t h i n g s s t u d i e d i n chemistry. But t h i s i s 
u n l i k e l y t o r e v e a l what makes them both 'science'. As Alexander, i n 
an i n t r o d u c t o r y t e x t on the philosophy o f science, p o i n t s o u t , ".... 
the question i s t o be understood as a request f o r an account of the 
f e a t u r e s o f these a c t i v i t i e s which lead us t o c l a s s i f y them together 
i n t h i s way and t o d i s t i n g u i s h them from other a c t i v i t i e s . " 1 Thus 
P. Alexander (1963) p.13 
what we wish t o know i s what i s d i s t i n c t i v e about science as a mode 
of understanding the world. What d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from other modes 
of understanding 9 And t h i s i s a request f o r the t r a c i n g out o f the 
i n t e r n a l l o g i c o f science. Any separate d i s c i p l i n e of thought must 
have a d i s t i n c t i v e i n t e r n a l l o g i c i n order t o e s t a b l i s h i t as a 
d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e . 
At the same time, t o t r a c e out the unique i n t e r n a l l o g i c o f a 
d i s c i p l i n e i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t o say anything about the conduct of 
such a d i s c i p l i n e i n the contemporary academic world. To enquire 
i n t o the nature o f science i s not t o make any claims about what anyone 
i s a c t u a l l y doing. As Alexander says, "A l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s of a method 
need not look l i k e a d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h a t method, or a recipe f o r doing 
something, any more than a c r i t i c ' s comments on the me r i t s of a p a i n t i n g 
need look l i k e an account o f the a r t i s t ' s behaviour while p a i n t i n g i t or 
of the f a c t o r s which l e d him t o p a i n t i t as he d i d . " 2 I f we are t o t a l k 
of the l o g i c u f tacience t h i s mus t beax1 some r e l a t i o n t o science as i t i s 
p r a c t i s e d , but the f a c t t h a t the work o f some s c i e n t i s t s , or the 
methodology which they employ, c o n f l i c t s w i t h our account cannot, i n 
i t s e l f , throw doubt on t h a t account. To describe the i n t e r n a l l o g i c 
o f science i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from d e s c r i b i n g what s c i e n t i s t s a c t u a l l y 
do. 
I f we are t o c a l l a c e r t a i n area o f study ' s c i e n t i f i c ' we must be 
able t o d i s t i n g u i s h the mode o f understanding appropriate t o i t . I t 
i s not enough t o demonstrate t h a t some techniques used i n physics can 
also be employed i n human geography, f o r there may be nothing p e c u l i a r l y 
s c i e n t i f i c about such techniques. One could perhaps u t i l i s e them w i t h i n 
other modes o f understanding. I f , then, we are convinced as geographers 
I b i d . p.15 
o f our a f f i n i t y t o science, our task must be t o demonstrate the 
appropriateness o f s c i e n t i f i c method t o our subject matter. F i r s t , 
however, we must examine what c o n s t i t u t e s a s c i e n t i f i c mode o f 
understanding; i e . we must t r a c e the i n t e r n a l l o g i c of science. 
The Baconian view o f science: 
One popular view o f the nature of science i s the Baconian or 
i n d u c t i v i s t view. On t h i s account, "The one basic method of a l l the 
sciences i s g e n e r a l i s a t i o n and the advance o f science c o n s i s t s i n the 
making of wider and wider g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . " 3 That t h i s i s a popular 
view should be ev i d e n t , f o r we have noted t h a t many geographers (and 
they are not alone) associate the development of theory w i t h the 
f o r m u l a t i o n o f g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . Such g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s are thought t o 
be obtained by means o f a s e r i e s o f i n d u c t i v e i n f e r e n c e s . 4 I t i s 
c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t the p r a c t i c e o f science involves the making of 
statements o f a u n i v e r s a l nature and t h a t these statements have general 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y . For example, the s c i e n t i f i c statement ' a l l gases expand 
when heated' applies t o a l l gases, even those which may not y e t have 
been discovered. I t i s a statement about the nature o f gases, about 
the e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s of a gas. Despite i t s u n i v e r s a l or general 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y , however, such a statement i s not a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n . I t 
i s the mistake o f supposing i t i s which characterises the i n d u c t i v i s t 
p o s i t i o n . Geographers, i n so f a r as they share t h i s view, are also 
l a b o u r i n g under the misapprehension t h a t science involves g e n e r a l i s i n g 
3 I b i d . p.102 
4 This i s g e n e r a l i s i n g from the observation of p a r t i c u l a r instances 
such as i n the a p p l i c a t i o n o f P.C.T. t o shopping behaviour. 
from many instances o f the p a r t i c u l a r . This p o i n t can best be 
appreciated by examining t h i s popular n o t i o n of what science i s . 
I f we adopted the Baconian view o f science, and wished t o 
make general statements about, say, the nature o f gases, we would 
need t o study as many instances o f the heating o f gases as we p o s s i b l y 
could. The g e n e r a l i t y of such statements must bear a d i r e c t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the volume o f experiments. I f t h i s was the only 
method o f science, however, and even i f we had conducted several 
hundred experiments o f the same k i n d , we would have no reason a t a l l 
f o r supposing t h a t the general statement would be t r u e o f the next 
instance o f the same phenomenon. The r e f e r e n t o f the g e n e r a l i s a t i o n 
would only be the observed instances from which i t was induced and 
t h i s provides no basis f o r a s s e r t i n g t h a t f u r t h e r occurrence o f the 
phenomenon would e x h i b i t the same p r o p e r t i e s . C l e a r l y s c i e n t i s t s do 
not consider t h e i r r e s u l t s t o be confined t o observed occurrences and 
cannot, t h e r e f o r e , consider i n d u c t i o n t o be the method of science. 
They claim u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y f o r the laws which they formulate 
and by accepting or assuming the basic u n i f o r m i t y o f nature are 
released from the s t r i n g e n c i e s o f i n d u c t i v i s t - m e t h o d . The s c i e n t i f i c 
laws which are advanced are timeless and must apply t o any gas, or 
whatever, whether a t the present moment, i n the past or i n the f u t u r e . 
They are general but not g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s . This i s not t o say t h a t 
such laws are immutable, f o r under c e r t a i n circumstances i t would be 
p o s s i b l e , and indeed necessary, f o r s c i e n t i s t s t o discar d them. 
S c i e n t i s t s can and do make mistakes, but a s c i e n t i f i c law cannot be 
t r u e then and f a l s e now. I f a serious counter-example i s found, the 
law cannot ever have been a t r u e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the nature o f the 
world. 
The u n i v e r s a l statement i n science: 
We have seen t h a t s c i e n t i f i c method does not i n v o l v e p u r e l y 
i n d u c t i v e reasoning. Let us now attempt t o i s o l a t e c e r t a i n 
f e a t u r e s which are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f science. B r a i t h w a i t e provides 
us w i t h a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n h i s discussion of s c i e n t i f i c explanation 
when he s t a t e s t h a t "The f u n c t i o n o f science i s t o e s t a b l i s h general 
laws covering the behaviour o f e m p i r i c a l events." 5 These are the 
u n i v e r s a l statements o f science and few would dispute t h e i r importance 
as p a r t o f the s c i e n t i f i c methodology. Z e l i n s k y , i n a recent 
p r e s i d e n t i a l address, endorses t h i s view when he remarks, 
s c i e n t i s t s are the creatures concerned w i t h 
u n i v e r s a l i t i e s , w i t h the p u r s u i t and t e s t i n g 
o f general laws, presumably applying t o a l l 
the subsumed ob3ects. This i s the u l t i m a t e 
o f f i c i a l i d e n t i t y o f science even when the 
immediate agenda covers only the seemingly unique. 6 
I t i s thns way o f seeing the w o r l d , t h i s search f o r general laws, r a t h e r 
•chan any p e c u l i a r i t y o f subject matter which marks science as a d i s t i n c t 
academic d i s c i p l i n e . I f the d e r i v a t i o n of general laws i s l o g i c a l l y 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o any p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon, then, i t must n e c e s s a r i l y 
be o u t w i t h the scope o f the s c i e n t i s t and o f no s c i e n t i f i c i n t e r e s t . 
But how i s the geographer t o discover the appropriateness, or 
otherwise, of the u n i v e r s a l statement t o h i s subject matter? I t i s 
o f t e n supposed t h a t geography, being a young science, has not y e t 
reached such an advanced stage and t h a t the volume o f comparative 
s t u d i e s must f i r s t be increased. C e r t a i n l y the body o f t h e o r e t i c a l 
knowledge i n science has been b u i l t up over a considerable p e r i o d of 
time and has involved the establishment, m o d i f i c a t i o n and replacement 
5 R. B. B r a i t h w a i t e (19 53) p . l 
6 W. Zelinsky (1975) p.127 
o f the general laws advanced by the s c i e n t i s t . Further r e f l e c t i o n 
on the u n i v e r s a l nature o f such laws, however, reveals an e s s e n t i a l 
f a c e t o f t r u l y s c i e n t i f i c s ubject matter. The presence ( o r absence) 
o f t h i s , then, would confirm the appropriateness ( o r inappropriateness) 
o f a s c i e n t i f i c mode of understanding as the methodology of human 
geography. 
The u n i v e r s a l statement i s a c e n t r a l f e a t u r e of science, but 
what i s the c e n t r a l f e a t u r e o f the u n i v e r s a l statement i t s e l f 9 What 
i s i t t h a t allows the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f making statements which 
r e f e r t o a l l occurrences of a p a r t i c u l a r phenomenon where t h i s even 
includes f u t u r e occurrences 9 On c l o s e r i n s p e c t i o n we can see t h a t 
a l l u n i v e r s a l statements of the form ' a l l gases expand when heated' 
r e f e r both t o anytime and t o everytime. Thus the n o t i o n o f time 
i t s e l f must be unimportant and s c i e n t i f i c laws can be seen t o be 
timeless. The nature o f statements as u n i v e r s a l excludes any n o t i o n 
o f c h r o n o l o g i c a l time. I f a law i s a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l gases the time 
a t which any such gas happens t o be discovered by a p a r t i c u l a r s c i e n t i s t 
must be q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t . This timelessness allows us t o c o n t r a s t 
s c i e n c e - w i t h h i s t o r y f o r , o f course, an h i s t o r i c a l understanding i s 
d i r e c t l y concerned w i t h the passage o f t i m e , 'the past' and 'the present 
being two c e n t r a l notions i n any c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of the nature of 
h i s t o r y . 
The e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n science 
This account o f what i s i n v o l v e d i n s c i e n t i f i c method i s supported 
by a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the way i n which such u n i v e r s a l laws have been 
esta b l i s h e d i n science, as w e l l as the l o g i c a l l y necessary c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r t h e i r v e r i f i c a t i o n . Here the e m p i r i c a l t e s t plays a prominent p a r t 
Sarre recognises t h i s when he concludes a discussion on perception 
by reminding us t h a t " s c i e n t i f i c method was characterized as 
i n v o l v i n g both i n d u c t i o n and deduction, but w i t h emphasis on b u i l d i n g 
and t e s t i n g hypotheses as a route towards producing geographic theory." 
Some e m p i r i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n o f an hypothesis w i l l be r e q u i r e d f o r the 
conduct o f science. As B r a i t h w a i t e p o i n t s o u t , the f u n c t i o n of 
science i s t o e s t a b l i s h u n i v e r s a l statements and i t i s i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the establishment o f hypotheses t h a t s c i e n t i s t s r e q u i r e a check against 
r e a l i t y . I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t there i s a problem o f v e r i f i c a t i o n 
i n science. Recent w r i t e r s i n the philosophy o f science have been 
concerned t o demonstrate t h a t v e r i f i c a t i o n taken l i t e r a l l y as 'the 
a s s e r t i o n o f the t r u t h o f i s impossible i n science and t h a t hence 
s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses can l o g i c a l l y only be subjected t o Popper's 
famous f a l s i f i c a t i o n c r i t e r i o n . That i s t o say t h a t no p a r t i c u l a r 
number o f instances on which an hypothesis could be s a i d t o h o l d could 
( l o g i c a l l y could) validaxe xhax hypothesis. One s i n g l e counter 
i n s t a n c e , however, would (indeed l o g i c a l l y must) i n v a l i d a t e or f a l s i f y -
t h a t hypothesis. A l l hypotheses, i f they are t o be c a l l e d s c i e n t i f i c , 
must be amenable t o such a t e s t . To use Popper's terminology, 
s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses must be i n p r i n c i p a l f a l s i f i a b l e . 8 Whatever 
else might count as p a r t o f s c i e n t i f i c method, then, the a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f an e m p i r i c a l t e s t i s both c e n t r a l t o the p r a c t i c e o f science and 
l o g i c a l l y necessary t o the establishment o f a s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis. 
The s c i e n t i s t p o s t u l a t e s an hypothesis, deduces i t s consequences f o r 
a p a r t i c u l a r case and f a l s i f i e s i t , or f a i l s t o do so, by comparing 
P. Sarre (1973) p.7 
see K. Popper (1959) 
these consequences w i t h the r e s u l t s of an e m p i r i c a l t e s t . 
I t i s important i n such a context t o be able t o repeat such a 
t e s t o r t o re c o n s t r u c t a p a r t i c u l a r instance a t l e a s t once. I f 
r e p e t i t i o n of t h i s k i n d i s l o g i c a l l y impossible, the hypothesis would 
not be i n p r i n c i p a l f a l s i f i a b l e and could n o t , t h e r e f o r e , be subjected 
t o s c i e n t i f i c s c r u t i n y or be amenable t o s c i e n t i f i c method. Further, 
the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f such r e c r e a t i o n depends upon the e s s e n t i a l 
a t e m p o r a l i t y o f science. This i s a p o i n t of considerable import, f o r 
i t i s only because the n o t i o n o f the s p e c i f i c time a t which a phenomenon 
occurs plays no p a r t a t a l l i n science as a mode o f understanding the 
world t h a t we can be s a i d t o rec r e a t e the same s i t u a t i o n f i v e minutes 
l a t e r . I f t h i s were not so, two experiments would not be the same i f 
the time at which they took place was i t s e l f d i f f e r e n t . Only i f we 
have t h e l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g the same s i t u a t i o n could 
we be s a i d t o t e s t u n i v e r s a l statements e m p i r i c a l l y . And only i f we 
have the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a t e s t can any such statements be 
i n p r i n c i p a l f a l s i f i a b l e and hence subject t o the canons o f s c i e n t i f i c 
reasoning. 
The i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the nature of science has l e d t o the 
i s o l a t i o n of two fea t u r e s which are fundamental t o the p r a c t i c e o f 
science. The aim o f science i s t o f u r t h e r the understanding o f the 
way the world i s by the f o r m u l a t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l laws and the 
establishment o f a body of s c i e n t i f i c theory. The establishment o f 
laws and t h e o r i e s r e q u i r e s the a p p l i c a t i o n o f an e m p i r i c a l t e s t , and 
9 I do not mean t o imply t h a t t h i s i s a simple or unproblematic 
procedure, but f o r present purposes i t i s enough t o note the 
f u n c t i o n o f the e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n science. 
i t i s m r e l a t i o n t o t h i s t h a t not only the a b i l i t y t o conduct 
l a b o r a t o r y experiments but also the e s s e n t i a l timelessness o f 
s c i e n t i f i c understanding are c r u c i a l . There are perhaps other 
l o g i c a l l y necessary features o f science which could have been 
elaborated but even w i t h o u t a f u l l account o f what science i s we 
s t i l l have one very e x p l i c i t c r i t e r i o n by which t o judge the 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c method t o the w o r l d o f human a f f a i r s . 
We have s a i d nothing here about the p r a c t i c e o f science. 
S c i e n t i s t s , l i k e other academic researchers, do meet p r a c t i c a l 
problems. They debate the best way t o proceed, disagree about the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f f i n d i n g s and spend considerable time p e r f e c t i n g the 
design o f experiments. 1 0 That i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t s w i l l experience 
d i f f i c u l t i e s when attempting t o recreate the same s i t u a t i o n ( i e . repeat 
a t e s t ) cannot be denied. We have been concerned, however, only w i t h 
the more fundamental question o f what makes such attempts l o g i c a l l y 
p O b b i b l e . 
I I 
THE NATURE OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR: 
What we are attempting t o a s c e r t a i n i n t h i s chapter i s whether 
a science of s o c i e t y i s p o s s i b l e , whether the s o c i a l world can be studied 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . We have seen something o f the nature o f s c i e n t i f i c 
E. F. Caldin (1961 p.21), f o r example, p o i n t s t o the experimental 
r u l e i n Chemistry o f 'varying one f a c t o r a t a t i m e ' , but adds 
" t h i s i s not the whole or even the h a l f o f s c i e n t i f i c method; 
f o r the a r t l i e s i n guessing which f a c t o r s are r e l e v a n t . " There 
i s an important d i s t i n c t i o n between such r u l e s o f thumb, or ways 
f o r the s c i e n t i s t t o proceed, and the l o g i c a l l y necessary steps 
i n s c i e n t i f i c reasoning. 
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method and must now t u r n t o a more d e t a i l e d e x p l o r a t i o n of the 
nature o f human a f f a i r s before we can judge the appropriateness o f 
the method t o t h i s subject matter. 
Meaningful and automatic behaviour: 
What i s i t t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s human behaviour from the behaviour 
of e l e c t r i c c u r r e n t s , t r e e s , p l a n t s or even animals? I n other words, 
what makes human behaviour s p e c i f i c a l l y 'human'? One possible 
answer would be t o c i t e the f r e e w i l l or choice element involved i n 
such behaviour, and indeed Maclntyre puts forward a convincing case 
f o r supposing t h a t e x p l a i n i n g actions i s e x p l a i n i n g c h o i c e s . 1 1 To 
avoid the well-worn d e t e r m i n i s t i c / p r o b a b i l i s t i c controversy, however, 
another d i s t i n c t i o n which renders i t i r r e l e v a n t i s worthy of emphasis. 
This i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between meaningful and automatic behaviour. 
Any human a c t i o n w i l l have meaning f o r the agent-or agents involved 
over and above the p h y s i c a l dimensions o f the a c t i o n i t s e l f . Thus 
on two separate occasions I may perform the p h y s i c a l movement o f r a i s i n g 
my r i g h t arm, but once i t i s r e a l i s e d t h a t on the f i r s t occasion I was 
h a i l i n g a t a x i and on the second I was waving goodbye t o a f r i e n d , these 
can be seen as two q u i t e d i f f e r e n t and d i s t i n c t a c t i o n s . The p h y s i c a l 
element o f the a c t i o n (the r a i s i n g o f the arm) may remain unchanged, 
but i f the purposeful element changes, the a c t i o n i t s e l f changes. 
Further, i t i s the absence o f t h i s p urposeful element which d i s t i n g u i s h e s 
automatic behaviour, as i n , f o r example, a nervous t w i t c h . This i s 
not a human a c t i o n , as h a i l i n g a t a x i i s , or waving goodbye. Rather 
i t i s simply a p h y s i c a l movement, i t i s not meaningful or purposive, 
and the agent could not do otherwise. 
1 1 see A. Maclntyre (1969) 
1 2 Automatic behaviour o f t h i s k i n d r e q u i r e s a p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
explanation i n terms o f , f o r example, nerve impulses. 
Can act i o n s be caused? 
I f human actions are e s s e n t i a l l y meaningful and can be 
contrasted w i t h automatic behaviour associated w i t h p h y s i o l o g i c a l 
causes t h i s again r a i s e s the question o f the appropriate explanatory 
mode f o r such a c t i o n s . The commonsense view of explanation l e d us 
t o suppose t h a t i n e x p l a i n i n g actions we must look f o r the reasons of 
the agents themselves. The idiom o f science, however, i s u s u a l l y 
associated w i t h causal explanations and we can now ask whether the two 
are exclusive or whether we could have causal explanations o f human 
a c t i o n s . C l e a r l y we do i n f a c t t a l k of a c e r t a i n event causing a 
person t o act i n a c e r t a i n way but i t i s not at a l l c l e a r t h a t t h i s i s 
the same k i n d o f causal connection as i n heating and the expansion o f 
gas. The imprecision o f o r d i n a r y language here may be a source of 
considerable confusion. 
The f o l l o w i n g example i s i n s t r u c t i v e . Suppose t h a t an a l i e n 
being was t o observe the behaviour o f m o t o r i s t s a t a set of t r a f f i c 
l i g h t s . I t might not be long before he came up w i t h the hypothesis 
t h a t 'red l i g h t s cause cars t o sto p ' , and t h i s may even be s a t i s f a c t o r i . 
confirmed when 99.9% o f a f u r t h e r sample o f cars also stop when the 
l i g h t s t u r n t o r e d . But t o invoke a l a w - l i k e hypothesis i n the 
explanation o f t h i s piece o f human behaviour i s t o completely miss 
the p o i n t . Red l i g h t s do not cause cars t o st o p , and the explanation 
o f why most cars do i n f a c t stop would r e q u i r e an understanding of what 
t r a f f i c l i g h t s are and o f the conventions associated w i t h t h e i r use. 
A d r i v e r who had never seen t r a f f i c l i g h t s before and knew nothing of 
them, could not observe the highway code i n r e l a t i o n t o them. This i s 
a c l e a r example o f s o c i a l behaviour as r u l e - f o l l o w i n g r a t h e r than law-
governed behaviour. The r e g u l a r i t y i n s o c i a l behaviour a t t r a f f i c 
l i g h t s ( t h e f a c t t h a t most people do stop when the l i g h t s are red 
etc . ) r e s u l t s from f i r s t , the f a c t t h a t the people involved understand 
what t r a f f i c l i g h t s are and, secondly, t h a t they are f o l l o w i n g the 
appropriate s o c i a l r u l e s . 
Again, i f one were t o witness the a c t i v i t i e s o f a bank, no 
matter how d e t a i l e d one's d e s c r i p t i o n , or how s o p h i s t i c a t e d one's 
c o r r e l a t i o n s , the s i t u a t i o n could not be explained w i t h o u t an under-
standing o f the concept o f banking, a s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n . Though we 
f r e q u e n t l y t a l k about something causing a human agent t o act i n a 
c e r t a i n way ( e s p e c i a l l y where a la r g e measure o f r e g u l a r i t y can be 
observed i n the way people act and r e a c t ) , s o c i a l behaviour i s not 
caused but r u l e - f o l l o w i n g . Ignorance o f the r u l e s or non-observation 
o f them can r e s u l t i n some p e c u l i a r i t i e s i n the p a t t e r n o f behaviour. 
Rules, t o o , can be seen as p r o v i d i n g an agent w i t h a reason f o r a c t i n g 
as he does. An account o f s o c i a l behaviour as r u l e - f o l l o w i n g , t h e r e f o r e , 
confirms the appropriateness o f reason-giving explanations r a t h e r than 
rendering them redundant. 
The automatic/meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n i s o f prime importance, f o r 
once we have d i s t i n g u i s h e d human actions as meaningful and t h e r e f o r e 
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g we can c o n t r a s t such a c t i o n s w i t h behaviour which i s 
caused i n the s t r i c t sense. And r u l e s here are very d i f f e r e n t from 
laws such as we f i n d i n science. A p a r t i c u l a r human agent could 
break a r u l e w i t h o u t a l t e r i n g i t s s t a t u s as a r u l e . An i n d i v i d u a l 
m o t o r i s t may f a i l t o stop a t a red l i g h t , but the r u l e ( t h a t cars 
must stop when the l i g h t s t u r n t o red) remains unchanged. This would 
not be the case f o r a s c i e n t i f i c law. Such laws must be immutable and 
i f counter-examples are found the law i t s e l f must e i t h e r be modified or 
discarded. Further,the reasons (associated w i t h the r u l e s ) and the 
causes (associated w i t h the laws) can also be shown t o be very 
d i f f e r e n t i n nature. I t i s f r e q u e n t l y not only a p p r o p r i a t e but 
necessary t o enquire i n t o the r i g h t n e s s or wrongness of an agent's 
reasons f o r a c t i n g i n a c e r t a i n manner. Such questions j u s t do not 
a r i s e i n a discussion o f causes. I f g r a v i t y causes the downward 
f a l l o f an apple from the branch o f a t r e e i t makes no sense a t a l l 
t o ask whether t h i s i s a good cause or a bad cause. We simply accept 
i t as a cause. The same would be t r u e o f automatic behaviour such as 
the nervous t w i t c h . Blame or p r a i s e may be attached t o human actions 
a f t e r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the reasons f o r and the circumstances 
surrounding the a c t i o n . The same would not be t r u e o f automatic 
behaviour, behaviour which i s caused. I t i s j u s t as i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o blame or p r a i s e anyone f o r having a nervous t w i t c h as i t i s t o 
blame or p r a i s e an apple f o r f a l l i n g from a t r e e . 
So f a r , we have a t l e a s t good grounds f o r doubting t h a t a 
s c i e n t i f i c mode of understanding i s r e l e v a n t t o the s o c i a l w orld. 
I n t h e study o f human a f f a i r s we could not sensibly advance the k i n d 
o f causal explanations commonly associated w i t h science. The r u l e s 
o f s o c i a l behaviour are q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from the laws o f science. And 
i t i s t o be noted t h a t t h i s i s so not because o f the complexity o f the 
subject matter i n the s o c i a l sciences. As Harvey emphasises, 
there i s a b s o l u t e l y no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the view t h a t laws cannot be 
developed i n human geography because o f the complexity and waywardness 
of the subject m a t t e r . " 1 3 I t i s not t h a t l a w - l i k e statements seem 
in a p p r o p r i a t e but may prove not t o be so i f more research were done. 
S o c i a l behaviour i s rule-governed and r u l e s are not laws. Nor can 
the sheer number o f f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n any s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n be deemed 
3 D. Harvey (1969a)p. 133 
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responsible f o r the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t ' s i n a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l 
experimentally h i s subject matter. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f any human 
a c t i o n depends upon the s o c i a l context i n which i t i s performed. 
The a c t i o n has meaning by v i r t u e o f i t s c o n t e x t . 1 4 To change the 
context i s t o change the very nature of t h a t a c t i o n . Many w r i t e r s , 
however, have mistakenly supposed t h a t the complexity o f human 
behaviour i s the only stumbling block t o the s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
o f such behaviour. Over a century ago M i l l i n A System o f Logic 
noted t h a t , "The agencies which determine human character are so 
numerous and d i v e r s i f i e d ( n o t h i n g which has happened t o the person 
throughout l i f e being w i t h o u t i t s p o r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e ) t h a t i n 
aggregate they are never i n any two cases e x a c t l y s i m i l a r " . 1 5 
Nevertheless he supposes a science o f human nature t o be possible 
despite the great d i f f i c u l t i e s i nvolved i n i t s development. 1 6 That 
t h i s i s a mistaken view should now be apparent. I t i s the nature 
o f a human a c t i o n r a t h e r than the complexity and volume o f the i n f l u e n c i n g 
f a c t o r s which makes the search f o r laws and causal connections a f r u i t l e s s 
The p h y s i c a l movement o f r a i s i n g an arm only becomes the a c t i o n 
of h a i l i n g a t a x i o r waving goodbye t o a f r i e n d i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
s o c i a l context. 
5 J. S. M i l l (1865) Vol.2, Book V I , C h . I I I p.427 
6 M i l l claims t h a t a science of human nature could be developed a t 
l e a s t t o the l e v e l o f Tidology and t h a t the study of human 
behaviour could achieve the same s c i e n t i f i c s t a t u s as the study 
o f t i d a l movements. Just as the i r r e g u l a r i t y o f the l a t t e r 
between d i f f e r e n t places on the globe does not mean t h a t there 
are no r e g u l a r laws governing than, so, he supposes, the v a r i e t y 
of human behaviour does not preclude r e g u l a r laws i n t h i s sphere. 
As we have seen, however, the r e g u l a r i t i e s o f human behaviour 
are a p p r o p r i a t e l y c haracterised as r u l e - f o l l o w i n g and not law-
governed. 
one. On a wider understanding o f what c o n s t i t u t e s science ( i e . 
any form o f d i s c i p l i n e d t h i n k i n g ) , x t i s as u n s c i e n t i f i c t o attempt 
to e x p l a i n the act i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l s by subsuming them under some 
u n i v e r s a l law as i t i s t o t r y t o e x p l a i n p h y s i c a l processes and 
phenomena by e x h i b i t i n g t h e i r reasons f o r a c t i n g . Gases do not 
have reasons f o r causing explosions. 
The e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n s o c i a l science. 
M i l l notes t h a t i n r e l a t i o n t o human character there w i l l never 
be two cases e x a c t l y s i m i l a r . And human geographers also r e a d i l y 
admit the unique aspects o f the landscape pa t t e r n s and the places they 
study. I n the l a s t two decades, however, the uniqueness o f the 
'capes and bays' geography has been widely c r i t i c i s e d and the focus 
f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d on the s i m i l a r i t i e s o f p a t t e r n and on the constants 
of behaviour. That c o n t r o l l e d l a b o r a t o r y experiments are i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o the study o f human behaviour may not worry many geographers, f o r they 
can go out i n t o the f i e l d and view the p a t t e r n and the behaviour r e l a t e d 
t o i t a t f i r s t hand. This,then, would be t h e i r check against r e a l i t y , 
t h e i r e m p i r i c a l t e s t , and thus t h e i r hypotheses (whatever the form) could 
be e s t a b l i s h e d i n a s c i e n t i f i c manner. S c i e n t i f i c hypotheses must be i n 
p r i n c i p a l f a l s i f i a b l e and could not geographers, using 'the f i e l d ' as 
t h e i r l a b o r a t o r y , meet t h i s c r i t e r i o n ? We have seen the c r u c i a l p a r t 
played i n s c i e n t i f i c methodology by the e m p i r i c a l t e s t and we cannot 
abandon such a methodology completely w i t h o u t f i r s t i n v e s t i g a t i n g the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f such a t e s t i n the s o c i a l sciences. 
I n order t o t e s t an hypothesis e m p i r i c a l l y i t must be l o g i c a l l y 
p o s sible t o i d e n t i f y a t l e a s t two occurrences o f the same s i t u a t i o n . 1 7 
1 7 This i s the minimum requirement f o r t e s t i n g an e m p i r i c a l hypothesis. 
Since geographers are not i n a p o s i t i o n t o recreate the s i t u a t i o n s 
they are studying they would be r e q u i r e d t o i d e n t i f y i n the f i e l d 
r a t h e r than r e c o n s t r u c t i n the l a b o r a t o r y . 
W i t h i n the s c i e n t i f i c mode o f understanding the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f r e p e a t i n g the same t e s t depends upon the e s s e n t i a l a t e m p o r a l i t y 
o f science. The time of the day, week, month or year at which 
experiments take place are, and must be, i r r e l e v a n t t o the experiment 
i t s e l f . I n the s o c i a l w o r l d , however, notions o f time play a l a r g e 
p a r t i n the conduct o f human a f f a i r s . 1 8 Indeed i t i s impossible t o 
imagine a s o c i e t y w i t h o u t temporal vocabulary or any n o t i o n o f the 
passage o f time. The i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f many explanations o f human 
actions e s s e n t i a l l y depends upon temporal v o c a b u l a r y . 1 9 Any two 
s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n s , however apparently s i m i l a r , must be l o g i c a l l y 
d i s t i n c t i f the time a t which they take place i s i t s e l f d i f f e r e n t . 
Even the same k i n d o f a c t i o n performed by the same agent on two 
occasions must be l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t ( i e . e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t ) simply 
because on the second occasion the agent w i l l already have experienced 
the f i r s t . 2 0 Further, since two such occasions cannot take place a t 
Time matters when studying human a f f a i r s , and t h i s has an obvious 
relevance t o human geography. Notions o f time are also important 
i n p h y s i c a l geography, however, f o r example when l o o k i n g a t the" 
development o f a drainage network or determining the l i m i t s o f 
g l a c i a t i o n a t various periods. I n so f a r as temporal vocabulary 
i s necessary t o such study, the arguments presented i n t h i s s e c t i o n 
are germane. 
We might e x p l a i n the f a c t t h a t a farmer had l e f t a f i e l d f a l l o w 
by p o i n t i n g out t h a t i t p r e v i o u s l y had been c u l t i v a t e d f o r f i v e 
years i n succession. Without notions o f time here we simply 
could not o f f e r an explanation. 
Any a c t i o n performed at time ( t + 1 ) must be l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t 
from an a c t i o n performed a t time t because a t time ( t + l ) the 
knowledge o f the agent i n v o l v e d w i l l have increased and w i l l 
i nclude the knowledge of the a c t i o n performed a t time t . 
the same time and t h e r e f o r e the time i t s e l f must d i f f e r , we must 
conclude t h a t i n the s o c i a l realm i t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible t o 
i d e n t i f y p r e c i s e l y the same s i t u a t i o n even t w i c e . 
C l e a r l y t h i s i s a p o i n t of some import i f one i s concerned t o 
understand and e x p l a i n human a c t i o n s . The e s s e n t i a l t e m p o r a l i t y 
o f the s o c i a l world not only precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i d e n t i f y i n g 
the same s i t u a t i o n but a l s o , t h e r e f o r e , precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
an e m p i r i c a l t e s t such as i s necessary t o the conduct o f science. A 
s c i e n t i f i c mode o f understanding the world i s e s s e n t i a l l y atemporal, 
t h i s being one fe a t u r e of i t s i n t e r n a l l o g i c . Thus the s o c i a l w o r l d , 
being e s s e n t i a l l y temporal, cannot, l o g i c a l l y , be subject t o a 
s c i e n t i f i c mode o f understanding nor could s c i e n t i f i c method ever be 
re l e v a n t t o i t s study. 
When i t i s pointed out t h a t any two human act i o n s must be 
l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t t h i s i s not t o say, o f course, t h a t two actions 
could never l e g i t i m a t e l y be c a l l e d the same. C l e a r l y such general 
d e s c r i p t i o n s as 'crossing the road' may apply t o the actions o f one 
agent seve r a l times i n a s i n g l e day, and we would know what i s 
e s s e n t i a l l y involved on each occasion. I t i s q u i t e i n t e l l i g i b l e t o 
i d e n t i f y a c t i o n s as the same i n so f a r as they come under the same 
general d e s c r i p t i o n . Nevertheless, t h i s does not weaken the case 
against the appropriateness o f s c i e n t i f i c method which r e q u i r e s t h a t 
two instances o f a phenomena be l o g i c a l l y the same. I t i s only 
p o s s i b l e t o repeat a t e s t where p r e c i s e l y the same s i t u a t i o n can be 
i d e n t i f i e d . 
The e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the s o c i a l world and 
the p h y s i c a l world: 
Whenever we wish t o i d e n t i f y two t h i n g s as the same we must have 
some c r i t e r i a o f r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e s . As Winch p o i n t s out i n 
The Idea o f a S o c i a l Science, 
Two th i n g s may be c a l l e d 'the same' or ^ d i f f e r e n t ' 
only w i t h reference t o a set of c r i t e r i a which l a y down 
what i s t o be regarded as a r e l e v a n t d i f f e r e n c e . When 
the t h i n g s i n question are p u r e l y p h y s i c a l the c r i t e r i a 
appealed t o w i l l o f course be those o f the observer. 
But when one i s d e a l i n g w i t h i n t e l l e c t u a l ( o r indeed any 
k i n d o f s o c i a l ) ' t h i n g s ' t h a t i s not so. For t h e i r 
being i n t e l l e c t u a l or s o c i a l , as opposed t o p h y s i c a l , i n 
character depends e n t i r e l y on t h e i r belonging i n a c e r t a i n 
way t o a system o f ideas or mode o f l i v i n g . I t i s only 
by reference t o the c r i t e r i a governing t h a t system o f 
ideas or mode o f l i f e t h a t they have any existence as 
i n t e l l e c t u a l or s o c i a l events. 1 
This underlines one e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between the p h y s i c a l world 
and the s o c i a l w o r l d , namely t h a t i t i s impossible t o be an 
'observer' o f s o c i a l l i f e i n the same way as one can be an observer 
o f the n a t u r a l world. This has been construed by many w r i t e r s as 
the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b j e c t i v i t y i n the s o c i a l sciences r e s u l t i n g 
from the necessary p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the researcher i n human s i t u a t i o n s . 
This p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i t i s not i n f r e q u e n t l y claimed, leads t o a value-
laden a n a l y s i s . W h i l s t the ' i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b j e c t i v i t y ' t h e s i s can 
be shown t o be f a l s e 2 2 i t i s the case t h a t the s o c i a l researcher has a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h i s s u b j e c t matter~which the p h y s i c i s t does not have. 
To speak a language i s already t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the s o c i a l world of 
the speakers o f t h a t language. I t i s impossible both t o understand 
t h i s s o c i a l l i f e and t o stand outside i t and t r e a t s o c i a l phenomena as 
P. Winch (1958) p. 108 
To argue the case here would be t o d e t r a c t from the present 
discussion. I t i s worth n o t i n g , however, t h a t i n order t o 
declare any statement o b j e c t i v e we need c r i t e r i a o f o b j e c t i v i t y 
and these are evident w i t h i n s e v e r a l modes o f understanding the 
world. Further, a charge o f s u b j e c t i v i t y i s only i n t e r e s t i n g 
or problematic i f we have o b j e c t i v e statements from w i t h i n the 
same mode o f understanding w i t h which t o compare the s u b j e c t i v e . 
experimental f a c t s . I n c o n t r a s t , the study o f p u r e l y p h y s i c a l 
phenomena r e q u i r e s c r i t e r i a f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g one from another 
which must be those of the observer. Whatever these c r i t e r i a , 
they could have no e f f e c t on the nature o f the phenomena themselves. 
The pure s c i e n t i s t and the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t stand i n very d i f f e r e n t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s t o t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e subject matter. 
Again i t must be stressed t h a t t h i s necessary involvement of 
the s o c i a l researcher i n the s o c i a l world does not preclude o b j e c t i v e 
study, indeed the researcher i s constrained by co n d i t i o n s which 
preclude the t o t a l l y s u b j e c t i v e . I n order t o understand, or even 
attempt t o e x p l a i n s o c i a l phenomena, the researcher must have a 
considerable f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the shared language. As we have seen 
behaviour a t t r a f f i c l i g h t s or i n a bank could not be understood or 
explained unless the researcher f i r s t understands the concept of 
' t r a f f i c l i g h t s ' and the concept o f 'a bank'. And t o share a language 
i s TO share a s o c i a l world. This makes reason-giving explanations 
q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n k i n d t o causal explanations. Not only does t a l k 
o f causes prompt d i f f e r e n t s o r t s o f questions t o t a l k of reasons, but 
the concept o f 'cause' i t s e l f , u n l i k e t h a t o f 'reason', i s e x t e r n a l 
t o the phenomena which are sai d t o be c a u s a l l y r e l a t e d . Suppose, f o r 
example, we appeal t o an agent's motives i n order t o e x p l a i n ( o r even 
p r e d i c t ) h i s a c t i o n s . This would be an explanation o f the same form 
as the reason-giving e x p l a n a t i o n . 2 3 We could only e x p l a i n i n t h i s 
2 3 There i s a d i s t i n c t i o n t o be made between motives and reasons, 
but i t i s not an important one i n the present context. A 
statement about an agent's motives, u n l i k e a d i s p o s i t i o n a l or 
causal statement, i s not based on g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s from what has 
been observed t o happen, and " . . . . i s b e t t e r understood as analogous 
t o a s e t t i n g out of the agent's reasons f o r a c t i n g thus." (P.Winch, 
1958 p.81). For present purposes we can use 'reason-giving' 
explanations t o denote a c e r t a i n explanatory form, one which 
includes statements about agent's motives and which can be 
contrasted w i t h causal explanations. 
way, however, given t h a t we already possess the concept o f a motive 
( i e . t h a t we already know what i s t o count as a motive). Winch 
reminds us t h a t , "Learning what a motive i s belongs t o l e a r n i n g the 
standards governing l i f e i n the s o c i e t y i n which one l i v e s ; and t h a t 
again belongs t o the process o f l e a r n i n g t o l i v e as a s o c i a l b e i n g " . 2 4 
Thus the concept o f a motive i s not i n the f i r s t place learned as p a r t 
o f a technique f o r e x p l a i n i n g or making p r e d i c t i o n s , u n l i k e the concept 
of cause. 
The e x t e r n a l i t y t o the phenomena o f the p h y s i c a l world o f 
explanatory techniques i s at the heart o f the matter. The pl a n e t 
Earth e x i s t e d long before there were any human beings who sought t o 
study i t s p h y s i c a l form. Methods o f explanation and the r e l a t e d 
vocabulary have t h e r e f o r e been developed q u i t e independently o f the 
behaviour o f any n a t u r a l phenomena. S o c i a l behaviour, i n c o n t r a s t , 
i s c l o s e l y and i n e x t r i c a b l y l i n k e d t o the language t h a t we speak. As 
Winch puts i t , "....our language and our s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s are j u s t two 
d i f f e r e n t sides o f the same c o i n . " 2 5 I t does not make sense t o 
suppose t h a t human beings might have been obeying orders or g i v i n g 
commands, f o r example, before they came t o formulate-the concepts o f 
'order' and 'command'.26 We cannot, t h e r e f o r e , choose which concepts 
P. Winch, op.ext.,p.83 
2 5 I b i d . p.123 
2 6 This p o i n t i s p o s s i b l y c l e a r e r i f one t h i n k s o f the p r a c t i c e o f 
d u e l l i n g . I t does not make sense t o suppose t h a t human beings 
fought duels before they came t o form the concept o f a duel. To 
f i g h t a duel i s t o f o l l o w c e r t a i n s o c i a l r u l e s appropriate t o 
d u e l l i n g . I f one d i d not know what a duel was ( i e . d i d not know 
the r u l e s appropriate t o d u e l l i n g ) then one simply could not f i g h t 
a duel. Knowing the r u l e s i n t h i s sense, however, does not 
ne c e s s a r i l y imply being able t o set them out when asked. 
t o apply t o s o c i a l l i f e f o r these are given f o r as by our language 
whereas the p h y s i c a l world i s as i t i s independently of what men 
may say about i t . 
Again, t h i s p a r t i c u l a r d i s t i n c t i o n i s i l l u s t r a t i v e o f the 
profound d i f f e r e n c e s between a s c i e n t i f i c understanding and any 
understanding o f the s o c i a l world. I t must now be c l e a r t h a t the 
study o f s o c i e t y could never be 'exact' i n the way t h a t the p h y s i c a l 
sciences are. (They are o f t e n c a l l e d the 'exact sciences'.) I f we 
are at l i b e r t y t o choose which concepts t o apply t o the p h y s i c a l w o r l d , 
we are also a t l i b e r t y t o define these concepts i n as exact a manner 
as we choose. On the other hand, because concepts cannot be ap p l i e d 
t o s o c i a l l i f e i n the same way, the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s c e r t a i n l y not 
a t l i b e r t y t o de f i n e them any more e x a c t l y than the lexicographer (who 
i s i n t e r e s t e d i n usage) and at the same time cl a i m t o study s o c i a l 
l i f e . For example, the s o c i a l researcher could not s t i p u l a t e t h a t 
f o r an exchange o f words t o be c a l l e d an 'argument' voice l e v e l s must 
r i s e above 65 d e c i b e l s , and s t i l l claim t h a t h i s study was one of 
arguments. What c o n s t i t u t e s an argument has t o do w i t h the meaning of 
the word i n the En g l i s h language. The inappropriateness of exact 
d e f i n i t i o n s i s a p o i n t f r e q u e n t l y overlooked by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s . 
The f a l l a c y of i d i o s y n c r a t i c world views: 
Some w r i t e r s do recognise the incoherence o f attempting t o 
impose conceptual frameworks on t h e i r s o c i a l subject matter, but they 
remain l a r g e l y mistaken about the source o f the incoherence. The 
2 7 This does not mean t h a t any i n d i v i d u a l language user could 
choose any concept he pleases, but merely t h a t the development 
o f language i s independent o f the p h y s i c a l world. 
researcher h i m s e l f , i t i s supposed, cannot define 'an argument' 
because he must remain s e n s i t i v e t o what the human agents (whose 
arguments he wishes t o study) take an 'argument' t o be. This i n 
i t s e l f i s unobjectionable. I t i s commonly concluded from t h i s , 
however, t h a t each agent or group o f agents may have a d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f what c o n s t i t u t e s an argument and t h a t t h e i r i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n must f i r s t be known before the research can proceed. This 
i s the mistake. I t a r i s e s d i r e c t l y from the f a l s e suppositions t h a t , 
f i r s t , a l l i n d i v i d u a l s have i d i o s y n c r a t i c views o f the w o r l d , and, 
secondly, t h a t knowledge of these views i s v i t a l t o the s o c i a l 
s c i e n t i s t . The p o p u l a r i t y o f t a l k o f d i f f e r e n t i a l perception suggests 
t h a t the f a l l a c i o u s nature o f such suppositions i s f a r from obvious and 
thus r e q u i r e s e l a b o r a t i o n . 
Given t h a t i d i o s y n c r a t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the word 'argument' 
are going t o i n f l u e n c e whether the agent t h i n k s himself t o be i n v o l v e d 
i n an argument, what are we t o say about the s i t u a t i o n i n which an 
i n d i v i d u a l appears t o be engaged i n an argument but maintains t h a t 
he i s n o t ? 2 8 There are two p o s s i b i l i t i e s . E i t h e r we can accept t h a t 
on the agent's i d i o s y n c r a t i c view o f what an argument i s he i s not 
engaged i n one and h i s exchange i s i r r e l e v a n t t o a study of arguments. 
Or we can discount h i s claims t o the c o n t r a r y and proceed w i t h our study 
on the grounds t h a t whatever he may suppose he i s doing he i s i n f a c t 
arguing. The former, although the more popular, i s problematic. I t 
n e c e s s a r i l y precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a mistake or a d e l i b e r a t e 
2 8 A s i m i l a r p o i n t i s d e a l t w i t h i n Chapter 2 i n the discussion 
o f perception and language. 
deception on the p a r t o f the agent. 9 And t o be co n s i s t e n t we 
would have t o in c l u d e i n our study o f arguments any exchanges, even 
the most c o n v i v i a l , where the agents involved maintain t h a t they 
are arguing. This would c l e a r l y be r i d i c u l o u s . I n order t o 
decide what i s an argument and what i s not we do not appeal t o any 
i d i o s y n c r a t i c n o t i o n o f an argument (whether the view o f the agent 
or the researcher) but t o the meaning o f the word i n the English 
language. I n order t o c a l l s everal d i f f e r e n t exchanges 'arguments' 
there must be something s i m i l a r about each o f them. Learning both t o 
argue and t o use the word 'argument' i s p r e c i s e l y t o l e a r n what i s 
involved i n t h a t s i m i l a r i t y , and t h i s i t s e l f i s t o recognise c e r t a i n 
s o c i a l r u l e s . Both the language and the r u l e s must be s h a r e d . 3 0 
The u n t e n a b i l i t y o f such a p o s i t i o n (which i s not as uncommon 
as i t i s mistaken) i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d i f considered i n the 
context o f a co u r t o f law. Imagine the chaos i f i t could be 
o f f e r e d as a serious defence t h a t a k i l l i n g was not a murder 
because i t d i d not coincide w i t h the accused's d e f i n i t i o n of 
'murder'. 
I t does not make sense t o suppose t h a t someone may have a 
p r i v a t e language, f o r i f i t i s t o be c a l l e d a language then 
there must be r u l e s by which any s i n g l e usage can be judged 
c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t . I t must, t h e r e f o r e , be po s s i b l e f o r 
others t o l e a r n these r u l e s . Thus i f we have only one speaker 
of a language t h i s must be a contingent matter as i t must be 
l o g i c a l l y p o ssible f o r there t o be more than one, the r u l e s o f 
usage being open t o anyone who cares t o consider them. See 
L. W i t t g e n s t e i n (1953). 
This i s not at a l l t o deny t h a t d i f f e r e n t people w i l l have 
d i f f e r e n t experiences i n the course o f t h e i r l i v e s , nor indeed t h a t 
t h e re can be sharply c o n f l i c t i n g o p i n i o n s , but only t o maintain t h a t 
such experiences or opinions are i n a good sense not p r i v a t e , unique 
or i d i o s y n c r a t i c . I n Chapter 2 we saw t h a t no sense could be made 
of the claim t h a t people l i t e r a l l y see t h i n g s d i f f e r e n t l y . 
I d e n t i f y i n g what i s seen depends upon having learned a language and 
a language i t s e l f cannot be p r i v a t e . For any language there must 
be r u l e s o f usage. I f t h i s were not so mistakes could not be 
corrected and, because two people could never be s a i d t o be speaking 
the same language, there would at l e a s t be doubt as t o the p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f any communication. The same p o i n t can be made regarding opinions. 
Any one person's op i n i o n o f another person, event, place, or whatever, 
could not be p r i v a t e or i d i o s y n c r a t i c f o r , i n order t o be coherent a t 
a l l , i t must be recognisable as an o p i n i o n . Learning what counts as 
an opi n i o n i s p a r t o f l e a r n i n g a language, and i n t h i s sense a l l 
opinions must be shared. 
The same would be t r u e of reasons. I n any reason-giving 
explanation the p r o f f e r e d reasons^must be i n t e l l i g i b l e as reasons f o r 
the a c t i o n under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . As such they must be p u b l i c and 
shared. I t i s important here t o d i s t i n g u i s h between i d e n t i f y i n g what 
i s t o count as a reason (a matter o f having learned the language) and 
espousing a p a r t i c u l a r reason oneself. Someone else's reason f o r 
a c t i n g i n a c e r t a i n manner may not be your reason f o r a c t i n g s i m i l a r l y 
but as long as i t can be understood as a reason ( i e . he i s not t a l k i n g 
nonsense) i t i s p u b l i c and shared r a t h e r than p r i v a t e and i d i o s y n c r a t i 
3 1 One farmer may p l a n t potatoes because higher p r i c e s have made 
t h i s p o t e n t i a l l y very p r o f i t a b l e , another because the s o i l and 
the c l i mate are best s u i t e d t o t h i s crop. Both p l a n t potatoes 
but f o r d i f f e r e n t reasons. Each, however, w i l l be able t o 
understand the other's reason although i t i s not h i s reason. 
We are now i n a p o s i t i o n t o ask i f anything can be made o f 
the claim t h a t people 'view' the world d i f f e r e n t l y . At the end of 
Chapter 2, Section 1 i t was suggested t h a t such claims could be 
taken n o n - l i t e r a l l y and the d i f f e r e n c e s considered i n terms o f 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . Undoubtedly d i f f e r e n t people w i l l f i n d d i f f e r e n t 
areas o f the c i t y s i g n i f i c a n t ( t h e j u t e worker the m i l l area, and 
the student the u n i v e r s i t y ) . However, s i g n i f i c a n c e ( l i k e reasons) 
i s shared. Both the j u t e worker and the student f i n d t h e i r places 
o f work s i g n i f i c a n t . That these occupy a d i f f e r e n t p h y s i c a l l o c a t i o n 
w i t h i n the urban area does not e f f e c t the common source o f the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . We understand what i s s a i d only because we understand 
t h a t a place o f work may have s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r an i n d i v i d u a l . 3 2 Even 
t a l k o f s i g n i f i c a n c e cannot accommodate the claim t h a t people view the 
world d i f f e r e n t l y i n any strong sense. To assume i d i o s y n c r a t i c views 
o f the world i s now shown t o be f a l l a c i o u s . 
Whatever the form o f explanation appropriate t o the academic 
study o f the s o c i a l realm i t i s c l e a r from the discussions o f t h i s 
chapter t h a t s c i e n t i f i c T methodology could not enhance the understanding 
o f human a c t i o n s . The d i s t i n c t i o n between automatic and meaningful 
behaviour, the i n a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f the e m p i r i c a l t e s t t o human events, 
the importance of context t o human act i o n s and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
'observing' the s o c i a l realm from o u t s i d e , a l l serve t o i l l u s t r a t e 
t h i s p o i n t . The n a t u r a l world and the s o c i a l world are e s s e n t i a l l y 
3 2 This p o i n t i s perhaps c l e a r e r i n the f o l l o w i n g example: A man, 
born on March 1 s t , i s the only l i v i n g person t o have been born 
on t h a t date. We might be tempted t o suppose t h a t March 1st 
has a s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h a t man which i s i n some way unique. 
Once i t i s r e a l i s e d , however, t h a t i t i s March 1st as the man's 
b i r t h d a y and not something i n t r i n s i c t o March 1st which i s 
s i g n i f i c a n t , then the s i g n i f i c a n c e i t s e l f i s seen t o be a general 
or shared one. 
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d i f f e r e n t and s c i e n t i f i c method i s appropriate only t o the former. 
We must t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t a science o f s o c i e t y i s not a 
poss i b l e academic p u r s u i t . Any understanding o f the s o c i a l world 
could n o t , l o g i c a l l y , be encompassed i n a s c i e n t i f i c mode of under-
standing. 
The human geographer cannot look t o science f o r s u i t a b l e 
methodological underpinnings. How then i s he t o conduct h i s 
enquiry i n t o the human behaviour of i n t e r e s t t o him 9 And t o which 
d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e or mode o f understanding the world would such 
an i n q u i r y belong? We have seen t h a t the inappropriateness o f 
c o n t r o l l e d experiments i n the study o f s o c i a l l i f e i s due, i n p a r t 
a t l e a s t , t o the e s s e n t i a l t e m p o r a l i t y of human a f f a i r s . Any human 
a c t i o n takes place i n ti m e , i s o f t e n connected w i t h what has gone 
before and may have consequences i n terms of f u t u r e a c t i o n s . This 
alone suggests t h a t the con s i d e r a t i o n o f an h i s t o r i c a l mode o f under-
standing may a f f o r d some i n s i g h t i n t o how p r o p e r l y t o e x p l a i n i n 
human geography. H i s t o r y , c e r t a i n l y , i s a d i s c i p l i n e c e n t r a l l y 
concerned w i t h notions o f time and the temporal sequence o f events. 
To r e d i r e c t the present discussion away from science and towards 
h i s t o r y may d i s t u r b many geographers, even those who make no p a r t i c u l a r 
c l a i m t o be s c i e n t i s t s . Some may even suppose i t a backward step, 
f o r e s a k i n g a l l t h a t the q u a n t i t a t i v e r e v o l u t i o n brought t o geography. 
I n e v i t a b l y some doubt and u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l surround any methodological 
r e v o l u t i o n . The s c i e n t i f i c paradigm u n d e r l i e s a wide range of research 
i n the s o c i a l sciences and i t i s n o t , i f the arguments o f t h i s chapter 
are c o r r e c t , simply a few research methods which are i n a p p r o p r i a t e but 
a whole way o f t h i n k i n g about s o c i a l phenomena. The extent t o which 
s c i e n t i f i c ways o f t h i n k i n g have permeated methodological discussion 
w i t h i n human geography i s considerable. The very aims o f the urban 
t h e o r i s t are most f r e q u e n t l y couched i n s c i e n t i f i c language or 
r e f l e c t the assumption t h a t urban theory f a l l s w i t h i n the d i s c i p l i n e 
o f science. The falseness o f the assumption leads t o the questioning 
o f the aims. I s i t , f o r example, sensible f o r the urban geographer 
t o attempt t o b u i l d up a body of urban theory which f u t u r e p r a c t i t i o n e r s 
could draw upon f o r t h e i r own researches? Or, i f theory and s c i e n t i f i c 
method go hand i n hand, must we abandon both and conclude t h a t the 
study o f human behaviour could never be t h e o r e t i c a l 9 I n s h o r t , i s 
theory possible at a l l i n the study o f the s o c i a l realm? I t i s t o 
these questions t h a t Chapter 4 i s devoted. Only a f t e r they have 
been considered can the f u l l import o f abandoning s c i e n t i f i c 
methodology be appreciated. The answers suggested can then be 
incorporated i n our account o f what urban geography i s or ever could be. 
CHAPTER 4 
THEORY AND MODELS IN SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 
The aim of t h i s chapter i s t o consider the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
approaching urban geography i n a t h e o r e t i c a l manner. To do t h i s 
we must f i r s t have some idea o f what i s meant by 'theory' and be 
q u i t e c l e a r about the nature o f a ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' account. The 
p h y s i c a l sciences are w e l l known as t h e o r e t i c a l studies and i t i s most 
o f t e n the s c i e n t i f i c model o f theory on which geographers and other 
s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s attempt t o base t h e i r own research. Phrases such 
as ' c o n s t r u c t i n g a body'of theory' and 'providing a t h e o r e t i c a l " b a s i s ' 
are f a m i l i a r i n t h i s context. Having r e j e c t e d s c i e n t i f i c method as 
in a p p r o p r i a t e t o the s o c i a l sciences we must now ask whether a s c i e n t i f i c 
model o f theory i s not also i n a p p l i c a b l e . And i f so, where does t h i s 
leave the urban t h e o r i s t 9 We w i l l again be concerned w i t h both science 
and s o c i a l science. The predominance of theory i n science and the 
p o p u l a r i t y o f the view t h a t one can t h e o r i s e about the s o c i a l realm 
i n the same way as one can t h e o r i s e about the n a t u r a l world make both 
worthy o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I t does not n e c e s s a r i l y f o l l o w from the 
r e j e c t i o n o f a s c i e n t i f i c mode o f understanding t h a t theory i n urban 
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geography could not share some o f the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of theory i n 
physics or chemistry. And cons i d e r a t i o n of the l a t t e r , even i f i t 
does not provide a v i a b l e b l u e - p r i n t , may nevertheless c l a r i f y the 
way i n which we could study the s o c i a l world t h e o r e t i c a l l y . 
Current ' t h e o r e t i c a l ' approaches i n human geography: 
What s o r t o f a c t i v i t y i s t h e o r i s i n g 9 I n the geographic 
l i t e r a t u r e one f r e q u e n t l y f i n d s the co n t r a s t between 'the t h e o r e t i c a l ' 
and 'the unique'. Indeed the q u a n t i t a t i v e r e v o l u t i o n was h a i l e d as a 
triumph f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l approach, the l a t t e r having superseded 
the t r a d i t i o n a l d e s c r i p t i v e accounts o f the unique p r o f f e r e d by 
r e g i o n a l geographers. As Johnston e x p l i c i t l y s t a t e s i n a recent 
discussion of s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e s , "The main aim o f the ' q u a n t i t a t i v e 
and t h e o r e t i c a l r e v o l u t i o n ' i n human geography has been t o develop 
general theory concerning the s p a t i a l p a t t e r n s of human a c t i v i t i e s . " 1 
Now t h a t the r e v o l u t i o n a r y methodology has i t s e l f become the sta t u s 
quo i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t r e g i o n a l geography i s f a r from 
dead. As Johnston h i m s e l f notes, 
p a r a d o x i c a l l y much o f the recent l i t e r a t u r e 
i n t h i s f i e l d presents the r e s u l t s o f s p e c i a l i z e d 
research p r o j e c t s , w i t h no o v e r a l l i n d i c a t i o n of 
t h e i r importance or p o s i t i o n i n the quest f o r t h e o r y . 2 
We cannot formulate t h e o r i e s i n human geography w i t h o u t knowing what 
such a theory would look l i k e . Methodological ignorance on t h i s p o i n t 
may account f o r the pa u c i t y o f t h e o r e t i c a l work w i t h i n urban geography. 
I n present urban methodology the search f o r theory heralded by 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n i s s t i l l very much t o the f o r e . Q u a n t i t a t i v e techniques 
are being presented as more de s i r a b l e than q u a l i t a t i v e techniques and 
f r e q u e n t l y f o r the reason t h a t the former and not the l a t t e r w i l l a i d 
1 R. J. Johnston (1973) preface. 
2 I b i d . 
theory c o n s t r u c t i o n . The q u a n t i t a t i v e / q u a l i t a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n i s 
ali g n e d w i t h the general/unique d i s t i n c t i o n and the s t a t u s of 
q u a n t i f i c a t i o n as more p r e c i s e , s c i e n t i f i c and respectable i s r a r e l y 
questioned. Meyer, i n an a r t i c l e on the 'urban l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s 
paradigm' s t a t e s c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t amongst those subscribing t o such 
a paradigm i t i s unequivocal t h a t , " . . . i n f a c t , q u a n t i t a t i v e techniques 
are more s c i e n t i f i c than q u a l i t a t i v e techniques." 3 Such a d e s c r i p t i o n , 
f a r from being recommendatory as intended, can now be appreciated as 
ca s t i n g doubt on the fundamental a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f such techniques t o 
urban a n a l y s i s . I f the attempt t o study human geography s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
i s a l o g i c a l l y incoherent e n t e r p r i s e , any ambition t o be more s c i e n t i f i c 
must s u r e l y be misplaced. Even Meyer, however, although he i s concerned 
t o demonstrate the inadequacies o f present urban l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , 
accepts t h a t the problems o f human geography r e q u i r e s c i e n t i f i c 
treatment. The very f a c t t h a t the a r t i c l e i s based on t a l k o f 
paradigms as expounded by Kuhn reveals such an accep tance. h The 
f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t from Kuhn quoted by Meyer i s r e v e a l i n g : 
textbooks expound the body o f accepted 
theory, i l l u s t r a t e many or a l l o f i t s 
successful a p p l i c a t i o n s , and compare these 
a p p l i c a t i o n s w i t h exemplary observations and 
experiments. 5 
C l e a r l y these remarks are r e l e v a n t only t o science. The same could 
not be sai d o f the s o c i a l sciences f o r experiments are l o g i c a l l y 
excluded from t h e i r methodology. I t i s the s c i e n t i f i c paradigm 
i t s e l f which must be questioned i n human geography. 
The attempt by s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s t o adopt the methods o f science 
3 D. R. Meyer (1973) p.170 
4 Kuhn i s concerned w i t h the s t r u c t u r e o f s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n s , 
see T.S.Kuhn (1970) 
5 D. R. Meyer, o p . c i t . , p.169 
i s as understandable as i t i s misled. The p h y s i c a l sciences have 
enjoyed a considerable p r e s t i g e i n the l a s t few decades and t h e i r 
success i n the realms o f the t h e o r e t i c a l made i t a l l the more 
l i k e l y t h a t t h e i r methods would be t r i e d out i n other academic 
f i e l d s . I t i s i n science t h a t the d i s t i n c t i o n between the general 
and the unique o r i g i n a t e s . The general statement of science i s the 
u n i v e r s a l statement. This a p p l i e s t o a l l instances o f a p a r t i c u l a r 
phenomenon and i t i s by appeal t o the u n i v e r s a l t h a t the unique or 
i n d i v i d u a l occurrence can be explained. The u n i v e r s a l statements 
themselves form the t h e o r e t i c a l base o f science, the body o f est a b l i s h e d 
s c i e n t i f i c theory. Geographers, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , have assumed the same 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the general, the t h e o r e t i c a l and the unique. 
Johnston, f o r example, declares t h a t h i s book "...presents a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f pa t t e r n s and i n t e r a c t i o n s along w i t h hypotheses f o r 
t h e i r development and o p e r a t i o n , thereby accounting f o r the s p a t i a l 
order Cor lack o f i t ) . Tesring many of These hypotheses," he adds, 
"remains the task o f f u t u r e r e s e a r c h . " 6 I f we were t o b u i l d up a 
p i c t u r e from the l i t e r a t u r e o f human geography o f what a t h e o r e t i c a l account 
i s and "how i t i s t o be a r r i v e d ^ at~, "two p r i n c i p a l f e a t u r e s would emerge; 
f i r s t , t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l study must be general i n nature ( i n urban 
geography conclusions must apply t o a l l c i t i e s , or a t l e a s t t o a l l 
c i t i e s o f a c e r t a i n s i z e or k i n d ) ; secondly, t h a t t h e o r i e s , based on 
observation o f the p a r t i c u l a r , must be t e s t e d against the r e a l world. 
As a p r e l i m i n a r y step towards both g e n e r a l i t y and t e s t i n g 5a model i s 
commonly set up. This i s s a i d t o reduce the 'noise' o f superfluous 
d e t a i l and, when o p e r a t i o n a l i s e d , be amenable t o s c i e n t i f i c t e s t i n g . 
Since such a key r o l e i s claimed f o r the model i n urban theory i t i s 
worth examining i t s p o t e n t i a l as a method of t h e o r e t i c a l study. 
R. J. Johnston, o p . c i t . , p.13 
One of the most f a m i l i a r modelling exercises w i t h i n geography 
i s t h a t concerned w i t h the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a system. Systems 
research, i t appears, embraces many l e v e l s o f g e n e r a l i t y although 
the major concern o f many systems t h e o r i s t s i s w i t h modes o f 
or g a n i s a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t l y general t o embrace behaviour systems of 
any type. Such an approach has l e d t o a considerable expenditure 
of time and energy on i d e n t i f y i n g systems, analysing i n p u t , o u tput, 
feedback e t c . , and determining e q u i l i b r i u m l e v e l s . The system 
i t s e l f i s represented by a model and i t i s t h i s model which i s s a i d 
t o embody the 'theory'. The severe g e n e r a l i t y o f such models i s 
o f t e n considered t h e i r primary v i r t u e b u t , as we have seen, the 
general and the t r i v i a l f r e q u e n t l y go hand i n hand. The f o l l o w i n g 
warning i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a pposite, 
I f a model can be developed which, when s u i t a b l e 
parameters are fed i n , f i t s e v erything from the 
r i s e and f a l l o f New England stone masons t o 
h o s p i t a l management and the decay o f the c i t y , we 
may question whether the general system has not 
become so general as t o become o p e r a t i o n a l l y 
meaningless or p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y o t i o s e . 8 
C e r t a i n l y the t r i v i a l could never be academically respectable. When 
Buckley, i n a discussion o f p h y s i c a l , b i o l o g i c a l , p s ychological and 
s o c i o - c u l t u r a l systems, maintains t h a t , " t o base scepticism on some 
inherent ' s u b s t a n t i v e 1 d i f f e r e n c e among such systems i s t o r e t r e a t t o 
an o l d e r p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n and miss the whole p o i n t o f the c u r r e n t 
s c i e n t i f i c trend", 9 i s i t not he who has 'missed the whole p o i n t ' o f such 
scepticism? No t r e n d can make sense o f the incoherent. The scepticism 
attacked by Buckley i s p a r t o f the much more general scepticism o f the 
cur r e n t vogue o f sci e n t i s m ( i e . the attempt t o make every study s c i e n t i f i c ) 
and the arguments o f t h i s t h e s i s show i t t o be well-founded. 
7 see, f o r example, W. Buckley (1967) 
8 Times L i t e r a r y Supplement (1971) quoted i n B.T.Robson (1973) 
9 W. Buckley, o p . c i t . , p. 
Whatever the f a u l t s of general systems theory, the systems 
framework has proved popular not only i n geographic research, but 
also i n other areas o f the s o c i a l sciences. The model o f the system 
i s the f o c a l p o i n t o f such study and model b u i l d i n g (whether systems 
r e l a t e d o r n o t ) has become the immediate aim o f many researchers. 
Urban t h e o r i s t s are no exception here. The exact r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between model and theory, however, i s almost always problematic, and 
r a r e l y made e x p l i c i t by the model b u i l d e r himself. To determine the 
r o l e o f models i n theory formation we must c l a r i f y t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
The model and the theory are sometimes taken t o be synonymous. 
Chorley and Haggett, on the other hand, have the f o l l o w i n g t o say 
about the f u n c t i o n o f models: 
Models are necessary, t h e r e f o r e , t o c o n s t i t u t e a 
bridge between the ob s e r v a t i o n a l and t h e o r e t i c a l 
l e v e l s ; and are concerned w i t h s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , 
r e d u c t i o n , c o n c r e t i z a t i o n , experimentation, a c t i o n , 
extension, g l o b a l i z a t i o n , theory formation and 
e x p l a n a t i o n . 1 0 
Here the model i s s a i d t o come before the theory or the ex p l a n a t i o n , 
although the precise nature o f the 'bridging' f u n c t i o n i s not c l e a r . 
Chorley and Haggett, i n these remarks, r e v e a l t h e i r conception o f both 
model and theory t o be based on s c i e n t i f i c methodology, f o r t h e i r 
account assumes the o b s e r v a t i o n a l , experimental and t h e o r e t i c a l stages 
u s u a l l y a c c r e d i t e d t o pure science. Even w i t h i n science, however, 
the f u n c t i o n o f a model i s not r e a d i l y apparent. 
Any i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the r o l e o f models i n t h e o r e t i c a l research 
w i l l meet one major ob s t a c l e , namely t h a t models themselves are not a l l 
o f the same type and t h e r e f o r e the r o l e s they play can be expected t o 
be many and v a r i e d . Several attempts have been made t o c l a s s i f y 
models, but no standard c l a s s i f i c a t i o n has emerged. Meyer p o i n t s t o 
the common concern of geographers w i t h models o f d i f f e r e n t kinds and 
R. J. Chorley and P. Haggett (196/7) p.24 
adds, 
....urban geographers have t h e i r b e l i e f s i n 
models which provide them w i t h l e g i t i m a t e 
analogies. For example, c i t i e s are t r e a t e d 
as b a l l s o r planets so t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n 
between c i t i e s can be represented by analogy 
w i t h Newtonian physics using the g r a v i t y model. 1 1 
Such analogue models are not only prominent i n geographic l i t e r a t u r e . 
The borrowing o f t h e o r i e s from one area t o use as analogies i n another 
area i s also p a r t o f the p r a c t i c e o f science. Models have been 
i d e n t i f i e d as i c o n i c , symbolic, conceptual, experimental, c l a s s i f i c a t o r y , 
h i s t o r i c a l , d e s c r i p t i v e or normative, s t a t i c or dynamic; the catalogue 
o f model types seems endless. I t i s the f u n c t i o n o f models which i s 
fundamental here, however, and i t i s best t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s f i r s t i n 
the realm o f science proper. For there the use o f models has a 
considerable h i s t o r y and i s thought by some t o provide the key t o 
s c i e n t i f i c research. Models i n science, t h e r e f o r e , may a f f o r d some 
valuable i n s i g h t s i n t o the p o s s i b i l i t y o f model b u i l d i n g and the 
development o f theory i n s o c i a l science. 
I 
MODELS AND ANALOGIES IN SCIENCE: 
This s e c t i o n w i l l be devoted t o an examination of the p a r t 
models play i n the on-going a c t i v i t y o f science m order t o e s t a b l i s h 
the appropriateness or otherwise o f the c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n of science 
as 'model t a l k ' . The place o f the model i n s c i e n t i f i c reasoning w i l l 
be made p l a i n and the p a r t models could play w i t h i n science assessed. 
D. R. Meyer, o p . c i t . , p.170. 
I t i s the nature o f the connection between the model and the 
advancement o f s c i e n t i f i c knowledge which i s c r u c i a l l y important 
here. 
The most commonplace n o t i o n o f a model i s t h a t o f a small scale 
r e p l i c a of some already e x i s t i n g o b j e c t or set o f objects- the c h i l d ' s 
model aeroplane or the model of the planetary system i n the museum. 
A l l such models are constructed as r e p l i c a s or copies and, as such, 
la c k one or more fea t u r e s o f the o r i g i n a l , t h i s e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 
them as models. I f t h i s were not the case we would j u s t have another 
aeroplane r a t h e r than a model aeroplane. The most important f e a t u r e 
o f such models i s t h a t they are constructed, and constructed as a 
copy o f something e l s e . I n order f o r the c o n s t r u c t i o n t o take place 
a t a l l , t h e r e f o r e , the p r o p e r t i e s o f the o r i g i n a l must already be known. 
One could n o t , i n other words, co n s t r u c t a model of Concorde w i t h o u t 
knowing beforehand, a t the very l e a s t , what Concorde looks l i k e . Thus 
such models presuppose knowledge o f the o r i g i n a l and could not precede 
such knowledge. 
I t would n o t , o f course, normally be supposed t h a t these model 
aeroplanes or model s o l d i e r s have anything whatever t o do w i t h science; 
they are t o y s , or pieces i n a game. But what about the model o f the 
pl a n e t a r y system, could t h i s not have something t o do both w i t h 
explanation and w i t h science? Let us look a t the nature o f the 
as s o c i a t i o n . A model o f the plan e t a r y system i s the same s o r t of 
model, e x h i b i t s the same e s s e n t i a l f e a t u r e s , as a model of Concorde, 
the d i f f e r e n c e being t h a t i n the case o f the former the o r i g i n a l o f 
which i t i s a copy happens t o be a set o f obj e c t s w i t h which science 
has been and continues t o be concerned. The ob j e c t o f r e p l i c a t i o n , 
then, also forms p a r t o f the subject matter o f science. The 
c o n s t r u c t i o n of such a model, however, does not a f f e c t the subject 
matter o f science one i o t a . I t cannot add t o knowledge of the 
p l a n e t a r y system, f o r we know t h a t i t presupposes such knowledge. 
Such a model could have no place i n the a c t i v i t y of science. The 
p o i n t o f c o n s t r u c t i n g i t a t a l l would be t o i mpart, perhaps w i t h 
greater ease, our own knowledge o f the subject t o others. I t i s , 
then, no more than a h e u r i s t i c device and as such does not f e a t u r e i n 
the d i s c i p l i n e o f science, but rat-her i n the i m p a r t i n g o f s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge t o n o n - s c i e n t i s t s . Such models do not t e l l us more about 
how the world i s than we already know. 
A second, f r e q u e n t l y employed, sense o f the word model i s t h a t 
associated w i t h a type o f design or plan such as t h a t used by 
a r c h i t e c t s , car designers and the l i k e . This i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from 
the model boat or model aeroplane, f o r i t i s not constructed from 
e x i s t i n g i n f o r m a t i o n about any o r i g i n a l , but i s r a t h e r a f e a t o f the 
imagination. I t s e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s t h a t i t i s the f i r s t 
stage i n the c r e a t i o n o f something which has not y e t been constructed. 
I t s f u n c t i o n i s t h e r e f o r e not one of e x p l a n a t i o n , nor indeed o f a i d i n g 
e x p l a n a t i o n , f o r before the design or plan i t s e l f i s produced" -there 
i s nothing t o be explained. This s o r t o f model, then, does not belong 
t o science but r a t h e r t o the f i e l d of technology, t o the p r a c t i c a l 
realm o f our l i v e s . 
What then are 'models' i n science? I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o f i n d 
agreement e s p e c i a l l y among s c i e n t i s t s as t o the nature of such models, 
or indeed the p a r t they play i n s c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n and p r e d i c t i o n . 
That s c i e n t i s t s do use models i n the course o f t h e i r s c i e n t i f i c p u r s u i t s 
i s not i n doubt. I t i s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f such models and the uses 
t o which they are put which are o f primary i n t e r e s t i n the present 
context. Can models, f o r example, be s a i d t o have a p a r t i c u l a r s t a t u s 
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i n science 9 Would there be no ongoing a c t i v i t y o f science w i t h o u t 
models? Can we i n f a c t say anything about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
' s c i e n t i f i c ' models i n general and the a c t i v i t y of science, or are 
the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and uses o f such models so many and v a r i e d t h a t 
each case must be considered on i t s own merits? 
The Campbell/Hesse t h e s i s and the s t a t u s o f models: 
Hesse i n her book on models and analogies gives an account of 
a model as "any system, whether b u i l d a b l e , p i c t u r a b l e , imaginable or 
none o f these, which has the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of making a theory 
p r e d i c t i v e . " 1 2 Leaving aside f o r one moment the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 
a c q u i r i n g an unimaginable system, l e t us consider her more i n t e r e s t i n g 
claims about the r e l a t i o n s h i p between models and the p r e d i c t i v e 
f u n c t i o n s o f a theory. Perhaps i t ought t o be pointed out a t t h i s 
j u n c t u r e t h a t a theory i n science by i t s very nature as a s c i e n t i f i c 
t heory, i s u n i v e r s a l . We do not t h e r e f o r e have the f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
the theory f i r s t , f o l l o w e d , however h o t l y , by i t s extension i n t o the 
realms o f p r e d i c t i o n or a t l e a s t p r e d i c t i v e n e s s . I t i s r a t h e r the 
essence o f a s c i e n t i f i c theory t h a t i t s very f o r m u l a t i o n allows the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f p r e d i c t i o n . I n the simple s c i e n t i f i c statement " a l l 
gases expand when heated" there i s no f u r t h e r step t o be taken i n order 
t o make i t p r e d i c t i v e . P r e d i c t i o n i s merely a matter of p r e d i c t i n g . 
I f we know t h a t a l l gases expand when heated then we can p r e d i c t i n 
a l l confidence t h a t t h i s gas we have i n f r o n t o f us w i l l expand when 
we heat i t . Models then cannot be devices which a l l o w t h e o r i e s t o be 
p r e d i c t i v e as opposed t o being d e s c r i p t i v e or explanatory. They must, 
i f they are t o play a p a r t i n science a t a l l , bear some r e l a t i o n t o the 
a c t u a l f o r m u l a t i o n o f the theory. 
2 M. B. Hesse (1963) p.21 
Having noted what Hesse cannot be c l a i m i n g f o r models, l e t 
us now t u r n t o the major t h e s i s o f her book. I n t h i s she f o l l o w s 
the English p h y s i c i s t N. R. Campbell who i n the 1920s put forward 
the view t h a t models were necessary t o the c r e a t i o n and extension 
of theory i n science. His opponents on the other hand recognised 
the p a r t models had played but claimed t h a t , although they were 
u s e f u l , they c e r t a i n l y were not e s s e n t i a l . The debate revolves 
round the question o f whether there could be any ongoing a c t i v i t y 
o f science w i t h o u t the proper use o f models. Are models v i t a l t o 
science or are they mere aids t o theory c o n s t r u c t i o n which can be 
thrown away when the theory has been developed 9 Both Campbell and 
Hesse wish t o emphasise the e s s e n t i a l nature of models i n r e l a t i o n t o 
the extension of s c i e n t i f i c theory. There are, however, two possible 
claims t h a t one could make i n t h i s respect. One could, f o r example, 
claim t h a t , i n the development o f the k i n e t i c theory of gases, the 
b i l l i a r d b a l l model as i t happens played an e s s e n t i a l parx. I n t h i s 
one would be r i g h t , but there i s no necessity i n v o l v e d . One could 
even extend the claim t o a l l past cases. I n other words t o the claim 
t h a t i n every case o f the development of a s c i e n t i f i c theory some model 
or other has as i t happens played a p a r t . One would then be e i t h e r 
r i g h t or wrong - a f a c t which could only be es t a b l i s h e d by c o n s u l t i n g 
an account o f the development o f every theory and not by l o o k i n g a t 
the nature o f science i t s e l f . Such a claim involves no appeal, muted 
or otherwise, t o necessity. This, i t must be added, i s not what I 
take e i t h e r Campbell or Hesse t o be advancing. 
The other possible c l a i m , the more i n t e r e s t i n g one, and the one 
which summarises the Campbell/Hesse p o s i t i o n i n v o l v e s l o g i c a l necessity 
When Campbell t a l k s o f the necessity o f using models what he i s t a l k i n g 
about, declares Hesse, i s l o g i c a l necessity. The claim i s t h a t becaus 
o f the nature o f science, t h e o r i e s could not ( l o g i c a l l y could n o t ) 
be developed w i t h o u t the use of some analogue model or other. Here 
i t i s necessary b r i e f l y t o digress i n order t o make p l a i n the nature 
o f an analogue model and the use t o which Hesse supposes i t can be put. 
The analogue model i n science: 
An analogue model, as used i n science, involves the employment 
o f a set o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s , already known i n science, as an analogy i n 
a sphere o f science not y e t f u l l y understood. Thus the movement o f 
b i l l i a r d b a l l s was taken as an analogy i n the study of gases. I n any 
analogue model there w i l l be what can be s u c c i n c t l y described as the 
p o s i t i v e , negative and n e u t r a l analogies. Thus when contemplating 
gas molecules as analogous t o b i l l i a r d b a l l s , there w i l l be some 
p r o p e r t i e s o f the b i l l i a r d b a l l s which are known t o be s i m i l a r t o 
those o f gas molecules ( f o r example, t h a t they are 'molecules' which 
may c o l l i d e w i t h one and o t h e r ) , some p r o p e r t i e s which are known not 
t o be analogous (eg. c o l o u r ) and other p r o p e r t i e s the relevance of 
which i s , as y e t , unknown. The most important p a r t o f such a model i s , 
according, t o Hesse, the n e u t r a l analogy, f o r i t i s by extending—the 
p o s i t i v e analogy i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n t h a t s c i e n t i f i c p r e d i c t i o n s are 
p o s s i b l e a t a l l . 
I n i t i a l l y l e t us r e s t r i c t the discussion t o what could be 
l a b e l l e d ' t h e o r e t i c a l analogies', t h a t i s , any analogue model which 
c o n s i s t s of a set o f already successful or w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d t h e o r e t i c a l 
statements from one area o f science. The model i s then a p p l i e d t o 
another less w e l l known area w i t h the purpose o f i n c r e a s i n g s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge o f the l a t t e r . For example, suppose t h a t we take the set 
of s c i e n t i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n s concerning the p r o p e r t i e s o f l i g h t and use 
these as an analogy i n t h e study o f sound. To r e f o r m u l a t e Hesse's 
t h e s i s , the claim would be t h a t , i n order t o produce s c i e n t i f i c 
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hypotheses about the p r o p e r t i e s o f sound, not only would i t be 
necessary t o use the p o s i t i v e and n e u t r a l analogies o f the theory 
o f l i g h t but i t could have been done i n no other way. For analogies 
o r models t o play a l o g i c a l l y necessary p a r t i n the p r a c t i c e o f 
science i t would also be necessary t o suppose t h a t some analogy or 
other played a v i t a l r o l e i n the f o r m u l a t i o n o f hypotheses about 
l i g h t , as w i t h every other s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis. This seems 
i m p l a u s i b l e , f o r at some p o i n t there must n e c e s s a r i l y have been no 
such t h e o r e t i c a l analogy t o act i n t h i s manner. Th i s , however i s 
not the main o b j e c t i o n . 
The claims o f l o g i c a l necessity must r e s t upon the contention 
t h a t , t o continue the above example, the s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses about 
the p r o p e r t i e s o f sound could not have been a r r i v e d a t i n any other 
way than by the use of analogy. But these p r o p o s i t i o n s are about the 
p r o p e r t i e s o f sound and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them, and only about 
such p r o p e r t i e s and such r e l a x i o n s h i p b . They can be presented and 
understood q u i t e separately from and wi t h o u t mention of the p r o p e r t i e s 
o f l i g h t . Their t r u t h i n no way r e l i e s on the t r u t h o f the p r o p o s i t i o n s 
a b o u t " l i g h t . This being the case i t i s a t l e a s t l o g i c a l l y possible 
t h a t such hypotheses could be a r r i v e d a t with o u t reference t o , and 
indeed i n t o t a l ignorance o f , the theory of l i g h t . I f a s c i e n t i f i c 
hypothesis i s the s o r t o f p r o p o s i t i o n which i s d i r e c t l y or e m p i r i c a l l y 
f a l s i f i a b l e , then i t s v a l i d i t y depends on such e m p i r i c a l observations. 
No matter i n what manner the p r o p o s i t i o n was a c t u a l l y a r r i v e d a t , i t s 
p l a u s i b i l i t y as a s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis r e q u i r e s only such d i r e c t 
observation. For example, i t may come t o me i n a f l a s h o f i n s p i r a t i o n 
t h a t the e a r t h moves round the sun, or I may a r r i v e a t the same 
conclusion by a process o f l o g i c a l deduction. The t r u t h o f the 
p r o p o s i t i o n 'the e a r t h moves round the sun', however, does not r e l y 
i n any way e i t h e r on a f l a s h o f i n s i g h t or upon knowing the r u l e s o f 
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l o g i c . Any p a r t i c u l a r way o f a r r i v i n g a t such an hypothesis i s a 
contingent matter and w i l l depend upon the other knowledge and 
experience o f the i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t . 
R a t i o n a l conduct and the use o f analogies: 
Both Campbell and Hesse would, I t h i n k , be forced t o concede 
t h i s p o i n t . They have a f u r t h e r argument concerning analogies, 
however, which they put alongside the claims f o r l o g i c a l necessity 
but which s h i f t s the ground s u f f i c i e n t l y t o be put instead. This i s , 
t h a t t o use an analogy, such as the one of our example, i s the most 
r a t i o n a l way t o conduct the business o f science. The t o p i c o f 
r a t i o n a l i t y i s d e a l t w i t h a t l e n g t h i n the p h i l o s o p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . 
I n the present context, however, a b r i e f summary of some of the 
conclusions w i l l s u f f i c e . I n order t o t a l k o f r a t i o n a l i t y a t a l l we 
must have agreed c r i t e r i a f o r what i s r a t i o n a l and what i s not. These 
are, however, not a r b i t r a r y . That i s , we cannot get together w i t h a 
few f r i e n d s and decide what i s t o count as a good reason and what i s 
not i n s p i t e o f the language which we speak and the soc i e t y i n which 
we f i n d ourselves. Judgements o f r a t i o n a l i t y and i r r a t i o n a l i t y are 
judgements about conduct, about human a c t i o n s . Such judgements r e l y 
on the conduct having a purpose and i t i s only i n the l i g h t o f t h i s 
purpose t h a t the conduct can be judged. The purpose i t s e l f , however, 
derives i t s coherence only from the realm o f experience or mode of 
conduct o f which i t i s a p a r t . Thus, t o f o l l o w Oakeshott, "no conduct, 
no a c t i o n or s e r i e s o f actions can be ' r a t i o n a l ' or ' i r r a t i o n a l ' out of 
r e l a t i o n t o the idiom o f a c t i v i t y t o which they belong." 
Again there are two possible claims which could be made about the 
r a t i o n a l i t y o f using analogies i n science. F i r s t i t might be s a i d t h a t 
i n a p a r t i c u l a r case, f o r example the development of the k i n e t i c theory 
o f gases, the use o f an analogy was, as i t happens, the most r a t i o n a l 
1 3 M. Oakeshott (1962) p.103 
way f o r the s c i e n t i s t i n v o l v e d t o proceed. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know 
whether there i s any sense i n such a statement, but i f there i s then 
i t i s something o f the form as f o l l o w s : here we have a f e l l o w 
e a r n e s t l y engaged i n s c i e n t i f i c research concerning gases and he has 
X^ __. po s s i b l e ways o f proceeding open t o him. He chooses X^, namely 
the using o f an analogy, and i n only Y hours he has come up w i t h 
c e r t a i n very promising hypotheses which over time become es t a b l i s h e d 
as the k i n e t i c theory o f gases. I f we then s a i d of t h i s s c i e n t i s t 
t h a t given the possible options t h a t presented themselves t o him he 
proceeded i n the most r a t i o n a l manner, we would mean something l i k e 
t h a t the p a r t i c u l a r procedure chosen had l e d t o the f o r m u l a t i o n o f 
important s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses, and t h i s quicker than any other 
manner o f proceeding might have been expected t o do. This i s 
n e c e s s a r i l y a r e t r o s p e c t i v e judgement and j u s t because t h i s "most 
r a t i o n a l " course o f a c t i o n would not have been a t a l l c l e a r a t the 
time o f the agents choice i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e s p e c t a b i l i t y must also 
be i n doubt. What c e r t a i n l y does not f o l l o w i s t h a t i t would be 
always or even ever again ' r a t i o n a l ' t o proceed i n the same manner. 
'Most r a t i o n a l ' i n our example can be replaced by 'quickest', and~~ 
whatever about the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o f reference t o r a t i o n a l i t y a t a l l 
i n r e l a t i o n t o the speed o f performing an a c t i o n , i t i s c l e a r t h a t 
"the quicker the b e t t e r " i s h a r d l y an idiom p e c u l i a r t o science. Such 
a claim t e l l s us n o t h i n g about how the r a t i o n a l s c i e n t i s t ought t o 
proceed i n the f u t u r e and can have no bearing whatsoever on the manner 
i n which the ongoing a c t i v i t y o f science i s conducted. 
I n order t o be o f any i n t e r e s t t o science the stronger claim would 
have t o be p u t ; namely, t h a t t o use analogies i n the development o f 
theory i s the most s c i e n t i f i c a l l y r a t i o n a l way t o proceed. That i s , 
t h a t t o proceed i n t h i s manner i s somehow more s c i e n t i f i c than t o 
proceed i n any other way. Let us look f i r s t a t what i t i s t o be 
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s c i e n t i f i c a l l y i r r a t i o n a l . Suppose we have a man who claims t o be 
and indeed appears t o be a s c i e n t i s t , who refuses t o accept the 
k i n e t i c theory o f gases on the grounds t h a t gas p a r t i c l e s are not 
coloured and b i l l i a r d b a l l s u s u a l l y are, and proceeds t o ignore t h i s 
theory i n h i s own researches i n t o the nature o f gases. We would, I 
t h i n k , be forced t o declare t h i s s c i e n t i s t i r r a t i o n a l , f o r what he i s 
doing i s denying an e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n t i f i c theory on grounds other 
than s c i e n t i f i c . So here we have a s c i e n t i s t being u n s c i e n t i f i c , 
and i t i s t h i s t h a t we c a l l i r r a t i o n a l i t y i n science. Here the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between u n s c i e n t i f i c and n o n - s c i e n t i f i c should be noted. 
I n the example above we can see t h a t t o be u n s c i e n t i f i c i s t o b r i n g 
n o n - s c i e n t i f i c considerations ( i e . considerations o u t w i t h the realm 
o f science) t o bear on a s c i e n t i f i c problem. Now we can see t h a t 
the reverse o f t h e i r r a t i o n a l i t y c r i t e r i a must also be t r u e . I f 
some p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n or agent's conduct cannot be dismissed as non-
s c i e n t i f i c , and cannot be condemned as u n s c i e n x i f i c , then i t f o l l o w s 
t h a t such an a c t i o n or set o f actions must be ' s c i e n t i f i c ' , o r , i f i t 
i s c l e a r e r , s c i e n t i f i c a l l y r a t i o n a l . I f the actions o f a s c i e n t i s t 
Cas s c i e n t i s t ) cannot~be declared u n s c i e n t i f i c then they are n e c e s s a r i l y 
r a t i o n a l f o r they cannot be i r r a t i o n a l . 
I t f o l l o w s from the above e x p o s i t i o n t h a t i f an approach becomes 
est a b l i s h e d w i t h i n a d i s c i p l i n e , i t must conform t o the norms o f 
r a t i o n a l i t y which have evolved w i t h i n t h a t d i s c i p l i n e . And t h i s 
because t o declare a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n u n s c i e n t i f i c , f o r example, _is_ 
j u s t t o declare t h a t i t does not conform t o the norms and standards o f 
science as p r e s e n t l y p r a c t i s e d . The use o f analogue models i s 
t h e r e f o r e c e r t a i n l y not u n s c i e n t i f i c and hence not i r r a t i o n a l , but 
then few would have supposed t h a t i t was. This does n o t h i n g , however, 
t o support the strong claim we have supposed Hesse t o be making. That 
the use o f analogue models i n science i s r a t i o n a l can no longer be i n 
question, and we have seen why t h i s i s so. To e s t a b l i s h t h e i r use 
as the most r a t i o n a l way of conducting the business of science may 
seem only a small step away, but i t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s step which 
betrays a considerable degree o f confusion concerning the n o t i o n of 
r a t i o n a l i t y . The idea t h a t s p e c i f i c a ctions could be more or less 
r a t i o n a l than other r e l a t e d actions i s a problematic one. For any 
a c t i o n t o be r a t i o n a l , i t only r e q u i r e s t h a t the agent puts forward 
g e n e r a l l y accepted and appropriate reasons f o r so a c t i n g . Thus i f 
I was asked why I had eaten some cheese, I might answer t h a t I was 
hungry and I l i k e cheese. Such reasons are p e r f e c t l y i n t e l l i g i b l e 
as reasons f o r e a t i n g cheese. No one would doubt t h a t my conduct 
was r a t i o n a l , and t h i s even though they do not share my p a r t i c u l a r 
reasons; t h a t i s , they do not themselves l i k e cheese. Reasons are 
i n t e l l i g i b l e or u n i n t e l l i g i b l e only i n p a r t i c u l a r c ontexts, but t h e i r 
i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y does not depend on them being shared i n t h i s way. 
E i t h e r a s p e c i f i c reason i s appropriate t o the context i n which i r i s 
advanced or i t i s not. Thus e i t h e r an a c t i o n i s r a t i o n a l or i t i s 
i r r a t i o n a l . We cannot use 'most r a t i o n a l ' as a synonym f o r 'best'. 
I t must be concluded from the preceding"discussion t h a t n e i t h e r 
o f the strong claims o f Campbell and Hesse w i l l stand up t o much 
s c r u t i n y . Whatever the r o l e o f analogue models i n science, they 
cannot provide e i t h e r a l o g i c a l l y necessary step i n the f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses, or take precedence as the most r a t i o n a l 
method o f procedure. This i s not t o say t h a t analogue models have 
not played and continue t o play an important p a r t i n the p r a c t i c e o f 
science, but only t h a t t h i s i s a contingent matter. A model may or 
may not be u s e f u l t o the s c i e n t i s t , may or may not be used by the 
s c i e n t i s t . The model, then, has no p a r t i c u l a r s tatus i n science, 
although i t may have a v a r i e t y o f f u n c t i o n s . I t i s t o the f u n c t i o n 
o f models i n science t h a t we now t u r n . 
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The f u n c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c models: 
When s c i e n t i s t s have used models i n order t o f u r t h e r t h e i r 
s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , what p a r t have such models played i n the 
f o r m u l a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses? What i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between model, s c i e n t i s t and t h e o r y 9 I n order t o answer these 
questions i t i s necessary t o have some idea o f what a s c i e n t i f i c 
theory i s , and indeed what i t i s not. And i t i s p r e c i s e l y confusion 
on t h i s p o i n t t h a t gives Hesse's claims an i n i t i a l p l a u s i b i l i t y ; a 
confusion which Hesse h e r s e l f appears t o share. B r i e f l y , a 
s c i e n t i f i c theory consists i n a set o f statements about the p r o p e r t i e s , 
and the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between these p r o p e r t i e s , of some s p e c i f i c set 
o f phenomena i n the n a t u r a l world. I t has two e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
F i r s t , t h a t i t i s u n i v e r s a l ; i e . o f the form ' a l l gases expand when 
heated'. Secondly, t h a t i t has become es t a b l i s h e d i n science, t h i s 
being r e l a t e d t o the f a l s i f l a b i l i t y c r i t e r i o n o f s c i e n t i f i c v a l i d i t y . 
S c i e n t i s t s do not astound the world w i t h new s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r y , they 
formulate hypotheses which may over time gain s c i e n t i f i c r e s p e c t a b i l i t y 
and become es t a b l i s h e d as p a r t o f the body of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. 
The k i n e t i c theory o f gases i s one such theory. The r e l a t i o n s h i p s 
revealed i n such a theory may be expressed i n several ways. Frequently 
i n science mathematical symbols are used, not only f o r t h e i r b r e v i t y 
but also because o f the ease w i t h which they allow comparison and the 
determination o f consequences. A mathematical formula i s one way o f 
expressing a s c i e n t i f i c p r o p o s i t i o n and not something over and above 
such a p r o p o s i t i o n . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between r e f l e c t i o n and the 
brightness o f l i g h t may be represented by mathematical symbols, but 
the mathematics n e i t h e r adds t o nor s u b t r a c t s from t h a t r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
I n her discussion o f reasons f o r using analogue models i n science 
Hesse claims t h a t " t o a s s e r t an analogy between amplitude o f waves and 
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loudness o f sound or brightness o f l i g h t , even before any 
experimental c o r r e l a t i o n i s known, _is_ t o give a reason f o r the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the symbol a I f an analogy i s asserted 
then t h i s does indeed provide a reason f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the symbol 
a i n a p a r t i c u l a r manner, but i t i s c e r t a i n l y not a s c i e n t i f i c 
reason and i n no way f o r e s t a l l s the more important question o f why 
the analogy was asserted i n the f i r s t place. I f a stands f o r the 
amplitude o f waves and an analogy i s asserted between the amplitude 
o f waves and the loudness o f sound, then a. w i l l c e r t a i n l y be 
i n t e r p r e t e d as the loudness o f sound, and because the analogy has 
been asserted. But t h i s i s a t r i v i a l matter. I t i s s i m i l a r t o 
c l a i m i n g t h a t X must have red h a i r because X i s a bachelor when you 
have s t a r t e d w i t h the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a l l bachelors have red h a i r . 
What r e q u i r e s explanation here i s why you should have s t a r t e d w i t h 
such a p r o p o s i t i o n i n the f i r s t place. What i s o f i n t e r e s t are the 
reasons f o r a s s e r t i n g the analogy a t a l l . 
What would count as a good reason f o r using a p a r t i c u l a r analogy 
i n science? This, I t h i n k , would be the same s o r t of reason as we 
might have f o r using an analogy i n any context, namely t h a t the 
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ( o r at l e a s t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s we wish t o 
emphasise) o f the one set o f o b j e c t s , a c t i o n or whatever are s i m i l a r 
t o the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the set of o b j e c t s , a c t i o n or 
whatever which i s t o be used as the analogy. Thus we must have a 
s i m i l a r i t y r e l a t i o n between ob j e c t s ( o r whatever) which are nevertheless 
d i f f e r e n t i n other respects. Analogies, i n everyday usage, are most 
f r e q u e n t l y employed i n answering such questions as 'what d i d i t f e e l 
l i k e ? ' or 'what d i d i t look l i k e 9 ', and i n such cases the f a m i l i a r can 
be used t o describe the u n f a m i l i a r . Thus someone d e s c r i b i n g the space 
M. B. Hesse, o p . c i t . , pp.36-37 
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c r a f t i n a science f i c t i o n f i l m might suggest t h a t i t was l i k e a 
g i a n t t o a d s t o o l made o f b r i g h t green metal w i t h s u c t i o n pads a t 
the f o o t o f the s t a l k . Here the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s the 
shape and the two items are u n l i k e l y t o be s i m i l a r i n any other 
way. We know immediately what the s i m i l a r i t y i s and, because o f 
t h i s , how f a r the analogy extends. That i s t o say, the inappropriateness 
o f questions such as 'where do these spaceships grow 9' i s q u i t e c l e a r . 
Likewise i n science the use o f a p a r t i c u l a r analogy depends on observed 
s i m i l a r i t i e s , the 'seeing' o f which may or may not depend on s c i e n t i f i c 
knowledge. The s i m i l a r i t y o f loudness and p i t c h as p r o p e r t i e s o f 
sound t o brig h t n e s s and colour as p r o p e r t i e s o f l i g h t might be 
supposed t o stand or f a l l l a r g e l y as a matter o f common sense, and 
t h i s because b r i g h t n e s s , loudness e t c . are notions w i t h which we are 
a l l f a m i l i a r . We do not doubt the s i m i l a r i t y between a pen and a 
p e n c i l ; nor indeed do we overestimate i t . To claim a s i m i l a r i t y 
between gas p a r t i c l e s and b i l l i a r d b a l l s , however, r e q u i r e s a 
f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the p r o p e r t i e s o f gases which goes beyond the common 
use o f language and can only be found w i t h i n the realm o f science. 
l n ~ whatever context an analogy i s asserted there i s a l i m i t t o the 
appeal f o r reasons f o r supposing there t o be a s i m i l a r i t y a t a l l . 
Nevertheless i t i s always possible t o p o i n t t o the aspects or 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are s i m i l a r . 
D i s t i n c t from the reasons f o r supposing there t o be a s i m i l a r i t y , 
are the reasons f o r using not t h a t analogy as opposed t o any o t h e r , 
but r a t h e r any analogy a t a l l . We could have described the spacecraft 
w i t h o u t reference t o t o a d s t o o l s , and the s c i e n t i s t , as we have already 
e s t a b l i s h e d , could have ( l o g i c a l l y could have) developed the k i n e t i c 
theory o f gases with o u t reference t o b i l l i a r d b a l l s . As i t i s only 
human agents who have reasons f o r a c t i n g i t might be supposed t h a t i n 
order t o discover the reasons f o r using an analogy at a l l we would 
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have t o ask the p a r t i c u l a r f i l m goer and the s c i e n t i s t who developed 
the s p e c i f i c theory i n which we were i n t e r e s t e d . And c e r t a i n l y i f 
we wanted t o know a l l the reasons f o r using p a r t i c u l a r analogies then 
q u i t e o f t e n our only recourse would be t o ask. Here, however, we 
are not concerned w i t h the whims o f i n d i v i d u a l s c i e n t i s t s , but r a t h e r 
w i t h questions about the nature o f science i t s e l f and the p a r t 
analogue models have t o play. 
What we can examine i n science i s the f u n c t i o n of models, the 
p a r t they play i n the development o f p l a u s i b l e hypotheses, and t h i s 
i n the same way as we might examine the f u n c t i o n of c e r t a i n f i g u r e s 
language 
o f speech i n everyday / which also make use o f s i m i l a r i t y 
r e l a t i o n s . Thus the f u n c t i o n o f a s i m i l e , f o r example, i s one of 
emphasis i r r e s p e c t i v e o f the p a r t i c u l a r reasons f o r i t s use. For the 
purposes o f t h i s discussion we can extend the n o t i o n o f analogies i n 
science t o include any 'way o f l o o k i n g ' a t a s c i e n t i f i c problem which 
makes appeal t o the f a m i l i a r (/though not necessax'ily f a m i l i a r t o 
n o n - s c i e n t i s t s ) i n order t o make advances i n science. This 'way o f 
l o o k i n g ' a t a problem can i n v o l v e the use o f an e n t i r e theory as 
an~ ^ analogy,~or s i m p l y the borrowing o f a s i n g l e concept from such a 
theory. I t i s the connection between t h i s 'way o f l o o k i n g ' and the 
c o n t i n u i n g a c t i v i t y o f science which r e q u i r e s examination. Analogies 
may " f u r n i s h p l a u s i b l e hypotheses, not p r o o f s " 1 5 , but i t i s the way i n 
which they do so t h a t i s o f importance. 
I wish t o argue t h a t any analogy used i n the p r a c t i c e of science 
stands i n r e l a t i o n t o the development o f p l a u s i b l e hypotheses as, and 
only as, an h e u r i s t i c device. I n other words t h a t such an analogy 
would prompt the s c i e n t i s t t o t h i n k i n a c e r t a i n way. I t would help 
him t o formulate the hypothesis, but i t does not suggest the hypothesis 
i t s e l f . There i s no necessary connection between the analogy and the 
5 M. Black (1962) p.223 
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p l a u s i b l e hypothesis; the connection i s between the analogy and 
the s c i e n t i s t t h i n k i n g along c e r t a i n l i n e s . There i s no necessary 
outcome of such t h i n k i n g . I t may or may not lead t o the f o r m u l a t i o n 
o f p l a u s i b l e s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses. This i s a contingent matter. 
That models do act i n t h i s way seems evident from the way i n which 
language i s t r a n s f e r r e d from the analogy t o the f i e l d o f study. 
Before considering t h i s , however, l e t us examine two claims. F i r s t , 
t h a t i f the f u n c t i o n of models and analogies i n science i s only an 
h e u r i s t i c one then t h i s i m p l i e s an absence o f explanatory power. 
Secondly, t h a t i f we wish t o reap the b e n e f i t s o f an explanation then 
t h i s i nvolves the e x i s t e n t i a l use o f models and t h a t t h i s characterises 
the p r a c t i c e o f the great t h e o r i s t s i n physics. 
Explanation and the use o f analogies: 
No analogy explains anything. Analogies do not answer 'why' 
questions. Further, s c i e n t i s t s when they are engaged i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g 
the nature o f gases, f o r example, are not concerned w i t h explanation. 
They are i n t e r e s t e d i n the p r o p e r t i e s o f gases, the way they behave 
when subject t o v a r i o u s . c o n d i t i o n s e t c . They are-not i n t e r e s t e d i n 
'why' gases are as they are. Indeed i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r what 
would count as an answer t o such a question. S c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s 
are concerned w i t h u n i v e r s a l d e s c r i p t i o n . S c i e n t i f i c e x p l a n a t i o n , 
on the other hand, inv o l v e s only the p a r t i c u l a r and here a phenomenon 
i s explained by appeal t o the appropriate s c i e n t i f i c theory or t h e o r i e s . 
So we could ask, 'why d i d t h i s gas expand 9' and the answer would be 
'because i t was heated and a l l gases expand when heated'. Analogies 
have no p a r t t o p l a y here. I f a s c i e n t i s t wishes t o e x p l a i n a 
phenomenon he does so by reference t o an e s t a b l i s h e d body of s c i e n t i f i c 
t h e o r y , unless the phenomenon i s from the realm o f the unknown i n 
science i n which case he may hims e l f advance an hypothesis. This 
theory or hypothesis, however, i s not an explanation of anything. 
I t can be used i n the explanation o f a p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n c e , but 
standing on i t s own i t t e l l s us how t h i n g s are. S c i e n t i f i c theory 
i s i n t h i s sense d e s c r i p t i v e . The r o l e o f analogy i n science as we 
have seen i s t o prompt the s c i e n t i s t t o t h i n k i n a c e r t a i n way, f o r 
he borrows the language and concepts o f the analogy and uses them i n 
h i s d e s c r i p t i o n . That such 'analogue models' i n science lack 
explanatory power may t h e r e f o r e be an i n t e r e s t i n g o bservation, but i t 
cannot be a c r i t i c i s m , f o r t h e i r f u n c t i o n i n science i s not one of 
expl a n a t i o n , nor indeed o f prompting explanation. 
The second claim could be dismissed along w i t h the f i r s t -
( s c i e n t i s t s are not i n v o l v e d m reaping the b e n e f i t s o f an explanation 
when they are engaged i n t h e o r i s i n g ) - were i t not f o r the r i d e r t h a t 
the great t h e o r i s t s i n physics used models p r e c i s e l y i n the way 
suggested, namely e x i s t e n t i a l l y . That they d i d so the b e t t e r t o 
ex p l a i n must, i f I am r i g h t , be discounted. That they d i d so a t a l l 
i s what i s now i n question. What would i t be t o use a model 
e x i s t e n t i a l l y ? Max Black, i n h i s book on models and metaphors, attempts 
t o i l l u s t r a t e " t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the model used as an h e u r i s t i c 
device and the model used e x i s t e n t i a l l y by appealing t o the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between s i m i l e and metaphor. He takes as an example f o r discussion 
Clerk Maxwell's celebrated r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f an e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d i n 
terms o f the p r o p e r t i e s of an imaginary incompressible f l u i d . "The 
d i f f e r e n c e " , he s t a t e s , " i s between t h i n k i n g o f the e l e c t r i c a l f i e l d 
as i f i t were f i l l e d w i t h a m a t e r i a l medium and t h i n k i n g of i t as 
being such a medium. One approach uses a detached comparison 
reminiscent of s i m i l e and argument from analogy; the other r e q u i r e s 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t y p i c a l o f metaphor." 1 6 This i s h a r d l y t o c l a r i f y 
6 I b i d . , p.228 
the matter, f o r metaphors do not i n v o l v e e x i s t e n t i a l claims but 
are, as w i t h any f i g u r e o f speech, merely a manner of speaking or a 
way of emphasising. 'Her eyes are l i k e s t a r s ' i s a s i m i l e and 'her 
eyes are s t a r s ' a metaphor. Both are a manner o f speaking. The 
l a t t e r might be thought the more emphatic or even the more romantic, 
but no one would suppose the d i f f e r e n c e t o i n v o l v e an e x i s t e n t i a l 
claim. No one, i n other words, would suppose t h a t one was c l a i m i n g 
t h a t her eyes a c t u a l l y are s t a r s . Both the s i m i l e and the metaphor 
are ways o f l i k e n i n g one t h i n g t o another, they may be d i f f e r e n t ways 
o f doing so, but n e i t h e r i s more than t h a t . I f then s c i e n t i s t s t a l k 
o f an e l e c t r i c f i e l d as being an incompressible f l u i d , i t does not 
nec e s s a r i l y f o l l o w t h a t they are making e x i s t e n t i a l claims. I t may 
j u s t be a manner o f t a l k i n g . Black, however, appears convinced t h a t 
models have been used e x i s t e n t i a l l y f o r he continues, "Whether we 
consider Kelvin's 'rude mechanical models', Rutherford's s o l a r system 
or Bohr's model o f the atom, we can h a r d l y avoid concluding t h a t these 
p h y s i c i s t s conceived themselves t o be d e s c r i b i n g the atom as i t i s , 
and not merely o f f e r i n g mathematical formulas i n fancy d r e s s . " 1 7 
This, as I hope w i l l be evident from the arguments already advanced, 
i s e x a c t l y what s c i e n t i s t s are doing - d e s c r i b i n g the atom or whatever 
as i t i s . The analogue model i s not included i n such a d e s c r i p t i o n . 
The language o f the model may be c a r r i e d over t o the d e s c r i p t i o n and 
used i n a way s i m i l a r t o language i n a metaphor. Here Black seems 
confused and i s c e r t a i n l y confusing when he r e f e r s t o Bohr's 'model' 
f o r t h i s i s s u r e l y the d e s c r i p t i o n or the s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis 
advanced. I t i s not an analogy and not indeed the s o r t of model whose 
place i n science we have been discussing. 
I b i d . , pp.228-9 
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The analogue model as an h e u r i s t i c device: 
The place o f the analogue model i n science, then, i s as an 
h e u r i s t i c device and no more than t h a t . This i s n o t , however, t o 
underestimate i t s importance, f o r , i n prompting the s c i e n t i s t t o 
t h i n k along c e r t a i n l i n e s , i t has i n the past played a key r o l e i n 
the f o r m u l a t i o n o f p l a u s i b l e s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses. As Black says, 
the heart o f the method co n s i s t s i n t a l k i n g i n a c e r t a i n way. And 
here the vocabulary o f one area o f science i s o f t e n t r a n s f e r r e d t o 
another. I t i s not a case o f 'applying' the model t o the f i e l d of 
study as we might apply the r e p l i c a o f a geometrical shape xo an ink 
s t a i n t o see i f i t f i t s or n o t , but r a t h e r an analogy i s used t o b r i n g 
out and explore the li k e n e s s c r s i m i l a r i t i e s . Again, the s c i e n t i s t 
i s not f i s h i n g i n the dark. I f h i s i n t e r e s t i s i n gases then he 
must know a considerable amount about the p r o p e r t i e s o f various gases 
before he could have any idea o f what might count as a s u i t a b l e analogy. 
And most i m p o r t a n t l y he w i l l be aware o f the e m p i r i c a l f a c t s which h i s 
d e s c r i p t i o n or hypothesis i s r e q u i r e d t o take account o f . Thus he i s 
able t o adapt the concepts o f the analogue model t o h i s own purposes. 
For instance, we are now q u i t e f a m i l i a r w i t h t a l k o f e l e c t r i c c u r r e n t s 
' f l o w i n g ' , and t h i s was presumably borrowed from the b e t t e r known 
'fl o w i n g ' of l i q u i d s such as water. To conclude, however, t h a t because 
e l e c t r i c i t y 'flows' i t cannot t r a v e l u p h i l l i s both l u d i c r o u s and t o 
mistake the way t h i s vocabulary t r a n s f e r works i n science. When 
s c i e n t i s t s adopted such terminology i n r e l a t i o n t o e l e c t r i c i t y , the 
notions i n volved were adapted t o the new sphere o f a p p l i c a t i o n . We 
are now f u l l y aware t h a t t o t a l k o f e l e c t r i c i t y f l o w i n g i s not q u i t e 
the same as t o t a l k o f water f l o w i n g . This adaption was possible 
p r e c i s e l y because s c i e n t i s t s were not searching f o r models i n complete 
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ignorance o f the nature o f e l e c t r i c c urrents nor without any i n k l i n g 
o f how they might behave. I f t o use analogue models i n science 
involves t a l k i n g i n a c e r t a i n way, then i t must be added t h a t no 
p a r t i c u l a r model d i c t a t e s the way the s c i e n t i s t must t a l k . The use 
of analogies o f the k i n d we have been considering i s an i n f i n i t e l y 
more f l e x i b l e method o f a r r i v i n g a t s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses. I t i s , I 
t h i n k , a d i s t i n c t i v e mode o f achieving i n s i g h t , but not one p e c u l i a r 
t o science. That the p r a c t i c e o f science i s on occasions, and even 
on many occasions, conducted i n t h i s manner i s c e r t a i n l y the case, 
but such models are n e i t h e r l o g i c a l l y necessary t o the ongoing a c t i v i t y 
o f science, nor indeed one o f the major concerns o f the d i s c i p l i n e . 
I t remains the i n s i g h t which i s o f importance and not the method of 
achieving i t , the 'model t a l k ' . 
I I 
MODELS-AND ANALOGIES ~IN" SOCIAL SCIENCE. 
I t i s a good deal more d i f f i c u l t t o examine the place o f the 
model i n the s o - c a l l e d ' s o c i a l sciences', f o r t h i s r a t h e r v a r i e d bundle 
of subjects does not appear t o have the coherence o f a d i s c i p l i n e t o 
provide u n i t y . The suspicion t h a t the models which have been used i n 
sociology, human geography, p o l i t i c s , economics e t c . , are o f a 
p a r t i c u l a r l y v a r i e d nature has considerable foundation. Before we can 
embark upon the discussion o f models i n s o c i a l science, and i n order t o 
reduce confusion as f a r as p o s s i b l e , a d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between 
a 'model' and a 'diagram' as used i n the l i t e r a t u r e . This d i s t i n c t i o n , 
although r a r e l y made, i s imp o r t a n t , f o r once diagrams have been 
i d e n t i f i e d they can then be set aside as i r r e l e v a n t i n the present 
context. 
A diagram may be s a i d t o represent u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l l y . Like 
the model o f the plan e t a r y system discussed e a r l i e r i t i s a purveyor 
o f i n f o r m a t i o n ( a l b e i t a two dimensional one) and o f t e n has a s i m i l a r 
teaching f u n c t i o n . Where a diagram does appear i n the course o f an 
academic argument i t i s as a way o f presenting evidence f o r a case, or 
f o r an hypothesis, and not i t s e l f the pr e s e n t a t i o n of any case or any 
hypothesis. Following t h i s i t may be argued t h a t i f theory i s simply 
w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and accepted hypotheses, a model would become a 
diagram when i t i s l i k e w i s e accepted. This would be the case i n 
science. Bohr's model o f the atom was a way o f presenting h i s 
h y p o t h e s i s . 1 8 When i t became es t a b l i s h e d i n science others were able 
t o use i t as a diagram o f what an atom i s l i k e . That the same i s t r u e 
i n the s o c i a l sciences must, however, remain i n doubt, f o r u n t i l the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f a coherent d i s c i p l i n e o f s o c i a l science can be 
demonstrated t h i s c o l l e c t i o n o f subjects continues t o lack any c r i t e r i o n 
by which hypotheses -"could become ( o r f a i l t o become) •established - 1. 
Thus a diagram i n the s o c i a l sciences i s not a pr e s e n t a t i o n o f what has 
once been a hypothesis. Rather i t represents some everyday matter of 
f a c t which does not r e q u i r e t o be es t a b l i s h e d by any s p e c i a l i s e d enquiry. 
Thus a graph of popula t i o n s t a t i s t i c s would be a diagram, f o r i t n e i t h e r 
presents a case nor provides an explanation. Losch's system o f hexagonal 
trade areas, on the other hand, i s a model, f o r i t represents h i s 
hypotheses about the s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f economic u n i t s . Having 
made t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between diagrams and models, we can now concentrate 
1 8 I t should be noted t h a t 'model' here has nothing i n common w i t h 
the use o f analogies examined i n the preceding s e c t i o n . 
on the l a t t e r f o r i f we are i n t e r e s t e d i n ex p l a n a t i o n , the former may 
be discounted. We are l e f t , t h e n, w i t h 'models' (such as Losch's 
model) whose purpose i s t o present an hypothesis, and w i t h the s o r t of 
analogue models used i n science. Both may play a p a r t i n the s o c i a l 
sciences. By t a k i n g a paradigm case o f each we can discover what 
f u n c t i o n they f u l f i l l i n the explanation of human ac t i o n s . 
C h r i s t a l l e r - t y p e models: 
F i r s t l e t us consider the model which represents a set o f 
hypotheses about the worl d , and i n t h i s case about the s o c i a l world. 
There are many examples of t h i s s o r t o f model i n economics, and Losch, 
C h r i s t a l l e r and many other geographers have borrowed notions from the 
economists and constructed t h e i r own models g i v i n g the 'bare economics' 
a s p a t i a l dimension. For instance, C h r i s t a l l e r organized h i s basic 
model on what he c a l l s the marketing p r i n c i p l e and a l l geographers are 
f a m i l i a r w i t h the hexagonal p a t t e r n s which he d e r i v e s . What he purports 
t o e x p l a i n , however, i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of market centres and i t i s not 
the model which explains t h i s , but only the hypotheses on which the model 
i s based. I n so f a r as C h r i s t a l l e r i s answering d i s t r i b u t i o n a l questions, 
the answer i s being given by the 'market p r i n c i p l e ' and the ' p r i n c i p l e 
o f l e a s t e f f o r t ' , and the model i s q u i t e unnecessary t o such an explanation. 
The f u n c t i o n o f t h i s model appears very much l i k e t h a t of Bohr's model 
of the atom, namely a convenient way o f presenting an hypothesis. On 
clo s e r r e f l e c t i o n , however, t h i s can be seen t o be the only s i m i l a r i t y , 
f o r not only i s the nature o f both sets o f hypotheses q u i t e d i f f e r e n t 
but C h r i s t a l l e r ' s model does not describe or represent any e x i s t i n g 
phenomena. The hexagonal model does not stand i n r e l a t i o n t o the 
s o c i a l world as Bohr's model stands i n r e l a t i o n t o the n a t u r a l world. 
I t i s n o t , i n other words, a demonstration o f 'how thi n g s are', but 
r a t h e r normative i n character and derived from what has been termed 
'explanation of the p r i n c i p l e ' . This i s a form o f explanation 
which i s not found i n science, and the character o f which requires 
considerable e l a b o r a t i o n and e x a m i n a t i o n . 1 9 Our main concern here, 
however, i s w i t h the h e u r i s t i c nature o f the hexagonal model which, 
i f we have not f u l l y understood the explanation i n terms o f the 
assumptions, may help us t o grasp what C h r i s t a l l e r i s t a l k i n g about. 
Like any h e u r i s t i c device i t can be discarded w i t h o u t i n any way 
a f f e c t i n g the explanation. 
Many geographers who would agree t h a t C h r i s t a l l e r ' s model i s 
i n t h i s way unnecessary t o h i s explanation o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
market centres would nevertheless, I t h i n k , wish t o maintain t h a t the 
model could not be discarded. Such a claim would be t h a t C h r i s t a l l e r 
i s d e a l i n g w i t h the s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f phenomena (although i t can 
be noted i n passing t h a t a l l phenomena are d i s t r i b u t e d i n space); t h a t 
the s p a t i a l dimension o f the explanation can only be i l l u s t r a t e d by 
c o n s t r u c t i n g a model, and f u r t h e r t h a t the v a l i d i t y o f such an 
explanation could only be determined by comparing the model t o r e a l i t y . 
Thus the model becomes the v i t a l l i n k between the explanation and i t s 
acceptance"into ( o r r e j e c t i o n from) the body o f geographical knowledge. 
Several p o i n t s can be made here. F i r s t , we do not need t o 
draw a map i n order t o d i r e c t someone from A t o B, although i t may be 
the best way of doing so. Likewise we do not need t o con s t r u c t a 
model i n order t o communicate the s p a t i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f such general 
explanations, although again i t may be the best way o f doing so. 
Secondly, we r e t u r n t o the very problem which prompted t h i s e n t i r e 
study, namely the comparison of such a model w i t h r e a l i t y . To compare 
1 9 Explanation o f the p r i n c i p l e i s discussed i n s e c t i o n I I I o f t h i s 
chapter. 
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C h r i s t a l l e r ' s model w i t h the a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f market centres 
i n some selected area i s indeed one way o f assessing the p l a u s i b i l i t y 
o f C h r i s t a l l e r ' s e x p l a n a t i o n , but i t i s n e i t h e r a necessary way nor 
the most d i r e c t way. The question which must concern a l o c a t i o n a l 
analyst i s , 'For what s o r t s o f reasons have people located market 
centres and how are such centres t h e r e f o r e d i s t r i b u t e d 9 *. Such a 
question can only be answered by o f f e r i n g p o s s i b l e reasons f o r the 
use o f one l o c a t i o n r a t h e r than another f o r the buying and s e l l i n g 
o f goods. I t i s the ' p l a u s i b i l i t y ' o f the h y p o t h e t i c a l accounts 
i n c o r p o r a t i n g such reasons (and indeed whether there could have been 
other reasons as w e l l ) which encourages t h e i r acceptance or r e j e c t i o n 
as explanations. The mistake o f t e n made i s t o suppose t h a t i f the 
model does not accord w i t h r e a l i t y then i t need not be r e j e c t e d but 
can e a s i l y assume the s t a t u s of a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n ; i t may not 
accommodate a l l p o s s i b l e reasons but i t includes the most important, 
and t h i s even i f the model and r e a l i t y appear considerably a t odds. 
To take the concentric r i n g model o f the Chicago s o c i o l o g i s t s as an 
example; when i t was found t h a t the p a t t e r n i n g of the s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e 
o f the c i t y o f Edinburgh bore no r e l a t i o n t o t h a t of concentric c i r c l e s 
there were three p o s s i b l e conclusions which could have been drawn. 
The f i r s t i n volves r e j e c t i n g the theory; the second, acknowledging 
Edinburgh as a s p e c i a l case t o which the theory does not apply (although 
t h i s r a i s e s questions as t o the status o f the ' t h e o r y ' ) ; and the t h i r d -
the conclusion which i n t e r e s t s us here - attempts t o r e c o n c i l e the 
model and r e a l i t y by e x p l a i n i n g o r accounting f o r the d i f f e r e n c e s . I t 
could, f o r example, be pointed out t h a t i r r e g u l a r i t i e s i n the land 
surface (Edinburgh, l i k e Rome, i s b u i l t on seven h i l l s ) could c e r t a i n l y 
d i s t o r t the c i r c l e s since the model does assume an i s o t r o p i c plane. 
The problem w i t h t h i s i s t h a t i t e f f e c t i v e l y destroys any c r i t e r i a f o r 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g v a l i d from i n v a l i d explanations. And i f anything 
counts as an explanation then equally nothing i s explained. Such 
accounting f o r d i f f e r e n c e s also tends t o take the focus away from 
the explanation i t s e l f and i t i s important t o remember t h a t the task 
i n hand i s one o f explanation. 
Models l i k e C h r i s t a l l e r ' s , then, are only h e u r i s t i c devices. 
Their f u n c t i o n may be t o c l a r i f y the e x p l a n a t i o n , but they themselves 
do not e x p l a i n . Indeed they presuppose the f o r m u l a t i o n o f some 
hypothesis as an answer t o the questions asked. The f u n c t i o n of 
C h r i s t a l l e r ' s hexagonal market area model i s s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f the 
model o f the planetary system or Bohr's model o f atom i n so f a r as 
i t i l l u s t r a t e s and c l a r i f i e s . T heir r e l a t i o n s t o explanation are, 
however, q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between models and explanation. 
We have seen elsewhere t h a t explanations o f the s o c i a l world 
and explanations o f the n a t u r a l world d i f f e r considerably, and i t seems 
reasonable t o assume t h a t the p r a c t i c e o f s o c i a l science and the 
p r a c t i c e o f science w i l l _ b e e a s i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e one from another. 
We have seen t h a t s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses do not e x p l a i n anything but 
merely describe i n a c e r t a i n way. I t i s the p a r t i c u l a r which the 
s c i e n t i s t explains and the t h e o r i e s he may c i t e i n such explanations 
are themselves u n i v e r s a l d e s c r i p t i o n s . Thus models (such as Bohr's) 
i n science bear only the i n d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o explanation t h a t 
h y p o t h e t i c a l u n i v e r s a l d e s c r i p t i o n does t o explanation o f the p a r t i c u l a r . 
I n s o c i a l a f f a i r s , however, there are no such u n i v e r s a l d e s c r i p t i o n s . 
I f the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s d i r e c t l y concerned t o e x p l a i n , t h e r e f o r e , 
he does not have recourse t o the same s o r t o f t h e o r i e s as s c i e n t i s t s 
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use i n t h e i r explanations. I f the nature o f h i s subject matter 
does not admit o f u n i v e r s a l d e s c r i p t i o n then i t i s not hypotheses 
concerning such a d e s c r i p t i o n t h a t h i s model represents. The 
s c i e n t i s t uses a model t o i l l u s t r a t e how t h i n g s are. The geographical 
o r s p a t i a l models we have been considering are concerned f i r s t and 
foremost t o i l l u s t r a t e how t h i n g s would be i f the p r e l i m i n a r y 
assumptions were c o r r e c t . I t i s o f t e n supposed t h a t such a model 
w i l l f u r t h e r accord w i t h the world as i t i s , but i t s primary purpose 
i s not one o f d e s c r i b i n g r e a l i t y - i t may or may not prove t o be an 
accurate i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s . F u rther, t h a t any model does i n f a c t 
provide an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i n g s as they are does not guarantee t h a t 
the explanatory hypotheses from which i t was derived are c o r r e c t . One 
may derive s i m i l a r expectations o f what the s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n would 
be from diverse sets o f p r e l i m i n a r y assumptions or explanatory 
hypotheses. Thus explanation and d e s c r i p t i o n remain d i s t i n c t . Even 
when a c e r t a i n d e s c r i p t i o n appears t o be e n t a i l e d by a c e r t a i n 
e x p l a n a t i o n , i f the d e s c r i p t i o n i s c o r r e c t , i t does not n e c e s s a r i l y 
f o l l o w t h a t the explanation i s the r i g h t one. Models o f t h i s s o r t 
i n s o c i a l science bear a more d i r e c t r e l a t i o n t o explanation than do 
those i n science, f o r i t i s claimed t h a t the model i s e n t a i l e d by the 
explanatory hypotheses, t h a t the model i l l u s t r a t e s the s p a t i a l 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the explanation. Thus the hexagonal areas model 
i l l u s t r a t e s the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f C h r i s t a l l e r ' s explanation o f the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f market centres i n terms o f the market p r i n c i p l e . I f 
the explanation i s found unacceptable, however, then the model becomes 
i r r e l e v a n t . Such models i n s o c i a l science are not advanced simply as 
d e s c r i p t i o n s o f the s o c i a l world - a f t e r a l l we have maps t o show us 
where towns and v i l l a g e s are i n r e l a t i o n t o each other - but r a t h e r as 
deductions from some explanatory hypothesis. Their usefulness depends 
upon the v a l i d i t y o f the hypothesis, i e . whether i t provides a 
p l a u s i b l e explanation or not. I n c o n t r a s t t o t h i s , the question 
r e l e v a n t t o the acceptance o f a s c i e n t i f i c model i s 'does i t describe 
c o r r e c t l y o r not?'. This underlines again the e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e 
between the s c i e n t i f i c mode o f understanding and the understanding o f 
the s o c i a l world. 
Models as p r e d i c t i v e devices: 
A f i n a l p o s i t i o n which could be adopted i n an attempt t o 
e s t a b l i s h a necessary place f o r models i n s o c i a l science i s t o deny 
t h a t geographers are i n t e r e s t e d i n explanation a t a l l ; or at l e a s t t o 
deny t h a t they ought t o be, f o r c l e a r l y t h e r e are many who do wish t o 
ex p l a i n . What geographers should be i n t e r e s t e d i n , i t could be claimed, 
i s p r e d i c t i o n . We want t o know what i s going t o happen so t h a t we can 
prepare f o r i t , i f not change i t , and not why t h i n g s , which are already 
past, happened a t a l l . This view i s most prevalent amongst geographical 
s t a t i s t i c i a n s who, i f provided w i t h the appr o p r i a t e data, make p r e d i c t i o n s 
by p r o j e c t i n g past s t a t i s t i c a l trends i n t o the f u t u r e . I n many cases 
such p r o j e c t i o n s do prove u s e f u l . What must be noted, however, are 
t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s . I n the s o c i a l realm p r e d i c t i o n i s c l o s e l y l i n k e d 
t o understanding and, since understanding and explanation are also 
r e l a t e d concepts, the a b i l i t y t o p r e d i c t cannot be divorced from the 
a b i l i t y t o e x p l a i n . Think o f attempting t o p r e d i c t the behaviour of 
one's b r o t h e r , s i s t e r o r f r i e n d i n some unusual s i t u a t i o n . We do not 
need t o have observed them i n s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s i n order t o attempt a 
p r e d i c t i o n which i s more than an i n s p i r e d guess. Understanding or 
knowing the person as an i n d i v i d u a l i s more important than having 
simply witnessed t h e i r behaviour on a couple o f previous occasions, 
however s i m i l a r . And t h i s understanding i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t to 
the s o r t of understanding r e q u i r e d to f o r e c a s t the weather when the 
sky i s f i l l e d w ith b l a c k c l o u d s . 
I t i s always open to the s t a t i s t i c i a n to r e p l y t h a t t h i s i s 
not the s o r t of understanding sought by geographers; indeed one has 
to agree t h a t geographers do not wish to p r e d i c t the a c t i o n s of any 
p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s . The geographer i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the 
aggregate outcome of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of i n d i v i d u a l d e c i s i o n s and i t 
i s thus the r e l e v a n t a c t i o n s of v a r i o u s groups which must capture 
the geographic a t t e n t i o n . Group a c t i o n s , however, r e q u i r e the same 
mode of e x p l a n a t i o n , understanding and indeed p r e d i c t i o n as do the 
a c t i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l human agents. Thus the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t must 
explore the world of human conduct. I f h i s questions concern the 
c h o i c e of r e s i d e n c e or the nature o f s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n the 
s o c i e t y , he cannot hide behind a w a l l of s t a t i s t i c s and expect an 
answer to emerge. 
Having s a i d t h i s , t h e r e i s one s o c i a l s c i e n c e which does use 
models f o r p r e d i c t i o n and has r e c e n t l y become i n c r e a s i n g l y i n v o l v e d 
i n the manipulation of s t a t i s t i c a l d a ta. T h i s i s economics. Here 
the model can be presented as a mathematical formula, a graph, or a 
s e r i e s of graphs. What i s important i s t h a t given the assumed 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the v a r i a b l e s (eg. supply, demand and the p r i c e 
o f a good), i f one of these changes, the r e s u l t a n t change i n the other 
two can be p r e d i c t e d . Here the model i s an e x p r e s s i o n of the assumed 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s and i t i s only because the v a r i a b l e s a re d e f i n i t i o n a l l y 
r e l a t e d t h a t p r e d i c t i o n ( o f a q u a n t i t a t i v e change) i s p o s s i b l e . Only 
by g r a s p i n g the nature of the r e l a t i o n s h i p s themselves, however, can 
one be s a i d to understand the workings of the economy. The model 
could not have been formulated without some such understanding, nor 
could the appropriateness of any p a r t i c u l a r p r e d i c t i o n be a s s e s s e d . 
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Again the model i t s e l f i s not n e c e s s a r y to t h i s understanding although 
i t may a c t as an h e u r i s t i c d e v i c e . As such, models i n the s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e s a r e undoubtedly v a l u a b l e and important but must n e c e s s a r i l y 
be an a i d to r e s e a r c h r a t h e r than any end-product or g o a l . The 
achievements o f human geography must l i e i n the understanding o f the 
s o c i a l world i t provides and not i n the number of models contained i n 
i t s l i t e r a t u r e . 
The use of a n a l o g i e s i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e : 
F i n a l l y i n t h i s s e c t i o n , i t i s app r o p r i a t e to examine the p a r t 
a n a l o g i e s have played i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s and attempt to determine 
what p a r t they might play i n the f u t u r e . Analogue models have been 
important i n the p r a c t i c e of s c i e n c e . They have, i n the p a s t , 
prompted s c i e n t i s t s t o t h i n k along c e r t a i n very f r u i t f u l l i n e s . 
From the d i s c u s s i o n of a n a l o g i c a l argument i n s c i e n c e we l e a r n t h a t 
a n a l o g i e s , in order to be u s e f u l , must be ap p r o p r i a t e . I t i s 
p r e c i s e l y t h i s p o i n t t h a t many s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s have ap p a r e n t l y f a i l e d 
t o c o n s i d e r . A s c i e n t i s t who uses a t h e o r e t i c a l analogy to f u r t h e r 
h i s r e s e a r c h - i s ^ n o t - f i s h i n g i n the dark and must know something about 
the nature of h i s subjecx matter b e f o r e he can ^udge any othe r theory 
to be analogous. Indeed he must have c o n s i d e r a b l e knowledge i f , as 
i s most of t e n the case i n s c i e n c e , he i s to adapt the language of the 
analogous theory to h i s f i e l d of study. 
The l i t e r a t u r e o f human geography c o n t a i n s many examples of what 
look l i k e the use of analogy; i e . o f the e x h o r t a t i o n to t h i n k of X 
as i f i t were ( o r l e s s f r e q u e n t l y as i f i t were l i k e ) Y. Consider 
the c l a i m t h a t the movement of human population on the e a r t h ' s 
s u r f a c e can be anal y s e d as i f i t were the movement of i r o n f i l i n g s i n 
a magnetic f i e l d . We take a formula of p h y s i c s , apply i t i n the 
f i e l d o f human migra t i o n and t a l k about the a t t r a c t i o n and r e p u l s i o n 
of v a r i o u s population c e n t r e s . T h i s appears to be very s i m i l a r to 
the use of t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l o g i e s w i t h i n the p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . 
Before we can l e g i t i m a t e l y use the theory of magnetism as an analogy, 
however, we must f i r s t be abl e to a s s e r t t h a t analogy and t h i s 
r e q u i r e s t h a t the movement o f i r o n f i l i n g s and the movement of 
population be shown to be s i m i l a r . I t i s not enough to say t h a t 
both move. To a s s e r t an analogy important s i m i l a r i t i e s must be 
pointed out and i f t h i s cannot be done the two are simply not analogous. 
The S i m i l a r i t y ' between i r o n f i l i n g s and people does not bear such 
s c r u t i n y . One only has to t h i n k of the questions r e l e v a n t to each 
to r e a l i s e t h a t they belong t o t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t realms. What caused 
t h e s e i r o n f i l i n g s to move i n t h a t way? Were they p o s i t i v e l y or 
n e g a t i v e l y charged? These q u e s t i o n s belong to s c i e n c e and many such 
q u e s t i o n s demand an answer i n terms o f cause and e f f e c t . The realm 
of human a f f a i r s i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Why d i d so many people move to 
the west c o a s t o f North America i n the 1890s? Here the answer would 
be i n terms of the s e a r c h f o r gold, dreams of r i c h e s , pioneer s p i r i t , 
greed e t c . , a l l r e v e a l i n g the reasons (and motives) people had f o r 
going-Westi —I-f-one ceases t o t a l k o f people as motivated and regards 
them as a c o l l e c t i o n of inanimate o b j e c t s moved by c e r t a i n hidden 
p h y s i c a l f o r c e s , one ceases to t a l k about human beings a t a l l and 
hence can say nothing about the movement of human p o p u l a t i o n s . 
The above example i l l u s t r a t e s w e l l the mistake made by those who 
f a i l to a s s e r t an analogy i n the f i r s t p l a c e but proceed r e g a r d l e s s 
i n t h e i r attempt to argue a n a l o g i c a l l y . I t would be p o s s i b l e to c i t e 
o t h e r i n s t a n c e s o f t h i s mistake i n the geographical l i t e r a t u r e . As 
Olsson and Gale point out, f o r example, " . . . i n e f f e c t , Bunge and the 
s o c i a l p h y s i c i s t s have drawn a n a l o g i e s w i t h the fundamental o p t i m a l i t y 
138. 
p r i n c i p l e i n p h y s i c s and, i n t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e i r approach i s s i m i l a r 
to some b i o l o g i c a l s t u d i e s and g e n e r a l systems theory i n p a r t i c u l a r " . 2 0 
A l l commit the same s o r t of e r r o r by borrowing d i r e c t l y from the realm 
of s c i e n c e and t r y i n g to apply the hypotheses or t h e o r i e s i n the realm 
of human a c t i v i t y . Whatever the c o n c l u s i o n s reached they could not 
be c o n c l u s i o n s about the nature o f human a c t i v i t y f o r they deny the 
e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r of t h a t a c t i v i t y . And, as Hesse p o i n t s out, i t 
must be remembered t h a t " a n a l o g i c a l arguments may be a t t a c k e d not only 
on the grounds t h a t they depend on s u p e r f i c i a l s i m i l a r i t i e s but a l s o 
on the grounds t h a t the c a u s a l r e l a t i o n s assumed a re i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o the s u b j e c t m a t t e r " . 2 1 
Not a l l t h e o r e t i c a l s t u d i e s i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s which attempt 
to make use of a n a l o g i e s provide such c l e a r examples o f i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s . 
N e v e r t h e l e s s many d i s p l a y a s i m i l a r e r r o r to the one j u s t examined, 
namely t h a t the proponents f a i l to a s s e r t an analogy a t a l l . They 
f a i l xo 'make p l a i n ' the s i m i l a r i r i e s . Much systems r e s e a r c h r e l i e s 
on analogy e i t h e r from the b i o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e s ( t h e ecosystem) o r from 
the f i e l d o f technology (mechanical and e l e c t r i c a l s y s t e m s ) . The 
members -of the E c o l o g i c a l ~ s c h o o l o f urban s o c i o l o g y base their"work 
on the c i t y as a l i v i n g organism and employ the language a p p r o p r i a t e 
to a b i o l o g i c a l community. But n e i t h e r Park nor h i s c o l l e a g u e s point 
out the s i m i l a r i t i e s between an urban community and a b i o l o g i c a l 
community before u s i n g the l a t t e r as an analogy i n the study o f the 
former. S i m i l a r i t i e s cannot be pointed to i f t h e r e a r e nofc<anv^. And 
even where t h e r e are some s i m i l a r i t i e s t h e s e must be s u b s t a n t i a l or 
important before an analogy can be a s s e r t e d . The s c i e n t i s t i s aware 
G. Olsson and S. Gale (1968) p.230 
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of the p o s i t i v e , n e g a t ive and n e u t r a l a n a l o g i e s before attempting to 
argue a n a l o g i c a l l y . He knows the extent of the s i m i l a r i t y , how f a r 
the analogy can be pushed. He i s i n c o n t r o l of the t r a n s f e r e n c e of 
language. I f the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s to make use of analogy i n h i s 
r e s e a r c h he must a l s o be f u l l y aware of the l i m i t s of such use, and 
of the way i n which a n a l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g must proceed i f i t i s to be 
p r o f i t a b l e . The analogy only prompts the r e s e a r c h e r to th i n k along 
c e r t a i n l i n e s j i t could never r e p l a c e such thought. 
To conclude t h i s d i s c u s s i o n we a r e l e f t only w i t h the problem 
o f i n d i c a t i n g the p o s s i b l e p a r t the model and the s u c c e s s f u l a n a l o g i c a l 
argument might play i n the examination and ex p l a n a t i o n of human a c t i o n s . 
We have looked a t the s t a t u s and f u n c t i o n of models and a n a l o g i e s i n 
s c i e n c e . Models, as such, do not have a n e c e s s a r y p a r t to p l a y i n 
s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h , although they may be important as h e u r i s t i c 
d e v i c e s both to the s c i e n t i s t and to othe r s who wish to l e a r n about 
s c i e n c e . They have i n the p a s t proved a u s e f u l way of p r e s e n t i n g an 
h y p o t h e s i s . The use of analogy, on the other hand, has played a key 
r o l e i n s c i e n t i f i c r e a s o n i n g , although again t h i s r o l e i s not a l o g i c a l l y 
n e c e s s a r y one. The p r a c t i c e of s c i e n c e could ( l o g i c a l l y could) s t i l l 
proceed even i f s c i e n t i s t s never use a n a l o g i e s . That they f r e q u e n t l y 
do employ argument from analogy i s thus a contingent matter. N e i t h e r 
t h e model nor the analogy would f e a t u r e i n an account of the l o g i c of 
s c i e n c e ; i e . an account of what makes s c i e n c e a d i s t i n c t i v e mode of 
understanding. N e v e r t h e l e s s , because analogy has played a major p a r t 
i n the formulation of many w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s , i t s 
use i s of c o n s i d e r a b l e i n t e r e s t . I t i s important to note the kind of 
language t r a n s f e r i n v o l v e d , the nature of the s c i e n t i s t ' s c o n t r o l over 
the analogy, and the c r i t e r i o n f o r an appropriate analogy without which 
the academic study could not advance. 
Taken as a whole, the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s cannot be c h a r a c t e r i s e d 
as a d i s t i n c t i v e mode of understanding. Consequently we cannot 
t a l k of the l o g i c of s o c i a l s c i e n c e as we can of s c i e n c e . The 
d i s c u s s i o n of models and a n a l o g i e s i n t h i s sphere, t h e r e f o r e , has 
centred around t h e i r use i n the g e o g r a p h i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . I t has 
been pointed out t h a t c e r t a i n fundamental mistakes are commonly made, 
e s p e c i a l l y i n systems r e l a t e d r e s e a r c h , and the s k e t c h i n g of the more 
important f e a t u r e s of s u c c e s s f u l a n a l o g i c a l argument allowed us to see 
more c l e a r l y the exact nature of t h e s e m i s t a k e s . Whether the s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e s could employ t h e o r e t i c a l a n a l o g i e s a t a l l must, f o r the 
p r e s e n t , remain an open qu e s t i o n . The theory of s o c i a l s c i e n c e w i l l 
n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r i n c e r t a i n r e s p e c t s from t h a t of s c i e n c e and u n t i l 
the nature of such theory i s c l e a r we can say nothing about how i t 
might be used a n a l o g i c a l l y . I t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a n a l o g i c a l argument 
w i l l l e a d to an i n c r e a s e i n our knowledge and understanding of the 
s o c i a l world even i f i t i s not t h e o r e t i c a l analogy which provides the 
i n s i g h t we seek. Above a l l , however, i t i s t h i s i n s i g h t , t h i s 
understanding of the world^of human a f f a i r s , which "must be the primary 
concern of the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s and not the way i t happens to be 
achieved on any p a r t i c u l a r o c c a s i o n . The c o n t r i b u t i o n of human 
geography ( o r any s o c i a l s c i e n c e ) to our knowledge and understanding 
o f the world w i l l be judged only by the v a l i d i t y of such i n s i g h t s . 
I l l 
THEORY AND THEORETICAL STUDY: 
Models may be a i d s to s c i e n t i f i c study, but the aim of s c i e n c e 
remains the formulation of hypotheses and the establishment of 
t h e o r i e s . No study can c l a i m to be t h e o r e t i c a l simply because the 
r e s e a r c h e r uses a model i n the course of h i s r e s e a r c h . I f the model 
i s not the key to theory, how then can we be t h e o r e t i c a l i n our study 
of the s u b j e c t matter of human geography? I n t h i s s e c t i o n we w i l l 
examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s c i e n t i f i c theory and s c i e n t i f i c 
e x p l a n a t i o n i n order t o a s s e s s the p o s s i b i l i t y of advancing t h i s type 
of theory w i t h i n the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . S i n c e economics provides us 
with a competing framework on which to base our s e a r c h f o r a v a l i d 
t h e o r e t i c a l approach to the realm of human a f f a i r s we must a l s o c o n s i d e r 
'explanation of the p r i n c i p l e ' and i t s p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s 
s e a r c h . 
The nature of s c i e n t i f i c theory: 
T h e o r i e s xn s c i e n c e embrace s c i e n t i f i c laws; t h a t i s , they 
i n c l u d e u n i v e r s a l statements about the nature of a p a r t i c u l a r c l a s s 
of phenomena. Whether the theory i s more than a c e r t a i n j u x t a p o s i t i o n i n g 
o f the laws i s a q u e s t i o n over which t h e r e i s s t i l l c o n s i d e r a b l e debate. 
C a l d i n , i n a d i s c u s s i o n of chemistry, c l a i m s t h a t , "..the theory i s a 
c o n s t r u c t i o n , not a deduction. I t goes beyond r e p r e s e n t i n g the laws; 
i t i n t e r p r e t s them." 2 2 Here we have the theory as something over and 
above the laws but not divorced from them. Alexander p o i n t s to the 
p r a c t i c e of p h i l o s o p h e r s of s c i e n c e to r e g a r d a theory as "a complex 
s t r u c t u r e of connected hypotheses r e l a t i n g statements about observable 
phenomena which otherwise appear to be u n r e l a t e d " . 2 3 Such statements, 
when of u n i v e r s a l a p p l i c a t i o n , would be s c i e n t i f i c laws. Again we have 
the theory as something grander than, but r e l a t e d t o , the laws. 
z ^ E. F. C a l d i n (1961) p.28 
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Alexander adds, 
Thus we have the K i n e t i c Theory of Gases, which 
i s a complex s t r u c t u r e intended to e x h i b i t the 
r e l a t i o n s between, and e x p l a i n , the v e r y d i f f e r e n t 
s o r t s of behaviour d i s p l a y e d by gases under widely 
d i f f e r i n g c o n d i t i o n s . 2 ^ 
I t i s the s c i e n t i f i c law which i s a statement about the behaviour 
of phenomena such as gases. The p r e c i s e r e l a t i o n s h i p between law 
and higher order theory i s , however, f a r from c l e a r . C a l d i n i s 
most r e v e a l i n g on t h i s s u b j e c t : 
.... i n most chemical a c t i v i t i e s t h e o r i e s are of 
i n t e r e s t because they o f f e r e x p l a n a t i o n s of 
o b s e r v a t i o n s t h a t would otherwise be p u z z l i n g . 
They are developed to help us understand the 
phenomena, not merely d e s c r i b e them. 2 5 
I t would not be p e r t i n e n t here to take up the debate and i t i s 
enough to note two r e l a t i v e l y u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l p o i n t s which can 
n e v e r t h e l e s s c o n t r i b u t e to the p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n . F i r s t , whatever 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between them, the s c i e n t i f i c law i s l o g i c a l l y p r i o r 
to the s c i e n t i f i c theory. I f t h e o r i e s d i s p l a y connections between 
laws, the laws must come f i r s t . And secondly, the s c i e n t i f i c law i s 
an e s s e n t i a l p a r t of the s c i e n t i f i c theory. The worth of a theory 
l i e s i n the e x t e n t to which i t can e x p l a i n what had p r e v i o u s l y been 
regarded as anomalous. Such s c i e n t i f i c puzzlement only a r i s e s because 
of some u n f u l f i l l e d e x p e c t a t i o n , and such an e x p e c t a t i o n r e l i e s upon an 
acquaintance with the accepted body of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. For 
example, i f during the i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the nature of an unusual 
gaseous substance we found t h a t i t d i d not expand when we heated i t 
t h i s would be, s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , v e r y p u z z l i n g . T h i s i s because the 
u n i v e r s a l statement ' a l l gases expand when heated' i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d 
2 1 + I b i d . 
2 5 E. F. Caldin, op. c i t . , p.32 
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i n s c i e n c e . We do not f e e l immediately i n c l i n e d to discount 
i t and are t h e r e f o r e l e f t w ith an apparent anomaly. We would have 
expected i t to expand but i t d i d not. I t i s anomalies of t h i s k i n d 
t h a t s c i e n t i f i c theory must account f o r . And the anomalies could 
not a r i s e i f t h e r e were no e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n t i f i c laws, no accepted 
body of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. S c i e n c e i n v o l v e s the constant s e a r c h 
f o r b e t t e r t h e o r i e s and t h e o r i e s a r e judged b e t t e r i f some occurrences 
which were p r e v i o u s l y problematic become both normal and p r e d i c t a b l e . 
I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r s o c i a l s c i e n c e : 
The t h e o r e t i c a l study of human a f f a i r s must be q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . 
The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d e r i v i n g s u b s t a n t i v e g e n e r a l laws i n t h i s context 
immediately p o i n t s to the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f the theory of s o c i a l s c i e n c e 
being i n any way based upon a s e t of such laws or g e n e r a l statements. 
F u r t h e r , new t h e o r i e s could not be provoked by p u z z l i n g occurrences 
of the same k i n d as found i n the p r a c t i c e of s c i e n c e . S c i e n t i f i c 
p u z z l e s a r i s e when e x p e c t a t i o n s , generated by a r e l e v a n t s e t of 
s c i e n t i f i c laws, f a i l to be met. Without such laws and the a s s o c i a t e d 
e x p e c t a t i o n s the b a s i s f o r theory a d a p t a t i o n and change w i t h i n the 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s c o u l d not be the same as t h a t i n the p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s . 
The s e a r c h f o r theory w i t h i n human geography, i f i t i n v o l v e s the attempt 
to copy the pure s c i e n c e s , w i l l only generate methodological c o n f u s i o n . 
We cannot escape the consequences of the c o n c l u s i o n s reached i n 
the d i s c u s s i o n s so f a r (about the nature of the human world and the 
nature of s c i e n t i f i c methodology) by t a k i n g up the f o l l o w i n g remark of 
Harvey's: 
Using l e s s r i g i d c r i t e r i a the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of 
laws i n geography becomes p a r t l y a matter of 
i d e n t i f y i n g the r e l e v a n t t heory, and p a r t l y a 
matter of our own w i l l i n g n e s s to r e g a r d geographical 
phenomena as i f they were s u b j e c t to u n i v e r s a l laws, 
even when they p a t e n t l y are not so g o v e r n e d . 2 6 
2 6 D. Harvey (1969a)p.l08 
To agree w i t h Harvey i n t h i s r e s p e c t would c e r t a i n l y be to commit 
methodological s u i c i d e , f o r we cannot pretend to study any phenomenon, 
m order to i n c r e a s e our understanding of t h a t phenomenon, i f we 
e i t h e r deny i t s e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s or s p u r i o u s l y c r e d i t i t 
w i t h some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n order to proceed i n some predetermined 
o r d e r l y f a s h i o n . Once we r e a l i s e t h a t the phenomena of human 
geography are p a t e n t l y not governed by u n i v e r s a l laws, then to t r e a t 
them as i f they were i s as r i d i c u l o u s as a t t a c h i n g reasons to the 
v a g a r i e s of ocean c u r r e n t s or the d e p o s i t i o n of l a v a a f t e r a v o l c a n i c 
e r u p t i o n . 
Our argument has l e d t o the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t whatever the 
approach adopted i n the study of human geography i t could not be both 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l and methodologically sound. To deny t h a t 
a study could be t h e o r e t i c a l i n the same manner as the pure s c i e n c e s , 
however, i s not to d e c l a r e i t unamenable to t h e o r e t i c a l treatment. 
Having e l i m i n a t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of s c i e n t i f i c theory i n human 
geography i t does not f o l l o w t h a t we have e l i m i n a t e d any p o s s i b i l i t y 
of theory. Our account of theory and of what i t i s to t h e o r i s e must 
now be broadened. Not a l l t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s s c i e n t i f i c a c t i v i t y , 
and c a u t i o n must be e x e r c i s e d l e s t we u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y f a i l to 
acknowledge t h i s i n the questions we ask about theory. I t may be, 
f o r example, t h a t t a l k o f ' b u i l d i n g a body of theory' i s q u i t e 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n the study of human a f f a i r s , w h i l s t t h a t study i t s e l f 
would be no l e s s t h e o r e t i c a l f o r the absence of such a c e n t r a l r e s e r v e . 
Care must be taken not to accept, without q u e s t i o n , c e r t a i n phrases 
widely used i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e of human geography and thus u n w i t t i n g l y 
f a i l to abandon the s c i e n t i f i c model of theory which so pervades 
c u r r e n t methodological t h i n k i n g . 
145. 
Theory and p r a c t i c e : 
How are we to re c o g n i s e a t h e o r e t i c a l approach i n the s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e s 9 I s t h e r e any other d i s c i p l i n e which embraces the 
t h e o r e t i c a l but not the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y t h e o r e t i c a l 9 Or i s the r e 
an approach w i t h i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e which i s commonly assumed to be 
t h e o r e t i c a l but which does not f e a t u r e i n the methodology of the 
p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s ? I n order to go someway towards answering these 
q u e s t i o n s , l e t us examine the nature o f the t h e o r e t i c a l by i n t r o d u c i n g 
another d i s t i n c t i o n , namely t h a t between theory and p r a c t i c e . 
The t h e o r e t i c a l and the p r a c t i c a l a r e l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t . 
P r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y can be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y , and 
the f i e l d s o f technology and s c i e n c e provide a u s e f u l i l l u s t r a t i o n 
o f such a c o n t r a s t . Both a r e marked by the goals o f t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e 
r e s e a r c h e s . T e c h n o l o g i c a l r e s e a r c h i s aimed a t improving the ways 
i n which man can e x p l o i t a v a i l a b l e r e s o u r c e s . I t s immediate goals 
are concrete and o f t e n c l o s e l y s p e c i f i e d (eg. the development of a 
more powerful warhead o r the manufacture of a more e f f e c t i v e d r u g ) . 
Stephenson's Rocket, B e l l ' s telephone and Fleming's p e n i c i l l i n are 
a l l phenomena of" theT f i e l d o f technology. The a c t i v i t y of s c i e n c e 
i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . The s c i e n t i s t , qua s c i e n t i s t , i s i n t e r e s t e d i n 
the nature of h i s s u b j e c t matter and not i n the p r a c t i c a l use to which 
p i e c e of 
any p a r t i c u l a r / s c i e n t i f i c knowledge could be put. I f the s c i e n t i s t 
i s s t udying steam he w i l l want to a s c e r t a i n , f o r example, the exact 
c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r i t s production. To the t e c h n o l o g i s t l i k e 
Stephenson, steam i s p r i m a r i l y a source of power. 
The f i e l d s of s c i e n c e and technology a r e not always e a s i l y 
d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . The t e c h n o l o g i s t r e q u i r e s a c o n s i d e r a b l e knowledge 
of s c i e n c e t o do h i s job and may even i n the course o f h i s p r a c t i c a l 
r e s e a r c h ( h i s r e s e a r c h i n t o ways of doing t h i n g s ) c o n t r i b u t e to the 
body of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge by d i s c o v e r i n g something p r e v i o u s l y 
unknown about the nature of the p h y s i c a l world. The one r e s e a r c h e r 
may be both s c i e n t i s t and t e c h n o l o g i s t . N e v e r t h e l e s s t h e r e i s a 
l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n between the two f i e l d s which makes the c o n t r a s t 
a v a l i d one and which al l o w s us to say something about the d i f f e r e n c e 
between theory and p r a c t i c e . 
I n order to use s c i e n t i f i c knowledge to improve ways of doing 
t h i n g s i n the p r a c t i c a l world, i t i s f i r s t n e c e s s a r y (and t h i s i s a 
remark about l o g i c and not about the a c t u a l conduct of i n d i v i d u a l 
t e c h n o l o g i s t s ) t o accept such knowledge as given. One does not 
q u e s t i o n the laws of aerodynamics and then base a i r c r a f t design upon 
them. I n the f i e l d o f technology c u r r e n t s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s 
accepted as f a c t and the t e c h n o l o g i s t proceeds from t h e r e . T h i s i s 
a p t l y l a b e l l e d a p p l i e d s c i e n c e . The s c i e n t i s t h i m s e l f i s i n a very 
d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n . He i s not i n t e r e s t e d i n u s i n g or a p p l y i n g the 
knowledge which he seeks and need never make the same commitment to 
i t s t r u t h as the t e c h n o l o g i s t must. Indeed i t i s i n the nature of 
t h e o r e t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n s c i e n c e t h a t i t i s c o n s t a n t l y c r i t i c a l . 
Not even the most b a s i c s c i e n t i f i c law can escape t h i s c r i t i c a l 
s c r u t i n y , f o r the b u s i n e s s of t h e o r i s i n g w i t h i n a s c i e n t i f i c mode"of 
understanding j u s t i s the c r i t i c a l s c r u t i n y of the e x i s t i n g body of 
theory and the replacement of such theory i n the l i g h t of apparently 
anomalous c a s e s . The p u r s u i t s of the t e c h n o l o g i s t and the s c i e n t i s t 
a r e l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t . 
T h e o r e t i c a l study can be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y 
i n a s i m i l a r manner. The p r a c t i c a l man has a goal to a c h i e v e , h i s 
work t h e r e f o r e has both w e l l - s p e c i f i e d purpose and d i r e c t i o n . The 
t h e o r i s t , i n so f a r as h i s r e s e a r c h can be s a i d to have purpose a t a l l , 
i s i n t e r e s t e d s o l e l y i n i n c r e a s i n g our knowledge of the world. 
T h e o r i s i n g i s c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y par e x c e l l e n c e , and the t h e o r i s t may 
be l i k e n e d to an onlooker or s p e c t a t o r r a t h e r than a man o b l i g e d to 
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a c t upon the knowledge he a c q u i r e s . ' 
Economics - a t h e o r e t i c a l or a p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y ? 
A d i s t i n c t i o n s i m i l a r to t h a t between s c i e n c e and a p p l i e d s c i e n c e 
(between theory and p r a c t i c e ) i s o f t e n assumed to apply w i t h i n the 
sphere of economics. Si n c e economics i s a s o c i a l s c i e n c e and more 
a k i n t o human geography than i s pure s c i e n c e , t h i s assumption i s 
worthy of i n v e s t i g a t i o n . On the one hand we have the economic 
t h e o r i s t e x e r c i s i n g h i s c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s to the f u l l on the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s of economic theory (between, f o r example, the money 
supply, p u b l i c spending and r a t e s of i n f l a t i o n ) . His i n t e r e s t l i e s 
i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p s themselves. I n c o n t r a s t , the economic a d v i s o r , 
the p r a c t i c a l man, i s concerned w i t h c u r r e n t economic problems. His 
a d v i c e w i l l be on ways of r e d u c i n g the present r a t e of i n f l a t i o n under 
circumstances x,y,z o p e r a t i n g here and now. L i k e the t e c h n o l o g i s t , 
he must apply accepted theory (however i m p e r f e c t ) i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
p r a c t i c a l context. The p a r a l l e l i s a p p e a l i n g , and i n both c a s e s i t 
would be the t h e o r i s t who i s engaged i n academic r e s e a r c h . Having 
discounted s c i e n t i f i c method as i n a p p r o p r i a t e to the s u b j e c t matter of 
human geography we may n e v e r t h e l e s s , as geographers, be a b l e to t h e o r i s e 
by modelling our r e s e a r c h on t h a t of economics. Before we examine t h a t 
p o s s i b i l i t y , however, we must f i r s t ask i f t h e r e i s not more to the 
academic s u b j e c t of economics than has so f a r been suggested. 
Suppose, f o r example, we had a B r i t i s h academic who was r e s e a r c h i n g 
i n t o the e f f e c t s of the E a s t A f r i c a n Customs Union on the economy of 
Kenya i n the l a t e 1960s. Would he q u a l i f y as a t h e o r i s t ? He 
c e r t a i n l y could not be a p r a c t i t i o n e r , f o r he i s not i n a p o s i t i o n to 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y , the one word i n Greek means both ' s p e c t a t o r ' and 
' t h e o r i s t ' . 
d e a l w i t h c u r r e n t economic problems i n Kenya even supposing h i s study 
bore some r e l e v a n c e to such problems. And y e t h i s study could not be 
t h e o r e t i c a l i n the sense t h a t i t i s s o l e l y concerned with the 
amendment and replacement of economic theory. The s u b j e c t matter 
c l e a r l y belongs to economics and y e t on the d i s t i n c t i o n o u t l i n e d 
above the r e s e a r c h can be d e c l a r e d n e i t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l nor p r a c t i c a l . 
S u f f i c e i t to note at t h i s j u n c t u r e t h a t t h e r e must be a t h i r d 
p o s s i b i l i t y i n economics, f o r the r e i s t h i s l a r g e r e s e a r c h e f f o r t 
d i r e c t e d a t the study o f a c t u a l events and s p e c i f i c economic s t a t i s t i c s 
which has no p r a c t i c a l purpose. Economic r e s e a r c h of t h i s k i n d , being 
n o n - p r a c t i c a l , i s more l i k e t h e o r i s i n g , with the r e s e a r c h e r as 
s p e c t a t o r or onlooker to the events he s t u d i e s . 
E x p l a n a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e : 
I f the human geographer cannot, with methodological i n t e g r i t y , 
adopt the s c i e n t i f i c model of theory then perhaps he could s t i l l a c h i e v e 
the g e n e r a l i t y o f economics by u t i l i s i n g i t s explanatory mode. The 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , i t has been argued, cannot o f f e r e x p l a n a t i o n s of 
d e t a i l as p h y s i c s can but they could g i v e 'explanations of the 
p r i n c i p l e ' . And economic theory can be c i t e d as a paradigm case of 
the l a t t e r . I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t a p h y s i c i s t could give a 
d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r occurrence but i t should be noted 
t h a t the f u n c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c theory i s not to provide e x p l a n a t i o n s 
of the world a t a l l , e i t h e r i n d e t a i l or i n p r i n c i p l e . The u n i v e r s a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n s o f s c i e n c e d e s c r i b e the world as i t i s . Economic theory 
and the attendant e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e , then, a r e not a ki n d 
of theory nor a mode of ex p l a n a t i o n found i n s c i e n c e . E x p l a n a t i o n of 
the p r i n c i p l e i s p e c u l i a r t o t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , and i t might w e l l be 
assumed t h a t as such i t w i l l , be b e t t e r s u i t e d to s o c i a l s c i e n t i f i c 
s u b j e c t matter. I t does appear to provide the g e n e r a l i t y sought by 
many t h e o r i s t s but whether i t i s indeed the key to a sound 
methodological base f o r urban theory remains to be seen. 
What i s e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e 9 Keynsian economics can 
be taken as a s u i t a b l e f i r s t example. I n h i s economic theory Keynes 
put forward a s m a l l number of r e l a t e d fundamental p o s t u l a t e s i n terms 
of which 'explanations of the p r i n c i p l e ' upon which economic phenomena 
appear a r e g i v e n . Within geography C h r i s t a l l e r , f o r example, can be 
seen to have advanced an e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e , f o r he was a l s o 
concerned to deduce the consequences of a s m a l l number of b a s i c 
p o s t u l a t e s . The s p a t i a l dimensions o f C h r i s t a l l e r ' s theory a r e 
important f o r geographers, but the explanatory power of the theory 
i t s e l f l i e s i n the b a s i c p o s t u l a t e s r a t h e r than i n any of the deduced 
consequences, s p a t i a l o r o t h e r w i s e . I n h i s book C e n t r a l P l a c e s i n 
Southern Germany, C h r i s t a l l e r devotes a chapter to 'fundamental 
meanings' and i t i s upon the notions d i s c u s s e d t h e r e t h a t the whole 
e l a b o r a t e c o n s t r u c t i o n of c e n t r a l p l a c e s and hexagonal n e t s i s based. 
The f i r s t of t h e s e meanings i s both the most fundamental and the most 
important. I t i s ' c e n t r a l i z a t i o n as a p r i n c i p l e of order'. Here we 
have an attempt to explain" the p a t t e r n of s e t t l e m e n t s (or a t l e a s t 
market p l a c e s ) m the landscape by an appeal to the p r i n c i p l e or 
p r i n c i p l e s which u n d e r l i e t h e i r s p a t i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n . C h r i s t a l l e r 
m a intains t h a t , 
The c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n o f mass around a nucleus i s , 
i n i n o r g a n i c as w e l l as o r g a n i c n a t u r e , an elementary 
form of order of t h i n g s which belong together - a 
c e n t r a l i s t i c order. The order i s not only a human 
mode of t h i n k i n g , e x i s t i n g i n the human world of 
imagination and developed because people demand order; 
i t i n f a c t e x i s t s out of the i n h e r e n t p a t t e r n of matter. 
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The same c e n t r a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e i s a l s o 
found i n some forms of human community l i f e , 
predominantly i n c e r t a i n o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e s 
and expressed xn an i n v i s i b l e o b j e c t i v e form. 2^ 
The landscape p a t t e r n a r i s e s from and i s explained by the c e n t r a l i s t x c 
order of t h i n g s . The c r u c i a l assumption of a l l those who attempt to 
provide e x p l a n a t i o n s o f the p r i n c i p l e i s t h a t there i s some such b a s i c 
f o r c e o p e r a t i n g upon a group of phenomena which r e s u l t s i n the 
fundamental o r d e r i n g of such phenomena. A f t e r t h i s , the whim and 
fancy of f i c k l e human beings provides the f r i l l s o r d e t a i l s which 
make any p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n unique. 
Un f o r t u n a t e l y , e x p l a n a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e even i n economics 
i s not without i t s d i f f i c u l t i e s , f o r statements of 'the p r i n c i p l e ' 
have a p e c u l i a r r e l a t i o n s h i p to d i r e c t l y observable phenomena. 2 9 
Consider, f o r example, Z i p f ' s ' p r i n c i p l e o f l e a s t e f f o r t ' which, i t 
i s claimed, i s "the primary p r i n c i p l e t h a t governs our e n t i r e i n d i v i d u a l 
and c o l l e c t i v e behaviour of a l l s o r t s , i n c l u d i n g the behaviour of our 
language and p r e c o n c e p t i o n s " . 3 0 'Least e f f o r t ' provides us w i t h a 
paradigm case of t a l k of p r i n c i p l e s i n r e l a t i o n to human behaviour and 
we can now examine the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h i s p r i n c i p l e and observable 
phenomena. When Z i p f s t a t e s t h a t i t i s the purpose of h i s book to 
e s t a b l i s h the p r i n c i p l e o f l e a s t e f f o r t we might w e l l wonder how such 
an e s t a b l i s h m e n t i s to be accomplished. What s o r t of evidence would 
W. C h r i s t a l l e r (1966) p.14 
see T.S.Torrance (1973) f o r an e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s p o i n t . 
G.K.Zipf (1965) p r e f a c e . (One can only s p e c u l a t e about the 
' p r i n c i p l e ' which guided Z i p f ' s own behaviour i n w r i t i n g such 
a lengthy book on the s u b j e c t . ) 
prove, o r even d i s p r o v e , the c l a i m t h a t human behaviour i s governed 
by the l e a s t e f f o r t p r i n c i p l e ? Z i p f h i m s e l f attempts to answer 
t h i s question when he p o i n t s out t h a t , 
t h e r e i s a l s o admittedly no a p r i o r i 
n e c e s s i t y f o r our b e l i e v i n g t h a t a l l l i v i n g 
p r ocess does i n f a c t behave a t a l l times 
according to one s i n g l e i n v a r i a b l e s u p e r l a t i v e , 
such as t h a t of l e a s t e f f o r t , t h a t , a f t e r a l l , 
must f i r s t be e s t a b l i s h e d e m p i r i c a l l y 3 1 
But i s he not mistaken i n supposing t h a t the t a s k i s an e m p i r i c a l one 9 
Statements of the p r i n c i p l e , being c o n t r a s t e d w i t h statements o f d e t a i l , 
a r e not simple statements of what i s t h e r e t o be seen. They a r e more 
s u i t a b l y c h a r a c t e r i s e d as r e f e r r i n g to something b a s i c or u n d e r l y i n g 
and as such c o u l d not be v e r i f i e d o r f a l s i f i e d by d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n . 
I n economics the phrase b t h e r t h i n g s being e q u al' i s the hallmark of 
such a p r i n c i p l e ; a p r i n c i p l e which i s s a i d to guide behaviour a t a 
b a s i c l e v e l and which can only be 'discovered' a f t e r the s u p e r f i c i a l 
d e c o r a t i o n s o f behaviour, the d e t a i l s , have been s o r t e d out and 
d i s c a r d e d . To c i t e a d e t a i l as c o n t r a r y to any suggested p r i n c i p l e , 
i f one i s seeki n g to e s t a b l i s h the p r i n c i p l e , i s to argue i r r e l e v a n t l y , 
f o r d e t a i l s have no b e a r i n g on p r i n c i p l e s . They can n e i t h e r r e f u t e 
them nor support them. And when the economic t h e o r i s t adds 'other 
t h i n g s being equal' to h i s economic law he i s d e l i b e r a t e l y l a y i n g a s i d e 
such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of d e t a i l . 
Could e x p l a n a t i o n s of the p r i n c i p l e ever be e i t h e r v e r i f i e d or 
f a l s i f i e d by 'looking to see'? Indeed a r e statements of the p r i n c i p l e 
e m p i r i c a l c l a i m s a t a l l ? Again Z i p f ' s w r i t i n g s s e r v e as a concrete 
example. Z i p f c h a r a c t e r i s e s h i s noti o n of ' e f f o r t ' as f o l l o w s : 
I b i d . p.3 
I n simple terms, the P r i n c i p l e of L e a s t E f f o r t 
means, f o r example, t h a t a person i n s o l v i n g h i s 
immediate problems w i l l view t h e s e a g a i n s t the back-
ground o f h i s probable f u t u r e problems, as estimated 
by h i m s e l f . Moreover he w i l l s t r i v e to s o l v e h i s 
problems i n such a way as to minimize the t o t a l work 
t h a t he must expend i n s o l v i n g both h i s immediate 
problems and h i s probable f u t u r e problems. That i n 
t u r n means t h a t the person w i l l s t r i v e to minimize 
the probable average r a t e o f h i s work-expenditure 
( o v e r - t i m e ) . And i n so doing he w i l l be minimizing 
h i s e f f o r t , by our d e f i n i t i o n of e f f o r t . 3 2 
The way i n which the p r i n c i p l e here operates i n any p a r t i c u l a r case 
i s s a i d to depend upon the i n d i v i d u a l ' s e s t i m a t i o n of h i s own s i t u a t i o n . 
Thus two i n d i v i d u a l s , with s i m i l a r problems to s o l v e , may choose to a c t 
i n v e r y d i f f e r e n t ways. T h e i r b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s may n e v e r t h e l e s s 
both be governed by l e a s t e f f o r t f o r , i f we are to b e l i e v e Z i p f , a c t u a l 
behaviour r e s u l t s from the i n t e r v e n i n g s u b j e c t i v e e s t i m a t i o n of a 
s i t u a t i o n . But i f any course of a c t i o n can f o l l o w as a s o l u t i o n to a 
s e t of problems then no p a r t i c u l a r course of a c t i o n could p o s s i b l y 
confirm t h a t the p r i n c i p l e of l e a s t e f f o r t d i d govern the behaviour. 
Conversely, to assume t h a t t h i s p r i n c i p l e guides a l l behaviour i s to 
be a b l e to say nothing about s p e c i f i c b e h a v i o u r a l s t r a t e g i e s . Take 
Z i p f ' s own example: 
We might take the c a s e of a student whose p a r t i c u l a r 
path of l e a s t e f f o r t out of h i s classroom would seem o f f -
hand to be the path t h a t l e a d s from h i s s e a t to the n e a r e s t 
a i s l e , and thence out of the door, through the h a l l , to the 
n e a r e s t s t a i r w a y . On the other hand, i n the event of a 
f i r e , the student may p r e f e r to run w i t h l e a s t time to the 
n e a r e s t window and adopt a path t h a t i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a 
path of l e a s t work and of l e a s t time and of l e a s t d i s t a n c e 
t o the ground. T h i s path w i l l a l s o be a path of l e a s t 
e f f o r t as estimated by h i m s e l f , even a t the r i s k of months 
i n h o s p i t a l w i t h a broken back. Other students may p r e f e r 
to take paths through the s m o k e - f i l l e d c o r r i d o r s . These 
paths a r e a l s o paths of l e a s t e f f o r t , as estimated by the 
students i n q u e s t i o n . 3 3 
3 2 I b i d , p . l 
3 3 I b i d . p.7 
The o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of ' e f f o r t ' a re u n l i k e l y to be 
e n t e r t a i n e d a t a l l i n such circumstances seems p e r t i n e n t although i t 
i s not the academic point i n q u e s t i o n . A l l the students i n the 
example a r e i n the same predicament; t h e i r s c h o o l i s on f i r e . T h e i r 
chosen escape r o u t e s , however, v a r y . T h i s i s n e i t h e r s u r p r i s i n g nor 
u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . To observe f u r t h e r than each was f o l l o w i n g h i s own 
path of l e a s t e f f o r t i s to add nothing to the account. I t does not 
make any i n d i v i d u a l a c t i o n more i n t e l l i g i b l e o r l e s s i n t e l l i g i b l e , 
f o r we have nothing w i t h which to c o n t r a s t the l e a s t e f f o r t path. 
And i f t h e r e i s no path which does not minimise the e f f o r t of the 
student who t a k e s i t , then i t must be l o g i c a l l y i m p o s s i b l e both to 
provide a counter-example t o Z i p f ' s c e n t r a l contention and to e s t a b l i s h 
the p r i n c i p l e of l e a s t e f f o r t e m p i r i c a l l y . I f we accept i n advance 
t h a t a l l r o u t e s taken by the students w i l l be l e a s t e f f o r t paths then 
t h i s n e c e s s a r i l y excludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of l o o k i n g to see i f the 
students do i n f a c t take such paths. The p r i n c i p l e cannot be 
e s t a b l i s h e d e m p i r i c a l l y . Indeed i t must be concluded t h a t i t i s not 
an e m p i r i c a l c l a i m a t a l l . 3 4 
3 4 Other v e r s i o n s of Z i p f ' s p r i n c i p l e appear i n the l i t e r a t u r e 
( p a r t i c u l a r l y of l o c a t i o n a l a n a l y s i s ) and normally i n c o r p o r a t e ' r a t i o n a l ' 
man and a c e t e r i s p aribus c l a u s e ; thus other t h i n g s being equal the 
r a t i o n a l man would choose the path of l e a s t e f f o r t . T h i s i s p l a u s i b l e , 
but s u r e l y other t h i n g s a r e r a r e l y equal. And even i f they were how are 
we to compare q u a n t i t i e s of e f f o r t when i t i s q u i t e i n a p p r o p r i a t e to a t t a c h 
even an o r d i n a l s c a l e to such a notion? Could we r e a l l y take s e r i o u s l y the 
c l a i m t h a t t h e r e i s more ( o r indeed l e s s ) ' e f f o r t ' i n v o l v e d i n w r i t i n g a 
Ph.D. t h e s i s than i n t r a i n i n g f o r the Olympic long jump 9 Such d i s p a r a t e 
a c t i v i t i e s cannot be compared i n terms of the e f f o r t they r e q u i r e . 
F u r t h e r , the c e n t r a l n o t i o n of ' e f f o r t ' i s i t s e l f o f t e n extended i n a way 
which renders i t meaningless. C e r t a i n l y , i f any c o n s i d e r a t i o n can add to 
or s u b t r a c t from the amount of e f f o r t i n v o l v e d i n f o l l o w i n g a p a r t i c u l a r 
path then, i n one sense, a l l other t h i n g s w i l l be equal f o r t h e r e w i l l be 
no other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to be unequal. To do t h i s , however, i s merely to 
h i d e the m u l t i p l i c i t y of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n the c h o i c e of a 'path' 
behind the g e n e r a l l a b e l o f e f f o r t and to guarantee the incoherence of the 
q u e s t i o n s one i s then f o r c e d to ask. The c h o i c e between a b e a u t i f u l path 
and an ugly one has nothing a t a l l to do w i t h e f f o r t . To deny t h i s and 
t r a n s l a t e any c o n s i d e r a t i o n ( l e n g t h , s t e e p n e s s , a e s t h e t i c q u a l i t y , 
f a m i l i a r i t y e t c . ) i n t o q u a n t i t i e s of ' e f f o r t ' i s to rob the notion of 
e f f o r t o f any sense whatsoever. 
S c i e n t i f i c laws are e m p i r i c a l laws. They d e s c r i b e the 
behaviour of phenomena which can be observed. T h e i r competitors i n 
economics a r e not e m p i r i c a l . Nor are statements of the p r i n c i p l e 
a n a l y t i c . 3 5 Could they then bear some a l t e r n a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p to 
the e m p i r i c a l ? Could they, f o r example, be n e i t h e r f u l l y a n a l y t i c 
nor e m p i r i c a l and s t i l l c o n t r i b u t e t o a mode of u n d e r s t a n d i n g 9 To 
c h a r a c t e r i s e such statements i n t h i s way, however, b r i n g s i n t o question 
t h e i r p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to any body of knowledge. For how are we 
to judge them t r u e or f a l s e ? The n o n - e m p i r i c a l cannot be t e s t e d 
e m p i r i c a l l y . T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y the problem o u t l i n e d i n Chapter 1 
where we noted t h a t i t i s not a t a l l c l e a r which e m p i r i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s 
would support and which undermine a theory such as C h r i s t a l l e r ' s . I f 
n© o b s e r v a t i o n i s to count a g a i n s t the theory ( i e . i f , whatever the 
divergence from the t h e o r e t i c a l p a t t e r n , we attempt to account f o r the 
divergence r a t h e r than abandon the t h e o r y ) then, s i n c e i t f o r b i d s n o t h i n 
e q u a l l y i t could e x p l a i n nothing. But a r e we on any f i r m e r ground i f w 
f i n a l l y admit the n o n - e m p i r i c a l s t a t u s o f C h r i s t a l l e r ' s t h e s i s ? 
An attempt has been made i n the c a s e of economics to overcome the 
ver i f r c a t r o n ~ p r o b l e m ~ a s s o ~ c i a t e d ~ w i t h statements - of~ the p r i n c i p l e . Non-
a n a l y t i c and n o n - e m p i r i c a l s t a t e m e n t s 3 6 are s a i d to be open to an 
i n f o r m a l t e s t o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y when considered as an i n t e g r a l p a r t of 
a formal theory which i s i t s e l f open to e m p i r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n . But i n 
3 5 ( a ) A l l b a c h e l o r s a r e unmarried men 
(i>) Income equals consumption p l u s s a v i n g s (Y = C + S ) . These a r e 
both a n a l y t i c statements. A l l such statements are t r u e i n v i r t u e of 
the meanings of the words and symbols. 
3 6 For example, 'the q u a n t i t y demanded and the q u a n t i t y s u p p l i e d of 
every good a r e some r e s p e c t i v e f u n c t i o n of the r u l i n g p r i c e ' would be 
one such statement. 
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what would t h i s i n f o r m a l t e s t c o n s i s t ? And how are we t o achieve the 
e m p i r i c a l r e f u t a t i o n ( o r c o n f i r m a t i o n ) of a theory the formulation of 
which i t s e l f i n v o l v e s statements which are n e i t h e r f u l l y a n a l y t i c nor 
e m p i r i c a l ? Here we can d e t e c t an e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e between 
economics and the other s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , f o r although economics i s 
c e r t a i n l y concerned w i t h human behaviour ( s a v i n g , expenditure e t c . ) 
the most sound economic theory i s based on wholly a n a l y t i c p r o p o s i t i o n s 
and many economic v a r i a b l e s a r e r e l a t e d d e f i n i t i o n a l l y . F u r t h e r , most 
economic problems a r e p a r t o f the world of p r a c t i c e ( i e . they c a l l f o r 
p r a c t i c a l s o l u t i o n s ) and i t i s only i n t h i s context t h a t we could have 
an i n f o r m a l t e s t o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y . I f a theory c o n t a i n s a statement 
about the p r i n c i p l e a t work i n r e g u l a t i n g the money supply, then the 
only p o s s i b l e candidate f o r a ' t e s t ' of t h a t theory i s to i n c r e a s e the 
a c t u a l money supply and compare the r e s u l t with the t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
expected o n e . 3 7 
Two p o i n t s r e q u i r e t o be made. F i r s t , the c l a i m t h a t even though 
the b a s i c statements o f a theory are not amenable to any d e c i s i v e 
e m p i r i c a l t e s t , the theory i t s e l f i s , i s a p e c u l i a r one. The 
i m p l i c a t i o n s ~ 6 f " a theory f o l l o w d e d u c t i v e l y from the statements of the 
theory i t s e l f , and t h e r e f o r e the b a l d c l a i m t h a t a t h e o r y ' s l o g i c a l 
E x a c t l y what such a comparison would confirm o r r e f u t e i s f a r from 
unproblematic. T h i s need not concern us h e r e , however, f o r i t i s 
enough a t t h i s p oint to e s t a b l i s h t h a t a comparison o f t h i s k i n d 
i s the only way we can construe the 'informal t e s t o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y ' . 
I t would merely d e t r a c t from the main arguments of the t h e s i s to 
comment upon the e f f e c t i v e n e s s or otherwise of t h i s t e s t . 
i m p l i c a t i o n s but never i t s b a s i c p o s t u l a t e s can be t e s t e d , must be f a l s e . 
Secondly, even i f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between some p o s t u l a t e s and some 
i m p l i c a t i o n s could s e n s i b l y be c h a r a c t e r i s e d as n e c e s s a r y but not 
d e d u c t i v e l y n e c e s s a r y , the human geographer does not have the 
p o s s i b i l i t y o f t e s t i n g a theory i n a p r a c t i c a l context. T h i s l a s t 
p o int may be questioned, f o r urban geography, a t l e a s t , i s o f t e n 
supposed to have a p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n i n the f i e l d o f pl a n n i n g . 
Could not the planner e f f e c t an i n f o r m a l t e s t of a c c e p t a b i l i t y f o r 
urban theory i n j u s t the same way as the economic p r a c t i t i o n e r could 
f o r economic t h e o r y ? 3 8 The s h o r t answer must be no. I n a t h e o r e t i c a l 
account of the p r i n c i p l e , the v a r i a b l e s i n ques t i o n a r e g e n e r a l ones 
such as the money supply. The p l a n n e r , however, i s not i n a p o s i t i o n 
to a l t e r such g e n e r a l v a r i a b l e s even i f the urban geographer could pass 
on t o him formulae r e l e v a n t to urban d i s t r i b u t i o n s . For example, the 
planner has no d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on the number of people of a p a r t i c u l a r 
socio-economic group who r e s i d e i n urban a r e a s . And nu matter how 
powerful the planning l e g i s l a t i o n , the planner could never c o n t r o l the 
numbers of people i n the same way as the economist can r e g u l a t e the 
T h i s , we can note i n p a s s i n g , r a i s e s s e v e r a l i n t e r e s t i n g q uestions 
about the k i n d o f understanding t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s c i p l i n e s such 
as s c i e n c e , h i s t o r y and philosophy p r o v i d e , and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to 
the world o f p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . For example, does a competence 
i n moral philosophy help one t o l e a d a b e t t e r l i f e 9 
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money supply. 
E x p l a n a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e , then, i s not an explanatory mode 
which could s e n s i b l y be adopted w i t h i n human geography. The formal 
t h e o r i e s o f C h r i s t a l l e r and Von Thunen are i n t e r e s t i n g attempts to 
extend economic p o s t u l a t e s i n t o the s p a t i a l dimension. I n so f a r as 
they employ s t r i c t l y economic notions (.of market p r i c e , economic r e n t , 
income e t c . ) they can be c l a s s e d w i t h economic theory and v e r i f i e d or 
f a l s i f i e d a c c o r d i n g l y . For the geographer, however, the i n t e r e s t l i e s 
i n the extension of the p u r e l y economic model and i t i s here t h a t such 
t h e o r i e s encounter insurmountable problems o f v e r i f i c a t i o n . No statement 
of the p r i n c i p l e which i s not a n a l y t i c can escape the fundamental flaw of 
u n t e s t a b i l i t y . To employ such statements, or t h e o r i e s which embody such 
statements, i n human g e o g r a p h i c a l r e s e a r c h would n e c e s s a r i l y be to engage 
i n u n s u b s t a n t i a t a b l e s p e c u l a t i o n . 4 0 
To c h a r a c t e r i s e p l a n n i n g as a p p l i e d urban geography i s u t t e r l y 
m i s l e a d i n g and a d i s t o r t i o n of the p a r t a planner might play i n the 
urban scene. I t i s a popular f a l l a c y , but a f a l l a c y n e v e r t h e l e s s , 
t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l advancement i n urban geography w i l l h elp the planners 
i n t h e i r job of c o n s t a n t l y improving the urban environment. T h i s i s 
a l s o the_myth o f Harvey's s o c i a l l y r e l e v a n t geography. Geographers a r e 
i n no p o s i t i o n to change the world. The urban t h e o r i s t i s not a 
p r a c t i c a l man. His t h e o r e t i c a l f i n d i n g s may i n c r e a s e our understanding 
of p r e s e n t s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s , but i f the theory i s not s c i e n t i f i c 
( i e . not u n i v e r s a l i s a b l e ) then i t cannot be a p p l i e d d i r e c t l y to f u t u r e 
o c c u r r e n c e s , however s i m i l a r . The planner would b e n e f i t from knowing 
the f u t u r e e f f e c t o f c u r r e n t d e c i s i o n s . The geographer may be able to 
provide him with r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , but urban theory could never 
provide him with the answer. 
i t 
T h i s i s w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d by Von Thunen's own work when he attempts to 
r e l a x one of the many very l i m i t i n g assumptions from which he d e r i v e s 
h i s i n i t i a l model of the c o n c e n t r i c r i n g pattern of a g r i c u l t u r e i n an 
i s o l a t e d s t a t e . A f t e r i n t r o d u c i n g a major waterway through the market 
c e n t r e , the way i n which t h i s i s s a i d to d i s t o r t the r i n g s i s e n t i r e l y 
a matter o f s p e c u l a t i o n . Nothing f o l l o w s d e d u c t i v e l y from the remaining 
assumptions. The c r i t i c i s m , i t should be noted, i s only of those t h e o r i e s 
which do purport t o be explanatory ( i e . i n c r e a s e our understanding of how 
c e r t a i n p a t t e r n s come about). A model of an i d e a l p a t t e r n which i s p a r t 
of a p r e s c r i p t i v e e n t e r p r i s e i s q u i t e another matter. 
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The d i s c u s s i o n s o f Chapter 4 have been wide-ranging. T h e i r 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the way i n which we could study human, and i n p a r t i c u l a r 
urban, geography a re c e n t r a l to t h i s t h e s i s and can, t h e r e f o r e , u s e f u l l y 
be summarised i n thr e e main p o i n t s : 
1. Model b u i l d i n g o r the use of any modelling techniques ( i n c l u d i n g 
the use of a n a l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g ) i s not a l o g i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f 
s c i e n t i f i c method. Geographers a r e t h e r e f o r e no n e a r e r to being 
s c i e n t i s t s simply because they employ models i n t h e i r r e s e a r c h . And i f 
a n a l o g i c a l r e a s o n i n g can advance r e s e a r c h i t must be w i t h i n a d i f f e r e n t 
t h e o r e t i c a l framework to t h a t o f s c i e n c e . F u r t h e r , the geographer 
must be sure to a s s e r t an analogy i n the f i r s t p l a c e ; i e . he must show 
t h a t the two areas i n v o l v e d are t r u l y a n a l o g i c a l . Only then do we have 
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f i n c r e a s i n g our understanding of the s o c i a l world by 
the use of models. 
2. T h e o r i s i n g i n s c i e n c e i s an a c t i v i t y marked by s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t i v e 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . These could not be shared by any study of human 
behaviour. The theory of pure s c i e n c e i s u n i v e r s a l d e s c r i p t i o n . There 
a r e no such u n i v e r s a l s i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e . (And those who seek to 
~ t h e o r i s e ~ i n geography _are c o m m o n l y - d i s s a t i s f i e d with-mere d e s c r i p t i o n ) . 
S c i e n t i f i c theory could not, t h e r e f o r e , provide methodologically sound 
g u i d e l i n e s f o r the development o f geo g r a p h i c a l theory. 
3. Economics, i t s e l f one of the s o c i a l s c i e n c e s , has two branches, one 
p r a c t i c a l and one academic. The p r a c t i t i o n e r uses the t h e o r e t i c a l 
f o r m u l a t i o n s of the academic i n a p r a c t i c a l c ontext. And i t i s the 
p r a c t i c a l context which a l l o w s the p o s s i b i l i t y of s u b j e c t i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s 
o f the p r i n c i p l e to an i n f o r m a l t e s t o f v a l i d i t y . Without such a 
p o s s i b i l i t y statements o f the p r i n c i p l e would have no explanatory power 
s i n c e they could never be shown to be e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e . Human 
geography has no p r a c t i c a l c o u n t e r - p a r t and t h e r e f o r e no p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f such a t e s t . E x p l a n a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e , t h e r e f o r e , i s not a 
mode of ex p l a n a t i o n which could meaningfully be employed i n human 
geography. 
These c o n c l u s i o n s are l a r g e l y n e g a t i v e . They t e l l us what 
human geography could not be and show us which methods would not 
i n c r e a s e our understanding o f human l o c a t i o n a l behaviour. I n doing 
t h i s , however, t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the methodological concerns of 
t h i s t h e s i s i s a p o s i t i v e one, f o r the examination of many fundamental 
i s s u e s has helped to c l a r i f y the nature of the s u b j e c t matter of human 
geography and t h i s i n i t s e l f t a k e s us one step n e a r e r to a s c e r t a i n i n g 
the methods appropriate to i t . 
I n the f i r s t p a r t of t h i s t h e s i s many of the c u r r e n t approaches 
i n human geography have been shown t o have major weaknesses and t o 
be methodologically confused i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. T h i s confusion 
a r i s e s from the mistaken b e l i e f t h a t human geographers could and 
should be s c i e n t i s t s . The l a c k of theory, the l a c k of a coherent 
body of knowledge, i n human (and urban) geography can now be e x p l a i n e d . 
Geographers have, i n the p a s t , attempted to employ a d i s t i n c t i v e mode 
of understanding ( s c i e n c e ) i n a sphere where understanding i n t h i s way 
i s i m p o s s i b l e . Human behaviour cannot and could never be understood 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y - hence the conundrum w i t h which we s t a r t e d . The 
methods of t h e o r e t i c a l s c i e n c e may produce t h e o r i e s i n human geography, 
but t h e s e have no explanatory power because the method i t s e l f i s wrong. 
The s o l u t i o n , of course, i s t o change the method. And t h i s 
indeed must be done i f we, as geographers, are to advance the 
understanding of the s o c i a l world. The p e r v a s i v e n e s s of s c i e n t i s m , 1 
however, nurtured i n geography by the q u a n t i t a t i v e r e v o l u t i o n , makes 
t h i s a d i f f i c u l t step t o t a k e , f o r the popular i l l u s i o n , t h a t the more 
s c i e n t i f i c the study the more ac a d e m i c a l l y r e s p e c t a b l e and c e r t a i n i t s 
c o n c l u s i o n s , 2 i s not e a s i l y c a s t a s i d e . N e v e r t h e l e s s human geography, 
and t h e r e f o r e urban geography, i s not a s c i e n c e and only by a c c e p t i n g 
S c i e n t i s m i s the (mistaken) b e l i e f t h a t a l l knowledge must be 
e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ; i e . according to the methods of 
the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . 
I t can be noted i n p a s s i n g t h a t the phrase 'more s c i e n t i f i c ' , 
though f r e q u e n t l y used, cannot be made sense o f . A v a l i d 
p i e c e of academic r e s e a r c h e i t h e r employs s c i e n t i f i c r e a soning 
or i t does not. I t i s e i t h e r s c i e n t i f i c o r n o n - s c i e n t i f i c . 
There are no 'degrees' i n v o l v e d i n e i t h e r c a s e . 
t h i s c o n c l u s i o n wholeheartedly can a r e a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to urban 
r e s e a r c h be begun. The methodological mistakes apparent i n the 
s o c i a l s c i e n c e s have been examined i n a g e n e r a l manner. I f 
anything i s to be s a i d about the modes of understanding which a r e 
a p p r o p r i a t e , however, t h i s can only be done by looking a t p a r t i c u l a r 
a r e a s of study. I t i s to the p a r t i c u l a r problems of urban geography 
t h a t we t u r n i n P a r t 2. 
PART 2 
URBAN GEOGRAPHY IN PARTICULAR 
L e t us t u r n our a t t e n t i o n , f o r the moment, away from the more 
g e n e r a l methodological concerns o f P a r t 1 and focus d i r e c t l y on the 
questions r a i s e d by urban geography. The p r i n c i p l e i n t e r e s t of the 
geographer i s i n s p a t i a l c o n f i g u r a t i o n s , i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f 
phenomena over the s u r f a c e o f the e a r t h . A l l geographers have t h i s 
much i n common. The s u b - d i v i s i o n s found w i t h i n the s u b j e c t , then, 
r e s u l t from v a r i a t i o n s i n the ki n d o f phenomena s t u d i e d , i n the 'what' 
of the d i s t r i b u t i o n s . For the urban geographer t h i s i n t e r e s t i n 
s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n s i s d i r e c t e d towards urban phenomena ( e i t h e r t h e i r 
p a t t e r n of d i s t r i b u t i o n over an a r e a o f the e a r t h ' s s u r f a c e or the 
p a t t e r n s c r e a t e d w i t h i n c i t i e s ) . I n the d i s c u s s i o n so f a r we have 
considered the l o c a t i o n of such human a r t e f a c t s as the outcome of many 
i n d i v i d u a l l o c a t i o n a l c h o i c e s and d e c i s i o n s and concentrated on the 
i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the nature and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h i s s u b j e c t matter 
f o r the way i n which we can s u i t a b l y study urban phenomena. Having 
i d e n t i f i e d s e v e r a l methodological c u l - d e - s a c s , i t i s perhaps a p p o s i t e 
a t t h i s j u n c t u r e to embark upon a c l o s e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f which 
p a t t e r n s the urban geographer might wish to study and of the questions 
he courd a p p r o p r i a t e l y ask about~the i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e - of-urban-space. 
I n other words, we s h a l l ask, 'What i s urban geography?'. C a r t e r has 
t h i s to say: 
Urban geography cannot c l a i m to be a s y s t e m a t i c study 
i n the sense t h a t i t i s concerned w i t h those p r o c e s s e s 
which, i n the context o f a c u l t u r e , operate t o c r e a t e 
s p a t i a l p a t t e r n s . These p r o c e s s e s a r e economic, 
s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l and t h e i r study r i g h t l y generates 
the s y s t e m a t i c themes w i t h i n human geography. Urban 
geography, i n c o n t r a s t , c o n s i d e r s a l l these p r o c e s s e s 
i n r e l a t i o n to one phenomenon, the c i t y . * 
But what questions might the urban geographer wish to ask about the 
c i t y ? What might he seek to d e s c r i b e and what might he seek to 
1 H. C a r t e r (1972) p . l . 
e x p l a i n ? I t i s easy to answer such questions i n a g e n e r a l way -
geographers want t o know about urban form or about the f u n c t i o n o f 
an urban c e n t r e . I t i s much more d i f f i c u l t , however, to be e x p l i c i t 
and to p i n - p o i n t p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t s and p a r t i c u l a r p u z z l e s which 
demand e x p l a n a t i o n . 
There i s to date a whole range o f questions which have been 
suggested i n the l i t e r a t u r e , and the choice of ' p e r s p e c t i v e s ' i s 
l e g i o n . One p e r s i s t e n t theme, taken up by C a r t e r f o r example, i s t h a t 
concerning the d i s t i n c t i o n between form and p r o c e s s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n 
i t s e l f i s by no means l i m i t e d to an urban context, but the p o p u l a r i t y 
of phrases l i k e 'urban form' and 'the process o f u r b a n i s a t i o n ' mark i t s 
prominence w i t h i n urban geography. The f i r s t chapter of t h i s s e c t i o n , 
t h e r e f o r e , i s devoted to a c l o s e r examination of urban s p a t i a l questions 
i n a form/process framework. T h i s w i l l introduce some f r e s h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 
to the methodological d i s c u s s i o n s and help us to determine the proper 
scope o f urban geography. 
CHAPTER 5 
SPATIAL FORM AND SOCIAL PROCESS 
The aim of t h i s chapter i s to explore the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s and the s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e of the c i t y i n order to 
d i s c o v e r whether the former can help i n the e x p l a n a t i o n o f the l a t t e r . 
I t i s f r e q u e n t l y supposed t h a t p a t t e r n ( i e . any geographical p a t t e r n ) 
can be e x p l a i n e d by c i t i n g the p r o c e s s e s which were i t s cause. 
Bearing i n mind the arguments o f P a r t 1, we now have reason to be 
cau t i o u s about t a l k of causes i n human geography. Such c a u t i o n need 
not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e f o r s a k i n g the process/form framework of 
e x p l a n a t i o n , but i t does r e q u i r e t h a t such a framework be looked a t 
more c l o s e l y than before. The d i s t i n c t i o n between form and p r o c e s s 
does not immediately p r e s e n t any problems. The form, on one popular 
account, i s what i s t h e r e to be seen and mapped, w h i l s t the p r o c e s s e s 
are going on behind the scenes, moulding and shaping the landscape i n t o 
a p a r t i c u l a r v i s i b l e form. As_we have a l r e a d y noted, many geographers 
have concentrated on the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f p a t t e r n and the development 
of techniques to d e s c r i b e more s u c c i n c t l y t h e s e p a t t e r n s . I n other 
words t h e i r concern has been e n t i r e l y w i t h form or s t r u c t u r e and hence 
w i t h d e s c r i p t i o n r a t h e r than e x p l a n a t i o n . I t i s when one begins to 
thi n k o f how to e x p l a i n a c e r t a i n p a t t e r n of phenomena t h a t the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s and s p a t i a l form may recommend 
i t s e l f as a p o s s i b l e , o r perhaps the only p o s s i b l e , l i n e of enquiry. 
Robson h i g h l i g h t s t h i s p o i n t : 
True the geographer s t a r t s out with the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
o f p a t t e r n s , but h i s a n a l y s i s , i f i t i s to be more than 
d e s c r i p t i v e , must proceed from t h e r e to the study of the 
i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p s which a re r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s e p a t t e r n s . 
.... Haggett's attempt to i s o l a t e a se p a r a t e s e t of i n t e r e s t s 
comprising the ge o m e t r i c a l a s p e c t s o f geography i s thus mistaken 
i n so f a r as the r e a l i n t e r e s t i n the e x i s t e n c e o f a p a t t e r n i n , 
s a y , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c e n t r a l p l a c e s i s not the e x i s t e n c e of 
the p a t t e r n i t s e l f , but the understanding of the movements and 
c i r c u l a t i o n s which a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the s p a t i a l p a t t e r n . 
....to the urban geographer s p a t i a l p a t t e r n s a r e thus a 
r e f l e c t i o n of s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s which a r e a t once h i g h l i g h t e d 
and b e t t e r understood by the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the s p a t i a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s and the s p a t i a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . 1 
I f , as urban geographers, we wish t o e x p l a i n or understand the form o f 
an urban a r e a what we must d i s c o v e r , a c c o r d i n g to Robson, are the s o c i a l 
p r o c e s s e s which have r e s u l t e d i n the s p a t i a l p a t t e r n . But how i s t h i s 
t o be done 9 What are ' s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s ' and where are we to d i s c o v e r 
them 9 Many would agree w i t h Harvey, " t h a t any ge n e r a l theory of the 
c i t y must somehow r e l a t e the s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s t h a t go on i n the c i t y to 
the s p a t i a l form which the c i t y assumes". 2 But i s i t not a good d e a l 
more d i f f i c u l t t o i n d i c a t e how t h i s can be accomplished? 
I 
THE IDEA OF FORM OR PATTERN IN GEOGRAPHY: 
Before we address o u r s e l v e s to these q u e s t i o n s , however, the 
explanatory framework i t s e l f needs some c l a r i f i c a t i o n . C a r t e r s a y s 
when t a l k i n g about a conceptual scheme r e l a t e d to m e t r o p o l i t a n s t r u c t u r e , 
"Here 'form 1 i s taken to r e f e r t o the morphological o r anatomical a s p e c t s 
and 'process' to f u n c t i o n a l o r p h y s i o l o g i c a l a s p e c t s " . 3 The form, then, 
i s the s p a t i a l dimension, but we are reminded t h a t , "even though the 
geographer may wish t o concentrate on the s p a t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
c i t y , and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the c i t y i n space, he cannot simply 
1 B.T.Robson Q.969) p.33 
2 D.Harvey (1970) p.47 
3 H.Carter, o p . c i t . , p.13 
sever them from aspatial considerations of process." 4 To understand 
form we need to know what processes were instrumental i n i t s creation. 
An inquiry using t h i s framework i n the explanation of any p a r t i c u l a r 
urban pattern must s t a r t with a description of the urban form ( i e . the 
pattern i t s e l f ) and proceed to explanation by the discovery and 
elucidation of process. But how many problems would an inquirer who 
attempted to follow t h i s recommendation meet along the way9 
What i s urban form? 
Urban geographers have i n the past rarely been disposed to reveal 
clearly and e x p l i c i t l y what they take urban 'form' or urban 'structure' 
to be. Most, i t must be assumed, suppose such terms to be s u f f i c i e n t l y 
f a m i l i a r to require no further elucidation. Familiar they may be, but 
t h i s does not exempt those who use them from the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
making t h e i r use perfectly clear when requested to do so. And 
alternatives such as 'internal morphology of a c i t y ' are l i t t l e help, 
for l i k e the words 'form' and 'structure' themselves they make reference 
to some pattern within ( i n t h i s context) the c i t y . Frequently no 
further indication i s given of what kind of pattern t h i s i s . Two 
impressions, however, are gained from the l i t e r a t u r e on urban structure. 
F i r s t , that the pattern i s a general one rather than a detailed one, 
that i t would feature areas rather than streets f o r example. And 
secondly that there i s a pattern i n any urban area which can be called 
the urban structure, form or i n t e r n a l morphology. In a methodological 
discussion such vague impressions are not adequate. The f i r s t thing 
we must be perfectly clear about i n urban geography, then,is the meaning 
of the word 'form' (or 'structure'). 
Sometimes reference i s made to the r e s i d e n t i a l structure of the 
c i t y . Here at least we have some idea of which pattern i s being 
I b i d . , p.333 
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referred t o , of which urban phenomena are relevant to i t and which 
irr e l e v a n t . Residential structure i s the pattern created by the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l areas, and those who seek to delineate 
t h i s i n the f i r s t stage of t h e i r enquiry can legitimately ignore 
fa c t o r i e s , shops, o f f i c e s , public works and any other non-residential 
features of the urban area. Whether t h i s would be the urban form or 
only part of i t i s open to dispute. What i s certain i s that urban 
form, however understood, i s not 'there to be seen'. One cannot 
simply go into a c i t y and discover i t s s p a t i a l form. This must be 
abstracted from the wealth of d e t a i l which presents i t s e l f to any 
investigator. And i n order to abstract a d i s t r i b u t i o n a l pattern, 
the geographer must adopt a p a r t i c u l a r c r i t e r i o n which w i l l single 
out one aspect of the complex whole. Maps can then be produced 
showing the d i s t r i b u t i o n of places of residence or the d i s t r i b u t i o n 
of i n d u s t r i a l areas (or whatever other aspect of the c i t y the 
geographer wishes to concentrate on). As Shevky demonstrates i n 
his work on social area analysis, 5 urban areas can have more than one 
axis of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and t h i s i s largely a matter of taxonomy rather 
than phenomenology. I t " " i s not that these patterns have to be "pulT 
i n t o " the c i t y by the research worker however. Rather they have to 
be abstracted by a process of selection. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of any 
category of phenomena thus selected, and being d i s t r i b u t e d i n space, 
w i l l be mappable. Not a l l such di s t r i b u t i o n s w i l l warrant i n t e l l e c t u a l 
enquiry in t o t h e i r nature; 
5 E. Shevky and W. B e l l (1955) and E. Shevky and M. Williams (1949) 
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some may, others certainly w i l l not. The d i s t r i b u t i o n i t s e l f , however, 
i s no less r e a l f o r being selected from a l l that i s there to be seen. 
I t i s not, as i s sometimes supposed, that such an abstraction results 
i n a wholly a r t i f i c i a l object of study. For the urban geographer 
concerned with the investigation of the form or structure of the c i t y , 
to be selective i s both necessary and unavoidable. But i t i s of 
should 
considerable importance that he/state clearly which aspect of the c i t y , 
(the p a r t i c u l a r urban form) he wishes to examine. Only then w i l l the 
scope of his study be evident and the confusion a r i s i n g from the 
unqualified use of terms such as 'structure' and 'form' dispelled. 
Urban form and Edinburgh: 
Nor does the c i t y of Edinburgh have one form or structure which 
i s there to be found by anyone with the i n c l i n a t i o n to look. One of 
the f i r s t questions which presented i t s e l f to the present w r i t e r during 
the preliminary investigation of the Scottish capital was, "How does 
one discern a pattern within the c i t y at a l l comparable to that suggested 
by Park, Burgess or any of the urban theorists?" What c r i t e r i a , i n 
other words, could be used to abstract d i s t r i b u t i o n a l patterns from the 
jumble of human artefacts? I t was decided that two related though not 
necessarily s p a t i a l l y coextensive aspects of the c i t y were the most 
6 The d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n d u s t r i a l establishments may pose academic 
questions. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of chairs i n a room w i l l not. Not 
a l l questions about location demand an answer, and of those which 
do, not a l l w i l l be of academic in t e r e s t . To ask of the b i r d 
perched on the telegraph wire, 'Why i s i t s i t t i n g there, on that 
spot?' when i t has to s i t somewhere, i s senseless. Such i d l e 
questions could never be properly academic. Academic problems 
and questions arise only w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r d i s c i p l i n e ; they are 
prompted by a d i s t i n c t i v e mode of understanding the world. 
l i k e l y contenders f o r comparison with previous studies, as well as 
being of pa r t i c u l a r interest i n Edinburgh. These are: 
(a) the d i s t r i b u t i o n of house types 
(b) the r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups. 
As axes of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n these two di s t r i b u t i o n s appear to be similar 
i n nature. Indeed i n certain areas they might be expected to be 
s p a t i a l l y coextensive. And yet there i s a fundamental difference 
between the two which, on a certain view of the nature of geography, 
would reveal (b) as u n f i t subject matter. Hartshorne mentions the 
construction and use of maps as one of the most d i s t i n c t i v e characteristics 
the m<ap 
of geography. Certainly / i s one of the geographer's most basic tools. 
I f we were to claim that the task of the geographer i s to understand and 
explain mapped di s t r i b u t i o n s (not an implausible claim), we would be 
forced t o agree that the r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups must, 
therefore, l i e outwith the scope of geography. This i s because such a 
d i s t r i b u t i o n cannot sensibly be put i n map form. And t h i s i s what 
distinguishes i t quite clearly from d i s t r i b u t i o n s of, f o r example, 
house types. Let us discover wherein the difference l i e s by looking 
again at the investigation of Edinburgh. 
I n i t i a l l y , the two chosen axes of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n seemed 
s u f f i c i e n t l y i n t e r r e l a t e d to be examined together. In Edinburgh, i n 
the nineteenth century, the upper strata of society l i v e d i n the large 
spacious town houses of the equally large and spacious New Town thorough-
fares, w h i l s t the smaller, less w e l l - b u i l t back mews houses were occupied 
by those of considerably lower status. The type of house and the 
social station or position of the occupier did seem to vary coextensively 
See R. Hartshorne (1939), p a r t i c u l a r l y pp.247-249. 
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i n space and i t was thought that to investigate the precise 
relationship f o r the whole of the c i t y would be both worthwhile and 
of considerable i n t e r e s t . I t was expected that t h i s investigation 
as a whole would be i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y but that i n the analysis of 
d i s t r i b u t i o n a l patterns created by the actions of individual human 
beings, geographical s k i l l s would be dominant. I t i s not our present 
concern to locate the boundaries of geography.8 Suffice i t to note 
that these o r i g i n a l expectations were not f u l f i l l e d and t h i s was 
possibly because the geographical conception of the investigation was 
mistaken. I f we examine each axis of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n turn t h i s 
point can better be appreciated. 
The f i r s t aspect of the c i t y chosen f o r study was that of house 
types. Using the form/process framework outlined above the i n i t i a l 
task i s to create a diagram of the form. This i s a r e l a t i v e l y 
straightforward matter i n t h i s case because we are dealing with a f i n i t e 
sex of human artefacts. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of houses i s reasonably stable 
and any disputes about p a r t i c u l a r cases can easily be resolved by looking 
to see. The l i k e l y problems are those involving the categories of 'house 
types' t o be used. Does one have a single class f o r a l l f l a t s ' 7 Or 
does one take size and/or amenities into consideration and have ' f l a t s ' 
I t i s important to remember that the boundaries (or scope) of a 
dis c i p l i n e form a l o g i c a l l i m i t outside which the mode of understanding 
which distinguishes i t as a separate d i s c i p l i n e i s necessarily 
inapplicable. The boundaries of a subject, however, are determined 
rather by t r a d i t i o n and convenience. Science i s a di s c i p l i n e and 
physics and chemistry are subjects. Only the d i v i s i o n between subjects 
could sensibly be called a r t i f i c i a l . 
divided into two, three or more type categories? The scale on which 
one i s attempting to abstract such a pattern w i l l have an obvious 
influence on the willingness of the individual researcher to 
accommodate a more detailed breakdown. Further, i t i s often pointed 
out (with considerable agitation) by human geographers that such a 
categorisation can never be anything but subjective. 9 And by t h i s 
they mean that the categories are not magically predetermined but 
have to be chosen by the researcher. At the one extreme a l l houses 
are i n the same category (they are a l l houses). And at the other, 
there are as many categories as there are houses, fo r one can always 
f i n d some basis on which to distinguish between one house and i t s 
neighbour. In between, there are many possible house-type divisions 
which could be chosen. The choice w i l l be influenced by the types 
of housing apparent i n the study area and the p a r t i c u l a r concerns of 
the research programme. Subjectivity can be overemphasised i n t h i s 
context. Indeed, i n one sense, i t i s not e n t i r e l y up to the in d i v i d u a l 
researcher to decide his categories. Standards of common-sense, 
relevancy and appropriateness do not end with the declaration of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y . We do not have to accept whatever categories the 
researcher himself offers us, f o r we are s t i l l at l i b e r t y to accuse 
him of t a l k i n g nonsense. The work of the researcher, i f i t i s to be 
considered a piece of academic research, must remain withi n the confines 
of logic (eg. he must not contradict himself), sense (he i s not at 
R. J. Johnston (1968, p.575), f o r example, remarks on the choice 
which governs the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of units wi t h i n any zone of 
t r a n s i t i o n (between classes), and declares, "Classification i s 
thus basically a subjective process, despite the apparent 
o b j e c t i v i t y of the methods employed." There can be no dispute 
about the necessity of exercising choice when clas s i f y i n g phenomena, 
but i t i s frequently forgotten that the choice i t s e l f can be judged 
good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, and need not be downgraded 
to the merely subjective. 
l i b e r t y to include an undivided town-house i n his category of ' f l a t s ' ) 
and appropriateness (we could r i g h t l y condemn the inclusion of 
'houses with blue doors' as a house-type category). I t i s the l a t t e r 
which gives r i s e to most disputes. The number and generality of 
categories i s often contested on the grounds of inappropriateness to 
the pa r t i c u l a r case. This does not mean that no sensible decision 
can be made. The adoption of one scheme rather than another may be 
a matter of choice, but that does not further imply that one cannot 
have good grounds on which to base such a choice. This would not 
preclude debate but i t does mean that such debate i s quite d i f f e r e n t 
from the o f f e r i n g of opinions. I t i s properly academic and reasoned. 
The area f o r disagreement i s considerably less than those who put 
forward a strong s u b j e c t i v i t y thesis suppose. 
When building up a pattern of house types i n any urban area, 
then, the choice of type categories i s clearly not a r b i t r a r y , but i t 
does require careful consideration. The choice affects the f i n a l 
pattern and since the pattern i s the 'object' to be understood,the 
choice of categories affects the whole investigation. The categories 
must be appropriate to the p a r t i c u l a r piece of work, the task i n hand. 
This i s an important point because i t highlights the fruitlessness of 
deciding i n advance, of choosing the c r i t e r i a on which to base the 
breakdown of any axis of urban d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n before examining the 
part i c u l a r case. Once an appropriate breakdown has been decided upon, 
however, the p l o t t i n g of the urban d i s t r i b u t i o n i s a r e l a t i v e l y simple 
matter. The more general the categories, the easier the project. I t 
would not be d i f f i c u l t , f o r example, to plot house types i n three 
categories as follows: 
( i ) houses with i n t e r n a l s t a i r 
( i i ) f l a t s 
( i i i ) bungalows 
With a s l i g h t l y more detailed specification these could be three mutually 
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exclusive categories which together account f o r the entire housing 
stock. Providing enough information i s available a d i s t r i b u t i o n a l 
pattern could be abstracted from the urban mosaic. Given visual 
information from the present day, a detailed plan of the nineteenth 
century layout and census information concerning the number of 
households occupying one buil d i n g , a diagram of the pattern of house 
types i n Victorian Edinburgh could be constructed with comparative ease. 
The problem of social groups: 
The same could not be said of the second axis of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
outlined e a r l i e r . The problems encountered i n any attempt to e l i c i t 
the pattern of r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups are considerably 
more complex than those of simple taxonomy. This axis i s d i f f e r e n t i n 
kind to that of house-types and i t cannot, therefore, be treated i n the 
same way. We are dealing here not with human artefacts but with 
i n d i v i d u a l human beings, a l b e i t as members of a group. This means 
that the decision of where to draw the boundaries of the social group 
i s not the same kind of choice as that of deciding upon suitable house-
types. I t i s frequently admitted that subject matter such as 'the 
social group' i s complex and presents special d i f f i c u l t i e s . Zelinsky 
declares t h a t , i n r e l a t i o n to science, "the subject matter of social 
science i s of a higher order of complexity and d i f f i c u l t y " . - 1 0 And 
certai n l y the complexity cannot be denied. I t i s of primary importance, 
however, to appreciate that the subject matter of social science i s not 
the same as that of natural science, only more complex; the difference 
i s more fundamental. Failure to recognise t h i s has, as we have seen i n 
Part 1, led to a l l sorts of methodological confusions. I n the same way 
the r e s i d e n t i a l pattern of social groups i s not a more complex version 
of the pattern of house types, f o r the two are quite d i f f e r e n t . 
W. Zelinsky (1975) p.137 
I f we are to map the r e s i d e n t i a l pattern of social groups, 
clearl y we must f i r s t decide which social groups i t i s that we are 
going to map. Only then could we allocate any given family or 
person to a p a r t i c u l a r social group. In other words, the f i r s t thing 
we must know i s what i s to count as a 'social group'. But how i s t h i s 
to be determined? The l i t e r a t u r e on the subject, although not lacking 
i n volume, i s more confusing than helpful i n r e l a t i o n to the problems 
of the human geographer. Much sociological w r i t i n g on s t r a t i f i c a t i o n , 
for example, i s of too general a nature to be useful to the urban 
researcher. The major sociological theories, however, do provide 
some insight i n t o t a l k of classes or groups withi n society and although 
we cannot be concerned here with t h e i r d e t a i l , two summary comments 
seem appropriate. 
1. The determination of what i s to be counted as a social group, or 
more correctly as a relevant social group, cannot be done i n a void 
but must be i n the context of some part i c u l a r problem or study. There 
are many d i f f e r e n t social groups one can think of, i d e n t i f i a b l e i n 
d i f f e r e n t ways and not necessarily mutually exclusive i n t h e i r member-
ship, ( i . e . one in d i v i d u a l may belong to more than one social group.) 
When we are concerned to explain the changing pattern of r e s i d e n t i a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n , therefore, the relevant social groups w i l l be those which 
have meaning i n terms of r e s i d e n t i a l decision making. Thus a f o o t b a l l 
team, although a social group, i s u n l i k e l y to be a meaningful one i n 
terms of influence on the r e s i d e n t i a l structure. 
2. For the urban geographer concerned with changing r e s i d e n t i a l 
patterns with i n the c i t y interest must l i e i n the social norms of 
pa r t i c u l a r groups as r e f l e c t e d i n in d i v i d u a l attitudes towards methods 
of acquiring a home, expectations and preferred locations. We must be 
careful, however, of the way i n which we t a l k of social groups, f o r 
a social group i s nothing other than a group of individual human beings. 
I t has no extra causal efficacy. Rex and Moore, f o r example, state 
t h a t , "...being a member of one or other of these classes ( i e . social 
groups) i s of f i r s t importance i n determining a man's associations, his 
interests, his l i f e s t y l e and his position i n the urban social structure." 
But surely t h i s i s t o make a mistake about the relationship between the 
social group and the i n d i v i d u a l member of i t . Indeed the mistake 
becomes evident i f we think of how Rex and Moore might attempt to support 
such a bald statement. Could they, f o r example, c i t e any evidence i n 
support of t h e i r claim, and i f so what kind of evidence would t h i s be? 
Consider the claim again. We are t o l d , amongst other things, that 
being a member of a class determines a man's l i f e s t y l e . So l e t us 
take some pa r t i c u l a r aspect of a ' l i f e s t y l e ' , drinking with the boys 
at the l o c a l pub for example, and make the matter plainer. We now 
have a specific instance of Rex's claim, that being a member of a 
par t i c u l a r class w i l l determine that Mr. A indulges, amongst other 
things, i n the practice of 'drinking with the boys' at the l o c a l pub. 
Our problem now i s to decide which class Mr. A might be said to be a 
member of. Suppose we have the choice of three - upper class, middle 
class, and working class - to which one could we assign Mr. A? We 
must, of course, know something about Mr. A before we can attach a class 
label to him. We could, f o r example, c o l l e c t information on his income. 
But we should require more than t h i s . We might also f i n d out details 
of his employment, the location of his residence, the income and 
employment of his associates and the sorts of leisure a c t i v i t i e s he 
J.A.Rex and R.Moore (1967) p.36 
indulges i n . Indeed the more we could f i n d out about his way of l i f e 
the better placed we would be to allocate him to a pa r t i c u l a r social 
class. But now what has happened to Rex's claim? We see that to 
determine Mr. A as a member of, say, the working class we appeal, 
amongst other things, t o his leisure a c t i v i t i e s . And so to translate, 
as i t were, Rex and Moore, we are l e f t with the rather peculiar claim 
that the fact that Mr. A indulges, amongst other things, i n 'drinking 
with the boys' determines, amongst other things, that he indulges i n 
'drinking with the boys'. One can readily see that the element of 
t r u t h i n the o r i g i n a l statement can be ascribed e n t i r e l y to i t s 
tautological nature. 
The mistake made by Rex and Moore was to suppose that they were 
involved i n an investigation i n which one thing could be said to 
determine the other. The relationship between the social group and 
the i n d i v i d u a l i s not l i k e t h i s . In order t o discover what sort of 
l i f e a working class man might lead, we must f i r s t look at p a r t i c u l a r 
examples of the l i f e style of what i s generally known as the working 
class population. We would not then be fin d i n g out what might 
determine a man's actions, but rather what i t i s l i k e to be working 
class. That a man acts in a p a r t i c u l a r way i s simply what i t i s f o r him 
to be working class. The current body of sociological l i t e r a t u r e can 
t e l l us something about social class, but the language used i s , on 
occasion, both confusing and misleading. 
For the problem of intra-urban d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , we are now able 
to adopt a position similar t o that of Gans 1 2 and suggest t h a t , although 
the r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups i s most certainly the 
2 H.J.Gans i n R.E.Pahl (1968) pp.95-118 
outcome of many individual aspirations and decisions, such choices 
and demands themselves do not develop independently or at random. 
That we can t a l k meaningfully of social groups at a l l implies that 
the members of such groups share certain opportunities, aspirations 
and experiences of l i f e . What s t i l l requires to be i l l u s t r a t e d i s 
that certain r e s i d e n t i a l opportunities, aspirations and related l i f e 
experiences are part of what i t i s to be a member of a certain social 
group. Again i t i s important not to mistakenly suppose the r e l a t i o n -
ship to be a causal one. Even Gans does not avoid t h i s mistake, f o r 
although he emphasizes the shared character of r e s i d e n t i a l choices 
and demands, he maintains that these "...are functions of the roles 
people play i n the social system." 1 3 The choices, he says, are 
related to the characteristics of the people, to t h e i r class ( i n a l l 
i t s economic, social and c u l t u r a l ramifications) and l i f e - c y c l e stage. 
On further examination, however, i t i s not at a l l clear what could be 
meant by t h i s . Individual choices are said to be functions of the role 
people play, but how do we characterise these roles? Surely i t could 
only be i n terms of an individual's actions and choices. And Gans, 
therefore, makes the same sort of mistake as Rex and Moore for he 
supposes that he i s dealing with a s i t u a t i o n i n which one thing can be 
said to be a function of the other. What we are interested i n i s 
social groups, and perhaps social roles and social norms, but these 
are not separate from people's actions. They cannot be used to explain 
people's actions, f o r they are merely a way of characterising such 
actions. This was what was meant by the 'social group' having no 
extra causal efficacy. I t cannot be used as an explanation of 
i n d i v i d u a l characteristics for i t i s nothing other than an agglomeration 
I b i d , p . I l l (my emphasis) 
of such characteristics. 
Class as a social grouping: 
We are s t i l l l e f t with the problem of how, i n the context of a 
par t i c u l a r study, we might i d e n t i f y relevant social groupings. One 
prominent notion which has been used by many of the great social 
theorists i n t h e i r discussions of social divisions i s that of 'class'. 
Marx and Weber, notably, had much to say on the subject of class as a 
group, class situations and class consciousness. Despite t h i s , i t i s 
d i f f i c u l t , on a pragmatic l e v e l , to i d e n t i f y a 'class' i n the same way 
as one might i d e n t i f y a f o o t b a l l team. We are a l l f a m i l i a r , i n usage 
at least, with the t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n of society into upper, middle 
and working class, but even with considerable information on any 
par t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l we might well have d i f f i c u l t y i n placing him 
decisively w i t h i n one or other of these class groups. And i f we were 
to use class as the basis of our r e s i d e n t i a l groupings then any i n a b i l i t y 
to allocate individuals to groups would indeed present a considerable 
problem. 
Here i t i s the notion-of 'class' which needs some c l a r i f i c a t i o n . 
What do we mean when we t a l k of class as a social group? Several 
sociologists have pointed out that'class' i s not simply a social taxonomy, 
i e . a way of clas s i f y i n g certain social phenomena. And t h i s i s to say 
that i t i s not simply a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n l i k e the house-type categories 
we have already examined. The difference has been noted as one of kind, 
and we must now ask, "What i s i t that distinguishes a 'class' categorisation 
from a simple taxonomy'7". E.P.Thompson i n his famous volume on the English 
Working Classes discusses the nature of class divisions. As an i l l u s t r a -
t i o n , he uses the analogy of a time machine. The sociologist, having 
stopped the machine, goes down into the engine room to have a look, but 
emerges saying that he has been t o t a l l y unable to locate and cla s s i f y 
a class. A l l he can f i n d i s a multitude of d i f f e r e n t people. He 
was mistaken, Thompson declares, i n ever supposing that he would f i n d 
a class i n t h i s way since class i s not t h i s or that part of the machine 
but rather the way the machine works once i t i s set i n motion. 
Class i s a social and c u l t u r a l formation (often finding 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l expression) which cannot be defined abstractly 
or i n i s o l a t i o n , but only i n terms of relationship with other 
classes; and, ultimately, the d e f i n i t i o n can only be made i n 
the medium of time - that i s , action and reaction, change and 
c o n f l i c t . When we speak of a class we are thinking of a very 
loosely defined body of people who share the same congeries of 
int e r e s t s , social experiences, t r a d i t i o n s and value system, 
who have a disposition to behave as a class, to define 
themselves i n t h e i r actions and i n t h e i r consciousness i n 
r e l a t i o n t o other groups of people i n class ways. 1 4 
The main point Thompson i s making here i s that social class cannot be 
defined by reference to quantifiable characteristics of ind i v i d u a l 
people, especially i n the abstract ( i e . outwith the context of a 
pa r t i c u l a r investigation). Further, i t i s not j u s t that class has 
so f a r defied any attempts to define i t i n t h i s way, but that the 
concept of class i s not one which can be so defined. I t s elucidation 
cannot be i n terms of such concrete data, f o r i t requires the consideration 
of the relationships involved. 
Could class play a part i n the investigation of Edinburgh's 
r e s i d e n t i a l structure? I f people could indeed be shown to have the 
disposition to behave as a social class i n t h e i r r e s i d e n t i a l choices 
and aspirations, what Weber c a l l s class s i t u a t i o n would become a key 
concept i n any analysis of urban social structure. We cannot, however, 
follow Weber too closely, f o r he also talks of a class s i t u a t i o n as 
being where class leads d i r e c t l y to certain sorts of experiences and 
' l i f e chances'. 1 5 Here Weber makes the same mistake as we have seen 
i n other writings when he supposes that one thing leads to another. 
E.P.Thompson (1968) p.939 
see M.Weber (19SO) 
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I t does not make sense to claim that being working class either 
determines or leads to a person choosing to l i v e on a council estate. 
That a person does so choose i s one aspect of a working class style 
of l i f e and not something separate from i t . I t i s part of being 
working class that certain r e s i d e n t i a l opportunities present 
themselves and certain r e s i d e n t i a l aspirations become prominent. 
One does not, therefore, use the fact that these people are working 
class to explain t h e i r occupation of a council estate as one might use 
cause and effect i n a s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis. Rather the explanation 
of a pa r t i c u l a r r e s i d e n t i a l structure i t s e l f becomes a piece of socio-
h i s t o r i c a l narrative concerning what i t i s or was l i k e t o be working 
class i n a part i c u l a r r e s i d e n t i a l choice s i t u a t i o n . Class i s a 
dynamic notion involving ongoing relationships. I t i s not amenable 
to s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of the characteristics of individuals 
and the necessarily general nature of class labels entails the 
imp o s s i b i l i t y of determining class l i m i t s . By the nature of a 
class categorisation there w i l l always be individuals who cannot 
appropriately be allocated to one class or another no matter how much 
information we"have about them. This i s one thing which marks notions 
of social class or social group as quite d i f f e r e n t from any house-type 
groupings. 
A second feature of the difference i n kind between the two axes 
of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n suggested f o r the study of Edinburgh, i s one touched on 
by some writers but seldom f u l l y appreciated. Boulding sums t h i s up 
well when he says, 
Social sciences are dominated by the fact that the 
social s c i e n t i s t and the knowledge which he creates 
are themselves i n t e g r a l parts of the system which i s 
being studied. Hence the system changes as i t i s studied 
and because i t i s studied, there can be no myth of an 
unchanging universe with the s c i e n t i s t acquiring abstract 
knowledge about i t . 1 6 
6 K.E.Boulding (1967) p.12 
182. 
We have already discussed at some length the relationship of the 
social s c i e n t i s t to the society which is his subject matter. 1 7 He 
himself i s essentially part of the system, f o r he speaks the language 
of the system. The understanding of any social system involves an 
understanding of the language of that system. In t h i s way, the 
social s c i e n t i s t i s not at l i b e r t y to define his terms. Here again 
we can contrast the social s c i e n t i s t and the natural s c i e n t i s t , f o r the 
l a t t e r can define his terms i n as precise a manner as he wishes. In 
s c i e n t i f i c language the meaning of a word may therefore vary from that 
of everyday usage. The common word 'mass', for example, meaning the 
bulk of an object, i s given much greater precision within science. 
Further, the language of the s c i e n t i s t has no e f f e c t on his subject 
matter; the laws of motion may change but nothing follows for the 
movement of a b i l l i a r d b a l l . 1 8 'The more precisely concepts can be 
defined, the more s c i e n t i f i c (and therefore better) the research i s 
l i k e l y to be', i s a common doctrine. I t i s equally common, but 
misplaced, f o r social s c i e n t i s t s to begin t h e i r studies with an attempt 
t o 'define t h e i r terms'. The concepts we use i n our study of society 
must be the concepts used i n the society i t s e l f . We are bound by the 
l i m i t s of our language. The concept of 'social class' then, must be 
the same concept as that which has evolved i n the English language. 
When we, as urban geographers, t a l k of the working class or of the 
middle class or of the upper class, we must use these terms as they 
are commonly understood. Only then would we have the p o s s i b i l i t y of 
advancing our understanding of class divisions. And i f E.P.Thompson 
1 7 see Chapter 3 above, especially pp.91-95 
1 8 Whether the s c i e n t i f i c law currently subscribed to i s " A l l i s 
stationary u n t i l i t i s moved" ( A r i s t o t e l i a n physics) or " A l l 
i s moving u n t i l i t i s held steady" (Newtonian physics), the 
actual movement of the b i l l i a r d b a l l w i l l remain the same. 
183. 
i s r i g h t , the concept o f class i s not o f an e n t i t y the boundaries o f 
which could ever be f i r m l y e l u c i d a t e d o r defined. Rather, 'class' 
i s a vague congery o f people who are disposed t o behave i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
way or ways. Because the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t i s not a t l i b e r t y t o lend 
any more p r e c i s i o n t o t h i s imprecise n o t i o n than i t s o r d i n a r y use 
a l l o w s , he cannot provide neat class categories as he could w i t h 
house-types. 
The n o t i o n o f class then, precludes the p o s s i b i l i t y of d i v i d i n g 
t h e households o f Edinburgh i n t o exclusive s o c i a l groupings, the 
p a t t e r n o f which could be presented i n map form. And t h i s i s not 
because o f any d i f f i c u l t i e s the urban geographer might have i n deciding 
upon the r e l e v a n t d i v i s i o n s . The very nature o f a s o c i a l class makes 
a s t r i c t class c a t e g o r i s a t i o n impossible, and t h i s i n t u r n makes i t 
impossible t o d e l i m i t t h e i r s p a t i a l e x t e n t . 1 9 A 'class* i s not a 
t h i n g which can be mapped. Whether such unmappable m a t e r i a l i s 
indeed f i t s u bject matter f o r the geographer must remain a moot p o i n t . 
That the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s o c i a l groups and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f house 
types are fundamentally d i f f e r e n t i s undeniable. We cannot t r e a t the 
former i n the same way as we t r e a t the l a t t e r . "Their comparison, 
then, r a i s e s f a r greater problems than would be i n v o l v e d i n o v e r l a y i n g 
one mapped p a t t e r n on another. 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note t h a t i t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible t o 
map the s p a t i a l extent o f c e r t a i n phenomena even though they 
may have some appearance o f being d i s t r i b u t e d i n space. The 
concept o f a 'neighbourhood' i s a good example here. The 
search f o r a standard d e f i n i t i o n must be a f r u i t l e s s one f o r the 
n o t i o n i s n e c e s s a r i l y imprecise. We can c e r t a i n l y agree w i t h 
Peter Mann (196 5 p.155), t h e r e f o r e , t h a t " I t i s more u s e f u l t o 
consider s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s themselves r a t h e r than t o worry 
where neighbourhoods begin and end". 
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The question w i t h which t h i s chapter began i s not as naive a 
question as i t might have f i r s t appeared. The meaning of the terms 
'form' and ' s t r u c t u r e ' cannot be taken f o r granted. There i s no p a t t e r n 
which can be c a l l e d the urban s t r u c t u r e , but only a wealth o f d e t a i l 
w i t h i n the urban area which can be so ordered as t o h i g h l i g h t a p a r t i c u l a r 
aspect o f the c i t y . This aspect o f i n t e r e s t may or may not be mappable. 
I n e i t h e r case i t s s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s l i k e l y t o r a i s e problems connected 
w i t h the nature o f the chosen set o f fea t u r e s . Even a f t e r these problems 
are overcome, however, t h i s i s only the f i r s t step i n any piece o f 
research. To make the axis o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , the p a r t i c u l a r urban 
s t r u c t u r e , e x p l i c i t i s t o describe a p a t t e r n . And t o describe a p a t t e r n 
i s t o describe the o b j e c t o f study. Only a f t e r t h i s can t h e study begin. 
I t i s i n t h e context o f any attempt t o i n v e s t i g a t e o r e x p l a i n the p a t t e r n 
t h a t the second element o f the popular research framework i s commonly 
invoked. To study form we look f o r process. 
I I 
THE IDEA OF PROCESS IN GEOGRAPHY: 
The idea t h a t the aim o f research i s t o 'get a t the process behind 
the p a t t e r n ' enjoys considerable currency i n many branches o f geography 
today. I t i s s a i d t o break down any b a r r i e r between p h y s i c a l and human 
geography and allow the subject t o assume a new course u n i t e d and 
unhampered by a r t i f i c i a l l y imposed d i v i s i o n s . The discussions o f Part I 
demonstrated t h a t the d i v i s i o n between human and p h y s i c a l geography i s f a r 
from a r t i f i c i a l . I t i s , r a t h e r , deep rooted and cannot s e n s i b l y be 
ignored. This i s not t o say t h a t c e r t a i n observations and techniques 
from one realm would not be o f relevance i n the o t h e r , but only t h a t the 
two geographies demand fundamentally d i f f e r e n t methodologies. The form/ 
process framework, t h e r e f o r e , could never u n i t e the subject o f 
geography under one methodology, but the perspective which i t recommends 
may indeed be u s e f u l t o both the human and the p h y s i c a l geographer. 
Before t h i s can be judged, however, we need t o know a l i t t l e more 
about 'process 1. 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p assumed between 'p a t t e r n ' and 'process' i s 
f r e q u e n t l y considered t o coincide w i t h t h a t between d e s c r i p t i o n and 
explanation. We s t a r t w i t h the p a t t e r n ( t h e urban s t r u c t u r e ) as a 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f what i s there and proceed t o e x p l a i n t h i s by c i t i n g the 
process, o r processes, from which t h i s p a t t e r n could be s a i d t o r e s u l t . 
Since the r e l a t i o n s h i p between explanation and d e s c r i p t i o n i s by no means 
a simple one, 2 0 i t would not be unreasonable t o suppose t h a t t o r e l a t e 
process t o p a t t e r n w i l l also be a complex matter. The r e l a t i o n s h i p 
i t s e l f may change w i t h the subject matter. Merely by using s i m i l a r 
words and phrases, researchers o f t e n appear t o u n i t e the various aspects 
of geography w h i l s t a l l the time g l o s s i n g over important d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
The r e l a t i o n s h i p between explanation and d e s c r i p t i o n i s a d i f f i c u l t 
one t o o u t l i n e , f o r many remarks which appear t o be wholly d e s c r i p t i v e 
nevertheless t u r n out t o be explanatory when the context i n which they 
are used i s known. This i s perhaps the key t o the d i s t i n c t i o n . I t 
i s the context which i d e n t i f i e s an e x p l a n a t i o n , whereas we do not need 
t o know the context i n order t o i d e n t i f y a d e s c r i p t i v e phrase. An 
explanation i s an answer t o a question, and the question i t s e l f w i l l 
a r i s e from a problem. I n order t o produce an e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , 
we must have a genuine problem which r e q u i r e s an answer. I f we have 
no problem ( i f questions o f the form "Why d i d X come about?" are 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e ) i t may be t h a t nevertheless the phenomenon warrants 
d e s c r i p t i o n . Further, t o gather such d e s c r i p t i o n s may help t o solve 
a problem, may i n other words form p a r t o f an e x p l a n a t i o n , at a l a t e r 
date. 
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Process i n p h y s i c a l geography: 
F i r s t , l e t us t u r n t o the heart o f p h y s i c a l geography and examine 
the use o f notions o f 'process' t h e r e , f o r i t i s i n t h i s area t h a t the 
most s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d use o f the term can be found. A prominent 'process' 
i n geomorphology, f o r example, i s t h a t o f weathering which, we are t o l d , 
includes such t h i n g s as expansion on unloading, thermal expansion, c r y s t a l 
growth, c o l l o i d p l u c k i n g and organic process. There are also chemical 
'processes' o f weathering. I n s o i l science, s o i l genesis has been 
o u t l i n e d as "an aggregate o f many i n d i v i d u a l p h y s i c a l , chemical and 
b i o l o g i c a l processes, a l l p o t e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t o r s t o the development o f 
every s o i l , t h e i r r ates d i f f e r i n g i n d i f f e r e n t environments." 2 1 But 
what makes a l l these processes? Take thermal expansion. The 
a d j e c t i v e thermal gives us a clue as t o the cause o f the expansion, any 
expansion which i s due t o the a p p l i c a t i o n o f heat comes under t h i s 
d e s c r i p t i o n . What a c t u a l l y happens i n each case ( i e . the source o f the 
heat and the subsequent r e s u l t s o f the expansion) may be expected t o vary 
considerably. The d e s c r i p t i o n 'thermal expansion' merely p i n p o i n t s the 
common element; i e . the presence o f a heat source. What does the word 
'process' add t o t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n ? Immediately, one t h i n k s o f 
'process' as imp l y i n g change over time but i n our example such a n o t i o n 
i s already contained i n the word 'expansion'. I f t h i s i s a l l t h a t 
'process' was intended t o convey then s u r e l y i t i s rendered redundant, 
f o r can we not appreciate the dynamic aspect o f weathering from the term 
'expansion' alone? I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o avoid t h i s conclusion. We could 
argue t h a t the word 'process' i s not e n t i r e l y superfluous since i t s 
f u n c t i o n i s one o f emphasis. I t reminds us o f , or u n d e r l i n e s , the nature 
o f the phenomenon i n question ( i n t h i s case, thermal expansion) as a 
l i n k e d s e r i e s o f events which may proceed a t d i f f e r e n t r a t e s i n d i f f e r e n t 
2 1 B. T. Bunting (1965) p.88 
cases. At the same ti m e , however, we would have t o admit t h a t the 
term process i s p l a y i n g a secondary r o l e i n the general d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
the weathering. I t must, t h e r e f o r e , be unwise t o l a y too much st o r e 
i n the language o f process alone and consequently i n the form/process 
framework as a basis f o r u n i t y even w i t h i n p h y s i c a l geography i t s e l f . 
How do p h y s i c a l geographers c h a r a c t e r i s e the form/process 
r e l a t i o n s h i p 9 I t s importance as an i n f l u e n c e on the conduct o f 
cu r r e n t research i s undeniable and i t i s because o f t h i s t h a t some 
f u r t h e r examination o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s necessary here. Take t h i s 
s h o r t passage from a text-book on drainage basin geomorphology i n which 
the authors discuss both process and form: 
Perhaps the greatest d i f f i c u l t y c o n f r o n t i n g the 
geomorphological study o f the drainage basin i s 
the discrepancy between process and form. The 
form o f the drainage basin i s the product o f the 
processes which have operated i n the past on 
m a t e r i a l l o c a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o produce a p a r t i c u l a r 
drainage basin form but these land-forming processes 
may not be the same i n r e l a t i v e importance o r , indeed, 
i n k i n d as the ones which operate i n the drainage 
basin at the present t i m e . 2 
Here we have the operation o f c e r t a i n processes l e a d i n g t o a c e r t a i n 
drainage basin form. Of course the s i t u a t i o n i s never s t a t i c , 
geomorphological 'processes' are always present and the p h y s i c a l landscape 
i s c o n s t a n t l y changing a l b e i t , i n many cases, i m p e r c e p t i b l y . Two basic 
f a c t o r s i n the formation o f a drainage basin are r u n - o f f and eros i o n ; the 
l a t t e r can be broken down i n t o the various types o f erosion depending upon 
the p a r t i c u l a r agent involved (eg. g l a c i a l e r o s i o n , where the main 
abrasive element i s the i c e s h e e t ) . These erosive processes w i l l r e s u l t 
i n d i f f e r i n g drainage basin shapes depending upon the type o f rock, the 
c l i m a t e , e t c . To f o l l o w Gregory and W a l l i n g , the form or shape o f the 
K. J. Gregory and D. E. Wal l i n g (1973) p.7 
basin (eg. a basin w i t h an elongated network having one main t r u n k 
and numerous sh o r t t r i b u t a r i e s j o i n i n g the trunk d i r e c t l y ) may have 
o r i g i n a l l y been the r e s u l t o f i c e a c t i o n whereas, c l e a r l y , the o r i g i n a l 
erosive f o r c e w i l l no longer be a c t i v e i n moulding the stream p a t t e r n 
at the present time. This i s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d enough. We can see 
t h a t the g l a c i a l a c t i o n , i n the above example, d i d i n some sense 
r e s u l t i n the elongated form o f the drainage basin. But are the 
'process' and the 'form' q u i t e as d i s t i n c t as the authors suppose? 
They claim t h a t geographers have been faced w i t h a dilemma - t o study 
process o r t o study form? - and f u r t h e r conclude t h a t , 
...some o f the most rewarding research w i l l a r i s e 
from the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f landform-process 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s because these provide r e s u l t s f o r 
understanding the pa s t , f o r e s t i m a t i n g the f u t u r e 
and f o r a p p l i c a t i o n t o other f i e l d s o f geography. 2 3 
I t i s the r e l a t i o n s h i p between form and process which they consider 
important and we can assume t h a t they would t h e r e f o r e claim t h a t the 
'dilemma' i s no dilemma a t a l l . Geographers do not need t o choose 
between form and process f o r they should study both. With t h i s we can 
agree, e s p e c i a l l y since i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o see how 'processes' such as 
erosion could be st u d i e d w i t h o u t reference t o any landform. Likewise 
i t would be a very barren study indeed which merely observed t h a t a 
drainage basin was elongated w i t h o u t considering i t s e v o l u t i o n . 
I n research 'form' and 'process' must go hand i n hand. What we must now 
ask i s "Why i s t h i s so?" I s i t a p r a c t i c a l m atter, t h i s being the best 
way t o advance our research e f f o r t s ? Or i s i t a matter o f n e c e s s i t y , 
w i t h the notions o f 'form' and 'process' being so interwoven t h a t one 
cannot be looked a t w i t h o u t the other? 
I n p h y s i c a l geography the term 'process', because o f the frequency 
2 3 I b i d , p.9 
o f i t s use and the g e n e r a l i t y o f i t s r e f e r e n c e , i s l a r g e l y devoid o f 
d i s t i n c t i v e meaning and depends e n t i r e l y upon the s p e c i f i c context 
i n which i t i s used. Therefore, any methodological discussion o f 
the form/process r e l a t i o n s h i p must be rooted i n p a r t i c u l a r examples. 
What has emerged so f a r i s the suspicion t h a t 'process' and 'form' 
cannot be divorced one from another i n q u i t e the way t h a t Gregory's 
statement o f t h e geographer's dilemma might lead us t o b e l i e v e . Use 
o f phrases such as 'the product o f could e a s i l y prompt the u n c r i t i c a l 
expectation o f a causal connection between the two. To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s 
p o i n t , l e t us take a f i n a l concrete example from p h y s i c a l geography; 
namely, the 'process' o f sedimentation. Sedimentation, l i k e e r o s i o n , 
i s one o f the elementary notions which might be used i n any discussion 
of r i v e r development. To r a i s e such a n o t i o n t o the status o f a process 
would add not h i n g t o an account of how the r i v e r has changed over time. 
The danger o f doing so, however, can c l e a r l y be seen i f one assumes any 
standard causal process/form r e l a t i o n s h i p . That i s i f one attempts, 
f o r example, t o e x p l a i n stream b r a i d i n g by reference t o the process o f 
sedimentation. The causal statement would be, sedimentation causes 
stream b r a i d i n g . But t h i s does not stand up t o s c r u t i n y , f o r what i s 
sedimentation but the t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and d e p o s i t i o n o f c e r t a i n m a t e r i a l s . 
Reference t o stream b r a i d i n g adds t o the account simply by i n d i c a t i n g the 
general p a t t e r n o f d e p o s i t i o n . I f one r e a l l y wanted t o e x p l a i n stream 
b r a i d i n g ( i e . the b u i l d i n g up o f c e r t a i n deposits i n small i s l a n d s 
w i t h i n the r i v e r c ourse), t h i s would r e q u i r e reference t o such f a c t o r s 
as the shape o f the r i v e r course and the d i f f e r e n t water currents i n v o l v e d . 
The 'process' o f sedimentation, then, doesn't l i e behind stream b r a i d i n g . 
Rather, a braided r i v e r course provides us w i t h one example o f the 
phenomenon o f sedimentation. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between form and process 
here i s not a causal one. 
190. 
I m p l i c a t i o n s f o r human geography: 
There are t h r e e conclusions o f t h i s discussion which may be o f 
importance t o human geography. F i r s t , even i n the examples from 
p h y s i c a l geography examined above, the l i n k between process and form 
i s not a causal one. I n other words, we could not ex p l a i n the form 
by regarding i t as the r e s u l t o f some un d e r l y i n g process. This gives 
us good reason not t o expect a causal form/process r e l a t i o n s h i p i n 
human geography. I t does not , however, r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
there being one. Secondly, one should not put too much emphasis on 
t a l k o f process, since such t a l k seems t o add l i t t l e t o the terms i t 
f r e q u e n t l y precedes. And l a s t l y , and most i m p o r t a n t l y , one should not 
expect a standard r e l a t i o n s h i p between form and process, as the meaning 
o f the l a t t e r depends upon the context i n which i t us used. The 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between form and process depends e n t i r e l y upon which 
process one i s t a l k i n g about. 
Process i n urban geography: 
Unlike the l i t e r a t u r e o f geomorphology which contains numerous 
references t o many w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d p h y s i c a l and chemical processes, 
the l i t e r a t u r e o f urban geography gives l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n o f which 
processes we might be able t o i d e n t i f y w i t h i n the c i t y . Indeed i n 
human geography i n general, references t o 'process' tend t o be vague 
r a t h e r than concrete. And a recent p u b l i c a t i o n b o l d l y e n t i t l e d 
Processes i n Physical and Human Geography 2does nothing t o reverse 
t h i s tendency. Few c o n t r i b u t o r s on the human side make d i r e c t mention 
o f any 'process' and w i t h no e d i t o r i a l comment on the matter one i s 
for c e d t o conclude t h a t , despite the t i t l e , t h e r e i s no p e c u l i a r or 
common concern which might be c a l l e d 'process'. Such a general use o f 
the term robs i t o f any meaning and gives no help a t a l l t o those who 
wish t o discover what a 'process' i n human geography might be. 
2 h R.Peel, M.Chisholm and P. Haeeett (1975) 
So what i s t o count as a 'process' i n urban geography? I f 
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f urban form n e c e s s a r i l y involves the discovery 
o f the processes i n some way connected w i t h t h i s form, then, before 
the i n v e s t i g a t i o n can proceed, we must f i r s t know what i t i s we are 
l o o k i n g f o r . The i n d i v i d u a l c i t y i s a human c r e a t i o n and as such i s 
a f e a t u r e of a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y . Thus the processes which might 
e x p l a i n i t s form w i l l be s o c i a l processes, r a t h e r t han, say, p h y s i c a l 
processes. But can we be any more e x p l i c i t ? Can we name a s o c i a l 
process? This i s s u r p r i s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t , but one candidate which 
does appear f r e q u e n t l y i n the urban l i t e r a t u r e i s the process o f 
u r b a n i s a t i o n i t s e l f . E p s tein, i n an a r t i c l e on s o c i a l change i n 
A f r i c a , r e f e r s t o u r b a n i s a t i o n as a "process o f movement and change". 2 5 
I t s essence, we are t o l d , i s t h a t i t creates the p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
d i s c o n t i n u i t y w i t h some p r e - e x i s t i n g set o f c o n d i t i o n s . Again the 
g e n e r a l i t y o f such comments considerably l i m i t s t h e i r usefulness i n 
the present context. Urbanisation does i n v o l v e change, namely t h a t 
from a non-urban t o an urban s o c i e t y . As Marcus and Detwyler have i t , 
"Urbanisation i s the process o f c i t y establishment and g r o w t h . " 2 6 But 
t h i s ~ i s ~ t 6 do l i t t l e more than t o s t a t e the obvious. The i n t e r e s t i n g 
questions concern the k i n d o f changes in v o l v e d i n the growth o f a c i t y 
based s o c i e t y . I s t h e r e , f o r example, anything d i s t i n c t i v e about an 
urban way of l i f e ? Questions o f t h i s k i n d have f a s c i n a t e d several 
w r i t e r s 2 7 and, since they i n v o l v e p e c u l i a r l y i n t a n g i b l e n o t i o n s , a 
considerable s u b t l e t y and imagination i s r e q u i r e d i f they are t o be 
answered s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . The recent p o p u l a r i t y o f d e f i n i n g one's terms 
2 5 see A. L. Epstein (1967) 
2 6 T. R. Detwyler and M. G. Marcus (1972) p.6 
2 7 Notably L. W i r t h (1938) 
at the outset has d i v e r t e d a t t e n t i o n away from such concerns, however, 
because o f the inappropriateness, and indeed the i m p o s s i b i l i t y , o f 
d e f i n i t i o n a l p r e c i s i o n i n discussions o f , f o r example, a way o f l i f e . 
W h i l s t i t i s o f paramount importance t o be p e r f e c t l y c l e a r about what 
one wishes t o i n v e s t i g a t e , t h i s c l a r i t y r a r e l y involves the necessity 
of s t i p u l a t i n g precise s p a t i a l boundaries, or precise q u a n t i t a t i v e 
d e f i n i t i o n s . There i s some t r u t h i n Miner's claim t h a t , "Everyone 
knows what a c i t y i s except the e x p e r t " . 2 8 
Urbanisation, then, involves change: change i n the whole 
o r g a n i s a t i o n o f s o c i e t y . I f we are t o study the urban form o f Edinburgh, 
however, we must know the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the general changes and 
the i n d i v i d u a l case. Lampard comments, 
I n d i v i d u a l c i t i e s f o r example can be t r e a t e d as 
p a r t i c u l a r accommodations t o a many-sided s o c i e t a l 
process: u r b a n i s a t i o n . I n t e r e s t lies i n so r e f o r m u l a t i n g 
the g e n e r a l i t i e s o f u r b a n i s a t i o n t h a t they can serve as 
p r i n c i p l e s f o r o r g a n i s i n g and e v a l u a t i n g the range of 
m a t e r i a l s found i n d i v e r s e , but r a r e l y unique experiences 
o f p a r t i c u l a r t o w n s . 2 9 
What would these g e n e r a l i t i e s o f u r b a n i s a t i o n , as a s o c i a l process, be? 
The most p l a u s i b l e answer t o t h i s question i s provided by t h a t group of 
geographers commonly r e f e r r e d t o as Marxist. I n p a r t i c u l a r , Harvey 
has addressed hims e l f d i r e c t l y t o urban geography and t o the e l a b o r a t i o n 
o f a Marxist c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the "theory o f r e s i d e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n " . 
He w r i t e s , 
R e s i d e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s produced, i n i t s 
broadest lineaments a t l e a s t by forces emanating 
from the c a p i t a l i s t production process and i t i s 
not t o be construed as the product o f autonomously 
and spontaneously a r i s i n g preferences o f p e o p l e . 3 1 
28 H. Miner (1967) p.3 
E. E. Lampard (1963) p.233 
D. Harvey i n R.Peel e t a l . (1975) pp.355-369 




According t o Harvey, then, we have t o examine c a p i t a l i s t production 
i f we are t o understand r e s i d e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , although he 
s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t r e s i d e n t i a l groupings are not class groups 
and serve t o fragment r a t h e r than strengthen 'class consciousness'. 
So the forces which r e s u l t i n neighbourhoods or communities are not 
s t r i c t l y Marxian, f o r they are an extension o f , or a d d i t i o n t o , Marx's 
o r i g i n a l ideas o f how s o c i e t y i s d i v i d e d . And Harvey him s e l f leaves us 
w i t h l i t t l e idea o f the exact nature o f these f o r c e s . He does suppose 
them t o be i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the process o f u r b a n i s a t i o n , f o r 
both are s a i d t o r e s u l t from the c a p i t a l i s t system. "The accumulation 
o f c a p i t a l on a p r o g r e s s i v e l y i n c r e a s i n g s c a l e " , Harvey declares, "has 
set i n motion a d i s t i n c t i v e and r a p i d l y a c c e l e r a t i n g u r b a n i z a t i o n process." 
So the g e n e r a l i t i e s o f u r b a n i s a t i o n , according t o the Marxist geographers, 
are connected e n t i r e l y w i t h the operation o f the c a p i t a l i s t system from 
which both c i t y development and growth and the r e s i d e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
o f the urban area r e s u l t . 
We cannot embark upon a c r i t i q u e o f Marxism here, but two features 
o f Harvey's a n a l y s i s are worth discussing f u r t h e r , not only because they 
are t y p i c a l o f a l l Marxist approaches but also because "the fundamental 
ideas are present i n many non-Marxist w r i t i n g s . The f i r s t o f these 
concerns the process o f u r b a n i s a t i o n i t s e l f . Harvey r e f e r s t o t h i s as 
a^  d i s t i n c t i v e process. The fundamental idea here i s t h a t there i s one 
i d e n t i f i a b l e and continuous process and various co u n t r i e s or s o c i e t i e s 
3 2 I b i d . , p.362 
w i l l be at d i f f e r e n t stages on the same p r o g r e s s i o n . 3 6 I f t h i s i s a 
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e m p i r i c a l claim then i t i s simply f a l s e . The c i t i e s 
o f the world cannot be seen t o stand i n t h i s s o r t o f r e l a t i o n one t o 
another. Indeed i t makes l i t t l e sense t o ask i f Sydney i s i n f r o n t 
o f o r behind Edinburgh on some urban continuum. Only on a very general 
l e v e l i s i t even p l a u s i b l e t o suggest t h a t one country might be ahead o f 
another. And the suggestion would be based upon, f o r example, a general 
s t a t i s t i c about the percentage o f the popu l a t i o n l i v i n g i n urban areas. 
But we could not f i n d e m p i r i c a l support f o r the claim t h a t i f one country 
i s more urbanised than another ( i e . has a higher percentage o f i t s 
population l i v i n g i n urban areas) they are both nevertheless subject t o 
the same progression, t o a d i s t i n c t i v e process. One only has t o look 
at the d i f f e r e n t ways i n which c i t i e s throughout the world have developed 
t o appreciate t h i s p o i n t . 
Marx thought i n the same way about the development of c a p i t a l i s m 
i t s e l f , w i t h d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s a t d i f f e r e n t stages along the 
f e u d a l i s m - c a p i t a l i s m - s o c i a l i s m continuum. The supposed h i s t o r i c a l 
i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h e progression i s also a legacy from Marx. More 
r e c e n t l y the economist Rostow suggested a standard model o f economic 
development w i t h various stages" through" which a l l economies would 
pass before they became 'developed'. Again t h i s was conceived o f 
as a continuum on which i n d i v i d u a l u n i t s would be at d i f f e r e n t stages 
at any one time. The weight o f e m p i r i c a l evidence i s against Rostow, 
however, and his model enjoys l i t t l e currency today. 
I t i s worth n o t i n g f u r t h e r t h a t t h ere may be a more fundamental 
d i f f i c u l t y i n such analyses which would a l l o w us t o discount them 
wi t h o u t e m p i r i c a l backing. We cannot explore t h i s p o i n t i n the present 
context, but s u f f i c e i t t o mention t h a t the notions o f time employed by 
Marx, Rostow and a l l those who envisage a s o c i a l continuum, do seem t o 
be incoherent. Our e a r l i e r discussion o f two human actions being 
d i f f e r e n t because the time a t which they took place was i t s e l f d i f f e r e n t , 
i s p e r t i n e n t here. And the incoherence i n the work o f Marx, Rostow, 
et c . , l i e s p r e c i s e l y i n the claim t h a t two s o c i a l s t a t e s o f a f f a i r are 
the same even though they occur a t d i f f e r e n t times. 
That there are urban features which are common t o many c i t i e s , 
or even most c i t i e s , i s not being denied. What i s being suggested i s 
t h a t c i t i e s are not subject t o some one basic process which i s the same 
i n every case. The t r o u b l e w i t h supposing t h a t they are i s t h a t t h i s 
basic process cannot be seen i n operation. This i s the second p o i n t 
on which we can take the Marxists t o task. For since the outcome o f 
'urbanisation' i s c i t i e s i n general, whatever t h e i r form, then there 
could be no case o f a c i t y i n which the 'process' was not op e r a t i v e . 
Because o f t h i s , the t h e s i s t h a t u r b a n i s a t i o n i s a d i s t i n c t i v e process 
i s completely unsubstantiatable f o r there i s not h i n g which would count 
against i t . This^merely a p a r t i c u l a r example o f the problems, 
p r e v i o u s l y discussed, involved i n any t a l k o f basic or un d e r l y i n g f o r c e s . 
I f we examine the n o t i o n o f 'u r b a n i s a t i o n ' f u r t h e r , the g e n e r a l i t y 
i t appears t o embrace w i l l be seen t o be s u p e r f i c i a l . F i r s t consider 
the p h y s i c a l process o f weathering. The ' g e n e r a l i t i e s ' o f weathering 
a r i s e only because xhis i s a term r e f e r r i n g i n a general way t o the 
wearing down o f m a t e r i a l i n the p h y s i c a l environment. There are no 
hidden g e n e r a l i t i e s l u r k i n g i n the background. I f one wants t o know 
more about a p a r t i c u l a r example o f weathering then i t i s appropriate t o 
ask what s o r t o f weathering i t i s . Here the answer might be i n terms 
o f a general category (such as p h y s i c a l or chemical weathering), or might 
r e f e r t o the specific agent involved (such as thermal expansion, i c e 
a c t i o n e t c . ) . The p o i n t about ' u r b a n i s a t i o n ' i s t h a t i t i s a reference 
term very l i k e weathering where the only g e n e r a l i t y i s the obvious one. 
I t r e f e r s i n a general way t o the development and growth o f c i t i e s . 
Unlike the case o f weathering, however, i t would not be appropriate t o 
ask what s o r t o f u r b a n i s a t i o n we are d e a l i n g w i t h . I n human or s o c i a l 
a f f a i r s we cannot n e a t l y categorise 'agents' o f change as we can i n 
see Chapter 4, Explanation of the p r i n c i p l e . 
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p h y s i c a l science. The p h y s i c a l and chemical r e a c t i o n s i n v o l v e d i n 
the weathering o f the landscape are w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d i n science and 
can be subject t o c o n t r o l l e d t e s t s and l a b o r a t o r y experiments. This 
would not be so f o r any f a c t o r which might be suggested as an agent o f 
u r b a n i s a t i o n . The d i f f e r e n c e i s a fundamental one, w i t h weathering 
belonging t o the p h y s i c a l world and u r b a n i s a t i o n t o the s o c i a l world. 
The u n i v e r s a l element i n the former i s , o f nec e s s i t y , absent i n the 
l a t t e r . Urbanised s o c i e t i e s are not produced by processes or forces 
o f a u n i v e r s a l nature and independent i d e n t i t y . 
S o c i a l area a n a l y s i s : 
Despite the s u p e r f i c i a l i t y o f any reference t o u r b a n i s a t i o n as a 
s o c i a l process, some v a l i d g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s can be made about the changes 
involved i n the development and growth o f c i t i e s . I n t h i s context the 
work o f Shevky and B e l l i s o f considerable importance f o r i t involves the 
attempt t o argue dedu c t i v e l y from basic p o s t u l a t e s concerning the e f f e c t s 
o f the in c r e a s i n g scale o f i n d u s t r i a l (and hence urbanised) s o c i e t y . I n 
t h e i r c l a s s i c book on s o c i a l area analysis they set out t o devise a 
c l a s s i f i c a t o r y scheme designed t o categorise census t r a c t populations 
i n terms o f three basic constructs - s o c i a l rank, u r b a n i s a t i o n and segregation. 
Their fundamental question concerns the s o r t o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g f a c t o r s one 
might f i n d i n modern s o c i e t y which would allow the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f 
d i s t i n c t i v e s o c i a l groups. Their study i s centred i n Los Angeles but 
they b e l i e v e t h a t the s o c i a l aspects o f the c i t y cannot be studied i n 
i s o l a t i o n : 
We conceive o f the c i t y as a product o f the complex 
whole o f modern s o c i e t y ; thus the s o c i a l forms o f urban 
l i f e are t o be understood w i t h i n the context o f the 
changing character o f the l a r g e r c o n t a i n i n g s o c i e t y . 3 5 
3 5 E. Shevky and W. B e l l , o p . c i t . , p.3 
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T h e i r a n a l y s i s proceeds from the f a c t o f the increase i n scale i n 
i n d u s t r i a l s o c i e t y which, they argue, i s accompanied by the d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n 
o f f u n c t i o n i n v o l v i n g both changes i n the s t r u c t u r e o f productive a c t i v i t y 
and changes i n the way o f l i v i n g . This Shevky and B e l l c a l l 
' u r b a n i s a t i o n ' , "a s o c i a l process which has impact on s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n 
p a t t e r n s . " 3 6 I n other words, these w r i t e r s attempted t o o u t l i n e the 
general changes which accompanied the t r a n s i t i o n t o an urban s o c i e t y . 
I n t h e i r book S o c i a l Area A n a l y s i s , however, Shevky and B e l l give 
more space t o the d e r i v a t i o n o f axes o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n from the 
in f o r m a t i o n o f the census than they do t o the e l u c i d a t i o n o f the connection 
between t h e i n c r e a s i n g scale o f s o c i e t y and changes i n ways o f l i f e . And 
many w r i t e r s have c r i t i c i s e d the s o c i a l area analysts p r e c i s e l y because 
they leave t h i s l a t t e r connection unexplained. Udry, f o r example, has 
suggested t h a t Shevky and B e l l do not present a s i n g l e theory r e l a t i n g 
s o c i a l process t o r e s i d e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , but two d i s t i n c t and 
separate t h e o r i e s Cthe f i r s t concerned w i t h i n c r e a s i n g scale and the 
second w i t h sub-area d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ) connected by the s i n g l e p r o p o s i t i o n 
t h a t 'as s o c i e t y increases i n sc a l e , so i t s sub-areas are f u n c t i o n a l l y 
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ' . 3 6 This i s not what Shevky intended. The an a l y s i s was 
conceived, i t seems, as a s i n g l e piece of work w i t h each step f o l l o w i n g 
d e d u c t i v e l y from the one before. The i n c r e a s i n g scale o f s o c i e t y alone 
l e d t o the expectation o f p a r t i c u l a r types o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n and the 
connection was thought t o be a necessary one. C e r t a i n l y some consequences 
o f increased scale can be deduced i n t h i s way. For example, u n l i k e those 
i n a v i l l a g e , t h e m a j o r i t y o f t r a n s a c t i o n s i n an urban centre w i l l be of an 
impersonal nature. I t i s only on t h i s very general l e v e l , however, t h a t 
consequences can be s a i d t o f o l l o w n e c e s s a r i l y and Shevky and B e l l were 
simply mistaken i n supposing t h a t t h e i r e n t i r e a nalysis was a deductive 
3 6 see J. R. Udry (1964) pp.4-08-9 
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c o n s t r u c t i o n from the one basic f a c t o f increased scale. I n order 
t o proceed beyond the e n t i r e l y obvious (eg. t h a t i n a l a r g e group o f 
people not everyone w i l l know everyone els e ) we would need t o consider 
the e f f e c t o f increased scale on a p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t y or c u l t u r a l group. 
The type o f economy would be important as w e l l as considerations o f the 
s o c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the exchange o f goods and the owning o f p r o p e r t y . 3 
I t i s knowledge o f such f a c t o r s which would lead t o the expectation o f 
p a r t i c u l a r forms o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . I f Shevky and B e l l were convinced 
o f the t o t a l g e n e r a l i t y o f t h e i r work they must stand c o r r e c t e d , f o r 
c l e a r l y t h e i r knowledge o f t w e n t i e t h century American s o c i e t y i n f l u e n c e d 
t h e i r conclusions and r e s t r i c t e d t h e i r r e s u l t s . I t i s h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g 
t h a t Abu-Lughod found t h e i r axes o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i n a p p r o p r i a t e when 
app l i e d t o Cairo, E g y p t . 3 8 I f , on the other hand, the s o c i a l area 
analysts were concerned t o demonstrate a method, a way o f approaching 
s o c i a l area d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , then the c r i t i c i s m of c u l t u r a l and temporal 
i n t r a n s i t i v i t y i s a minor one. Whatever the i n t e n t i o n , i t i s the 
approach which a f f o r d s greatest i n t e r e s t here, although i t i s p r e c i s e l y 
concerning the approach t h a t c r i t i c i s m s o f vagueness are most t e l l i n g . 
SHevky's book reveals a preoccupation w i t h the s t a t i s t i c s o f the census 
and the p r a c t i c a l problem o f making use o f the r e s t r i c t e d data a v a i l a b l e . 
The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f economic t r a n s a c t i o n s and a t t i t u d e s towards 
the ownership o f c e r t a i n goods can vary between c u l t u r a l groups and, 
indeed, can change over time. I n one South Sea i s l a n d community, 
f o r example, the e n t i r e s o c i a l o r g a n i s a t i o n revolves around the 
exchange o f a l i m i t e d number o f c o r a l necklaces each w i t h i t s 
associated s o c i a l s t a t u s . I n c o n t r a s t , the treasured possessions 
most f r e q u e n t l y associated w i t h s o c i a l standing i n B r i t a i n today are 
one's house and one's car. 
J. L. Abu-Lughod (1969) 
We have seen that by t h e i r very nature social groups cannot be defined 
by census data and that social areas do not have boundaries which can 
be marked on a map. The preoccupation was therefore misplaced, and 
the contribution of Shevky and B e l l to the understanding of social 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n within the c i t y l i e s i n the novelty of t h e i r approach 
rather than i n the mapped patterns which appear as the end-product of 
Social Area Analysis. 
When considering the work of both Shevky and B e l l we are again 
confronted with researchers whose conception of an ultimate goal i s 
dependent upon a s c i e n t i f i c model of theory and the expansion of 
knowledge. They suppose t h e i r work to be, at the very l e a s t , a large 
step towards the development of a universal account of the way i n which 
social areas are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d through time, of the way i n which societies 
change with the expansion of t h e i r population. But our discussions so f a r 
have led us to the conclusion that there can be no universal account of 
any social development. Whar Shevky and B e l l do i s provide an account of 
the effects of increased scale on American society, although they 
themselves only give momentary recognition to the necessary p a r t i c u l a r i t y 
of "the~ir researches. In the elaboration of the f i r s t major trend 
Cchanging d i s t r i b u t i o n of s k i l l s ) i d e n t i f i e d as a corollary of increasing 
scale they state, 
The manner i n which the workforce i s d i s t r i b u t e d 
among the larger groupings of occupations, the 
proportion they bear to one another, i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
related to the economic organization, the l e v e l of 
l i v i n g of the society, and the class system of that 
s o c i e t y . 3 9 
And t h i s i s an admission that i n order to say anything about the way i n 
which the d i s t r i b u t i o n of s k i l l s w i l l change, one f i r s t needs to know 
a considerable amount about the society one wishes to examine. 
Generalisations about society are ra r e l y informative. Substantial 
observations can only be made when investigating p a r t i c u l a r societies 
E. Shevky and W. B e l l , o p . c i t . , p.10 
or social groups. I t i s the p a r t i c u l a r which lends substance to 
social research. And any research which considers p a r t i c u l a r 
t r a d i t i o n s or social groups i s inevitably more akin t o history than 
science. 
The discussions of Part 1 allowed us to appreciate the fundamental 
differences between physical geography and human geography, between 
science and the study of human a f f a i r s . Many geographers would 
nevertheless wish to claim that geography i s a single subject with i t s 
two halves united by common interests and an a l y t i c a l techniques. In 
Chapter 5 we have examined one general framework which i s frequently 
advanced as being appropriate t o a l l geographical research. In both 
human and physical geography researchers conceive of t h e i r task as the 
explanation of, or accounting f o r , the pattern or form evident i n the 
landscape. And t h i s i s to be done by discovering the processes which 
l i e behind the pattern. The process/form perspective, however, can do 
nothing t o unite the two halves of geography which belong to d i f f e r e n t 
i n t e l l e c t u a l disciplines and require d i f f e r e n t modes of understanding. 
The generality of the perspective i s s u p e r f i c i a l . Even the relationship 
between form and process i s not a constant one and depends upon which 
form and which process i s being examined. 
Within urban geography i t s e l f the process/form framework presents 
several d i f f i c u l t i e s . The greatest of these i s answering the apparently 
simple question, "What i s a social process?". Again the search f o r 
generality predominates i n the l i t e r a t u r e and urban processes are taken 
to be processes operating i n a l l urban areas. Urbanisation, or the 
urban process 1* 0, has been construed as a progression with various stages 
through which a l l urbanising countries w i l l pass. But either the stages, 
L. Reissman (1964) 
when specified, are so general that they t e l l us nothing that we did 
not know already, or they are pa r t i c u l a r and refer only to one country 
or society. This i s necessarily the case i n any social study where 
generality could never be uni v e r s a l i t y . Urbanisation i s not, and 
could not be, a process of universal application. 
Whilst, thai, i t i s both desirable and necessary to dispense with 
a l l s c i e n t i f i c notions of generality i n urban geography (a sphere of 
interest undoubtedly on the human side of the geographical schism), to 
recognise t h i s i s not to suggest that c i t i e s have no features i n common. 
Nor i s i t t o deny that these common features may both be of interest and 
t e l l us something about the way i n which other settlements can be expected 
to develop. I t i s the way i n which we search for t h i s generality which 
i s important, however, and what i s to be made of i t . Briggs i n his 
book on Victorian Cities 1* 1 does not use, nor need, a general framework 
of any kind to bring out the s i m i l a r i t i e s between the great c i t i e s of 
the Victorian era or to convey the atriiObphei'e of energy and c i v i c purpose 
i n which they were created. He neither concentrates on such common 
elements, nor does he overlook them. And perhaps the urban geographer 
can learn from the success of Briggs' enterprise. Urban geography has 
tended to concentrate exclusively on the features which c i t i e s have i n 
common i n an attempt to achieve generality, and general research frameworks 
have been evoked to aid the attempt. But the attempt i t s e l f i s misplaced 
and i s based upon a mistaken notion of what urban geography i s . I f we 
are to engage i n substantive urban research we cannot disregard the 
uniqueness, the d e t a i l , of individual c i t i e s . Understanding i n t h i s 
sphere can only be of the p a r t i c u l a r . The future of urban geography, 
then, l i e s with history rather than science. 
A. Briggs (1968) 
CHAPTER 6 
URBAN GEOGRAPHY, QUANTIFICATION 
AND PREDICTION 
I t i s appropriate at t h i s juncture to wonder whether the 
quantitative revolution - at least i n urban and human geography -
has a l l been i n vain. I f we are not involved i n a s c i e n t i f i c study, 
what use are the s t a t i s t i c a l techniques presently dominating many 
geographical research programmes9 Does the collect i o n of s t a t i s t i c a l 
data not suggest a search for generality which may i t s e l f be misplaced 9 
In order to appreciate f u l l y the consequences of the methodological 
conclusions so far presented i n t h i s thesis, these are questions which 
must be answered. 
S t a t i s t i c a l or quantitative techniques are not synonymous with 
s c i e n t i f i c method although they are not infrequently taken to be so. 
Burton, i n his a r t i c l e on the quantitative revolution, closely relates 
the two when he remarks that the revolution "was inspired by a genuine 
need to make geography more s c i e n t i f i c . " 1 That Burton i s wrong i s 
apparent, f o r human geography could not be made 'more s c i e n t i f i c ' . 
I . Burton (1963) p.156 
I t i s also the case, however, that quantitative techniques may be 
both appropriate and valuable with i n areas of i n t e l l e c t u a l concern 
other than science. From the discussions of the nature of science 
i n Part 1, i t i s clear that the s c i e n t i s t may or may not use 
s t a t i s t i c a l techniques i n his research. This i s a contingent matter 
and such techniques are not necessary to the a c t i v i t y of science. 
They may help the s c i e n t i s t to formulate laws but they are not a 
necessary part of such formulation. Rejecting a s c i e n t i f i c mode 
of understanding because i t i s inappropriate to human geography does 
not e n t a i l r e j e c t i n g s t a t i s t i c a l method. There would be no l o g i c a l 
inconsistency i n accepting the methodological conclusions of Part 1 
whilst maintaining that quantitative techniques are invaluable to the 
urban researcher. 
The question of the use of quantitative methods i n urban and 
human geography, then, i s quite separate from the question of the 
appropriateness of s c i e n t i f i c method. And i t i s only to the former 
that t h i s chapter i s directed. In t h i s context there i s one substantial 
methodological claim which has not so far been considered i n t h i s thesis. 
Since i t i s both closely related to quant i f i c a t i o n and would, i f 
substantiated, render much of the thesis irrelevant to proper 
geographical research, i t has been taken as a major theme of the chapter. 
This i s the claim that geographical research should not be directed 
towards explaining or understanding at a l l , but only towards predicting. 
The importance of geographical research, on t h i s account, l i e s i n i t s 
a b i l i t y t o predict, with the f u l l weight of geographical expertise being 
put t o use i n providing a pre-view of the future and thus enabling 
corrective measures to be introduced i n p o t e n t i a l disaster areas. 
This view of the purpose of geography i s not uncommon, and the quantitative 
revolution i t s e l f did much to promote i t . 
Prediction and forecasting: 
I f prediction i s the main aim of many s t a t i s t i c a l l y orientated 
geographers then to question the aim we f i r s t need to know what they 
take 'prediction* to be. Again a certain conception of s c i e n t i f i c 
method frequently informs such views. In t h i s case, however, i t i s 
a mistaken view of the nature of science f o r , as Hartshorne points 
out, 
While the success of any branch of science i s 
often measured, i n the popular mind, at least, 
by the r e l i a b i l i t y of i t s predictions, prediction 
i s not the purpose of science. 2 
Prediction i s not at the heart of s c i e n t i f i c method, although one 
consequence of the formulation of any universal statement i s indeed 
that prediction i s simply a matter of predicting. I f we know that 
a l l gases expand when heated then we know that t h i s gas w i l l expand 
when we heat i t sometime i n the future. I t seems that t h i s i s the 
sort of prediction that Bunge has i n mind when he declares, " I f a 
theory cannot predict i t has not discovered a rule of r e a l i t y . " 3 
In science i t i s the unive r s a l i t y of the central propositions of any 
theory which allows prediction. There are no such u n i v e r s a l i t i e s i n 
the world of human a f f a i r s and thus prediction of t h i s kind ( i e . 
s c i e n t i f i c prediction) i s not possible i n urban geography. Further, 
even i n science prediction i s a by-product rather than the central 
concern of the di s c i p l i n e . 
There i s another connection which i s often supposed to hold between 
prediction and s c i e n t i f i c study. In Chapter 3 we examined the nature 
of the empirical t e s t i n science and i t i s i n the v e r i f i c a t i o n of 
s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses that prediction i s thought to play, on occasion, 
2 R. Hartshorne (1960) p.165 
3 W. Bunge (1966) p.2 
an important part. Astronomy i s a good example here. Suppose we 
have a certain astronomical hypothesis which, when the mathematics 
has been worked through, ent a i l s that there must be a planet at a 
par t i c u l a r location i n the heavens. When technological advances 
produce a more powerful telescope which reveals that there i s indeed 
a planet where the hypothesis 'predicted' there would be, t h i s i s 
r i g h t l y taken as some support f o r the hypothesis i t s e l f . Prediction, 
therefore, i s seen as a way of te s t i n g an hypothesis. But t h i s i s 
'prediction' i n a peculiar sense for i t does not involve saying what 
w i l l happen at some l a t e r date. The planet, though unknown, i s i n 
existence throughout the astronomical speculations. I t i s not that 
the s c i e n t i s t predicts that i t w i l l appear at some point i n the future, 
but rather that his knowledge and understanding of other planetary 
movements allow him to state t h a t , i f he i s r i g h t , there must be a 
planet i n a pa r t i c u l a r position i n the heavens here and now, although 
our instruments do not allow us to see i t for ourselves. This i s not 
prediction of some future event but i s , rather, an hypothetical statement 
concerning what is_ there i f only we could see i t . I t i s a deduction 
from a set of hypotheses and not properly a~ prediction ( i e . a statement 
of what w i l l happen i n the f u t u r e ) . 
Prediction i s closely associated with forecasting. Indeed the 
words are sometimes used interchangeably. We can remove one source 
of p o t ential confusion from the present discussion, however, i f we 
take 'prediction' to be s c i e n t i f i c prediction. To predict X, then, i s 
to state categorically that X w i l l happen at some future date. 
Forecasting, i n contrast, i s a more general anticipation of future events. 
The most f a m i l i a r example here i s weather forecasting and the problems 
encountered by those who attempt such forecasts are reflected i n the 
degree to which they are considered r e l i a b l e . There i s no necessary 
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connection between forecasting and science, although forecasting 
may involve the use of s c i e n t i f i c knowledge. Toulmin concludes a 
discussion of forecasting by elaborating t h i s point: 
Forecasting, then, i s a c r a f t or technology, an 
application of science rather than the kernel of 
science i t s e l f . I f a technique of forecasting i s 
successful, that i s one more f a c t , which sci e n t i s t s 
must t r y to explain, and may succeed i n explaining. 
Yet a novel and successful theory may lead to no 
increase i n our forecasting s k i l l , while, a l t e r n a t i v e l y , 
a successful forecasting technique may remain f o r 
centuries without any s c i e n t i f i c basis. In the f i r s t 
case the s c i e n t i f i c theory w i l l not necessarily be any 
worse; and, i n the second, the forecasting technique 
w i l l not necessarily become s c i e n t i f i c , j u s t because 
i t works.^ 
Further, forecasting and prediction d i f f e r i n the respective importance 
of h i s t o r i c a l s p e c i f i c i t y . Where prediction i s based on a universal 
law of science, the importance of the actual time of occurrence to the 
event being predicted i s minimal. What we know i s that whenever the 
gas i s heated i t w i l l expand. The prediction of any set events 
necessarily linked i n a causal chain takes the same form. Whenever 
the f i r s t event occurs then the others w i l l follow. Events which can 
properly be forecasted rather than predicted are not of t h i s kind. 
These events are unique occurrences and the part i c u l a r time ( i e . the 
h i s t o r i c a l moment) at which they take place i s of considerable importance. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n was also outlined i n Chapter 3, i n the discussions of 
notions of time i n science and social science. 
Prediction ( i n the s t r i c t sense i n which i t has been defined) 
i s not a p o s s i b i l i t y for the urban geographer. The events which concern 
him are part of the social world and, i f they can be for e t o l d at a l l , i t 
is only by the use of forecasting techniques. This i s one of the 
greatest promises of the quantitative revolution, f o r s t a t i s t i c a l 
4 S. Toulmin (1961) p.36 
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techniques are said to make r e l i a b l e forecasts a r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y . 
Forecasting and understanding: 
An a b i l i t y to forecast future events and thereby plan f o r them 
would undoubtedly be a major asset to any society. I f we knew what 
our urban problems would be ten years ahead then we could design 
present strategies to cope with them i n the best way possible. In 
t h i s time of serious economic problems and world recession i t i s of 
paramount importance that national resources are used to t h e i r f u l l 
often 
p o t e n t i a l . This i s why forecasting has/been held to be not only an 
important, but the most important aspect of research i n the social 
sciences. I t promises the p o s s i b i l i t y of super-efficient advanced 
planning, a massive saving of resources and an accompanying increase 
i n wealth and s t a b i l i t y . This view of the potential contribution of 
urban geography i s popular. And i t i s easy to see how those who espouse 
i t also come to endorse the claim that forecasting i s the sole aim of 
urban geography. 
What can we make of t h i s claim? Would forecasting be a sensible 
aim for the urban geographer? And could we-improve our present techniques 
i n t h i s f i e l d , sharpen our t o o l s , and thus provide a f i r m base for 
government policy? How successful could the urban geographer ever expect 
to be i n forecasts of future urban developments? The more cautious may 
wonder at t h i s point whether, i n addressing ourselves to these questions, 
we are not attempting the impossible task of l e g i s l a t i n g a p r i o r i on a 
purely empirical issue. After a l l , i s not the test of any forecasting 
technique whether what i s forecast does i n fact happen or not? Success, 
on t h i s account, can only be decided post festum. And i f t h i s i s the 
case we can say nothing about the pot e n t i a l of forecasting techniques 
i n general. We are obliged simply to wait and see i f any pa r t i c u l a r 
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technique does prove successful. Not a l l forecasting techniques 
are of the same kind, however, and whilst f o r some the only possible 
measure of success i s whether or not they work ( i e . what they say w i l l 
happen, does happen), f o r others, 'working' i s certainly not enough. 
I f urban geographical research i s to involve forecasting i n any 
way, t h i s forecasting must be part of an academic d i s c i p l i n e . There 
are many forecasting techniques which enjoy or have enjoyed popularity 
i n d i f f e r e n t parts of the world. Few, however, are academic. 
Quantitative techniques are important precisely because they promise 
academic (or what are sometimes called objective) forecasts. And these 
must be distinguished from forecasting techniques which have no part to 
play i n an academic enterprise. A few examples w i l l c l a r i f y t h i s point. 
In astrology, certain events and dispositions are forecast with reference 
to planetary movements. This i s a developed technique of forecasting and 
has many adherents. Again the prophecies of the witchdoctor" may also 
'come true' and his warnings of impending doom are taken seriously by 
those upon whom he practises his medicine. Yet neither the astrologer 
nor the witchdoctor i s engaged i n academic study. What then marks o f f 
these techniques" from any forecasting technique which i s properly academic? 
In astrology, the only possible test f o r any part i c u l a r forecast i s 
to 'wait and see'. I f events do unfold as forecast then the technique 
i t s e l f i s usually declared successful. For the academic enquirer, however, 
the jump from ' i t happened' to the declaration of success i s one which 
naturally prompts several questions. To become academically respectable 
the jump i t s e l f must have factual support; i e . be demonstrably legitimate. 
After a l l , forecasted events may happen coincidentally and the technique 
used to arrive at the forecast be completely bogus. Astrology does not 
qual i f y as an academic subject precisely because the connections i t 
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supposes i n i t s techniques are undemonstrable. The relationship 
between the position of the planets and the disposition of a certain 
category of person or the occurrence of certain events cannot be 
elucidated. The astrologer merely announces a connection and cannot 
give an account of what the relationship i s . I t i s the a b i l i t y to 
provide such an account which distinguishes the academic from the 
non-academic i n t h i s sphere. 
We can now appreciate the contradiction i n the claim that the 
sole aim of geographical research should be the provision of forecasts 
(or predictions), and that explanation and understanding are either 
unnecessary or come a poor second. In order to guarantee the academic 
nature of forecasting techniques we would have to give a f u l l account 
of the connections upon which the techniques were based. And t h i s 
account would contribute to our understanding of the world. I t i s 
t h i s understanding (and the accompanying a b i l i t y to explain) which 
allows the formulation of the forecasting techniques i n the f i r s t place. 
Academic techniques must be based on our current knowledge of the world. 
Thus we could not have forecasts (or predictions) i n urban geography 
without an accompanying understanding of the social world. Where 
forecasting i s the sole aim ( t o the exclusion of understanding) the 
techniques developed necessarily l i e outside academic inquiry and are 
no d i f f e r e n t i n kind to the c r a f t of the witchdoctor or the astrologer. 
Quantification and understanding: 
Increasing our knowledge and understanding of the world i s what 
academic study i s a l l about. And i f s t a t i s t i c a l forecasting techniques, 
or indeed any s t a t i s t i c a l techniques, are to be legitimately designated 
academic, they must be rooted i n our knowledge and our understanding. 
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This i s a point sometimes forgotten by the more mathematically minded 
geographers. We are not s t a t i s t i c i a n s , and our concern i s therefore 
not with the perfectly legitimate pursuit of examining the s t a t i s t i c a l 
relationships i n numerical data for t h e i r own sake. As urban geographers 
we do want to say something about the world as i t i s , or was, or w i l l be. 
The discovery of s t a t i s t i c a l relationships i s not enough. I t i s i n the 
relationship between the s t a t i s t i c s and an understanding of the world 
that our interest must l i e , and i t i s t h i s that we must now investigate. 
Since s t a t i s t i c a l methods are currently i n vogue i n a l l branches 
of geography i t may seem surprising that they have not been considered 
u n t i l t h i s l a t e stage i n the development of the present discussions. 
As techniques, however, (outside the d i s c i p l i n e of mathematics) they do 
not form a l o g i c a l l y necessary part of any d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e of 
thought. Neither science nor history can claim them as a necessary 
part of research although they may have t h e i r uses i n both. Most of 
the thesis so f a r has been directed towards establishing the non-scientific 
nature of human geography. In t h i s debate the question of the appropriate-
ness or otherwise of quantitative methods i s i r r e l e v a n t . The continuing 
popularity of such methods,~however, j u s t i f i e s , i f not demands, t h e i r 
independent consideration. 
The use of s t a t i s t i c a l method i s hardly new i n geography. Since 
the 1840s census data has been presented at various stages of aggregation, 
trends i d e n t i f i e d and forecasts made. The quantitative revolution of 
the early 1950s, however, considerably increased the variety and 
sophistication of the s t a t i s t i c a l techniques employed. Could these 
techniques, then, not provide us with a legitimate way of investigating 
the urban structure of Victorian Edinburgh? Think again of our two axes 
of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ( i e . the d i s t r i b u t i o n of house types and the r e s i d e n t i a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups). What we wanted to investigate was the 
relationship between the two. And amongst the new tools for data 
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handling we f i n d s t a t i s t i c a l methods of correlation which, i t i s 
claimed, measure the strength of the relationship between any two 
variables or sets of variables. I f , then, we were to measure the 
sp a t i a l correlation between the two d i s t r i b u t i o n s would t h i s provide 
us with the answers fo r which we have been looking? The short reply 
here i s no. Since the r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups 
cannot be represented on a street plan, i t cannot provide a quantitative 
data set with s p a t i a l reference. And without two comparable sets of 
data any measure of correlation would be meaningless. This i s a 
d i f f i c u l t y connected with the p a r t i c u l a r choice of subject matter 
within Edinburgh, but there are also problematic issues raised by the 
correlation calculations themselves. 
We have already recorded the pessimistic remarks of Amedeo and 
Golledge when they conclude a discussion of s c i e n t i f i c reasoning and 
s t a t i s t i c a l method i n geography by pointing out that even our most 
complex methods have contributed l i t t l e to our general understanding 
of phenomena.5 And since understanding and the a b i l i t y to explain are 
central to academic research, t h i s i s indeed a serious state of a f f a i r s . 
I f Amedeo and Golledge are r i g h t , the quantitative methods and s t a t i s t i c a l 
manipulations of the 'new' geography have not succeeded i n advancing the 
subject or i n increasing our body of knowledge of geographical phenomena 
to any great extent. Why the revolution (which did so much to change 
the face of geography and give the subject new l i f e ) should, i n several 
major geographical f i e l d s , have f a i l e d i n t h i s way i s an in t e r e s t i n g 
question. By considering the p o t e n t i a l contribution of correlation 
analysis to the investigation of urban structure we can, perhaps, provide 
an answer. 
5 see D. Amedeo and R. G. Golledge (1975) p.H20 (and Chapter 2, p.30 
above) 
Measures of correlation alone cannot increase our understanding 
of phenomena. This fact i s frequently overlooked by the s t a t i s t i c a l l y 
minded geographer whose research i s sometimes more concerned with the 
manipulation of data than with whatever the data set represents. As 
with some model builders, they make the mistake of regarding the 
s t a t i s t i c a l measures ( l i k e the model) as the end-product rather than 
the preliminary stage of research. For i f we do not go further than 
the s t a t i s t i c a l calculations we have said l i t t l e about the phenomena 
themselves. E l i o t Hurst makes precisely t h i s point when, i n indicating 
the possible inaccuracies of predictions based on current s t a t i s t i c s , he 
declares, "The main c r i t i c i s m of t h i s method i s that i t does not attempt 
to explain the facts, but merely correlates them i n an apparently 
successful manner."6 What he himself wishes to do i n his study of 
household t r a v e l behaviour i s to gain some insight i n t o the motivations 
of i ndividual t r i p makers i n order to understand why the behaviour 
occurred. This d i s t i n c t i o n between 'mere correlation' and understanding 
the phenomena i s important, f o r seldom are i t s implications f u l l y realised. 
In the study of human behaviour, the most any measure of correlation can 
do i s to suggest a r e l a t i o n s h i p . 7 I t cannot provide any understanding 
of how that relationship works. Winch highlights t h i s point when he says, 
The difference i s precisely analogous to that 
between being able to formulate s t a t i s t i c a l laws 
about the l i k e l y occurrences of words i n a language 
and being able to understand what was being said by 
someone who spoke the language. 8 
6 M. E. E l i o t Hurst (1969) p.72 
7 The relationship revealed by correlating the occurrences of any two 
variables i s , of course, only a s t a t i s t i c a l one. I t i s possible f o r 
two such variables to share similar d i s t r i b u t i o n s but to be quite 
unrelated i n any other way. 
8 P. Winch (1958) p.115 
Suppose, for example, that we found a s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t 
correlation between the number of children under ten years of age per 
family u n i t and the distance (of place of residence) from the centre 
of an urban area. This merely suggests a relationship between the two 
and provides no understanding of what that relationship i s . An 
explanation of the s i t u a t i o n would require a f a r wider knowledge of 
such things as the d i s t r i b u t i o n of types of housing and amenities and 
the d i f f e r e n t i a l a v a i l a b i l i t y of mortgages. There are many factors 
which might play a part i n the r e s i d e n t i a l decisions of couples with 
young children, and i n order to understand the d i s t r i b u t i o n of such 
households we would have to render these decisions i n t e l l i g i b l e . The 
'strength' of s t a t i s t i c a l measures of s p a t i a l co-variance t e l l s us nothing 
about the manner i n which the variables are related. And i t i s the 
l a t t e r , not the former, which must be the major concern of geographical 
research. 
We can, therefore, put measures of correlation into t h e i r proper 
perspective as indicators or prompters, f o r they may prompt us to look 
f o r more substantial relationships. They can do no more than t h i s , and 
indeed a f a m i l i a r i t y with the subject matter under investigation may even 
render such precise indicators superfluous. S t a t i s t i c a l techniques may, 
on occasion, be useful for focussing a t t e n t i o n , but i n the study of 
human behaviour i t i s only a f t e r the s t a t i s t i c s end that the study begins. 
The place of quantitative methods i n human geographical research needs 
to be reappraised and geographers would do well to heed the warnings of 
the French physiologist Claude Bernard. His remarks, although directed 
at his own sphere of study, have a much wider relevance today: 
In every science we must recognise two classes of 
phenomena, those whose cause i s already defined; next 
those whose cause i s s t i l l undefined. With phenomena 
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whose cause i s defined s t a t i s t i c s have nothing 
to do; they would even be absurd. As soon as 
the circumstances of an experiment are well 
known we stop gathering s t a t i s t i c s . . . . . o n l y 
when a phenomenon includes conditions as yet 
undefined can we compile s t a t i s t i c s ; we must 
learn therefore that we compile s t a t i s t i c s only 
when we cannot possibly help i t ; f o r i n my opinion 
s t a t i s t i c s can never y i e l d s c i e n t i f i c t r u t h and 
therefore cannot establish any f i n a l s c i e n t i f i c 
method.9 
Social prediction and i t s l i m i t s : 
S t a t i s t i c a l analysis cannot increase our understanding of the 
world, and, i n i t s e l f , explains nothing. Only i n the sphere of 
prediction could i t s contribution possibly be a major one. But can 
we f o r e t e l l the future at a l l i n human geography? And i f so, what are 
the l o g i c a l l i m i t s to such an enterprise? How far could we go i n making 
statements about the human landscape of the future whilst avoiding both 
conceptual confusion and contradiction? The answer to t h i s l a s t 
question depends upon what sort of 'prediction' one has i n mind. There 
are three p o s s i b i l i t i e s : 
1. The most we could possibly ask of a forecast of, say, intra-urban 
r e s i d e n t i a l changes i s a categorical statement concerning who w i l l migrate 
and from where to where they w i l l move. The form of such categorical 
statements i s - ((since ( i f P then Q) and P, therefore Q)). And t h i s i s 
precisely the form of the s c i e n t i f i c prediction examined e a r l i e r . 1 0 
Further, i t i s lo g i c a l l y impossible to make such statement about human 
behaviour. I t i s not just that human beings sometimes behave i n 
unexpected ( i e . unpredictable) ways. In order to make a categorical 
statement about the future occurrence of any event i n the social world 
9 Quoted i n M. O'c. Drury (1973) p.9 
((since ( i f a gas i s heated then i t w i l l expand) and a gas i s heated, 
therefore i t w i l l expand)) 
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we would also be r e q u i r e d t o p r e d i c t the r e l e v a n t f u t u r e s o c i a l 
c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g a t a s p e c i f i c time. But t o attempt the l a t t e r 
surrounds us i n considerable conceptual confusion, f o r the p r e d i c t i o n 
o f p r e v a i l i n g s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s would i n v o l v e making statements about, 
f o r example, the time and content o f f u t u r e s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o v e r i e s . 
And, o f course, i f we could make such statements we ourselves would 
also have made the dis c o v e r i e s and would, t h e r e f o r e , i n no sense be 
p r e d i c t i n g them. Likewise i t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible t o p r e d i c t the 
emergence and substantive d e t a i l o f f u t u r e i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r i e s . 
As Popper remarks, " The idea, i n s h o r t , o f an exact and d e t a i l e d 
calendar o f s o c i a l events i s s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y ; and exact and d e t a i l e d 
s c i e n t i f i c s o c i a l p r e d i c t i o n s are t h e r e f o r e i m p o s s i b l e . " 1 1 C a t e g o r i c a l 
statements concerning f u t u r e events are the province of the s c i e n t i s t 
and not o f the s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t . As Torrance p o i n t s o u t , 
....oncethe f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s o f the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between the s o c i a l and the n a t u r a l sciences are 
appreciated, the demand t h a t long-term c a t e g o r i c a l 
p r e d i c t i o n be made the aim o f the s o c i a l sciences 
reveals i t s e l f as a demand t h a t the sciences o f 
soc i e t y pursue a goal t h a t cannot even be s p e l l e d 
out w i t h o u t conceptual incoherence. 1 2 
2. Many geographers search f o r more general f o r e c a s t s . Instead o f 
attempting t o discover the 'who' and the 'where' o f in t r a - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n 
they content themselves w i t h c a l c u l a t i o n s o f the f u t u r e growth r a t e of 
the urban area, composition of i t s p o p u l a t i o n and, perhaps, employment 
s t r u c t u r e . The methods used t o a r r i v e a t such for e c a s t s can a p t l y be 
c a l l e d t r a d i t i o n a l , f o r they have been i n use f o r many decades. They 
in v o l v e the anal y s i s o f s t a t i s t i c a l data ( p r i m a r i l y census m a t e r i a l ) , 
1 K. Popper (1961) pp. 13-14 
2 T. S. Torrance (1973) p.150 
the d e t e c t i o n o f t r e n d s , and the p r o j e c t i o n o f such trends i n t o the 
f u t u r e . I n recent years the d e t e c t i o n and analysis o f such trends 
has become f a r more precise w i t h the a p p l i c a t i o n o f more complex 
s t a t i s t i c a l methods. The basic approach, however, remains the same 
and no matter how s e n s i t i v e the ana l y s i s becomes one major f a u l t 
remains. This i s the u n d e r l y i n g presupposition t h a t the in f l u e n c e s 
a f f e c t i n g urban growth and the s t r u c t u r e o f the urban p o p u l a t i o n are 
constant over t i m e , or a t l e a s t change slowly. I t i s upon the accuracy 
o f t h i s t h a t the accuracy o f the fore c a s t depends. The e x t r a p o l a t i o n 
o f growth curves i s n o t , and could not be, s e n s i t i v e t o new i n f l u e n c e s , 
f o r these are not q u a n t i f i a b l e . And a l l too o f t e n there i s no good 
reason f o r assuming t h a t past trends w i l l continue i n t o the f u t u r e . 1 3 
To base one's for e c a s t s o f f u t u r e p o p u l a t i o n s t r u c t u r e and growth 
on past s t a t i s t i c a l trends i s , t h e r e f o r e , a p o t e n t i a l l y h i g h l y 
inaccurate method o f a n t i c i p a t i n g the s t a t e o f any urban p o p u l a t i o n f i v e 
o r t en years hence. Unforeseen events do occur and t h e i r i n f l u e n c e s 
upon urban growth can be considerable. The 1976 Guatemalan earthquake, 
f o r example, had a devastating e f f e c t on the volume, composition and 
s p a t i a l l o c a t i o n o f the popul a t i o n o f t h a t country, and y e t t h i s sudden 
and f a r - r e a c h i n g change could c e r t a i n l y not have been a n t i c i p a t e d by 
l o o k i n g at past p o p u l a t i o n data alone. The inaccuracies o f many past 
attempts at f o r e c a s t i n g by the p r o j e c t i o n o f past s t a t i s t i c a l trends 
i n t o the f u t u r e i s testimony enough t o the shortcomings of the method. 
3. The t h i r d and l a s t p o s s i b i l i t y i s t h a t f o r e c a s t s i n human geography 
are n e c e s s a r i l y more imprecise than i s f r e q u e n t l y allowed. I f l o g i c 
forces us t o concede t h a t we cannot s e n s i b l y make c a t e g o r i c a l statements 
1 3 Forecasts o f f u t u r e b i r t h r a t e s are a good example here. Considerable 
f l u c t u a t i o n s i n the past suggest t h a t long-term f o r e c a s t s are impossible, 
and any advanced planning based on the 1964 b i r t h r a t e w i l l c e r t a i n l y have 
r e s u l t e d i n a surplus since the a c t u a l number o f b i r t h s has been much 
lower than 1964 p r o j e c t i o n s suggested. 
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about f u t u r e s o c i a l events and the s t a t i s t i c a l p r e c i s i o n o f t r a d i t i o n a l 
f o r e c a s t i n g methods i s no guarantee o f accuracy then we have l i t t l e 
choice but t o abandon both and s a c r i f i c e p r e c i s i o n f o r r e l i a b i l i t y . 
The only a l t e r n a t i v e would be t o claim t h a t f o r e c a s t i n g human behaviour 
i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . But c l e a r l y we do, i n our everyday l i v e s , f o r e c a s t 
the f u t u r e behaviour o f our r e l a t i o n s , colleagues or f r i e n d s and i t would 
be unreasonable t o deny t h a t t h i s were e i t h e r possible or s e n s i b l e . I t 
i s the way i n which such forecasts are a r r i v e d at t h a t i n t e r e s t s us here. 
Forecasting, i n t h i s sense, i s more an a r t than a technique. 
Forecasting human behaviour: 
I n order t o f o r e c a s t any piece of human behaviour, no matter how 
t r i v i a l , a knowledge o f the agent or group o f agents involved i s e s s e n t i a l . 
This f a m i l i a r i t y i s what makes f o r e c a s t i n g p o s s i b l e . The more f a m i l i a r 
we are w i t h a person, the more c e r t a i n we can be o f h i s r e a c t i o n s i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n . Of course, a f r i e n d may s u r p r i s e us by a c t i n g 
i n a way we would never have expected, but such e v e n t u a l i t i e s are i n no 
way problematic f o r we are q u i t e f a m i l i a r w i t h the n o t i o n o f an 
' u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c r e a c t i o n ' . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c behaviour being, by -
d e f i n i t i o n , more usual than u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c behaviour, we can f o r e c a s t 
the r e a c t i o n o f those f a m i l i a r t o us w i t h a t o l e r a b l e degree o f c e r t a i n t y . 
The p o s s i b i l i t y o f knowing a l l we could know and s t i l l being wrong i s , 
however, always present. Take, f o r example, one's own behaviour. 
Here the agent and the f o r e c a s t e r are synonymous. This i s s u r e l y the 
most advantaged f o r e c a s t i n g p o s i t i o n since i t i s possible f o r the 
f o r e c a s t e r t o know a l l t h a t there i s t o know before the event. He can 
base h i s f o r e c a s t s on h i s own i n t e n t i o n s . I f he intends t o do X 
tomorrow, he can s t a t e w i t h reasonable c e r t a i n t y t h a t he w i l l do X 
tomorrow. Nevertheless t h i s f o r e c a s t i s not l i k e the p r e d i c t i o n o f 
218. 
an event i n a causal sequence. The u n c e r t a i n t y a r i s e s from the 
nature o f 'an i n t e n t i o n ' and not from the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t something 
might intervene t o stop X happening. Winch elaborates t h i s p o i n t : 
Suppose t h a t N, a u n i v e r s i t y l e c t u r e r , says t h a t he 
i s going t o cancel h i s next week's l e c t u r e s because he 
intends t o t r a v e l t o London: here we have a statement o f 
i n t e n t i o n f o r which a reason i s given. Now N does not 
i n f e r h i s i n t e n t i o n o f c a n c e l l i n g h i s l e c t u r e s from h i s 
desire t o go t o London, as the imminent s h a t t e r i n g o f 
glass might be i n f e r r e d , e i t h e r from the f a c t t h a t 
someone had thrown a stone or from the b r i t t l e n e s s o f 
the glass. N does not o f f e r h i s reason as evidence 
f o r the soundness o f h i s p r e d i c t i o n about h i s f u t u r e 
behaviour Rather, he i s j u s t i f y i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n . 
His statement i s not o f the form: 'Such and such causal 
f a c t o r s are present, t h e r e f o r e t h i s w i l l r e s u l t ' ; nor 
yet o f the form: ' I have such and such a d i s p o s i t i o n , 
which w i l l r e s u l t i n my doing t h i s ' ; i t i s o f the form: 
' I n view o f such and such considerations t h i s w i l l be a 
reasonable t h i n g t o do'.1** 
What i s c l e a r i s t h a t a d i f f e r e n t range o f vocabulary i s necessary when 
p r e d i c t i n g an event i n a causal sequence and when f o r e c a s t i n g a piece 
o f human behaviour. Stones do not have i n t e n t i o n s , and i t makes no 
sense t o suppose t h a t a stone might change i t s mind a t the l a s t moment. 
Again we come upon the fundamental d i f f e r e n c e between the meaningful 
a c t i o n o f a human agent and the automatic behaviour o f a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . 
These demand d i f f e r e n t modes o f p r e d i c t i o n or f o r e c a s t i n g no less than 
d i f f e r e n t modes o f exp l a n a t i o n . 
The f o r e c a s t i n g o f the f l u x o f events i n the s o c i a l w o r l d , o f the 
growth o f an urban area and i t s f u t u r e demands f o r housing and employment 
f o r example, must be done i n the same way as we might f o r e c a s t the 
rea c t i o n s o f our f r i e n d s . A knowledge o f , and f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h , a 
p a r t i c u l a r urban centre i s what allows us t o suggest what may reasonably 
be expected t o happen t o t h a t c i t y i n the f u t u r e . We can never know i n 
P. Winch, o p . c i t . , p.81 
219. 
advance, but we can make reasoned and informed guesses. There can be 
no exactness here or sharpening o f t o o l s , f o r i t i s i n the nature o f 
things t h a t f o r e c a s t s o f human behaviour are more matters o f observation 
and judgement than c a l c u l a t i o n or measurement. Further, the s k i l l 
i n v o l v e d i n making such judgements i s p r a c t i c a l r a t h e r than academic; 
t h a t i s t o say t h a t i t i s something more a k i n t o business sense than 
t o the l e a r n i n g o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f economics. C e r t a i n l y , f a m i l i a r i t y 
does not c o n s i s t i n the mere c o l l e c t i o n o f a host of f a c t s . For any 
f o r e c a s t o f human behaviour there i s always the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t i t i s 
wrong and yet also what could most reasonably have been expected t o 
happen; i t i s always possible t h a t no previous s t a t e o f a f f a i r s gives 
us any clue as t o the f u t u r e . People do behave i n unexpected ways which 
could not reasonably be a n t i c i p a t e d beforehand. Nevertheless, the 
p r a c t i t i o n e r who has h i s f i n g e r on the pulse of the area w i t h which he 
i s concerned i s as w e l l equipped as i t i s possible t o be f o r h i s task 
as advanced planner. 
Forecasting f o r the urban planner, then, i s a p r a c t i c a l s k i l l 
r a t h e r than an academic one; a s k i l l l e a r n t through p r a c t i c e r a t h e r 
than i n the course o f academic^research. Further the urban geographer 
i s not i n a p o s i t i o n t o provide such f o r e c a s t s . The only r o l e he could 
play i n advanced planning i s t h a t o f p r o v i d i n g i n f o r m a t i o n f o r the 
planners. This would undoubtedly i n v o l v e the a n a l y s i s o f s t a t i s t i c a l 
t r e n d s , but these, i n order t o become u s e f u l f o r e c a s t s , would have t o be 
tempered by the p r a c t i c a l knowledge and s k i l l of the planner. Even the 
most complex s i m u l a t i o n models such as those discussed by M o r r i l l i n h i s 
work on M i g r a t i o n and the Spread and Growth o f Urban Settlement r e l y , at 
l e a s t p a r t i a l l y , on p r o b a b i l i t y c a l c u l a t i o n s such as "... f o r example 
the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a twenty-nine year o l d w i l l cross a s t a t e boundary 
or n o t . . . . , (which) w i l l have been determined from appropriate 
s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s . " 1 5 They cannot, t h e r e f o r e , avoid the major 
f l a w o f the t r a d i t i o n a l approach. And although any p r o j e c t i o n o f 
past trends i n t o the f u t u r e may be i n f o r m a t i v e , we should be aware 
o f the l i m i t a t i o n s and not be s u r p r i s e d or dismayed i f our numerical 
estimates are wide o f the mark. 
Chapter 6 has been a d i g r e s s i o n from r a t h e r than p a r t o f the 
main argument o f t h i s t h e s i s . The necessity o f i n c l u d i n g such a lengthy 
d i g r e s s i o n a r i s e s from the prominence given t o q u a n t i t a t i v e methods i n 
both teaching and research i n geography today. The i n d i s c r i m i n a t e use 
o f such methods not only i n urban geography but i n a l l branches o f human 
geography can only be a waste o f both time and resources. The d e t e c t i o n 
o f s t a t i s t i c a l r e g u l a r i t i e s cannot enhance our understanding o f the 
urban world. I f i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t at a l l , a s t a t i s t i c a l r e g u l a r i t y i s 
merely another f a c t t o be understood and explained. Few geographers 
have taken these words o f Robson's t o h e a r t : 
As a means o f analyzing an array o f c i t y sizes 
the n o t i o n t h a t the set o f places comprises a system 
i s an a t t r a c t i v e one, but u n t i l the o b j e c t s themselves 
can be defined i n t o t o and u n t i l the linkages which 
determine the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between them can be 
s p e c i f i e d one must accept the conclusion t h a t the 
existence of r e g u l a r i t i e s i n such data suggest 
r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e about the substantive phenomena 
themselves. 1 6 
We cannot r e l y on s t a t i s t i c s t o do our work f o r us. As Stewart and 
Warntz p o i n t o u t , "Mathematical s t a t i s t i c s can be a good servant; but 
only a weak s o c i a l science, i n t e n t on becoming weaker, w i l l welcome i t 
as a m a s t e r . " 1 7 Neither the use o f s t a t i s t i c a l method nor the 
development o f f o r e c a s t i n g techniques i s s u f f i c i e n t t o bestow upon 
1 5 R. L. M o r r i l l C1965) p.42 
1 6 B. T. Robson (1973) p.36 
1 7 J. Q. Stewart and W. Warntz (1958) p.119 
urban geography the f r e q u e n t l y sought a f t e r s t a t u s of a science. 
As Toulmin p o i n t s o u t , 
The c e n t r a l aims o f science are, r a t h e r , concerned 
w i t h a search f o r understanding - a desire t o make 
the course o f Nature not j u s t p r e d i c t a b l e but 
i n t e l l i g i b l e - and t h i s has meant l o o k i n g f o r 
r a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s o f connections i n terms o f which 
we can make sense o f the f l u x o f e v e n t s . 1 8 
S t a t i s t i c a l techniques are n e i t h e r e s s e n t i a l t o nor should they be 
the preoccupation o f the urban geographer. They may be u s e f u l , but 
they have no bearing upon the fundamental character o f urban geography. 
We can now r e t u r n t o the c e n t r a l task o f s p e c i f y i n g what t h i s 
character i s . 
S. Toulmin, o p . c i t . , p.99 
CHAPTER 7 
URBAN GEOGRAPHY AND HISTORICAL METHOD 
I n the concluding chapter o f Part 2 we can replace negative 
recommendations w i t h p o s i t i v e ones, warnings o f methodological nonsense 
w i t h i n d i c a t o r s o f methodological good sense. I t has several times been 
h i n t e d t h a t urban geography would do w e l l t o look t o the d i s c i p l i n e o f 
h i s t o r y f o r the r e s o l u t i o n o f i t s methodological problems and the aim 
of t h i s chapter i s t o do so e x p l i c i t l y . 
H i s t o r y as the study o f the past: 
I f we ask, 'What i s h i s t o r y ? ' , the most common answer would be, 
'The study o f the past'. H i s t o r i a n s study past events and p e r s o n a l i t i e s 
and, u n l i k e s c i e n t i s t s , a r e concerned t o place these i n t h e i r s o c i a l and 
h i s t o r i c a l contexts. An h i s t o r i a n provides an account of what happened 
i n the past by using t h e h i s t o r i c a l evidence e x i s t i n g at the present 
time. I n t h i s he w i l l encounter two l o g i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s or l i m i t s 
which are: 
1. The h i s t o r i c a l account can only be an account of the pr e s e n t l y 
e x i s t i n g evidence. This evidence can take many d i f f e r e n t forms (eg. 
o f f i c i a l documents, d i a r y e n t r i e s , newspaper r e p o r t s or books w r i t t e n 
at the time and evidence s t i l l d i r e c t l y v i s i b l e i n the landscape i t s e l f ) 
and, although cross-checking i s both p o s s i b l e and indeed e s s e n t i a l , there 
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i s u l t i m a t e l y no way o f knowing whether what the evidence suggests 
happened d i d i n f a c t happen. We cannot be sure t h a t the w r i t e r o f 
the d i a r y , the newspaper a r t i c l e or the book d i d not d i s t o r t h i s s t o r y , 
add colour where i t was l a c k i n g , or d e l i b e r a t e l y l i e as t o the 
happenings o f the time. 
2. The h i s t o r i c a l evidence i t s e l f w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y be incomplete. 
Not a l l past events w i l l have been documented and o f a l l the evidence 
ever i n existence much w i l l f a i l t o s u r v i v e t o take i t s place as 
'present evidence'. Since the g i v i n g o f an h i s t o r i c a l account e n t a i l s 
the p i e c i n g together o f present evidence, the account cannot, l o g i c a l l y , 
extend beyond the scope o f the present evidence i t s e l f . 
Because the h i s t o r i a n has no grounds upon which t o question the v a l i d i t y 
o f 'present evidence' i n general (although he can se n s i b l y question the 
v a l i d i t y o f a s p e c i f i c piece o f evidence), and because the evidence i s 
l i m i t e d , he may be s a i d , more c o r r e c t l y , t o give an account o f the 
present evidence f o r what happened i n The past r a t h e r than o f the past 
i t s e l f . This i s a p o i n t e l u c i d a t e d by Oakeshott i n h i s s t i m u l a t i n g 
essay on t h e ' A c t i v i t y o f being an Historian'. He says, 
- - I n s h o r t , r.. 'the—past' i s a consequence o f 
understanding the present world i n a p a r t i c u l a r 
manner. 1 
The a c t i v i t y o f the h i s t o r i a n i s pre-eminently 
t h a t o f understanding present events - the t h i n g s 
t h a t are before him - as evidence f o r past happenings. 2 
The h i s t o r i a n as a n o n - p r a c t i c a l man: 
The h i s t o r i a n i s concerned t o understand the world about him, 
1 M. Oakeshott (1962) p.146 
2 I b i d . , p.150 
but the s i g n i f i c a n c e he f i n d s i n present events i s not a p r a c t i c a l 
one. H i s t o r y , l i k e science, i s not a p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Any 
statement made about the world i s made i n a c e r t a i n idiom and i t 
i s t h i s idiom which reveals the manner i n which the speaker i s 
att e n d i n g t o the world and understanding i t . I t i s Oakeshott who 
c l a r i f i e s t h i s p o i n t and the f o l l o w i n g examples are h i s . 
I f a man says, ' I am hot ' , he i s recognisably speaking i n the 
idiom o f p r a c t i c e f o r he i s making a statement about the world i n 
r e l a t i o n t o h i m s e l f and i n so doing conveys e i t h e r s a t i s f a c t i o n or 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h h i s present s t a t e . I n co n t r a s t t o t h i s we have 
statements l i k e 'The thermometer on the r o o f o f the A i r M i n i s t r y stood 
a t 90°F at 12 noon 1, which are capable o f being t r e a t e d as i n f o r m a t i o n , 
not about the world i n r e l a t i o n t o a human agent, but about the world 
i n respect o f i t s independence o f the human agent. F i n a l l y , t o make 
a statement such as, 'The b o i l i n g p o i n t o f water i s 100°C, achieves 
the detachment o f science, f o r the s i t u a t i o n described i s h y p o t h e t i c a l 
and the observation i s not about the world i n r e l a t i o n t o the describer. 
The h i s t o r i a n may, t o t h i s e x t e n t , be l i k e n e d t o the s c i e n t i s t . 
He does not wish t o describe the present i n r e l a t i o n t o h i m s e l f , but 
merely t o t r e a t the present as evidence f o r the past. And i n h i s 
statements about the past he conveys n e i t h e r s a t i s f a c t i o n nor 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n . Nothing i s approved or disapproved, f o r there i s no 
desired c o n d i t i o n o f t h i n g s i n r e l a t i o n t o which approval can operate. 
As Oakeshott puts i t , "This past i s with o u t the moral, the p o l i t i c a l or 
the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e which the p r a c t i c a l man t r a n s f e r s from h i s present 
t o h i s p a s t . " 3 The h i s t o r i a n i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the past f o r i t s own 
sake. He does not claim t h a t the beheading o f Mary Queen of Scots 
I b i d . , p.154 
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changed the course o f events i n Scotland at t h a t t i m e , f o r o f course 
t h i s was the course o f events. The h i s t o r i a n may be s a i d t o be 
emancipated from a p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t i n the past. I t i s t h i s which 
makes h i s t o r y a d i s t i n c t universe o f discourse and which marks i t o f f 
from the world o f p r a c t i c e . The h i s t o r i a n i s e s s e n t i a l l y a n o n - p r a c t i c a l 
man. 
The h i s t o r i a n as n o n - s c i e n t i s t : 
Nor i s the h i s t o r i a n a s c i e n t i s t ; t h a t i s t o say, a s c i e n t i f i c 
mode o f understanding i s i n a p p l i c a b l e t o the subject matter o f h i s t o r y . 
There could be no such t h i n g as a s c i e n t i f i c understanding o f h i s t o r i c a l 
events. We do not need t o repeat the arguments here. S u f f i c e i t t o 
note t h a t the e a r l i e r discussions o f the nature o f science and o f human 
behaviour brought out the e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e s between the n a t u r a l 
world and the s o c i a l world which make them l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t . 
S c i e n t i f i c method i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o urban geography,and h i s t o r y , 
because i t i s also concerned w i t h the world o f human a f f a i r s , i s 
not a science. The at e m p o r a l i t y o f s c i e n t i f i c hypotheses can e a s i l y 
be contrasted w i t h the character o f h i s t o r y . Despite t h e ease o f t h i s -
c o n t r a s t , s c i e n t i s t i c accounts o f h i s t o r y are not unknown and even some 
philosophers argue t h a t the p r a c t i c e o f h i s t o r y i nvolves recourse t o 
general ' h i s t o r i c a l laws'. 4 The d e t a i l s o f the debate are beyond the 
scope o f t h i s t h e s i s . But on the account o f h i s t o r y so f a r given, i t 
i s easy t o see t h a t those who attempt t o formulate general 'laws' 
(however t h a t i s t o be understood) are not oper a t i n g w i t h i n the idiom o f 
h i s t o r y f o r they are attempting t o make the past r e l e v a n t t o the present 
i n a c e r t a i n way. And as Oakeshott has i t , 
see, f o r example, C. G. Hempel (1965) pp.231-243 
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.... the e n t e r p r i s e o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g general 
causes i n respect o f past events i s now t o be 
recognised as an attempt t o a s s i m i l a t e .... 
the past t o the present and the f u t u r e , an 
attempt t o make the past speak t o the present, 
and consequently as a relapse i n the d i r e c t i o n 
o f p r a c t i c e . 5 
F u r t h e r , from e a r l i e r discussions, i t i s evident t h a t there are other 
good reasons f o r supposing the concept o f a 'general law' t o be 
incompatible w i t h the n o t i o n o f human behaviour and thus i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
i n h i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h . 6 
Science and h i s t o r y do have one major f e a t u r e i n common. They 
are both ways o f t h i n k i n g , modes o f understanding the w o r l d , a l b e i t 
separate and d i s t i n c t ones. H i s t o r y i s u n l i k e urban geography i n 
t h i s respect f o r i t has a d i s t i n c t i v e i n t e r n a l l o g i c centred upon the 
way i n which the present i s viewed only as evidence f o r past happenings. 
H i s t o r y i s a d i s c i p l i n e whereas urban geography and even human geography 
are s u b j e c t s . The question 'What i s urban geography 9* i s t o be understood 
as the question, 'Which d i s c i p l i n e o f thought i s appropriate t o the study 
o f urban phenomena?'. I f the answer i s indeed, ' H i s t o r y ' , then the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between h i s t o r y and urban geography i s the same as t h a t 
between science and physics,~ between a d i s c i p l i n e and a s u b j e c t . 
The o b j e c t i v i t y o f the h i s t o r i c a l account: 
The u l t i m a t e product o f the h i s t o r i a n i s an h i s t o r i c a l account, 
a n a r r a t i v e constructed around the p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g evidence. Where 
there i s no evidence, no h i s t o r y can be w r i t t e n . Where there i s evidence, 
however, the w r i t i n g o f an h i s t o r i c a l account i s by no means a simple 
matter. The h i s t o r i a n has t o 'make something' o f the evidence; t h i s i s 
h i s p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l . The evidence guides h i s account r a t h e r than 
M. Oakeshott, o p . c i t . , p.157 
see Chapter 3, sec t i o n I I above. 
d i c t a t e s i t t o him and i t i s because two h i s t o r i a n s can be guided 
i n s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s by the same body o f evidence ( i e . can 
produce c o n f l i c t i n g h i s t o r i c a l accounts) t h a t h i s t o r i c a l research i n 
general has been denounced as u n s c i e n t i f i c and s u b j e c t i v e . This 
denunciation c a l l s i n t o question the very p o s s i b i l i t y o f o b j e c t i v i t y 
i n h i s t o r i c a l research and i s a serious challenge i n the present 
context f o r i t presumes an account of h i s t o r y r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t t o 
t h a t presented here. Amongst those who promote t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e 
account are those who view the world from a s e l f - p r o f e s s e d Marxist 
s t a n d p o i n t . 7 Since t h i s standpoint i s an e a s i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e one, 
we s h a l l take i t as r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a l l those who advance the claim 
t h a t h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g i s i n f l u e n c e d by the i d e o l o g i c a l b e l i e f s o f the 
w r i t e r and as such i s n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t i v e . The crux o f the matter 
i s the question whether h i s t o r i c a l enquiry can be t r u l y o b j e c t i v e or not. 
The Marxist would claim t h a t the i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n o f the 
i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r i a n n e c e s s a r i l y permeates h i s h i s t o r i c a l research; the 
research i t s e l f must have an i d e o l o g i c a l b i a s and could n o t , t h e r e f o r e , 
be o b j e c t i v e . I f we were t o accept t h i s claim we would be force d t o 
The l a b e l 'Marxist' may be misleading here i f i t i s taken t o mean 
derived d i r e c t l y from the w r i t i n g s o f K a r l Marx. I n f a c t , i n h i s 
t a l k o f ideology, Marx was i n t e r e s t e d i n the co n t r a s t between absolute 
and r e l a t i v e t r u t h s and not i n the c o n f l i c t between d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l 
p r e j u d i c e s . Since, however, the term 'Marxist' i s not a p p l i e d w i t h 
any great accuracy, not l e a s t by Marxists themselves, the view 
pr e s e n t l y under discussion can be c a l l e d Marxist w i t h o u t serious 
misrepresentation. When discussing the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a comprehensive 
urban t h e o r y , D. Harvey says, f o r example, "Theories, l i k e d e f i n i t i o n s , 
have t h e i r r o o t s i n metaphysical s p e c u l a t i o n and i n ideology There 
are, i t seems, f a r too many i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s t o be defended....for 
a general theory o f urbanism t o emerge e a s i l y . " (1973, pp.195-6). C l e a r l y 
here, the i d e o l o g i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n s o f the i n v e s t i g a t o r are thought t o have a 
considerable i n f l u e n c e on the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
228. 
r e j e c t the account o f h i s t o r y we have so f a r o u t l i n e d , f o r the two 
are l o g i c a l l y incompatible. We have already s p e c i f i e d the non-
p r a c t i c a l nature o f h i s t o r i c a l enquiry and t o deny t h a t h i s t o r y can 
be o b j e c t i v e ( i e . t o claim t h a t an h i s t o r i c a l account i s n e c e s s a r i l y 
r e l a t e d t o the personal views and preferences o f the h i s t o r i a n - a 
relapse i n t o the idiom o f p r a c t i c e ) i s a simple c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I f 
we are t o defend the Oakeshottian account of the nature o f h i s t o r y 
against the Marxist challenge, then, we must demonstrate t h a t the 
o b j e c t i v e study o f h i s t o r y i s indeed p o s s i b l e . 
The s u b j e c t i v e and the o b j e c t i v e : 
The p o p u l a r i t y o f the view t h a t u l t i m a t e l y e v e r y t h i n g i s 
s u b j e c t i v e save, perhaps, mathematics and pure science, cannot escape 
the n o t i c e o f anyone browsing through the general and methodological 
l i t e r a t u r e o f the s o c i a l sciences. I n geography i t i s evident i n most 
t a l k o f d i f f e r e n t i a l p e r c e p t i o n , although some geographers do suppose 
themselves t o be capable of o b j e c t i v i t y . Since the 1950s, however, 
t h i s o b j e c t i v i t y has been r e l a t e d almost e n t i r e l y t o the a b i l i t y t o 
q u a n t i f y or measure. Only a numerical standard can, according t o many 
geographers, guarantee complete o b j e c t i v i t y . Pinder and W i t h e r i c k , f o r 
example, i n an a r t i c l e on nearest-neighbour a n a l y s i s emphasise t h a t , 
Each student w i l l have h i s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
s i t u a t i o n and each i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s h i g h l y l i k e l y t o 
d i f f e r from the remainder. Subjective impressions 
are an obvious problem and i t i s c l e a r t h a t an o b j e c t i v e 
y a r d s t i c k i s r e q u i r e d t o reduce them t o a minimum. 8 
And Johnson r e l a t e s o b j e c t i v i t y t o measurement when he s t a t e s , 
" C l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s a s u b j e c t i v e process. Although the a c t u a l methodology 
employed may be based on o b j e c t i v e , numerical techniques." 9 Again and 
D. A. Pinder and M. E. W i t h e r i c k (1972) p.277 
R. J. Johnston (1968) p.588 
again geographers have expressed the idea t h a t o b j e c t i v i t y a r i s e s 
only i n cases o f exact measurement where, however many researchers 
make the measurement f o r themselves, i f they are accurate they w i l l 
a l l o b t a i n the same answer. I n c o n t r a s t , i f we ask the same group 
t o describe a p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n or p o i n t p a t t e r n , no two o f 
them w i l l come up w i t h e x a c t l y the same d e s c r i p t i o n . For they w i l l 
convey s u b j e c t i v e impressions expressed i n the imprecise medium o f 
prose. 
But i s t h i s r e a l l y a s a t i s f a c t o r y account o f the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y ? I f I describe a settlement 
p a t t e r n i n prose r a t h e r than by the means o f a nearest neighbour 
s t a t i s t i c am I always t o be accused o f s u b j e c t i v i t y ? Surely n o t , f o r 
we cannot d i s t i n g u i s h between the o b j e c t i v e and the s u b j e c t i v e i n q u i t e 
the manner suggested. To suppose t h a t only i n numeracy can we escape 
accusations o f s u b j e c t i v i t y i s t o l i m i t the scope o f the word ' o b j e c t i v e ' , 
or conversely t o extend the scope o f the word ' s u b j e c t i v e ' , t o such an 
extent t h a t the l a t t e r becomes meaningless. Geography would be a barren 
subject i f i t s research e n t a i l e d o nly the pre s e n t a t i o n and manipulation 
of numerical d a t a . 1 0 Further, Johnston, although he hi m s e l f i s g u i l t y 
o f i n t e r p r e t i n g ' o b j e c t i v e ' as ' s t r i c t l y numerical', draws a t t e n t i o n t o 
what he c a l l s the s u b j e c t i v i t y (but what might be b e t t e r termed judgement 
or choice) i n v o l v e d even i n s t a t i s t i c a l methods. This p o i n t i s i l l u s t r a t e d 
w e l l by nearest-neighbour a n a l y s i s . For any a r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n t h e r e i s 
only one Rn value (nearest neighbour s t a t i s t i c ) which w i l l f a l l between 
0 (a completely c l u s t e r e d d i s t r i b u t i o n ) and 2.15 (a p e r f e c t l y r e g u l a r 
d i s t r i b u t i o n ) on a numerical scale. I f the p a r t i c u l a r distances i n v o l v e d 
see Chapter 6 above 
are measured accurately and no s l i p i s made i n the c a l c u l a t i o n s , the 
answer w i l l always be the same, whoever the researcher. Nevertheless, 
the a c t u a l value a r r i v e d a t w i l l depend upon the s p a t i a l extent o f the 
study area chosen, amongst other t h i n g s . The numerical c a l c u l a t i o n s 
themselves do guarantee a standard r e s u l t given the data t o be processed. 
The choice o f what t h a t data i s t o be (both i n content and coverage), 
however, u l t i m a t e l y d i c t a t e s the numerical r e s u l t s . Thus even 
q u a n t i t a t i v e methods are dependent upon the judgement and choice o f 
the i n d i v i d u a l researcher. Are we then t o declare a l l geographical 
research subjective? 
I t i s the act o f jud g i n g or choosing which i s f r e q u e n t l y 
associated w i t h the n o t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i t y . Where there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y 
o f d i f f e r i n g judgements or o f opposing claims about what i s the case, 
those who make t h i s a s s o c i a t i o n r e a d i l y declare the judgements and the 
claims s u b j e c t i v e . F u r t h e r , i t i s u s u a l l y t h e i r aim e i t h e r t o eradicate 
such s u b j e c t i v i t y from t h e i r researches o r , where t h i s proves impossible, 
t o r e g r e t the f a c t and t o make every attempt t o reduce the s u b j e c t i v e element 
t o a minimum. But are a l l judgements and choices n e c e s s a r i l y subjective? 
Can we never have an o b j e c t i v e judgement? I n other words, i s the n o t i o n 
o f ' s u b j e c t i v i t y ' contained i n the n o t i o n o f a 'judgement' 9 And by 
su b j e c t i v e here we mean r e l a t e d t o the personal l i k e s and d i s l i k e s , 
contentment or discontentment of the p a r t i c u l a r human agent making the 
judgement. The nature o f the d i s t i n c t i o n between o b j e c t i v i t y and 
s u b j e c t i v i t y can i t s e l f be made c l e a r e r by r e l a t i n g i t , b r i e f l y , t o the 
wider p h i l o s o p h i c a l issue o f the dichotomy between f a c t and value. The 
popular conception o f the nature o f t h i s dichotomy i s t h a t f a c t s are f a c t s 
(and thus both o b j e c t i v e and something upon which everyone can agree), 
and t h a t values are personal or i d i o s y n c r a t i c assessments o f the f a c t s 
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(and thus s u b j e c t i v e and capable o f wide v a r i a t i o n s over a p o p u l a t i o n ) . 
We a l l have our own values, which amount t o personal opinions o f the 
world around us, the world o f f a c t s . That t h i s i s a misconception i s 
demonstrable and indeed has been demonstrated by several p h i l o s o p h e r s . 1 1 
To examine the p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments i n f u l l would take us too f a r 
from the path o f the present d i s c u s s i o n , but there are three p o i n t s 
o f p a r t i c u l a r pertinence which can u s e f u l l y be mentioned: 
1. The d i v i s i o n between statements o f the f a c t s and statements about 
the f a c t s (values) i s not what those who advance a s t r i c t f a c t / v a l u e 
dichotomy suggest. At the very l e a s t , the world o f f a c t s i s much 
l a r g e r than they commonly suppose. They base t h e i r c l a i m on 
p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d and simple statements i n r e l a t i o n t o 
which the suggested dichotomy i s , a d m i t t e d l y , p l a u s i b l e . I f we take 
only the statements, 'This i s a c h a i r ' and 'This i s a room', f o r example, 
and c o n t r a s t them w i t h t h e statements, 'This i s a comfortable c h a i r ' and 
'This i s a spacious room", i t i s easy t o make the mistake o f supposing 
the former t o be f a c t u a l and the l a t t e r t o be expressions of personal 
values r e v e a l i n g the l i k e s and d i s l i k e s o f the speaker. But what 
makes the l a t t e r statements o f values? Even i f we accept t h i s account 
f o r the moment, i t i s c l e a r t h a t the simple presence of an a d j e c t i v e 
before the noun does not r e v e a l a value judgement. I f we s a i d , 'This 
i s a blue c h a i r ' o r , 'This i s a square room' we could not be accused of 
making value judgements. I s t h i s not also the case w i t h the other 
examples given above? Spaciousness, j u s t as much as squareness, i s a 
property o f the room. I f the room i s spacious then i t i s a f a c t t h a t 
i t i s spacious. Again consider the statements, 'He i s a murderer', 
see, f o r instance, J. Kovesi (1967) 
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•That b u i l d i n g i s d e r e l i c t ' and 'The m a j o r i t y of the i n h a b i t a n t s o f 
V i c t o r i a n Edinburgh l i v e d i n unsanitary c o n d i t i o n s ' . These t o o , i f 
they are t r u e , are statements o f f a c t s . We may dispute t h e i r t r u t h 
by c l a i m i n g t h a t , 'He never k i l l e d a t a l l ' , 'The b u i l d i n g i s simply i n 
need o f modernisation' and 'Only a m i n o r i t y o f V i c t o r i a n Edinburgians 
l i v e d i n unsanitary c o n d i t i o n s ' . I n each case we would have t o c i t e 
evidence t o support our counter-claims. We argue, t h a i , over what 
the f a c t s are. Most d e s c r i p t i v e phrases are of t h i s k i n d ; i e . they 
can, i n p r i n c i p l e , be shown t o be e i t h e r t r u e or f a l s e . Statements 
o f personal preference or o p i n i o n are not amenable t o such v e r i f i c a t i o n . 
And i t i s the exception r a t h e r than the r u l e t h a t statements i n the form 
o f d e s c r i p t i o n s o f the world can l e g i t i m a t e l y be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o 
statements o f personal preferences, opinions or v a l u e s . 1 2 
2. Where disputes do a r i s e over the use of words such as 'spacious', 
' d e r e l i c t ' , ' a f f l u e n t ' e t c . , they w i l l not always be resolveable. The 
dispute i t s e l f , however, has l o g i c a l l i m i t s set by, i n x h i s case, the 
English language. There w i l l be some houses which c l e a r l y are d e r e l i c t , 
and some which j u s t as c l e a r l y are not d e r e l i c t . I n between, there i s 
l i k e l y t o be a small number o f houses- t o which t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s riot 
The statement, 'This i s a d e r e l i c t b u i l d i n g ' can be changed t o 
the statement, 'This b u i l d i n g seems d e r e l i c t t o me' or ' I t h i n k t h i s 
b u i l d i n g i s d e r e l i c t ' . But t h i s i s not a l e g i t i m a t e t r a n s l a t i o n o f 
an apparently f a c t u a l statement i n t o i t s proper form as a statement 
o f value. To add ' I t h i n k ' or ' i t seems t o me' may u n d e r l i n e my 
u n c e r t a i n t y as t o the f a c t s but i t does not c o n s t i t u t e a change i n 
the k i n d o f statement I am making. As f a r as the form o f the statement 
i s concerned t o add ' I t h i n k ' i s j u s t as u n i n t e r e s t i n g as t o s t a r t w i t h 
the phrase ' I am saying t h a t ' . 
The only examples o f l e g i t i m a t e t r a n s l a t i o n t h a t r e a d i l y come t o mind 
are those concerned w i t h personal t a s t e s and preferences. I f I say 
t h a t eggs are p r e f e r a b l e t o bacon, t h i s may simply be a way o f saying 
t h a t I p r e f e r eggs t o bacon. C l e a r l y the h i s t o r i a n need never f e e l 
tempted t o make t h i s s o r t o f statement i n the course o f w r i t i n g an 
h i s t o r i c a l account. 
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obviously appropriate nor y e t obviously i n a p p r o p r i a t e . This i s the 
area o f p o t e n t i a l disagreement. I t s existence and extent i s not a 
r e f l e c t i o n o f the d i f f e r e n t values which people have, but o f the 
i m p r e c i s i o n of the n o t i o n o f d e r e l i c t i o n i n the English language. 
Because there are no exact s p e c i f i c a t i o n s f o r what a d e r e l i c t house 
must have ( o r r a t h e r not have) and because t h i s i mprecision i s i n the 
very nature o f the word, there w i l l always be a r e s t r i c t e d area o f 
p o t e n t i a l disagreement. Exactly the same i s t r u e o f d e s c r i p t i o n s , 
not normally associated w i t h disputed claims, such as those s p e c i f y i n g 
colour. We may not be able t o decide whether a p a r t i c u l a r door i s 
p r o p e r l y t o be described as 'blue' or 'turquoise'. Again the area 
o f dispute i s r e s t r i c t e d . We know, f o r example, t h a t the door i s not 
black and i s not green. I n t r a c i n g the nature o f what i s under dispute 
i n any o f these cases, we are concerned only w i t h the use o f language 
and the l i m i t s i t imposes on the v e r i f i c a t i o n o f f a c t u a l statements. 
3. Every statement involves some k i n d of judgement by the agent making 
the statement. Judgement and s u b j e c t i v i t y cannot, t h e r e f o r e , be 
synonymous, f o r i f they were no statement could be o b j e c t i v e . 1 3 The 
d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e - s u b j e c t i v e and the o b j e c t i v e cannot, then, r e s t 
on the presence or absence o f a judgement. Even the most simple f a c t u a l 
1 Someone might claim t h a t no statement could be o b j e c t i v e ( i e . t h a t 
every statement must be s u b j e c t i v e ) . This c l a i m , however, i s not an 
i n t e r e s t i n g one, f o r i t i s only i n so f a r as the suggested s u b j e c t i v i t y 
o f h i s t o r y can be contrasted w i t h the o b j e c t i v i t y o f another d i s c i p l i n e 
such as mathematics, t h a t the charge o f s u b j e c t i v i t y i t s e l f becomes 
important. Further, I am not sure t h a t the claim i s a sensible one. 
I f every statement must be s u b j e c t i v e and we can g i v e no i l l u s t r a t i o n 
o f what a non-subjective statement would be (because the claim i t s e l f 
excludes the p o s s i b i l i t y o f doing s o ) , then the word ' s u b j e c t i v e ' 
becomes meaningless. I n a s i m i l a r way, the n o t i o n o f 'least e f f o r t ' 
was found t o be meaningless when a p p l i e d t o a l l p o s s i b l e paths, (see 
Chapter 4, Section I I I above). 
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statement r e q u i r e s an act o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . The d e c l a r a t i o n , 
•This i s a t a b l e ' , r e q u i r e s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f an object as a 
t a b l e i n j u s t the same way as the d e c l a r a t i o n , 'This i s a d e r e l i c t 
house' re q u i r e s the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f an obje c t as both 'a house' and 
as ' d e r e l i c t ' . Although the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f everyday o b j e c t s w i l l 
r a r e l y give r i s e t o disputes - at l e a s t where the human agents i n v o l v e d 
are competent speakers o f the same language - t h i s i s a contingent 
matter and not r e l a t e d t o the nature o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f . 
Words, such as ' d e r e l i c t ' and ' a f f l u e n t ' which some would claim t o be 
value-laden are no less p a r t o f the Eng l i s h language and t h e r e f o r e 
r e q u i r e the same k i n d o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n by the speaker as the words 
' c h a i r ' , ' t a b l e ' e t c . And t h i s act o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s some 
judgement on the p a r t o f the i d e n t i f i e r . Value statements, then, 
cannot be d i s t i n g u i s h e d by the f a c t t h a t they i n v o l v e some k i n d o f 
judgement. 
Objective judgements i n h i s t o r y : 
Despite the b r e v i t y w i t h which the d i s t i n c t i o n s between f a c t and 
value and between o b j e c t i v i t y and s u b j e c t i v i t y have been o u t l i n e d , the 
conclusions are both s u b s t a n t i a l and lend considerable support t o the 
account o f h i s t o r y already advanced. A l l we needed t o e s t a b l i s h i n 
order t o counter the Marxist challenge was t h a t i t i s possible t o make 
o b j e c t i v e statements about t h e world which are not a t the same time 
s t a t i s t i c a l or numerical. This much i s now evident. When we t a l k 
about events i n the world we do not need t o t a l k about them i n r e l a t i o n 
t o ourselves ( i e . i n the p r a c t i c a l idiom) or i n r e l a t i o n t o our p a r t i c u l a r 
l i k e s and d i s l i k e s ( i e . s u b j e c t i v e l y ) . We can make judgements about what 
i s happening o r what has happened which are not n e c e s s a r i l y s u b j e c t ] v e . I f 
we are t o assess whether a p a r t i c u l a r k i l l i n g was a murder or a 
p a r t i c u l a r property d e r e l i c t , these assessments themselves can be 
o b j e c t i v e f o r i t i s a matter o f a r r i v i n g a t the c o r r e c t d e s c r i p t i o n . 
Disputes are about the meaning o f the words i n the language r a t h e r 
than clashes o f personal values. This i s not t o claim t h a t no 
statements are s u b j e c t i v e , nor t h a t h i s t o r i a n s never make s u b j e c t i v e 
statements, but only t h a t an o b j e c t i v e h i s t o r i c a l account i s a l o g i c a l 
p o s s i b i l i t y . And there i s , t h e r e f o r e , no c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n c h a r a c t e r i s i n g 
the h i s t o r i a n as a n o n - p r a c t i c a l man. 
The h i s t o r i c a l account: 
The h i s t o r i c a l account i s an o b j e c t i v e account, but i n what 
r e l a t i o n does i t stand t o the world o f present evidence? I s the g i v i n g 
o f an h i s t o r i c a l account an act o f d e s c r i b i n g o r an act of explaining? 
The answer i s important i n the context of the t h e s i s as a whole, f o r 
i f the adoption o f an h i s t o r i c a l mode o f understanding produces only 
a d e s c r i p t i o n of Edinburgh's r e s i d e n t i a l p a t t e r n s , the search f o r a 
way of e x p l a i n i n g these pa t t e r n s must end w i t h an admission o f defeat. 
I f an h i s t o r i c a l account i s m e r e l y - d e s c r i p t i v e then we must conclude 
t h a t the urban geographer can never f u r n i s h an explanation o f the 
l o c a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s o f human a r t e f a c t s . And i t i s open t o anyone t o 
p o i n t out t h a t the geographer does not need the h i s t o r i a n ' s help i n 
order t o describe the settlement features o f i n t e r e s t t o him. I f we 
examine the nature o f the h i s t o r i c a l account, however, i t i s evident t h a t 
i t i s not a mere d e s c r i p t i o n of past events, and i t does e x p l a i n something 
The h i s t o r i c a l account or n a r r a t i v e i s the product o f h i s t o r i c a l 
t h i n k i n g about the present. The l o g i c a l l i m i t s o f the h i s t o r i a n s work 
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are set by the content and scope o f the evidence which p r e s e n t l y 
e x i s t s . 1 1 * The discovery of new evidence (from the set o f e x i s t i n g 
but p r e v i o u s l y unknown evidence) i s o f supreme importance t o the 
h i s t o r i a n . I t gives him grounds upon which t o question the received 
o r e s t a b l i s h e d account and, i f the new evidence warrants i t , t o provide 
a new account. This new account w i l l then compete f o r r e c o g n i t i o n 
w i t h i n the community o f h i s t o r i a n s . Thus the h i s t o r i c a l account has 
t h i s much i n common w i t h the t h e o r i e s o f n a t u r a l science. The 
s c i e n t i s t also questions e s t a b l i s h e d s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s i n the l i g h t 
o f newly discovered evidence. He can o f f e r an hypothesis o f h i s own 
which takes account o f t h i s new evidence and which has t o compete w i t h 
the o l d theory f o r r e c o g n i t i o n by the s c i e n t i f i c community. And, l i k e 
the s c i e n t i s t , i t i s the h i s t o r i a n ' s task t o question every d e t a i l o f 
the e s t a b l i s h e d account i n r e l a t i o n t o the evidence he himself has 
amassed. H i s t o r y , l i k e science, i s a cumulative d i s c i p l i n e w i t h 
researchers b u i l d i n g upon the accepted body of knowledge and c o n s t a n t l y 
endeavouring t o improve upon i t i n order t o come cl o s e r and cl o s e r t o 
the t r u t h . A l a r g e p a r t of l e a r n i n g t o t h i n k h i s t o r i c a l l y ( o r 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y ) i s l e a r n i n g how t o assess the importance o f any piece 
o f evidence i n r e l a t i o n t o the es t a b l i s h e d account ( o r t h e o r y ) . This 
i s a s k i l l l e a r n t only w i t h i n t h e appropriate community o f scholars. 
I t depends upon a wide knowledge o f the subject matter o f the d i s c i p l i n e , 
but also on a f e e l i n g f o r t h a t s u b j e c t . As w i t h other s k i l l s t h e r e are 
a number o f t e c h n i c a l r u l e s which must be fol l o w e d i n the assessment o f 
The l i m i t s t o any a c t u a l account w i l l be set by the evidence known 
t o the i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r i a n . The l o g i c a l l i m i t s o f a l l h i s t o r i c a l 
study, however, are determined by the e x i s t i n g evidence whether 
known or unknown. 
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evidence ( t o check a u t h e n t i c i t y , f o r example), but t e c h n i c a l 
competence alone does not produce a good h i s t o r i a n . Learning t o do 
h i s t o r y , l i k e l e a r n i n g t o speak a language, i s t o f o l l o w c e r t a i n r u l e s 
which have evolved w i t h i n t h e community and are r a r e l y s p e c i f i e d . The 
h i s t o r i a n must judge or assess t h e import o f newly discovered evidence 
but i n doing so he makes an h i s t o r i c a l judgement; i e . a judgement which 
involves f o l l o w i n g the r u l e s o f h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e . This i s the 
p a r t i c u l a r s k i l l o f the h i s t o r i a n . The account he presents i s based 
upon such judgements and, since both the account and the judgements 
are e s s e n t i a l l y h i s t o r i c a l , t h i s i s what marks h i s t o r y as a separate 
d i s c i p l i n e and the h i s t o r i c a l account as e n t i r e l y o b j e c t i v e . 1 5 
The c o m p i l a t i o n o f an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e involves 'making 
something' o f the heterogeneous evidence i n existence at the present 
time. Therefore, although t h e n a r r a t i v e may be s a i d t o be a d e s c r i p t i o n 
o f events i n the past, i t i s not simply a d e s c r i p t i o n o f the present 
evidence. I r i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h a t evidence which provides an 
understanding of the events f o r which the evidence i s evidence. And 
since the h i s t o r i c a l account i s i n t e r p r e t a t i v e , since i t makes use o f 
the e v i d e n c e i n a p a r t i c u l a r way, i t i s ~ v e r y l i k e the s c i e n t i f i c theory. 
The account i s o f f e r e d as an hypothesis, a suggested i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
the evidence. Like the s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis, i t i s then subject t o 
s c r u t i n y according t o the ap p r o p r i a t e academic c r i t e r i a . b e f o r e becoming 
O b j e c t i v i t y i n any sphere i s concerned w i t h the f o l l o w i n g o f c e r t a i n 
r u l e s or the adoption o f c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a . The s c i e n t i s t as w e l l as 
the h i s t o r i a n can be o b j e c t i v e , f o r , i n l e a r n i n g t o t h i n k s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , 
he w i l l also have l e a r n t how p r o p e r l y t o assess the evidence. And the 
o b j e c t i v i t y derives from the way i n which the evidence i s assessed. 
Even i n the use o f s t a t i s t i c a l method and simple measurement Ccommonly 
assumed t o be o b j e c t i v e ) standard r u l e s must be fol l o w e d i f the proper 
r e s u l t s are t o be obtained. 
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e s t a b l i s h e d ( o r f a i l i n g t o become esta b l i s h e d ) as p a r t o f a body 
o f knowledge. The h i s t o r i c a l account i s the theory o f the h i s t o r i a n 
and the d i s c i p l i n e o f h i s t o r y i s every b i t as t h e o r e t i c a l as the 
d i s c i p l i n e o f science. The e s s e n t i a l uniqueness o f h i s t o r i c a l events 
does not preclude t h e o r e t i c a l study i t simple precludes s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
t h e o r e t i c a l study. Urban geography, i f i t adopts h i s t o r i c a l method, 
can c e r t a i n l y b u i l d up a body o f theory. But t h i s wealth o f received 
accounts would be concerned e n t i r e l y w i t h unique events. There could 
be no u n i v e r s a l formula i n t o which any s i m i l a r event could be plugged. 
H i s t o r i c a l t h e o r i e s are not general or u n i v e r s a l i n nature. They deal 
only w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r . Indeed t h i s i s what d i s t i n g u i s h e s them from 
the t h e o r i e s o f n a t u r a l science. 
H i s t o r i c a l explanation: 
So the urban geographer can o f f e r an account which i s both 
t h e o r e t i c a l and i n t e r p r e t a t i v e . He can. by t h i n k i n g h i s t o r i c a l l y , 
advance the understanding o f urban events and the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f human 
a r t e f a c t s . But can he provide an explanation of these events and 
these d i s t r i b u t i o n s ? _ Explanation i t s e l f is_concerned w i t h the 
s o l v i n g o f a problem or p u z z l e . 1 6 As Toulmin p o i n t s o u t , "...the 
idea o f explanation i s t i e d up w i t h our p r i o r p a t t e r n s o f expectation...". 
I t i s the unexpected which presents a problem and which t h e r e f o r e r e q u i r e s 
an explanation. 'Explanation' can be thought o f as 'accounting f o r the 
unexpected'. And p r i o r expectations i n both h i s t o r y and science w i l l 
be set by the appropriate e s t a b l i s h e d body o f knowledge. I t i s t h e 
received account i n h i s t o r y and est a b l i s h e d theory i n science against 
see f o o t n o t e , p.185 above 
S. Toulmin (1961) p.56 
which any newly discovered piece o f evidence can be judged 'expected' 
or 'unexpected'. H i s t o r i c a l explanations are p r o p e r l y given only 
when there i s an h i s t o r i c a l puzzle; i e . only when a piece o f evidence 
does not f i t i n w i t h the received account. And i t i s the puzzle 
which i s explained i n o f f e r i n g a new account o f the events, and not 
the events themselves. The existence o f t h a t piece o f apparently 
c o n t r a d i c t o r y evidence ( i e . evidence not f i t t i n g i n w i t h the received 
account) i s , by changing the account, rendered unproblematic. 
H i s t o r i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n , then, concerns r e l a t i n g the known evidence t o 
the h i s t o r i c a l account i n a way such t h a t the existence o f any piece 
o f t h a t evidence i s n e i t h e r p u z z l i n g nor problematic. 
There i s , however, another sense of the unexpected i n h i s t o r y , 
and t h e r e f o r e another way i n which the h i s t o r i a n can be s a i d t o e x p l a i n . 
This i s where the present evidence i t s e l f suggests a s e r i e s o f past 
events one or more o f which appear as completely unexpected i n r e l a t i o n 
t o the r e s t . For example, i f we have evidence o f a country waging a 
b i t t e r war against i t s neighbour over a p e r i o d o f years and slowly 
b u i l d i n g up i t s reserves o f trained s o l d i e r s and s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons 
u n t i l i t i s i n a p o s i t i o n o f dominance, then f u r t h e r evidence which 
suggests t h a t i t then made a very unfavourable peace settlement would 
c e r t a i n l y be p u z z l i n g and unexpected. That such a peace settlement 
followed a strong m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n and v i c t o r i e s on the b a t t l e f r o n t 
r e q u i r e s an explanation because i t i s p r o b l e m a t i c . 1 8 Explanation here 
too involves d i s p e l l i n g puzzles. Since the puzzles and problems are 
not d i s t i n c t i v e l y h i s t o r i c a l ( i e . they do not r e l y on there being pieces 
I t should not be i n f e r r e d from t h i s , t h a t h i s t o r i a n s e x p l a i n the 
past. Rather, the h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e describes the course o f 
past events. The h i s t o r i a n could not give a general account o f why 
what happened, happened a t a l l . What he can do, however, i s t o take 
a p a r t i c u l a r event, the occurrence o f which appears as problematic i n 
the general course o f events at t h a t t i m e , and render i t s occurrence 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
o f evidence which do not f i t i n w i t h the received account), however, 
nor i s the mode o f explanation. This sense o f the unexpected i s not 
p e c u l i a r t o h i s t o r y , and i t i s the content r a t h e r than the mode which 
marks these explanations as h i s t o r i c a l . The task o f the h i s t o r i a n 
i s t o provide a n a r r a t i v e which renders the course o f past events 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
I t i s important t o note here, t h a t making any s e r i e s o f h i s t o r i c a l 
events i n t e l l i g i b l e does not i n v o l v e e s t a b l i s h i n g causal connections 
between the events. The primary concern o f the h i s t o r i a n i s w i t h human 
agency and he must construct an account which reveals the a c t i o n s o f 
s p e c i f i c human agents as i n t e l l i g i b l e i n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r context. 
Since actions are not caused ( i n the s t r i c t sense), they cannot be made 
i n t e l l i g i b l e by d e t a i l i n g the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s 
( i e . the cause) f o r t h e i r occurrence. Actions are i n t e l l i g i b l e i f 
the actors can be seen t o have some reason f o r so a c t i n g . And past 
events are i n t e l l i g i b l e when they are shown not to be T o t a l l y unexpected 
or s u r p r i s i n g i n r e l a t i o n t o the whole series o f events o f which they 
are a p a r t . As Oakeshott says, 
I n the ' h i s t o r i a n ' s ' understanding o f events, j u s t 
as none i s ' a c c i d e n t a l ' , so none i s 'necessary' or 
' i n e v i t a b l e ' . What we can observe him doing i n h i s 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i n q u i r i e s and utterances i s , not e x t r i c a t i n g 
general causes or necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s , but 
s e t t i n g before us the events ( i n so f a r as they can be 
ascertained) which mediate one circumstance t o another. 
....'the h i s t o r i a n ' , although he sometimes w r i t e s o f the 
outbreak o f war as a ' c o n f l a g r a t i o n ' , nevertheless leaves 
us i n no doubt t h a t he knows o f no set o f c o n d i t i o n s which 
may p r o p e r l y be c a l l e d the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n s 
of war. He knows only o f a set o f happenings which, when 
f u l l y set o u t , make the outbreak o f t h i s war seem n e i t h e r 
an 'accident', nor a 'miracle', nor a necessary event, but 
merely an i n t e l l i g i b l e o c c u r r e n c e . 1 9 
A l l h i s t o r i c a l events are contingent f o r they could have been otherwise. 
The Archduke Ferdinand was shot and died at Serajevo i n Bosnia on June 
M. Oakeshott, o p . c i t . , p.157 
24, 1914, but i t need not have been so. I n the same way, the 
l o c a t i o n o f a p a r t i c u l a r f a c t o r y , house, c a s t l e or palace i s what 
i t i s , although i t could have been b u i l t elsewhere. The act o f 
l o c a t i n g i t at a p a r t i c u l a r spot can be made i n t e l l i g i b l e by d e t a i l i n g 
the h i s t o r i c a l circumstance which l e d t o i t s founding. There i s no 
necessity i n v o l v e d and those who have attempted general t h e o r i e s o f 
l o c a t i o n o f t e n r e f e r to the ' h i s t o r i c accident' which l e d t o an 
i n d u s t r i a l concern occupying a p a r t i c u l a r s i t e ( w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n 
t h a t these are i n e x p l i c a b l e and can be ig n o r e d ) . I t i s p r e c i s e l y the 
' h i s t o r i c accident' which i n t e r e s t s the h i s t o r i a n , however. And i t i s 
h i s task t o demonstrate t h a t i t was no 'accident' a t a l l . H i s t o r y 
i s one way o f t h i n k i n g about the past and a way open t o the urban 
geographer f o r h i s subject matter i s amenable t o h i s t o r i c a l treatment. 
Oakeshott best sums up the nature o f t h i s past, the past o f the h i s t o r i a n 
I t i s a complicated w o r l d , w i t h o u t u n i t y o f f e e l i n g 
or a c l e a r o u t l i n e : i n i t events have no o v e r - a l l 
parxern or purpose, lead nowhere, p o i n t t o no favoured 
c o n d i t i o n o f the world and support no p r a c t i c a l conclusions. 
I t i s a world composed wholly of contingencies and i n which 
contingencies are i n t e l l i g i b l e , not because they have been 
resolved, but on account o f the c i r c u m s t a n t i a l r e l a t i o n s 
which have been e s t a b l i s h e d between them: the h i s t o r i a n ' s 
concern i s not w i t h causes but w i t h o c c a s i o n s . 2 0 
An h i s t o r i c a l mode o f understanding the world i s a d i s t i n c t i v e way 
of t h i n k i n g which can provide an understanding o f the l o c a t i o n a l p a t t e r n 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n s found i n and among urban places. I t i s t h e o r e t i c a l i n 
nat u r e , but ne c e s s a r i l y involves a co n s i d e r a t i o n o f the p a r t i c u l a r , the 
unique. The h i s t o r i c a l account i s o f the p a r t i c u l a r event and not of 
a class o f events. B r i g g s , i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n t o V i c t o r i a n C i t i e s , 
I b i d . , pp.166-7 
confirms the h i s t o r i a n ' s preoccupation w i t h t h e unique,when he 
remarks, 
The f i r s t e f f e c t o f e a r l y i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was 
t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e English communities r a t h e r than 
t o standardize them. However much the h i s t o r i a n 
t a l k s o f common urban problems, he w i l l f i n d t h a t 
one o f h i s most i n t e r e s t i n g tasks i s t o show i n 
what respects c i t i e s d i f f e r e d from each other. 
....nineteenth century c i t i e s not only had markedly 
d i f f e r e n t topography, d i f f e r e n t economic and s o c i a l 
s t r u c t u r e s , and q u i t e d i f f e r e n t degrees o f i n t e r e s t 
i n t h e i r surrounding r e g i o n s , but they responded 
d i f f e r e n t l y t o the urban problems which they shared 
i n common. A study o f English V i c t o r i a n c i t i e s , i n 
p a r t i c u l a r , must n e c e s s a r i l y be concerned w i t h 
i n d i v i d u a l c ases. 2 1 
The urban geographer can only provide a t h e o r e t i c a l base f o r h i s study 
i f he too considers any c i t y as i n d i v i d u a l . By adopting h i s t o r i c a l 
method we can co n s t r u c t an account, using the p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g 
evidence ( d i a r i e s , newspaper accounts, census r e t u r n s , the present 
s t r e e t p a t t e r n and f a b r i c o f the c i t y e t c . ) , o f the movement of 
various sections o f the population w i t h i n the c i t y and the nature o f 
the areas and accommodation i n which they took up residence. I n t h i s 
way, and only i n t h i s way, can the r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n s o f the various 
s o c i a l groups i n l a t e nineteenth century Edinburgh be made i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
To make t h e i r l o c a t i o n i n t e l l i g i b l e i s t o remove any puzzle there might 
have been about the i n t r a - u r b a n movements and c o n f i g u r a t i o n s of the 
popu l a t i o n . And t o remove a puzzle i s t o e x p l a i n . 
A. Briggs (1968) pp.33-i+ 
To have concluded the methodological discussions o f Parts 1 
and 2 i n favour o f employing h i s t o r i c a l method i n the study o f 
geographical subject matter i s h a r d l y t o have introduced a new 
idea t o the community o f geographers. Indeed h i s t o r i c a l geography 
i s a w e l l recognised branch o f the subj e c t and many geographers 
could l e g i t i m a t e l y claim t h a t they have f o r some time been t h i n k i n g 
h i s t o r i c a l l y about the geographical phenomena o f i n t e r e s t t o them. 
The major t h e s i s being advanced here, however, i s not t h a t urban 
geographers can i f they wish t r e a t t h e i r subject matter h i s t o r i c a l l y 
b ut t h a t they must do so i f they are t o engage i n v a l i d , p r o f i t a b l e 
and t h e o r e t i c a l academic research. There i s no other way o f increas-
i n g our knowledge and understanding o f pat t e r n s and d i s t r i b u t i o n s t o 
be found w i t h i n the c i t y . And understanding the world i s the p o i n t 
o f i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r y . We asked, "What i s urban geography?" , 
"Which d i s t i n c t i v e mode o f understanding the w o r l d , or form o f reason-
i n g , must the geographer employ i f he i s t o provide an understanding 
o f urban l o c a t i o n s ? " An extensive s c r u t i n y o f the nature o f the sub-
j e c t matter has l e d t o the conclusion t h a t urban geography i s urban 
h i s t o r y , o r a t l e a s t a branch o f i t . Like science, h i s t o r y as a 
d i s c i p l i n e o f thought i s a d i s t i n c t i v e way o f l o o k i n g at the world. 
Amongst other i n t e l l e c t u a l i n q u i r i e s t o which man has turned h i s a t t e n t -
i o n only mathematics, theology and philosophy o f f e r e qually d i s t i n c t i v e 
forms o f reasoning. Of these, philosophy has a s p e c i a l s t a t u s being 
thought about thought, but mathematics, theology and science have i n 
t h e i r t u r n dominated man's t h i n k i n g about the problems o f knowledge. 
Only i n the eighteenth century d i d people begin t o t h i n k c r i t i c a l l y 
about h i s t o r y . I t was r e a l i s e d t h a t the o b j e c t o f h i s t o r i c a l thought, 
the p a s t , c o n s i s t i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r events i n space and time which are 
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no longer happening, cannot be apprehended by mathematical t h i n k i n g 
(the o b j e c t o f which has no s p e c i a l l o c a t i o n i n space and t i m e ) , nor 
by t h e o l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g ( t h e o b j e c t o f which i s i n f i n i t e r a t h e r than 
f i n i t e ) , nor even by s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g (the past not being open t o 
observation and experiment). I t i s , o f course, l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e 
f o r there TO be other d i s t i n c t i v e forms o f reasoning but so f a r i n 
the h i s t o r y o f man's c r i t i c a l t h i n k i n g about the nature o f the wor l d 
none i s evident. Having r e j e c t e d science as being an i n a p p r o p r i a t e 
way of t h i n k i n g about the e s s e n t i a l l y temporal sub j e c t matter o f 
urban geography, h i s t o r y then seemed the d i s c i p l i n e of thought most 
l i k e l y t o f u r n i s h an understanding o f urban phenomena. Chapter 7 
was devoted t o e x h i b i t i n g the way i n which the h i s t o r i c a l mode i s an 
appropriate v e h i c l e f o r explanation and understanding i n urban geo-
graphy. 
Despite the recent r e v i v a l o f i n t e r e s t i n h i s t o r i c a l geography 
i t would be misleading t o suggest That urban geographers r e a d i l y 
employ h i s t o r i c a l method i n t h e i r urban research. Most do not. I t 
would be equ a l l y misleading t o suggest t h a t what i s p r e s e n t l y being 
advocated i s the treatment o f urban geography as a s u b - d i v i s i o n o f a 
narrowly defined h i s t o r i c a l geography. 'History' as i t has been d i s -
cussed so f a r i n t h i s t h e s i s i s not a synonym f o r 'the past', but 
r a t h e r a way o f t h i n k i n g which can r e s u l t i n the understanding o f a 
wide range o f subje c t matter. I t i s only when the subject matter i s 
urban and geographical t h a t we have urban geography. I f i t i s the case, 
as Darby suggests, t h a t "The term ' h i s t o r i c a l geography' has come t o be 
i n c r e a s i n g l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h an approach i n which the data are h i s t o r -
1 
i c a l but i n which the method i s geographical" , then such an h i s t o r i c a l 
1 
H.C. Darby (1953) p.3 
geography i s fundamentally a t odds w i t h the conception o f h i s t o r y 
being advanced here. Darby uses ' h i s t o r i c a l ' merely t o r e f e r t o 
'the past' and the method he t a l k s o f must be a technique r a t h e r 
than a d i s t i n c t i v e mode of thought f o r only the former could be 
s a i d t o be geographical. A piece o f research i n geography i s only 
p r o p e r l y h i ^ T o r i c a l i f i t e n t a i l s h i s t o r i c a l t h i n k i n g . Thus Moodie 
and Lehr are r i g h t when they c r i t i c i s e Darby's view t h a t , " A l l 
2 
geography i s h i s t o r i c a l geography, e i t h e r a c t u a l or p o t e n t i a l " , 
f o r contemporary geography w r i t t e n i n the l i g h t of the p r a c t i c a l 
problems o f today could never r e v e a l such t h i n k i n g however out o f 
date i t became. As Guelke comments, " H i s t o r i c a l geography i s an 
academic f i e l d par excellence. I t owes i t s existence t o i n t e l l -
3 
e c t u a l enquiry about the past." This d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t from any 
contemporary w r i t i n g w i t h e s s e n t i a l l y pragmatic o b j e c t i v e s . 
To accept the arguments so f a r presented i s t o accept t h a t only 
by c o n s t r u c t i n g an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e can we gain a knowledge 
and understanding o f urban phenomena which would allow us t o e x p l a i n 
the l o c a t i o n or p a t t e r n of urban a r t e f a c t s . As a c o r o l l o r y t o t h i s 
i t must also be accepted t h a t there can be no other way o f studying 
such phenomena which e x h i b i t s d i s c i p l i n e d t h i n k i n g and i s , t h e r e f o r e , 
p u r e l y academic. To be sure, there may be many p r a c t i c a l problems 
f a c i n g contemporary urban communities t o which i n d i v i d u a l geographers 
t u r n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n . There, however, the o b j e c t i v e i s one o f 
s o l v i n g the problems and does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e an understanding 
o f the a c t u a l urban pa t t e r n s or l o c a t i o n s concerned, but only an 
see D.W. Moodie and J.C. Lehr (.1976) pp. 132-133 
L. Guelke (1975) p. 13b 
awareness o f what would count as a s o l u t i o n . F u r t h e r , i n so f a r 
as some understanding o f the p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n o r l o c a t i o n i s 
re q u i r e d , h i s t o r i c a l t h i n k i n g must be employed. I t i s the case 
t h a t any consideration o f l o c a t i o n i n a temporal context w i l l 
seek explanations through examining past events " , and urban geo-
graphy, concerned as i t i s wixh human a r t e f a c t s ( t h e s p e c i f i c out-
come o f human behav i o u r ) , cannot avoid temporal contexts. To 
have e s t a b l i s h e d t h i s i s t o have p o i n t e d a way forward f o r human 
geography which could avoid much o f the methodological confusion 
associated w i t h the predominance o f sc i e n t i s m i n the s o c i a l sciences. 
I n so saying i t has not been assumed t h a t the path i s e i t h e r s t r a i g h t 
or narrow. The c o n t i n u i n g i n f l u e n c e o f s c i e n t i f i c method and the 
many p r a c t i c a l problems faced by any h i s t o r i a n combine t o ensure t h a t 
w r i t i n g an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e o f urban events r e q u i r e s considerable 
a p p l i c a t i o n . The recent methodological w r i t i n g s o f h i s t o r i c a l 
geographers provide a good i l l u s t r a t i o n o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n v o l v e d . 
The p r a c t i c a l problems which may confront any geographer attempt-
i n g t o co n s t r u c t an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e are many and v a r i e d . Baker, 
5 
Hamshere and Langton discuss a few o f the most common o f these i n 
some d e t a i l and anyone who has examined h i s t o r i c a l documents w i l l be 
aware of the f r u s t r a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n atte m p t i n g t o read i l l e g i b l e 
h a n d w r i t i n g , t r y i n g t o a s c e r t a i n e x a c t l y t o which a r e a l u n i t a 
document r e f e r s ( i n the absence o f maps), d i s c o v e r i n g the standard-
i s e d equivalents o f unstandardised weights and measures, and not 
i n f r e q u e n t l y f i n d i n g t h a t a document which evidence suggests must 
have e x i s t e d can no longer be traced. But i t i s not w i t h the 
it A.R.H. Baker, R.A. B u t l i n , A.D.M. P h i l l i p s and H.C. Prince (1969) p.48 
5 see A.R.H. Baker, J.D. Hamshere and J. Langton (1970) i n t r o d u c t i o n 
247. 
p r a c t i c a l problems o f the scholar t h a t a methodological t r e a t i s e 
i s concerned. W h i l s t no one could deny t h a t i n the course o f 
h i s t o r i c a l s cholarship such problems do a r i s e , these problems 
are n e i t h e r d i s t i n c t i v e l y nor e x c l u s i v e l y h i s t o r i c a l . Even 
the i n d i s p u t a b l e f a c t t h a t h i s t o r i c a l evidence i s r a r e l y com-
p l e t e does not c o n s t i t u t e a methodological problem although 
i t may r e s u l t i n a n a r r a t i v e which only p a r t i a l l y covers the 
events i n question. As we have seen , the l o g i c a l l i m i t t o 
the h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e i s determined by the p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g 
evidence. Where there i s no evidence there can be no h i s t o r y . 
This i s an important p o i n t , b ut a p o i n t which r e q u i r e s some 
el a b o r a t i o n not l e a s t because i t i s sometimes overlooked. 
For the h i s t o r i a n , "Facts drawn from the records o f the 
past d i c t a t e h i s conclusions - they are the touchstones o f the 
6 7 v a l i d i t y o f h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . " Without the f a c t s of the 
present evidence there would be no way o f ' t e s t i n g ' an h i s t o r -
i c a l n a r r a t i v e . The n a r r a t i v e i t s e l f , i n order t o pass such a 
t e s t , must account f o r a l l known pieces o f evidence and be con-
8 
t r a d i c t e d by no known evidence. To suppose, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t 
there could be such a t h i n g as c o u n t e r f a c t u a l h i s t o r y i s t o mis-
understand the nature o f h i s t o r y . Even the phrase ' c o u n t e r f a c t u a l 
6 
A.R.H. Baker e t a l , (1969) p. 47 
7 
And i t i s as much a f a c t t h a t Mr. A. f e l t so depressed as t o 
contemplate committing s u i c i d e , i f indeed t h i s was h i s s t a t e 
o f mind, as i t i s t h a t the b u l l e t s h a t t e r e d h i s r i b cage and 
penetrated h i s h e a r t . 
8 
I t i s worth n o t i n g t h a t , f o r any p a r t i c u l a r piece o f h i s t o r i c a l 
research, ' evidence' o r i g i n a l l y thought t o be r e l e v a n t may be 
shown not t o be so; i . e . not t o be evidence f o r the events 
i n question a t a l l . 
24-8 . 
9 h i s t o r y ' i s a misnomer f o r i t cannot be made sense of. W h i l s t , 
then, we can agree w i t h Baker t h a t , "... i t would be i l l o g i c a l t o 
argue t h a t the observed states are r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f a l l p o s s i b l e 
10 
s t a t e s " , i t i s l o g i c a l l y impossible t o (and t h e r e f o r e i l l o g i c a l 
t o attempt t o ) t r e a t "other possible s t a t e s " h i s t o r i c a l l y . C l e a r l y 
what d i d happen might not have happened, and t h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what 
was meant by c h a r a c t e r i s i n g h i s t o r i c a l events as contingent. But 
i t i s not the h i s t o r i a n ' s task t o examine the p o s s i b l e , only t o 
attempt t o e s t a b l i s h the a c t u a l . Present evidence suggests only 
what d i d happen i n the past and any concern w i t h what might have 
been must be e n t i r e l y an exercise i n sp e c u l a t i o n which, a t best, 
reveals a powerful imagination but which i s not and never could be 
11 
e i t h e r h i s t o r i c a l scholarship or academic study. 
To acknowledge the v i t a l connection between evidence and 
n a r r a t i v e i s not t o avoid a l l the methodological p i t f a l l s which 
may waylay the urban geographer who attempts t o t h i n k h i s t o r i c a l l y . 
As Collingwood p o i n t s o u t , a l l h i s t o r y i s i n f e r e n t i a l knowledge 
9 
Like the phrase ' married b a t c h e l o r ' , the phrase ' c o u n t e r f a c t u a l 
h i s t o r y ' i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n t h a t once one r e a l i s e s the nature 
o f h i s t o r y as knowledge i n f e r r e d from the evidence, i t becomes 
obvious t h a t h i s t o r y could never be c o u n t e r f a c t u a l j u s t as c e r t -
a i n l y as a b a t c h e l o r must be unmarried. 
10 
A.R.H. Baker i n B.S. Osborne (1976) p. 176 
11 
The same mistake i s evident i n the w r i t i n g s o f H. Prince (1971 
p. 52)who w h i l s t recommending c o u n t e r f a c t u a l methods s t a t e s , 
"The h i s t o r i a n who f i r m l y r e j e c t s the p r o p r i e t y o f studying 
h i s t o r i c a l ' might-have-beens' and adheres t o the p r i n c i p l e 
t h a t the only possible course f o r h i s t o r y i s the one t h a t was 
a c t u a l l y taken i s fundamentally a t odds w i t h the model b u i l d e r . " 
Prince's main p o i n t i s , i t would seem, c o r r e c t . Like Baker, 
however, he wrongly assumes t h a t the h i s t o r i a n who dismisses 
c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s p e c u l a t i o n as n o n - h i s t o r i c a l i s also committed 
t o c l a i m i n g t h a t the course o f events could not have been other 
than they were. I t should now be evident t h a t the h i s t o r i a n 
claims, r a t h e r , t h a t past events were as they were (although 
they could have been otherwise) but t h a t t h e i r contingency does 
not a l t e r the f a c t t h a t only a n a r r a t i v e o f these events can 
be constructed from the present evidence. 
2M-9 . 
since i t i s i n f e r r e d from evidence about the past. Any h i s t o r i a n 
must, t h e r e f o r e , be aware o f what i s t o count as a l e g i t i m a t e i n f e r -
ence . Inferences can be more or less acceptable, more or less 
convincing, and there w i l l always be those which remain debateable. 
Baker has examined the l i m i t s o f inference i n h i s t o r i c a l geography 
12 
and Qjiggests s e v e r a l ways i n which such l i m i t s might be extended. 
I t i s important t o note t h a t h i s t o r i c a l inferences depend upon 
h i s t o r i c a l evidence, and a t l e a s t some o f Bakers suggestions are 
13 
s t r a t e g i e s f o r dis c o v e r i n g new evidence. There are many stages 
i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e and many ways i n 
14 
which inferences might be drawn and supported. As Mandlebaum 
has r e c e n t l y observed, "... what i s evident i n the f i r s t instance 
may be supplemented by the use o f hypotheses drawn from the h i s -
t o r i a n ' s knowledge o f human nature and from h i s acquaintance w i t h 
15 
other cases". Such hypotheses lead him t o look f o r other 
evidence not at f i r s t obvious t o him. Whether such hypotheses 
12 
A.R.H. Baker i n B.S. Osborne (1976) 
13 
S t a t i s t i c a l e x t r a p o l a t i o n s , f o r example, provide reasons 
f o r l o o k i n g f o r evidence t o support them. They themselves 
are a s p e c i a l k i n d o f inference from a c t u a l numerical data 
but -make only a weak h i s t o r i c a l hypothesis when there i s 
no other shred o f evidence f o r or against them. Further, 
the s t a t i s t i c a l e x t r a p o l a t i o n s alone could never form an 
h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e since they could never be an account 
of events. Technical advances may also allow new s o r t s 
o f evidence t o be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; p o l l e n a n a l y s i s , 
f o r example, provides a new k i n d o f evidence f o r the h i s t o r i a n . 
14 
An e x c e l l e n t example o f the way i n which many d i f f e r e n t 
inferences can be drawn from the same basic set o f evidence, 
be supported by various kinds o f supplementary evidence but 
s t i l l be judged i n terms o f t h a t evidence i s given by a 
work o f f i c t i o n . A. Berkeley (1929) 
15 M. Mandlebaum(i977) p. 127 
are based on economic laws, p s y c h o l o g i c a l g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s or 
knowledge o f s i m i l a r geographical c o n d i t i o n s , they can only be 
incorporated i n an h i s t o r i c a l account i f supported by the 
evidence. I t i s also important t o note the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
between any such g e n e r a l i s a t i o n and the account o f the p a r t i c u l a r . 
As Collingwood purs i t , 
I f by h i s t o r i c a l t h i n k i n g we already understand 
how and why Napoleon e s t a b l i s h e d h i s ascendancy 
i n r e v o l u t i o n a r y France, n o t h i n g i s added t o our 
understanding'of t h a t process by the statement 
(however t r u e ) t h a t s i m i l a r t h i n g s have happened 
elsewhere. I t i s only when the p a r t i u l a r f a c t 
cannot be understood by i t s e l f t h a t such s t a t e -
ments are o f v a l u e 1 6 
The drawing o f inferences i s a necessary p a r t o f h i s t o r i c a l t h i n k -
i n g the purpose o f which i s t o provide as complete an account as 
possible o f events "as they occurred and i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
17 
one another". The events themselves are s p e c i f i c i n time and 
place and hence unique. I t i s i n the w r i t i n g s o f those who have 
denied or ignored the ideographic nature o f h i s t o r y t h a t the method-
o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s which accompany the continued i n f l u e n c e o f 
scientism i n h i s t o r i c a l research are most evident. 
A r i s i n g perhaps from the f e e l i n g t h a t there i s a 'lack o f 
a e s t h e t i c s a t i s f a c t i o n ' about h i s t o r i c a l accounts, some h i s t o r i c a l 
geographers have concerned themselves w i t h the e l u c i d a t i o n o f 
a l t e r n a t i v e ways o f viewing the past. I n p a r t i c u l a r , s e v e r a l 
w r i t e r s c i t e as problematic the question o f how we can r e l a t e 
s t r u c t u r e s and the processes which produce them; t h i s i s not 
thought t o be a question which can be answered by a n a r r a t i v e 
16 
R.G. Collingwood (1970), p. 223 
17 
I b i d . p. 114 
o f past events. Olsson has c a l l e d i t 'the geographical 
18 
inference problem', and no ge n e r a l l y excepted s o l u t i o n t o i t 
has y e t been found. As Prince says, "... our knowledge o f 
the nature o f processes shaping s p a t i a l p a t t e r n s through time 
19 
i s no b e t t e r than rudimentary". We have already seen i n 
chapter 5 t h a t the connection between form and process depends 
e n t i r e l y upon which process one i s t a l k i n g about and t h a t on 
many occasions process cannot be divorced from form nor charact-
e r i s e d as an independent force of change o p e r a t i n g upon p a r t i c u l a r 
forms or s t r u c t u r e s . And t o t a l k o f processes i n h i s t o r y as i f 
they were such independent forces i s t o t a l k i n a s c i e n t i f i c idiom 
e n t i r e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o the subject matter. When Darby discuss-
es vege t a t i o n change on the East Anglian Breckland he q u i t e r i g h t l y 
p o i n t s out t h a t what he i s d e a l i n g w i t h i s "... not a s t a t i c p i c -
20 
t u r e but a process t h a t i s c o n t i n u i n g and seemingly never ending". 
The process here, however, consists i n the a c t u a l changes 'as they 
occurred and i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p t o one another'. There i s no 
other 'process' which could be taken out o f the p a r t i c u l a r context 
and discussed on i t s own. Neither v e g e t a t i o n change nor the devel-
opment o f an urban area r e v e a l processes , l i k e o x i d i s a t i o n f o r 
example, f o r which the d e t a i l s of p a r t i c u l a r instances are i r r e l e v -
ant. I n the p u r s u i t o f such g e n e r a l i t y i n h i s t o r i c a l geography 
today can be seen the c o n t i n u i n g i n f l u e n c e o f s c i e n t i s t i c (and 
t h e r e f o r e i n a p p r o p r i a t e ) t h i n k i n g . 
18 
G. Olsson (1969) 
19 
H. Pr i n c e , op. c i t . , p.22 2Q 
H.C. Darby, op. c i t . , p.7 
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A f i n a l example o f the pervasiveness o f science as a mode o f thought 
i s provided by the s t r u c t u r a l i s t approach, an approach r e c e n t l y 
recommended as o f f e r i n g great promise f o r h i s t o r i c a l geography. Indeed 
a t f i r s t glance s t r u c t u r a l i s m does appear t o be more h i s t o r i c a l than 
s c i e n t i f i c , since i t involves examining p a r t i c u l a r s o c i e t i e s or s o c i a l 
groups. However, given t h a t the study i s o f the p a r t i c u l a r , the 
s t r u c t u r a l i s t may be thought o f as pursuing what Baker c a l l s ' l i m i t e d 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s ' , and w h i l s t some o f these may be genuine h i s t o r i c a l 
( i f general) hypotheses, the s t a t u s o f others r a i s e s many questions. 
Baker claims, 
... the new technology (computerised i n v e s t i g a t i o n ) 
now makes i t possible f o r us t o discover much more 
about some aspects o f a past s o c i e t y than i n d ^ y i d u a l s 
w i t h i n t h a t s o c i e t y knew about i t themselves. 
And i t i s some k i n d o f fundamental u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e which, we are 
t o l d , the computer can r e v e a l t o us but o f which the i n d i v i d u a l 
members o f the s o c i e t y i n question would not have been aware. A 
moment'sreflection reveals t h a t what the s t r u c t u r a l i s t i s doing i s 
e i t h e r denying or i g n o r i n g the meaningful nature o f human a c t i o n . I f 
i n d i v i d u a l s are not aware o f the s t r u c t u r e s then the s t r u c t u r e s 
themselves could not be a reason f o r a c t i n g , i e . could not be an 
22 
i n f l u e n c e upon meaningful behaviour. The s t r u c t u r a l i s t approach 
could, t h e r e f o r e , never a i d the geographer concerned t o understand and 
e x p l a i n urban p a t t e r n s or l o c a t i o n s , f o r these j u s t are the outcome o f 
meaningful behaviour. This i s not t o say t h a t there are no r e g u l a r i t i e s 
or norms i n s o c i a l behaviour. Chapter 3 considers these e x p l i c i t l y 
21 
A.R.H. Baker i n B.S. Osbourne, op. c i t . , p. 175 
22 
I f , on the other hand, the s t r u c t u r e s are seen as the crea t i o n s of 
human behaviour ( i e . as produced by the behaviour r a t h e r than v i c e 
versa) then, since i t i s the behaviour and i t s s p a t i a l and v i s i b l e 
outcome which the geographer must understand, the s t r u c t u r e s 
themselves are q u i t e i r r e l e v a n t t o geographical research. 
253. 
and characterises such commonly shared responses as r u l e - f o l l o w i n g . But 
r u l e - f o l l o w i n g behaviour remains meaningful behaviour. Any attempt t o 
e l u c i d a t e what are conceived o f as more fundamental i n f l u e n c e s on behaviour 
must s u r e l y i n v o l v e a move away from h i s t o r y and towards science ( i n s o f a r 
as the behaviour i n question i s t r e a t e d l i k e a nervous t w i t c h , an automatic 
response) or theology ( i n s o f a r as some u l t i m a t e purpose or j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
o f human conduct i s sought). 
Bernstein i n h i s recent book on The R e s t r u c t u r i n g o f Social and P o l i t i c a l 
Theory recognises t h i s , but argues t h a t we do not have t o make the choice; 
t h a t , i n other words, the s o c i a l sciences are genuinely i n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y . 
He s t a t e s , 
I have argued t h a t we are not fo r c e d t o choose between an e i t h e r / 
or: e i t h e r the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s are s i m i l a r i n 
a l l respects t o the n a t u r a l sciences, o r they are so l o g i c a l l y 
d i s t i n c t as t o i n v o l v e wholly d i f f e r e n t concepts, methods and 
aims. On the c o n t r a r y , I have t r i e d t o show t h a t i f we work 
through what i s i n v o l v e d i n the n a t u r a l i s t i c s e lf-understanding 
o f the s o c i a l sciences, we are i n e l u c t a b l y l e d t o recognise how 
the world i s a meaningful one f o r human beings, how such meanings 
a r i s e , what sustains and challenges these meanings, and how they 
shape what we do. Fur t h e r , a more robust understanding o f s o c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y , and o f the ways i n which t h i s r e a l i t y i s 
v a l u e - c o n s t i t u t e d , does not d i s c r e d i t o r undermine the a p p l i c a t i o n 
o f s c i e n t i f i c techniques t o the study o f men i n s o c i e t y . 
I t i s c e r t a i n l y not being denied here t h a t techniques o f study may be 
ap p l i e d w i t h i n more than one d i s c i p l i n e o f thought. The q u a n t i t a t i v e 
techniques o f pure science may be u s e f u l i n the discovery and o r d e r i n g o f 
general h i s t o r i c a l f a c t s . Any piece o f research, however, i n order t o be 
a genuine advance i n knowledge and understanding, must r e v e a l some 
d i s t i n c t i v e mode o f understanding. And techniques themselves do not 
c o n s t i t u t e d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e s . Whatever the techniques, I have argued 
t h a t research i n urban geography must be h i s t o r i c a l f o r i t could not be 
s c i e n t i f i c ; and by t h i s I mean t h a t the d i s c i p l i n e o f thought necessary t o 
the understanding o f urban phenomena i s t h a t o f h i s t o r y and not t h a t o f 
science. The subject o f geography may span these d i s c i p l i n e s , b ut w i t h i n 
23 R.J. Bernstein (1976) p.157 
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i t any research must r e v e a l some p a r t i c u l a r d i s c i p l i n e o f thought i f 
i t i s t o be more than a miscellaneous c o l l e c t i o n of f a c t s . Some 
research may in v o l v e reasoning from more than one mode o f understand-
i n g . I t could be argued t h a t the study o f geomorphology, f o r 
2<+ 
example, re q u i r e s the use o f both h i s t o r i c a l and s c i e n t i f i c reasoning. 
This i s not the case i n human geography where s c i e n t i f i c reasoning 
i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e although s c i e n t i f i c techniques may not be. As 
Bernstein also notes, 
One could w r i t e the h i s t o r y of much o f s o c i a l science 
d u r i n g the past hundred years i n terms of d e c l a r a t i o n s 
t h a t i t has j u s t become, or i s j u s t about t o become, a 
genuine s c i e n t i f i c e n t e r p r i s e . 2 
The f a c t t h a t there i s s t i l l considerable debate about the methodology 
of the s o c i a l sciences - subjects which show so l i t t l e advance as 
sciences - should s u r e l y prompt c a u t i o n . I t i s being suggested 
here t h a t the p o s s i b i l i t y of advancing our knowledge and understanding 
of urban phenomena l i e s i n r e j e c t i n g s c i e n t i f i c method and espousing 
the method o f h i s t o r y . The t h e o r e t i c a l hypotheses of urban 
geography would then be h i s t o r i c a l i n nature. 
H i s t o r y as a mode of understanding derives i t s d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s 
from i t s method o f examining the present as evidence f o r what 
happened i n the past. Thus, "the h i s t o r i c a l scholar's p i c t u r e of 
the past i s a h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t " . As such i t i s open t o 
24 
Even i n geomorphology the two modes o f understanding are d i s t i n c t 
and d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . Any hypothesis w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y belong 
t o one or the other and be judged accordingly. 
25 
R.J. B e r n s t e i n , op. c i t . , p.52 
2 6 
D.W. Moodie and J.C. Lehr, op. c i t . , p.133 
c r i t i c i s m i n the l i g h t o f the evidence and, l i k e a s c i e n t i f i c 
hypothesis, i f i t stands the t e s t of time i t becomes established as an 
h i s t o r i c a l theory. The events w i t h which i t deals are seen as 
f o l l o w i n g i n t e l l i g i b l y one from another, but never necessarily, always 
c o n t i n g e n t l y . Unlike the s c i e n t i s t , the h i s t o r i a n i s not concerned 
t o e s t a b l i s h general laws. Collingwood has t h i s t o say, 
the t h i n g s about which an h i s t o r i a n reasons are not 
abs t r a c t but concrete, not u n i v e r s a l but i n d i v i d u a l , not 
i n d i f f e r e n t t o space and time but having a where and a when 
of t h e i r own, though the where need not be here and the when 
cannot be now. 7 
Most urban geographers recognise a time dimension i n t h e i r urban 
research, though few go as f a r as Robson i n concluding t h a t there i s 
l i t t l e i n the s p a t i a l p a t t e r n o f urban growth which could be i n t e r -
p reted b e t t e r by the geographer than by the d e s c r i p t i v e e x p e r t i s e o f 
the h i s t o r i a n . The arguments of chapter 7 were designed t o show 
t h a t only by t h i n k i n g h i s t o r i c a l l y can the urban geographer expect t o 
gain an understanding of such s p a t i a l p a t t e r n s . The p e c u l i a r task o f 
Part 3 of t h i s t h e s i s i s t o demonstrate t h a t the geographer can himself 
develop the same e x p e r t i s e as the h i s t o r i a n and y e t remain a geographer. 
2 7 R.G. Collingwood, op. c i t . , p.234 
2 8 B. Robson (1973) 
PART 3 
E D I N B U R G H 
AS A SPECIFIC URBAN PHENOMENON 
I n t h i s t h i r d and l a s t p a r t o f the t h e s i s we leave the general 
methodological discussions and concentrate a t t e n t i o n on a s p e c i f i c 
urban place, Edinburgh. The methodological conclusions must not 
be f o r g o t t e n , however, f o r they have forced the r a d i c a l a l t e r a t i o n o f 
the o r i g i n a l conception of how Edinburgh's urban s t r u c t u r e might be 
i n v e s t i g a t e d . And we must s t a r t again a t the beginning by s t i p u l a t i n g 
which f e a t u r e s o f the urban p a t t e r n are t o be s t u d i e d . 
My i n i t i a l i n t e n t i o n , as o u t l i n e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n , was t o 
take two d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p a t t e r n s which could be found w i t h i n the c i t y 
o f Edinburgh and t o examine the way i n which these are r e l a t e d . The 
f i r s t - the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f house types - r a i s e s few problems o f 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n , but i t also i s the l e a s t i n t e r e s t i n g . Indeed house 
type i s only one f e a t u r e , although an important one, o f any r e s i d e n t i a l 
l o c a t i o n . The second d i s t r i b u t i o n a l p a t t e r n - the r e s i d e n t i a l 
d i s t r i b u t i o n o f s o c i a l groups - was always intended as the primary 
concern o f the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The major questions r e l a t e d TO t h i s 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . Why are c e r t a i n s o c i a l groups confined t o p a r t i c u l a r 
and r e s t r i c t e d areas o f the c i t y 9 The answer was thought t o l i e i n 
the nature o f these areas, one f e a t u r e of which i s the type o f house 
t o be found t h e r e . The mistake was not only i n t h i s general 
also 
conception o f the questions t o be answered, b u t / i n the methods which 
were supposed t o produce the answers. The r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f s o c i a l groups cannot be given s t r i c t s p a t i a l boundaries, and cannot 
be given a s t r i c t d e f i n i t i o n . Q u a n t i t a t i v e techniques based upon 
d i s c r e t e area s t a t i s t i c s are consequently i n a p p r o p r i a t e , and the data-
set which could l e g i t i m a t e l y be provided could not y i e l d sensible 
measures o f c o r r e l a t i o n , even i f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f such measures 
was tempered w i t h a r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e i r r e s t r i c t e d s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
S t a t i s t i c s only provide answers f o r s t a t i s t i c i a n s and s t a t i s t i c a l 
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f o r m u l a t i o n s , however complicated, cannot alone provide the 
understanding the geographer seeks. I n s h o r t , the methods and modes 
o f a n a l y s i s prevalent i n the c u r r e n t l i t e r a t u r e o f urban geography 
presented methodological problems so numerous t h a t a r a d i c a l 
r e t h i n k i n g o f many issues was seen as a pressing necessity. 
So we began w i t h a c a r e f u l examination o f both methods and 
subject matter and have found h i s t o r y t o be the mode of understanding 
a p p l i c a b l e t o urban l o c a t i o n a l p a t t e r n s . The modern conception o f 
h i s t o r y i s , i n Collingwood 1s words, 
....a study a t once c r i t i c a l and c o n s t r u c t i v e 
whose f i e l d i s the human past i n i t s e n t i r e t y , 
and whose method i s the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h a t 
past from documents w r i t t e n and u n w r i t t e n , 
c r i t i c a l l y analysed and i n t e r p r e t e d . 1 
Any i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r i a n , then, can only make a small c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o such a vast f i e l d . Most become s p e c i a l i s t s i n one or two very 
r e s t r i c t e d periods o f the past, and indeed t h i s i s necessary i f they 
are t o make any s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n ax a l l . One man cannor 
deal w i t h the e n t i r e spread, both temporal and s p a t i a l , o f human 
h i s t o r y . Although we can agree, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t , "The whole p e r c e p t i b l e 
w o r l d , then, i s p o t e n t i a l l y and i n p r i n c i p l e evidence t o the h i s t o r i a n " 2 , 
understanding a document or whatever as evidence f o r a p a r t i c u l a r event 
r e q u i r e s some p r i o r h i s t o r i c a l knowledge and thus an i n d i v i d u a l h i s t o r i a n 
w i l l only recognise 'evidence' r e l a t i n g t o h i s own s p e c i a l i t i e s . Part 
o f being an h i s t o r i a n i s developing these s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s ( o f t e n i n 
p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n a l i t i e s , t h e i r l i f e and t i m e s ) , f o r the more concentrated 
one's research, the more s e n s i t i v e one becomes i n d e t e c t i n g new evidence 
and i n assessing i t s proper c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the h i s t o r i c a l account. 
1 R. G. Collingwood (1970) p.209 
2 I b i d . , p.247 
I n adopting an h i s t o r i c a l approach, then, we do not break w i t h 
the p r a c t i c e o f h i s t o r i a n s i f we s t a r t by c o n f i n i n g our study t o a 
p a r t i c u l a r time p e r i o d . And here I have chosen Edinburgh i n the 
l a t e n ineteenth century, the years between 1851 and 1891. The 
choice i s t o be explained r a t h e r than j u s t i f i e d . 3 No h i s t o r i c a l 
study has a r a i s o n d ' l i t r e other than t h a t i t provides an understanding 
of the past f o r i t s own sake. The l a t e nineteenth century, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n the c i t i e s o f Scotland, saw the advent o f s o c i a l reforms. The 
c o n t r a s t between the r i c h and the poor was s t i l l very g r e a t , but the 
a p p a l l i n g c o n d i t i o n s under which a l a r g e s e c t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n 
miraculously managed t o survive was only f o r the f i r s t time being 
widely p u b l i c i s e d . S o c i a l d i v i s i o n s were more pronounced than they 
are now and t h i s was p a r t i c u l a r l y so i n Edinburgh. There was no 
town p l a n n i n g 4 l e g i s l a t i o n t o mould the c i t y s t r u c t u r e w i t h p o l i c i e s 
o f land zonation or s o c i a l mixing. P r i v a t e e n t e r p r i s e and the p r a c t i c e 
o f l a i s s e z f a i r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the housing market, were dominant. 
Thus the i n f l u e n c e s on the s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e o f the nineteenth century 
c i t y were not complicated by extensive l o c a l government l e g i s l a t i o n as 
they are today. F i n a l l y , V i c t o r i a ' s r e i g n , as the age o f great c i t i e s , 
has an obvious appeal t o anyone i n t e r e s t e d i n the c i t y as an o b j e c t o f 
study. 
The choice o f s p e c i f i c dates was l a r g e l y pragmatic, being i n f l u e n c e d 
by the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f the o r i g i n a l census r e t u r n s a t t e n year i n t e r v a l s 
between and i n c l u d i n g 1851 and 1891. A census was taken i n 1841, but the 
S c o t t i s h r e t u r n s are both chaotic and less than comprehensive. Thus, f o r 
Edinburgh, the census o f 1851 was the f i r s t r e l i a b l e one and t h a t o f 1891 
the l a s t a v a i l a b l e one. O r i g i n a l l y these d e t a i l e d r e t u r n s were t o provide 
the basis o f an o b j e c t i v e d i v i s i o n o f s o c i a l groups and s o c i a l areas. This 
they cannot do, but they are the source o f a great wealth of i n f o r m a t i o n 
and can be t r e a t e d by the urban geographer as evidence f o r the s p a t i a l 
c o n f i g u r a t i o n s o f the past. 
'Town planning' here i s intended t o r e f e r t o the t w e n t i e t h century 
l e g i s l a t i o n . I n f a c t by 1851, Edinburgh's b u i l t environment had f o r 
some time been c o n t r o l l e d by the s t a t u t o r y powers o f the Dean o f Guild 
Court. 
These are my reasons f o r choosing the second h a l f o f the 
nineteenth century. But what about the choice o f Edinburgh i t s e l f ? 
I t i s o f t e n s a i d t h a t h i s t o r y i s about time, and geography about space. 
Although t h i s i s a gross and p o t e n t i a l l y misleading s i m p l i f i c a t i o n , 
of 
there i s a g r a i n / t r u t h i n i t which saves i t from being pure nonsense. 
H i s t o r y i s a d i s c i p l i n e , a way o f l o o k i n g a t the wor l d . W i t h i n 
h i s t o r y , t h e r e f o r e , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o have several s p e c i a l i s a t i o n s 
j u s t as we have the s p e c i a l i s a t i o n s o f physics and chemistry w i t h i n 
science. Sometimes the d i v i s i o n o f the d i s c i p l i n e of h i s t o r y i s a 
temporal one; we have, f o r example, modern h i s t o r y , medieval h i s t o r y 
or ancient h i s t o r y . And sometimes the d i v i s i o n i s a s p a t i a l one; 
here we have S c o t t i s h h i s t o r y , I n d i a n h i s t o r y , European h i s t o r y e t c . 
Any i n d i v i d u a l piece o f h i s t o r i c a l research w i l l have both temporal 
and s p a c i a l boundaries, f o r no s i n g l e h i s t o r i a n can cover the whole 
o f human h i s t o r y . F u r t h e r , since a l l events occur i n space the 
h i s t o r i a n w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y make s p e c i f i c s p a t i a l references i n the 
course o f h i s h i s t o r i c a l w r i t i n g . 5 Urban geography, as an h i s t o r i c a l 
s u b j e c t , can also make l e g i t i m a t e use o f both temporal and s p a t i a l 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s i n the designation o f i n d i v i d u a l research i n t e r e s t s . 
For urban geography, however, the s p a t i a l considerations w i l l always 
be the primary ones; the 'place' i s chosen f i r s t and s u i t a b l e temporal 
co-ordinates are decided upon i n r e l a t i o n t o the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s o f 
t h i s place. But i t i s not only t h i s s h i f t from the primacy o f p e r i o d 
t o the primacy o f place which d i s t i n g u i s h e s urban geography as a separate 
subject and as p e c u l i a r l y geographical. I n geography, place i s not 
merely more important than p e r i o d but i s , r a t h e r , a l l important. I t 
i s the place which i s of i n t e r e s t and not simply the general run o f 
Just as geographers, concerned w i t h the changing landscape, must 
include temporal references i n t h e i r geographical w r i t i n g s . 
h i s t o r i c a l events which have happened t h e r e . The urban geographer 
wants t o know what the place was l i k e and how i t developed. He i s 
t h e r e f o r e concerned only w i t h a c e r t a i n set o f h i s t o r i c a l events, 
and these are the events which have had some e f f e c t on the urban 
environment, on the place he s t u d i e s . I t i s only such events which 
are r e l e v a n t t o h i s research. Edinburgh was chosen as an h i s t o r i c a l 
arena worthy o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n because o f i t s f a s c i n a t i o n as a place. 
The concern i s geographical, although the method must be h i s t o r i c a l . 
This i s urban geography. And i f we are t o i l l u s t r a t e the way i n 
which the geographical subject matter i s t o be understood h i s t o r i c a l l y , 
i t i s t o a c t u a l events and happenings i n l a t e n i n e t e e n t h century 
Edinburgh t h a t we must now t u r n . 
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CHAPTER 8 
EDINBURGH, AN HISTORICAL ARENA 
To t a l k o f the h i s t o r y o f Edinburgh can be misleading. A c i t y 
cannot act and, t h e r e f o r e , has no actions t o be made i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
Things happen t o i t , t o i t s f a b r i c ; the b u i l t area i s extended, the 
centre decays or new roads and rai l w a y s change the urban p a t t e r n . 
The agency i s a human one. The 'events' o f the c i t y are the actions 
o f i t s i n h a b i t a n t s i n t h e i r p r i v a t e or p u b l i c c a p a c i t i e s . I t i s 
these actions which may be p u z z l i n g and demand an ex p l a n a t i o n , and i t 
i s these actions which the h i s t o r i c a l account can make i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
Urban geography, then, i s also human h i s t o r y . 1 The urban geographer 
i s concerned w i t h human behaviour, a l b e i t only w i t h t h a t behaviour 
which has r e l e v a n t s p a t i a l repercussions. I m p o r t a n t l y , Edinburgh i s not t o 
Collingwood (1970 p.215) p o i n t s t o the d i f f e r e n c e between the 
sequence o f 'mere events' i n the n a t u r a l world and the sequence o f 
(human) actions i n the h i s t o r i c a l world. This leads him t o make the 
i n t e r e s t i n g claim t h a t , " A l l h i s t o r y i s the h i s t o r y o f thought". The 
question o f whether Collingwood i s r i g h t or not must be l e f t open. I t 
i s worth n o t i n g , however, t h a t on t h i s basis he d i s t i n g u i s h e s geology 
(a n a t u r a l sequence o f events) from archaeology (a sequence o f events 
concerning human a c t i o n s ) . Only the l a t t e r i s s a i d t o be an h i s t o r i c a l 
sequence. Having i d e n t i f i e d the necessity o f examining the behaviour 
o f human agents i n the study o f human geography the l a t t e r i s f i r m l y on 
the ar c h a e o l o g i c a l side o f the d i v i d e and, t h e r e f o r e , even on Collingwood's 
account, e s s e n t i a l l y an h i s t o r i c a l s u b j e c t . 
be regarded as a place with a history so much an an h i s t o r i c a l arena 
i n which to view the co l l e c t i v e behavLcur of hosts of individuals and 
the effects of t h i s behaviour on the physical form and the character 
of the c i t y i t s e l f . The place and the period have been chosen, and 
the method has been decided. The p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s of Edinburgh are 
to form the content of the h i s t o r i c a l account. Generalities are of 
no i n t e r e s t , f o r to generalise i s to lose Edinburgh, to forsake the 
very details which give the c i t y i t s colour and f i r e the c u r i o s i t y 
of the explorer of i t s wynds and closes, i t s gracious crescents and 
i t s squares. The d e t a i l s , i n short, make i t Edinburgh, a d i s t i n c t i v e 
and distinguished urban form. I t i s these idiosyncratic features 
which are h i s t o r i c a l l y i nteresting and upon which any h i s t o r i c a l 
account w i l l inevitably concentrate. We can s t a r t here by setting 
the scene, by describing the arena before we take up the narrative i n 
the middle years of the nineteenth century. 
Edinburgh and the eighteenth century achievements: 
In the hundred years before 1850 the inhabitants of Edinburgh 
saw the proposal, b u i l d i n g , and ultimate completion of one of the most 
ambitious planning projects ever carried out by the governing body of 
any individual c i t y . Certainly no other c i t y corporation i n B r i t a i n 
could lay claim to changing the character of i t s central area so 
completely and i n such a short time. U n t i l the turn of the eighteenth 
century the layout of the Scottish c a p i t a l , the plan view, was skeletal 
i n form with a long backbone following the crest of the dip slope 
eastwards from the castle rock. 2 At r i g h t angles to t h i s main route-
Hugh Douglas (1969) uses the description, 'herringbone c i t y on 
the h i l l ' . 
way, narrow wynds and closes, sometimes stepped to cope with the 
steep gradients, dipped away to both north and south. The physical 
r e s t r i c t i o n s of the s i t e were considerable. The Nor' Loch to the 
north and the marshy lands to the south proved t o be very effective 
barriers t o the expansion of the c i t y area and by 1647 almost every 
part of the long narrow "closours", or cultivated p l o t s , stretching 
down behind the older houses had been b u i l t on. (See Fig.2) Although 
the closely spaced tenements rose to the considerable height of four 
and f i v e storeys above street l e v e l , overcrowding was already a 
problem. Edinburgh could not expand outwards, so i t expanded upwards. 
The housing stock of the early 1700s was remarkably homogeneous, being 
almost e n t i r e l y composed of t a l l , stone-built tenements some of which 
reached a tremendous ten storeys above street l e v e l on t h e i r north-
facing sides. (See Fig.3) The p e c u l i a r i t i e s of t h i s s i t u a t i o n 
resulted i n the unusual absence of marked areal social divisions. 
Over a century l a t e r a l o c a l j o u r n a l i s t said of the High Street (the 
main routeway), " I t s tenements have at d i f f e r e n t times housed princes, 
nobles, labourers and l o a f e r s . " 3 More remarkable s t i l l , however, i t 
housed a most unl i k e l y combination of characters at the same time and 
often under the same roof: 
The multifariousness of avocation i n one building gave 
r i s e to the following lines from a stranger, who was 
struck by t h i s p e c u l i a r i t y i n the Scottish metropolis:-
•You may c a l l on a friend of note, and discover him 
With a shoemaker under, a staymaker over him. 
My dwelling begins with a periwig-maker; 
I'm under a corn-cutter, over a baker; 
Above the chiropodist; cookery too; 
O'er that i s a laundress - o'er her i s a Jew; 
A painter and t a i l o r divide the eighth f l a t , 
And a dancing academy thrives over that ! ' 
3 W. McPhail (1911) p . l 
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With no marked areal d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n s , r e s i d e n t i a l social s t r a t i f i c a t i o n 
was v e r t i c a l w i t h i n each tenement building. Those of the aristocracy 5 
who did wish to savour l i f e i n the Scottish c a p i t a l , established 
themselves i n the middle floors of the tenements and l e f t the lower 
f l o o r s , basements and cramped a t t i c s to any of the more common souls 
who could afford the rent. This, then, i s the background against 
which the achievements of the eighteenth century can be seen i n true 
perspective. The r e s t r i c t i o n s of the s i t e , the nature of social 
divisions wi t h i n Scottish society at that time, 6 and the homogeneity 
of Edinburgh's housing, led to the peculiar d i s t r i b u t i o n of social 
groups. The basements and the a t t i c s became more and more cramped 
as the population expanded. The narrow alleyways, permanently 
darkened by the sheer tenement walls on either side and more often 
than not f i l l e d with r o t t i n g garbage, were less than i n v i t i n g . Above 
a l l , the c i t y had extended v e r t i c a l l y as f a r as i t was able, and, with 
a growing population, overcrowding had become a serious problem. So 
serious was i t , that by 174-0 some of the aristocracy had ceased to 
maintain town houses i n the c a p i t a l at a l l . The population increase, 
from about 40,000 i n 1722 to 57,000 i n 1755, exacerbated an already 
desperate s i t u a t i o n . In the century since 1647 the c i t y area had 
increased l i t t l e , as the plan of 1742 shows. (Fig.4) Edinburgh was 
5 Scotland had, i n the eighteenth century, a r e l a t i v e l y large 
a r i s t o c r a t i c class with about one hundred and f i f t y peerage families. 
6 D. Young et a l . , (1967 p.8) state, "The Scottish nation of the eighteenth 
century was simultaneously a more a r i s t o c r a t i c and a more democratic 
community than could be found at that time i n either France or England. 
....something of t h i s no doubt derives from the peculiar social structure 
which achieved i t s physical expression i n the t a l l tenements of the Old 
Town. Scotland had a r e l a t i v e l y large a r i s t o c r a t i c class, ...peerage 
families ramifying into large clans, with hundreds or thousands of 
persons i n the middle or lower income groups able to claim cousinship 
with the noble lords at the top." 
v « ! 
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cramped, dark, squalid and grossly over-populated. 
We do not require here to t e l l , or rather r e - t e l l ( f o r i t has 
been well documented), the whole story of how the New Town of 
Edinburgh came about, of how i t ever came to be conceived and b u i l t . 
Much must be credited to the farsightedness of the City Council and 
i n p a r t i c u l a r t o the Lord Provost of the time, George Drummond, f o r 
whom the adoption of the scheme was the f u l f i l l m e n t of a long-
nurtured ambition. What prompted the Town Council to promote such 
an ambitious and costly scheme? This i s a d i f f i c u l t question to 
answer, for i t i s not enough to suppose that those i n charge of 
Edinburgh's a f f a i r s were, l i k e the councils of many other large 
c i t i e s i n the lat e eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, caught 
up i n that swell of c i v i c pride which has l e f t to posterity some f i n e , 
i f elaborate, monuments and public buildings. What George Drummond 
proposed was not simply a monument, nor the construction of several 
grand public buildings to impress the v i s i t o r and l o c a l inhabitant 
a l i k e . His project was, rather, the creation of a new Edinburgh, 
the deliberate construction of an extensive r e s i d e n t i a l area over the 
water on the south-facing slopes of the northern shores of the Nor' 
Loch. This whole area was to be planned i n advance and b u i l t , under 
the guidance of the municipal a u t h o r i t i e s , i n as grand a style as might 
be found at that time i n any other town i n Europe. In the words of 
the proposers who issued a pamphlet advocating the extension of Edinburgh 
i n t o a 'new town', the aim was to create a c i t y which "should naturally 
become the centre of trade and commerce, of learning and a r t s , of 
politeness and of refinement of every k i n d . " 7 Not only was such a 
7 This pamphlet, e n t i t l e d Proposals for carrying on certain Public Works 
i n the City of Edinburgh, was published i n 1752. I t i s thought to have 
been w r i t t e n by Sir Gilbert E l l i o t , an Edinburgh lawyer, but clearly owes 
much to George Drummond, then Lord Provost f o r the t h i r d time. I t i s not 
signed, but a l i s t of persons named by the several societies to execute 
the foregoing proposals i s appended. This l i s t i s composed of:- three lords 
of Session, two Barons of Exchequer, twelve Town Councillors (including 
Drummond), three from the Faculty of Advocates (including E l l i o t ) and three 
Clerks to the Signet. 
270. 
project proposed, however, but i t won the support of the whole 
council as well as that of many i n f l u e n t i a l c i t i z e n s , and was carried 
through i n almost every d e t a i l . 
By the 1740s i t was already imperative that some extension of 
the c i t y take place. This i s beyond doubt. I t i s not the fact that 
the c i t y was extended at a l l which raises questions, but the grandness 
of the extension i n conception. The s i t e , the scale and the character 
of the extension are s u f f i c i e n t l y remarkable to prompt the h i s t o r i a n 
to examine the i n i t i a t i o n of the project i n more d e t a i l . Edinburgh 
was not notably a r i c h c i t y and yet many thousands of pounds i n public 
subscriptions were collected f o r the New Town project. Nor were these 
p a r t i c u l a r l y prosperous times i n Scotland. During the f i r s t h alf of 
the eighteenth century the Scottish people suffered many poor harvests 
with the accompanying shortages, high prices, poverty and d i s t r e s s . 8 
In 1740, f o r example, a f t e r the 'seven i l l years' of the turn of the 
century and the catastrophic famine of 1709, the weather was once 
again extremely unaccommodating to agriculture. The ground did not 
thaw u n t i l A p r i l , and a lat e f r o s t i n July dashed any remaining hopes 
of an adequate harvest. The shortage was a l l the worse coming, as i t 
did , a f t e r the poor harvest of the previous year. In October 1740 
there were r i o t s i n the c a p i t a l i n which the granaries were raided. 
The magistrates intervened and, i n a bid to keep grain prices down, 
authorised the import of grain to Leith. The Scots Magazine of January 
the following year reported, 
8 Many died, especially i n the Highland areas, because they could not 
affo r d the high price of the country's staple food, oats. The price 
of oats at Haddington (near Edinburgh), for example, rose from 6s.2d. 
per b o l l i n 1738 to 13s.4d. i n 1740. 
2U. 
...by the dearth of provisions so many poor 
people i n the c i t y were reduced to beggary ... 
that the clamours and importunities of these 
miserable objects made i t very disagreeable to 
walk the s t r e e t s . 9 
I t i s not surprising that those whose incomes allowed them to winter 
i n London found the f o u l a i r and d i r t y streets of Edinburgh so 
objectionable. I t was such people, the gentlemen of the c i t y , who 
were most keenly aware of Edinburgh's defects. I t was such people 
who could afford large donations to any extension project. I f they 
had been looking for a worthy cause, however, there were many 
destitute and starving souls whom sixpence might have saved from an 
early grave. But something must have persuaded them to give to the 
Edinburgh improvement fund, f o r give they did. 
The arguments of the promoters were subtle and persuasive. 
They appealed both to s e l f - i n t e r e s t 1 0 and to c i v i c pride. By the 
1750s Edinburgh had l o s t favour amongst the Scottish aristocracy, 
many of whom, preferring the English c a p i t a l or the c i t i e s of Europe, 
no longer availed themselves of even the best of the c i t y ' s r e s i d e n t i a l 
accommodation. More than one prominent c i t i z e n of the time realised 
that t h i s decline i n patronage could have a devastating effect on the 
whole economy and prestige of the c i t y . Moreover,Glasgow was growing 
both i n population and reputation i n response to the rapid expansion 
of industry and the increasing importance of contact with America. 
(The tobacco trade and the development of a fine linen industry were 
two major sources of Glasgow's wealth). L i t t l e could have been more 
ga l l i n g to many Edinburgians than to see Glasgow enjoying what Edinburgh 
lacked. In the pamphlet of 1752, George Drummond and Gilbert E l l i o t 
challenged the populace to create a ca p i t a l c i t y of which to be proud, 
9 Scots Magazine (1741), Vol.3, p.45 
1 0 The northerly extension of the town promised considerable advantages 
to certain i n d u s t r i a l i s t s not only i n the increased market, but also 
i n the easier access to the port at Leith. 
2 U . 
a c i t y which would be the f i r s t c i t y of Scotland. And undoubtedly 
many saw f i n a n c i a l advantages i n doing j u s t t h i s . Their donations 
accounted for the major part of the finance of public building i n the 
New Town.11 
In A p r i l 1766 the Town Council issued a formal i n v i t a t i o n to 
interested parties to submit plans f o r the extension of the c i t y . I n 
May of the following year Royal assent was given to the B i l l f o r 'An 
Act for Extending the Royalty of the City of Edinburgh over certain 
adjoining lands', which B i l l had passed the House of Commons the month 
before. 1 2 Meanwhile the Town Council had not been i d l e . The construction 
of a bridge (the North Bridge) over the eastern end of the Nor' Loch was 
well under way, and the plans of James Craig (Fig.5) had been o f f i c i a l l y 
adopted. On 26 October 1767 the foundation stone of the f i r s t house of 
the New Town of Edinburgh was l a i d by the architect himself, and building 
followed apace. During the closing years of the eighteenth century the 
character and layoux of the c i t y of Edinburgh underwent a spectacular 
transformation which made the new centre of the Scottish capital both 
d e l i g h t f u l and unique amongst the c i t i e s of Europe. 
So much i s well known. Historians have f o r many years concerned 
themselves with the remarkable achievement of the Town Council and citizens 
of Edinburgh i n the 1760s. The account given here i s merely an outline of 
the received account of the period which has been pieced together by many 
Donations were made not only by the citizens of Edinburgh, but also 
by those i n other parts of Scotland who had equal interest i n the future 
of the c a p i t a l . Before the end of 1752 almost £6,000 had been promised. 
(There was no government aid involved except i n the case of Register 
House, which large and impressive building was completed i n 1788 at 
the vast cost of £30,000). 
Details of t h i s are given i n F. C. Mears and J. Russell (1938) and 
(1940). 
I l A N U V BR TRIET 
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individual historians. I t i s both the skeleton of the narrative 
of what happened i n and to Edinburgh i n t h i s period, and an i l l u s t r a t i o n 
of how these happenings might be accounted f o r where they arouse 
cu r i o s i t y by being out of the ordinary or remarkable. By t h i s method, 
the ambitious proposals, t h e i r acceptance and the f i n a l completion of 
rhe plans are a i l seen as i n t e l l i g i b l e within the pa r t i c u l a r circumstances 
of t h e i r occurrence. This does not make them any the less remarkable. 
I t merely fixes f o r them a comfortable niche i n a continuing narrative 
where they appear as neither accidental nor inevitable. The unprecedented 
scale of these early town planning achievements changed the face of 
Edinburgh. Not only was the acreage of the Royalty extended, variety 
introduced i n t o the housing stock and a new a i r of prosperity engendered, 
but the building of the New Town resulted i n a s h i f t of the commercial 
centre of the c i t y . And today i t i s the New Town and not the o r i g i n a l 
c i t y which houses the central business d i s t r i c t . The 'core area' i s not 
the oldest part of the c i t y surrounded by a twilighx zone of ancient and 
decrepit properties. Some of the most desirable r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation 
within the c i t y l i m i t s i s s t i l l to be found i n the central area. These 
are the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s and the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of Edinburgh and, whatever 
the l e v e l of analysis, i t i s with these that the general urban models 
examined i n Chapter 1 cannot cope. To study the urban form of Edinburgh 
we must appreciate the uniqueness and concern ourselves with the details 
of the actions which have produced i t . 
Victorian Edinburgh: 
There i s more that can be done to prepare the ground, as i t were, 
fo r the examination of the character of r e s i d e n t i a l areas and t h e i r 
inhabitants which i s to form the theme of the next chapter. I f , by 1851, 
Edinburgh's b u i l t environment was unique within B r i t a i n , the l i f e s t y l e s of 
her citizens were not. Edinburgh was a Victorian City and there are many 
2*5. 
things which distinguish t h i s age i n Britain's history. Victorian 
B r i t a i n has been called 'the world's f i r s t urbanized s o c i e t y ' . 1 3 
Certainly, f o r nigh on a century the c i t i e s had been a t t r a c t i n g people 
from the surrounding and more distant countryside. In 1851 the census, 
f o r the f i r s t time, reported an aggregate urban population which exceeded 
the r u r a l population i n size. This was the age of i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n , 
of f a c t o r i e s , steam-powered machinery, domestic smoke and long working 
hours f o r the i n d u s t r i a l labourer. But the c i t i e s were fashionable. 1 1* 
The ladies of the realm promenaded there i n the extravagent crinoline 
and the bicycle was s t i l l a great novelty. During Victoria's reign 
public executions were stopped, 1 5 and public l i b r a r i e s were b u i l t . The 
concentration of people i n urban areas provided,for the f i r s t time, the 
scale of readership required to support the newspapers and magazines which 
were launched i n t h e i r thousands. 1 6 Advances i n p r i n t i n g technology and 
the spread of l i t e r a c y resulted i n a broadening of horizons f o r a wide 
section of the population. The newspapers carried narional and even 
inter n a t i o n a l news items, and here too the ea r l i e s t printed advertising 
i s to be found. 1 7 
see E. Lampard i n H. J. Dyos and M. Wolff (1973) pp.3-57 
The c i t i e s attracted both the r i c h and the poor, even though the 
penalties of c i t y l i f e f o r the poorer classes appear to have been so high. 
In Edinburgh, the l a s t public execution (of George Bryce, the Ratho 
murderer) took place on 21 June 1864-. 
The number of newspapers started at t h i s time was greatly influenced by 
the t o t a l a b o l i t i o n , i n 1855, of the stamp duty on newspapers. (Previously 
in 1836 t h i s had been reduced from 4d. to I d . and i n 1853 the duty on 
advertisements had been abolished). The resultant decrease i n the price 
of a newspaper undoubtedly did much to encourage the public to buy them 
and the publishers to produce them. 
Popular amongst such advertisements were those f o r quasi-medical 
preparations. In 1850 several Edinburgh newspapers, f o r example, carried 
the following exhortation: 'Throw physic to the dogs, I ' l l none of i t ' 
Medicine superceded, L i f e prolonged and Health preserved by that Universal 
Preparation, Roper's Royal Bath Plaster. 
On a d i f f e r e n t f r o n t , the railways had begun t h e i r own process 
of widening horizons. " I perceive", wrote Carlyle i n 1850, "railways 
have set a l l the Towns of B r i t a i n a-dancing". 1 8 The journey from 
Edinburgh to London i n 1850 could be completed i n the r e l a t i v e comfort 
of a railway carriage i n only th i r t e e n hours. 1 9 Before the end of 
the nineteenth century the railway had made i t possible to reach London 
from the Scottish c a p i t a l i n under eight hours. The newly urbanised 
populations experienced a sudden and considerable increase i n mobility 
which, i n i t s e l f , had a marked effect on t h e i r patterns of l i f e . Not 
only were the citizens of Edinburgh now able to t r a v e l with comparative 
swiftness and ease to the great i n d u s t r i a l and commercial centres of 
England, as well as to the i n d u s t r i a l centre of Scotland (Glasgow), but 
t r a v e l within the expanding c i t y also became easier, less time consuming, 
and therefore more popular. 'The B i l l f o r the Introduction of Street 
Tramways into Edinburgh 1 was passed i n June 1871, and by November 
tramways were opened between the Bridges and Haymarket. Thxs was i n 
addition to the f l e e t of open double-decked cars which had been i n 
existence f o r some t i m e . 2 0 Towards the end of 1874- the Edinburgh 
suburban railway, which had cost £225,000 to b u i l d , was opened. F i n a l l y , 
by 1891, the tramways had been extended north of Princes Street (using 
cable haulage to negotiate the steep i n c l i n e ) , the f l e e t of open cars had 
been considerably expanded, and the r a i l l i n k to the north secured by the 
T. Carlyle (1850) 'Hudson's Statue', p.15. This state of a f f a i r s 
did not, apparently, e n t i r e l y please Carlyle f o r he characterises the 
towns as 'confusedly waltzing, i n a state of progressive dissolution, 
towards the four winds'. 
The r a i l l i n k between Edinburgh and London was f i n a l l y completed i n 
September 1846. What t h i s represented i n terms of a transport improvement 
can be appreciated by comparing the duration of the r a i l journey to that 
of the Wellington Stage coach which, i n 1825, reached London three days 
(or 74 hours) a f t e r leaving Edinburgh. In 1700, the same journey by mail 
coach had taken f i v e and a h a l f days. 
Most cars i n the c i t y were horse-drawn, but as early as 1828 a steam 
coach t r a v e l l i n g between 4 m.p.h. and 7 m.p.br. appeared on the streets of 
Edinburgh. 
opening of the Forth Railway Bridge. 1 The Capital was now more 
accessible from the rest of Scotland than i t had ever been before. 
Equally, the citizens of Edinburgh were able to enjoy the unhampered 
crossing of the Forth at a point so near to t h e i r c i t y . 
The railways played t h e i r part, too, i n the shaping and changing 
of the form or layout of the urban areas. They were greedy f o r land. 
Houses were demolished and many thousands of people displaced as the 
railway companies, often paying handsomely, bought up tracts of land 
which swept through to the centres of even the largest c i t i e s . Edinburgh 
was no exception. I t s townscape had been equally threatened by the 
rapacious railway companies. In 1841 the residents of Canal Street 
(Haymarket) and i t s immediate neighbourhood were dislodged and the 
street removed to make way f o r a railway s t a t i o n , the Edinburgh and 
Glasgow Railway Company having acquired the land from the Dairy Estate 
at the rate of £700 per acre. And between 1838 and 1842 a considerable 
b a t t l e was waged to prevent t h i s railway company from extending i t s Ixne 
from Haymarket to the North Bridge through Princes Street Gardens. 2 2 
On 4 March 1890, the Prince of Wales drove the l a s t r i v e t i n t o the 
Forth Bridge and declared the bridge open. 
Thas e gardens had been created on the s i t e of the Nor'Loch a f t e r i t 
had been drained. (Previously, i n 1774, an i n t e r d i c t had been granted 
by the Court of Session against the erection of buildings on the south 
side of Princes Street, although one block had already been b u i l t at the 
east end.) At f i r s t they were kept as private gardens f o r the use of 
the residents of Princes Street i t s e l f . Around 1850, however, sections 
of the public were taking the view that the gardens ought to serve a 
wider purpose, and by 1855 they were open to the public at large on special 
occasions (such as Christmas and New Year) when band performances were 
given. I t was over twenty years l a t e r i n 1876 that the Town Council 
f i n a l l y took over control of the West Gardens. 
Princes Street gardens are one of the most d i s t i n c t i v e features of the 
urban structure of present day Edinburgh. They are i n the very heart 
of the c i t y , running almost the entire length of Princes Street which i s 
the major shopping street of the twentieth century c a p i t a l . The story 
of t h e i r preservation as gardens (despite the very high commercial value 
of the land) would play an important part i n 'accounting f o r ' the present 
urban form of the c i t y . 
276. 
The outcome was a compromise. The railway company obtained the 
powers i t sought, but i t s opponents succeeded i n t h e i r demand that the 
new l i n e be disguised i n a deep cutting topped o f f by a high wall and 
thus hidden from the residents of Princes Street. The wa l l was to be 
made seemly by 'a profuse use of i v y , evergreens and t r e e s 1 . 2 3 
Undoubtedly the railway lines within the c i t y l i m i t s of Edinburgh 
resulted i n less displacement and demolition of housing than i n other 
large c i t i e s (most notably London).21* Nevertheless, t h e i r impact on 
the b u i l t form of the c a p i t a l i s both considerable and enduring, f o r 
i n the Victorian age the c i t y developed around i t s railway network. 
Edinburgh, as much as any other large centre of population i n 
B r i t a i n , served i t s time as a Victorian c i t y . Many of the features 
and problems of these c i t i e s were common to a l l of them. They were a l l 
products of the Victorian age. Their inhabitants witnessed revolutions 
i n transport and i n sources of power which i n turn brought about general 
changes i n styles of l i f e ( i n , to use popular jargon, social interaction 
patterns). These, however, provide only a background against which we 
can examine the p a r t i c u l a r problems of Edinburgh and those actions of 
Edinburgh's citizens which influenced the development of t h i s one 
pa r t i c u l a r and unique urban form. 
The Scottish Victorian City: 
I f Edinburgh i n the second ha l f of the nineteenth century was a 
Victorian c i t y , i t was also a Scottish c i t y . And t h i s i s to say that i t 
was (and i s ) d i s t i n c t i v e l y Scottish, f o r there were many influences on i t s 
b u i l t form which were not shared by i t s counterparts south of the border. 2 5 
2 3 see D. Robertson (19 35) pp.37-46 
2 1 f I l l u s t r a t i o n s of the effects of the railways on the urban population 
are given by J.Simmons i n H.J.Dyos and M.Wolff, op.cit. For example, the 
sixty-nine railway construction schemes put forward between 1853 and 1901 
i n London, required the displacement of 76,000 persons. 
2 5 G. Best (1968) explores t h i s idea. 
The major o f these i n f l u e n c e s was (and remains) the separate l e g a l 
systems under which S c o t t i s h and English c i t i e s have developed. For 
example, i n the matter o f p u b l i c h e a l t h , the S c o t t i s h Acts were 
introduced q u i t e independently o f the English l e g i s l a t i o n . As Best 
p o i n t s o u t , 
...only m the 1860s d i d the general government o f 
Scotland a t t a i n , i n respect o f p u b l i c h e a l t h , the 
st a t e which England had been i n since 1848, and .... 
only i n the 1890s d i d the S c o t t i s h laws o f p u b l i c 
h e a l t h r e a l l y catch up w i t h the E n g l i s h . 2 6 
Best's c e n t r a l theme, however, concerns the d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s o f the 
S c o t t i s h c i v i c t r a d i t i o n and urban outlook. He advances the t h e s i s , 
a t once i n t e r e s t i n g and persuasive, t h a t by V i c t o r i a ' s r e i g n S c o t t i s h 
c i t i e s were already accustomed t o a much f i r m e r and more p o s i t i v e c i v i c 
government than were the c i t i e s of England. C e r t a i n l y , by 1851, the 
century which had elapsed since the launching o f the ambitious New Town 
p r o j e c t had not only proved the success o f such c i v i l i n i t i a t i v e but 
also accustomed the c i t i z e n s o f Edinburgh t o a xown c o u n c i l a c t i v e i n 
the shaping o f i t s area of j u r i s d i c t i o n . I n many contemporary E n g l i s h 
c i t i e s such ' i n t e r f e r e n c e ' would not have been t o l e r a t e d had i t ever 
been contemplated. I t was, perhaps, t h i s w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d i n t e r v e n t i o n 
by a p u b l i c body which allowed Edinburgh ( f o l l o w i n g close on the heels o f 
Glasgow) t o lead the way i n the matter o f slum clearance. The Edinburgh 
Improvement Act o f 1867 gave the Town Council the powers t o purchase, 
c l e a r and redevelop c e n t r a l slum areas. Such e a r l y planning powers were 
not made gene r a l l y a v a i l a b l e elsewhere u n t i l the Cross Acts of 1875 onwards. 
The Scots, however, had every reason f o r promoting slum clearance. 
I n the 1850s both Glasgow and Edinburgh contained some o f the worst slums 
i n B r i t a i n , and indeed i n Europe. Even a f t e r the New Town was b u i l t and 
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i t s residences i n h a b i t a t e d , overcrowding i n the o l d town remained a 
serious problem and a t h r e a t t o p u b l i c h e a l t h . And i n many cases, 
the towering tenements (a form o f a r c h i t e c t u r e p e c u l i a r t o the nort h e r n 
p a r t of the B r i t i s h I s l e s ) were at the centre o f the problem. I n 
Edinburgh, the tenements o f the High Street and i t s a d j o i n i n g closes 
formed the main area o f low-class housing w i t h i n the c i t y . Decades 
of "making-down" had turned the never spacious f l a t s i n t o a t i g h t l y 
packed maze o f one and two roomed d w e l l i n g s , some o f which never saw 
d a y l i g h t . As George B e l l noted during h i s t o u r o f the wynds and 
closes o f the Old Town m 1849, "By curious and clumsy contrivance, 
rooms have been converted i n t o dens and sepulchres f o r l i v i n g men." 2 7 
There was nothing i n England at t h a t time t o equal the density o f persons 
per ground area found i n these towering warrens. Within B r i t a i n , Scotland 
alone had the common s t a i r w i t h i t s f e t i d a i r and i t s f i l t h which 
i n c r e a s i n g l y concerned the s a n i t a r y reformers. That Scotland by the 
1850s had, over many c e n t u r i e s , developed a d i s t i n c t i v e form o f 
a r c h i t e c t u r e i s u n d e n i a b l e 2 8 and the t i e r e d dwelling-houses, themselves 
i l l - a d a p t e d t o such i n t e n s i v e usage, i n t u r n displayed a d i s t i n c t i v e 
'overcrowded and uncomfortable s t a t e 1 . 
L a s t l y , i n any account o f p e c u l i a r l y S c o t t i s h influences on the 
b u i l t form o f urban areas, we cannot omit mention both of the system o f 
f e u i n g land and o f the r e g u l a t o r y powers o f the Dean of Guil d Court over 
the adaptation or extension o f the e x i s t i n g b u i l d i n g stock. The Edinburgh 
Property Review o f 1880 explains what i t i s t o 'feu' land: 
There have been various modes o f conveying land from 
super i o r t o vas s a l ; but a f e u i s the usual t i t l e upon which 
land i n Scotland i s given o f f f o r b u i l d i n g purposes. And 
once given o f f , and the co n d i t i o n s adhered t o , the feuar i s 
as absolute owner o f the p o r t i o n o f land which he has feued 
2 7 G.Bell (1850) p.21. George B e l l was a medical p r a c t i t i o n e r i n Edinburgh. 
2 8 This i s r e f e r r e d t o i n the Report o f a Committee o f the Working Classes 
of Edinburgh on the Present Overcrowded and Uncomfortable State o f t h e i r 
Dwellinghouses (Edinburgh, 1860) as, "the Scotch method o f b u i l d i n g f l a t s " . 
2*L. 
as the s u p e r i o r himself. I t i s h i s i n p e r p e t u i t y ; 
and i t i s t o the s e c u r i t y thus enjoyed by the feuars 
i n Scotland g e n e r a l l y t h a t we owe the s u b s t a n t i a l , and 
i n many cases h i g h l y ornate and expensive b u i l d i n g s 
which have been erected i n our p r i n c i p a l towns and c i t i e s . 
Leases are not unknown i n Scotland, but they are unusual 
and unpopular; and a lease even f o r n i n e t y - n i n e years i s 
j u s t l y regarded as o f g r e a t l y i n f e r i o r value t o an o r d i n a r y 
feu , 2 9 
The f e u i n g system, however, i s not i n every d e t a i l as favourable as 
t h i s might suggest. Best r e f e r s t o i t as "a s o r t o f compromise" between 
the two normal E n g l i s h methodsof t r a n s f e r r i n g land - sale o f f r e e h o l d and 
ground-lease. I n the nineteenth century the S c o t t i s h landowner c o u l d , 
i f he wished and i f h i s bargaining p o s i t i o n was a strong one, w r i t e i n t o 
the f e u i n g c o n t r a c t a claim t o t r i p l i c a t e feus f o r any change o f ownership. 
Thus on 31 January 1880, f o r example, the second f l o o r f l a t o f No.6 Great 
Stuart S t r e e t i n the New Town was s o l d w i t h a feu o f £8 (per annum) and 
"Entry of h e i r s and s i n g u l a r successors taxed a t a duplicand over and 
above the f e u " . 3 0 Further, the o r i g i n a l landowner could c o n t r o l the 
k i n d of development which would xake place on h i s land once s o l d by 
i n c l u d i n g s t i p u l a t i o n s of h e i g h t or b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l , f o r example, i n 
the f e u i n g c o n t r a c t . The H e r i o t Trust,which owned much o f the land n o r t h 
of Queen S t r e e t and out towards I n v e r l e i t h , took considerable i n t e r e s t i n 
the way i t s feued land was developed and o f t e n took steps t o ensure t h a t 
no 'undesirable' b u i l d i n g s were e r e c t e d . 3 1 I f we are t o understand the 
The Edinburgh Property Review (1879-80) V o l . 1 , p.403 
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The Trust went t o some t r o u b l e t o see t h a t the land t o be feued was 
d i v i d e d i n t o s u i t a b l e l o t s , the layout o f which (as w e l l as the character 
o f the subsequent b u i l d i n g s ) would be in-keeping w i t h the surrounding 
land use. This had the desired e f f e c t o f c r e a t i n g an o v e r a l l planned 
development even when the l o t s were s o l d i n d i v i d u a l l y . The p r a c t i c e i n 
general, however, m i l i t a t e d against c e r t a i n prospective buyers and the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s experienced by the e a r l y co-operative b u i l d i n g s o c i e t i e s i n 
o b t a i n i n g s u i t a b l y l o c a t e d land were, i n some measure, due t o the l a y i n g 
down of p r o h i b i t i v e c o n d i t i o n s by c e r t a i n s u p e r i o r s . 
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developing s t r u c t u r e o f any S c o t t i s h c i t y , then, we must know what 
i t i s t o 'feu' land and appreciate the k i n d o f c o n t r o l the superi o r 
had over the b u i l t environment. 
One popular c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n o f the nineteenth century i s as 
an age o f f r e e - e n t e r p r i s e c a p i t a l i s m and i n d i v i d u a l freedom, where 
governmental i n t e r f e r e n c e was kept t o a minimum. The p i c t u r e of 
haphazard urban development which t h i s suggests, however, i s f a r from 
the t r u t h i n the case o f Edinburgh. As we have seen, by the time o f 
V i c t o r i a ' s ascension t o the throne the a u t h o r i t i e s of the S c o t t i s h 
c a p i t a l , by the s t r a t e g i c employ o f p u b l i c funds, already had considerable 
planning achievements behind them. And the Town Council were n o t , even 
i n the 1800s, the only s t a t u t o r y body concerned w i t h the r e g u l a t i o n of 
the c i t y ' s b u i l t form. The Dean o f Gu i l d Court, es t a b l i s h e d i n common 
law, had "the sole j u r i s d i c t i o n i n r e g u l a t i n g b u i l d i n g s w i t h i n burghs, 
whether m r e p a i r i n g or t a k i n g down and r e b u i l d i n g o l d b u i l d i n g s or 
e r e c t i n g new ones." 3 2 Indeed, i n Scotland, The Dean o f Guil d Court 
preceded the Town Council as the l e g i s l a t i v e body of each Royal Burgh. 
The Court developed from the mediaeval Merchant Guilds, and u n t i l 1469 
the Provost and Council were simply an e l e c t e d committee o f the Merchant 
G u i l d . 3 3 The minutes of the present Edinburgh Dean o f Guil d Court date 
back t o the year 1529 and i t i s the ol d e s t j u d i c i a l court s t i l l i n 
existence i n Scotland. I t s t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e can be appreciated by 
l o o k i n g a t the k i n d o f decisions t y p i c a l l y made. I n 1529, f o r example, 
the Court was in v o l v e d i n the r e g u l a t i o n o f 'dykes' or boundary w a l l s 
R. M i l l e r (1896) p.39. A d e t a i l e d account o f the f u n c t i o n of the 
Dean o f Guil d Court i s given i n t h i s work. 
The Dean o f Gu i l d Court was (and i s ) headed by an e l e c t e d o f f i c e r , 
the Dean o f Guild. The j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the Dean h i m s e l f , when a t i t s 
g r e a t e s t , has been sai d t o correspond i n many respects t o the Curule 
Aedileship of the Romans. The Roman Aediles were magistrates who, 
among other d u t i e s , were responsible f o r the superintendence o f the 
b u i l d i n g s , the s t r e e t s and the markets, and had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o decide 
questions and d i f f e r e n c e s a r i s i n g out o f market transactions, (see R . M i l l e r , 
1891) 
and w i t h r i g h t s o f passage through neighbouring back-lands. And i n 
1578, s i t t i n g a t L e i t h , i t found the east end o f a newly b u i l t s t a i r 
t o be an encroachment on a neighbour's ground and ordered i t t o be 
removed. By an Act o f Council i n 1674, Dean o f Guil d powers were 
extended s p e c i f i c a l l y t o cover b u i l d i n g r e g u l a t i o n s . 3 4 Thus, although 
throughout the eighteenth century the claims o f the Guild as a p u b l i c 
body l a y dormant, when i t d i d reconvene i n 1817 (prompted t o do so by 
the f i n a n c i a l mismanagement i n l o c a l government around the t u r n o f the 
century) i t already had a long-standing t r a d i t i o n t o appeal t o . 
Nevertheless, i t s p o s i t i o n and the r i g h t s o f the Gui l d r y remained 
u n c e r t a i n u n t i l the Municipal Reform Act o f 1833 which r e s t o r e d the 
members' r i g h t t o e l e c t t h e i r own Dean who, ex o f f i c i o , became a member 
of the Town Council. By 1850 the e i g h t members o f the Dean o f Guil d 
Court were a c t i v e i n the r e g u l a t i o n o f b u i l d i n g s and s t r e e t s i n the C i t y 
o f Edinburgh. An act o f parliament o f 1879 r e c o n s t i t u t e d the Edinburgh 
Court and consolidated i r s p o s i t i o n , i n c r e a s i n g i t s membership t o eleven 
( t e n plus the Dean of G u i l d ) . And during the f o l l o w i n g decade the 
powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h i s body were extended beyond the o r i g i n a l 
Royalty t o cover most o f the City area and i t s suburbs. By 1888 the 
Court had powers t o impose a penalty on those who f a i l e d t o inform i t o f 
any proposed new b u i l d i n g or a l t e r a t i o n s and/or t o comply w i t h i t s 
r e g u l a t i o n s . This took the form o f a standard f i n e o f £5 plus the 
removal o f the b u i l d i n g i f necessary. 3 5 F i n a l l y , i n 1891 the Edinburgh 
P o l i c e Amendment Act gave the Court, f o r the f i r s t t i m e , j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
3 I + The p a r t i c u l a r concern a t t h i s time was w i t h the High St r e e t s i n c e , 
not long before, many o f the wooden houses there had been gutte d by 
f i r e and the new r e g u l a t i o n s were set down t o c o n t r o l the r e b u i l d i n g 
i n stone. 
3 5 see Dean o f Guild Court: Memoranda, Edinburgh 1888 
i n t e r n a l a l t e r a t i o n s or a d d i t i o n s t o a b u i l d i n g not i n v o l v i n g s t r u c t u r a l 
change. 3 6 
Throughout the ninet e e n t h century, then, the Dean of Guild Court 
played an i n c r e a s i n g l y important p a r t i n the r e g u l a t i o n of b u i l d i n g s 
and i n the maintenance o f b u i l d i n g standards. By the s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
o f b u i l d i n g m a t e r i a l s and, f r e q u e n t l y , the j u d i c i a l upholding o f 
r e s t r i c t i o n s and conditions imposed on feuars, i t d i d much t o preserve 
the character and amenity o f a d i s t r i c t . The e f f e c t o f i t s powers on 
the b u i l t form o f Edinburgh (as i n a l l S c o t t i s h c i t i e s ) has been 
considerable and any f u l l account o f how t h a t b u i l t form came about 
would n e c e s s a r i l y include a d e t a i l e d account of the operation of t h i s 
Court. I n 1896, Edinburgh's Lord Dean o f G u i l d , Robert M i l l e r , saw 
the most important f u n c t i o n o f h i s c o u r t as t h a t of improving p u b l i c 
h e a l t h . This b e n e f i t , he clamed, 
....arises from the j u d i c i o u s a p p l i c a t i o n o f the powers 
conferred upon i t by the various Acts o f Parliament. The 
Court acts i n t h i s way under i x s present r e g u l a t i o n s -
p o s i t i v e l y by i n c r e a s i n g the amount of a i r and s u n l i g h t 
t h a t are at the di s p o s a l o f each i n d i v i d u a l w i t h i n i t s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n ; and n e g a t i v e l y by r e s t r i c t i n g the number o f 
i n d i v i d u a l s t h a t may occupy any given space. 3 7 
The r o l e o f the Dean o f G u i l d Court i n Edinburgh i n the l a t t e r p a r t o f 
the nineteenth century i s an important one, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f we are 
considering the changing d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n . I t s decisions 
e f f e c t e d many aspect o f the b u i l t form, but above a l l i t f u n c t i o n e d as 
"one great guardian of p u b l i c h e a l t h " . 3 8 I t i s another f e a t u r e of 
This p a r t i c u l a r extension o f the Dean o f Guild's powers was an 
important one, f o r i t guaranteed t h a t the s o r t o f "making down" 
( i e . s u b - d i v i d i n g and s u b - d i v i d i n g again) popular amongst the l a n d l o r d 
o f the High Street area f o r over a century, would not i n the f u t u r e be 
pe r m i t t e d . No 'house' could, l e g a l l y , be created w i t h o u t an e x t e r n a l 
window or w i t h only cardboard w a l l s . This c o n t r i b u t e d something t o t h 
s o l u t i o n o f the great problem of overcrowding. 
R. M i l l e r (1896) p.77 
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V i c t o r i a n Edinburgh which makes the c i t y i t s e l f d i s t i n c t i v e l y S c o t t i s h . 
And so the stage i s set f o r a closer look a t Edinburgh between 
the years 1851 and 1891. Again i n t e r e s t l i e s i n the changing form o f 
the urban area and the decisions and actions o f the c i t y ' s p u b l i c bodies 
and i n h a b i t a n t s which r e s u l t e d i n these changes. I t has been s a i d 
t h a t Edinburgh i s not one c i t y , but two - the Old Town and the New Town. 
And as Young puts i t , "The Old Edinburgh o f the Middle Ages grew; the 
new Edinburgh o f Scott's age was p l a n n e d " . 3 9 The urban s t r u c t u r e o f 
Edinburgh i n 1851 revealed these two very d i s t i n c t p a r t s ; the one o f 
ancient foundation centred on the High Street had been i n h a b i t e d and 
shaped by many a generation; the other had been created almost a t once 
only a century before and had l i t t l e h i s t o r y except t h a t o f i t s c r e a t i o n . 
To show the b u i l t form o f the whole c i t y as an understandable outcome o f 
past human agency, then, there are two separate "casks i n v o l v e d . The 
f i r s t i s t o constru c t an account o f how Old Edinburgh grew and the 
various f a c t o r s which i n f l u e n c e d t h i s growth, the p e r s o n a l i t i e s and the 
events, the p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s and the p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f Edinburgh's past. 
The collapse o f p a r t o f an o l d s i x - s t o r e y tenement block i n the High 
S t r e e t and the u n s i g h t l y p i l e s o f rubble l e f t a f t e r the d e m o l i t i o n o f 
other unsafe p r o p e r t i e s both helped Provost Drummond's campaign f o r a 
New Town. The decay o f the tenements was not i t s e l f c o n t r i v e d ( i e . by 
any human agency), but merely happened. Yet undoubtedly i t s t i m i n g 
f u r t h e r e d Drummond's cause, a cause which was t o have such a dramatic 
e f f e c t on the face o f Edinburgh. I t i s t h i s s o r t o f d e t a i l which allows 
the h i s t o r i c a l a p p r e c i a t i o n of how Edinburgh came t o be as i t was i n 1851. 
3 9 D. Young (1965) p.31 ( t h e reference i s t o S i r Walter Scott.) 
The second task i s t o account f o r the b u i l t form o f the New 
Town and t h i s i s d i s t i n c t from the f i r s t simply because i t i s a s t o r y 
o f c r e a t i o n and not o f e v o l u t i o n . By 1851 the populace had seen the 
completion o f the f o u r t h phase o f New Town b u i l d i n g , on the E a r l o f 
Moray's p r o p e r t y . (This l i n k e d the western and eastern extensions 
of Craig's p l a n ) . But the o r i g i n a l l a y o u t was only added t o , not 
a l t e r e d . The New Town was s t i l l i n i t s infancy and t o understand 
t h i s p a r t o f the urban s t r u c t u r e , i t s conception and b i r t h are what 
must be made i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The Edinburgh o f the l a t e nineteenth century was V i c t o r i a n ; i t 
shared w i t h other c i t i e s the problems and the fashions o f the V i c t o r i a n 
age. I t s people were V i c t o r i a n s ; s i m i l a r s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s and l i f e s t y l e s 
were t o be found throughout B r i t a i n . But Edinburgh was also a S c o t t i s h 
c i t y , the c a p i t a l o f a country w i t h an independent l e g a l system and i t s 
own t r a d i t i o n s . The urban s t r u c t u r e had emerged from a past i n which 
contact w i t h England and abroad was i n t e r m i t t e n t and in v o l v e d journeys 
of considerable d u r a t i o n . And t h i s r e l a t i v e i s o l a t i o n i s revealed i n , 
f o r example, the d i s t i n c t i v e a r c h i t e c t u r e o f the 'Herringbone C i t y ' . 4 0 
Above a l l , however, Edinburgh was Edinburgh, a unique urban form o f v a r i e t y 
and i n t e r e s t . And i t i s t h i s Edinburgh which i s t o be the ob j e c t o f 
study, the h i s t o r i c a l arena wherein the events o f p a r t i c u l a r concern here 
took place and l e f t t h e i r i m p r i n t on the urban landscape. 
I t would be misleading t o suggest t h a t Scotland had no, or even 
l i t t l e , contact w i t h the r e s t of the world. The "Auld A l l i a n c e " w i t h 
France, prominent i n the r e i g n o f Mary Queen o f Scots, d i d le a d t o 
exchanges o f s k i l l e d craftsmen. Nevertheless these craftsmen came 
from d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s o f b u i l d i n g and design and, i f one traces 
the development o f a r c h i t e c t u r a l s t y l e s i n Scotland, w h i l s t the French 
i n f l u e n c e can be detected i t i s an i n f l u e n c e upon an already e x i s t i n g 
and d i s t i n c t i v e a r c h i t e c t u r a l t r a d i t i o n . This would hardly be the 
case w i t h the ' i n t e r n a t i o n a l design' prominent today. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF VICTORIAN EDINBURGH 
1851 TO 1891 
The purpose o f t h i s chapter i s t o provide some answer t o the 
o r i g i n a l questions concerning the urban form o f the c a p i t a l o f Scotland 
i n the l a t e r p a r t o f the nineteenth century. This task i s a vast one 
and the p i e c i n g together of a complete h i s t o r i c a l account would i t s e l f 
be a l i f e ' s work. The methodological issues around which the discussions 
o f t h i s t h e s i s are centred can, however, be amply i l l u s t r a t e d by an 
o u t l i n e o f such an account and how i t i s t o be compiled. Two general 
questions come t o mind i n t h i s context: What s o r t o f m a t e r i a l can the 
urban geographer make use o f i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n o f an h i s t o r i c a l 
account? And, how i s t h i s account t o be presented? I n p r a c t i c e , any 
i n d i v i d u a l research p r o j e c t w i l l have i t s temporal and s p a t i a l l i m i t s 
i n order t o reduce the q u a n t i t y o f p o t e n t i a l l y r e l e v a n t h i s t o r i c a l 
m a t e r i a l t o manageable p r o p o r t i o n s . Any i n d i v i d u a l researcher w i l l 
only be able t o piece together a small s e c t i o n of the o v e r a l l h i s t o r i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e . The boundaries of t h i s s e c t i o n may be more or less a p p r o p r i a t e , 
but the u l t i m a t e worth o f the research must be judged by i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n 
t o the whole. Our present concern i s t o provide an i l l u s t r a t i o n . The 
place and the perio d have already been s p e c i f i e d , but a f u r t h e r s e l e c t i o n 
i s necessary i f we are t o l i m i t the scale (though not the scope) 
o f t h i s chapter. To t h i s end I have chosen three d i s t i n c t i v e areas 
o f the V i c t o r i a n c a p i t a l from which t o draw examples f o r the o u t l i n e 
account. These areas, i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l order o f development, are: 
(a) the closes o f the High S t r e e t , Cowgate and 
Grassmarket; 
(b) the most recent extension o f the New Town from 
the E a r l o f Moray's estate t o the banks of the 
Water o f L e i t h ; 
( c ) the newer i n d u s t r i a l area o f Fountainbridge. 
I n the f i r s t and the l a s t the r e l a t i v e homogeneity o f both house type 
and the s o c i a l standing o f the i n h a b i t a n t s i s remarkable. Together 
they provide a f a i r cross-section of the areas o f Edinburgh at t h a t 
time. Precise s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the boundaries o f these areas, i f i t 
were p o s s i b l e , would have l i t t l e p o i n t . To t a l k o f the 'character' 
o f an area i s n e c e s s a r i l y t o t a l k i n a general manner (although about a 
p a r t i c u l a r area). This i m p r e c i s i o n , whether i n t a l k o f s o c i a l areas 
or s o c i a l groups, can i t s e l f be both i n f o r m a t i v e and i n t e r e s t i n g . The 
geographer, i f he i s t o embrace wholeheartedly the h i s t o r i a n ' s method, 
must recognise the necessity o f i n v e s t i g a t i n g something (eg. the 
character o f an area) which cannot, l o g i c a l l y , be broken down i n t o a 
c e r t a i n number o f s p e c i f i a b l e components. Some o f the i n f o r m a t i o n used 
by the urban research w i l l r e f e r t o bounded areas. Census data, f o r 
example, i s l i s t e d by P a r i s h , and when examining t h i s data i t i s 
necessary t o bear i n mind the l o c a t i o n o f the Parish boundaries. Much 
h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l , however, r e l a t e s t o p a r t i c u l a r houses, people or 
events, f o r which the d e l i m i t a t i o n o f c i t y 'areas' i s q u i t e beside the 
p o i n t . The only s p a t i a l guide r e q u i r e d i s t h a t given by a general 
i n d i c a t i o n o f the whereabouts o f named s t r e e t s , both i n r e l a t i o n t o 
each other and w i t h i n the c i t y as a whole. And t h i s can be gleaned 
from the s i x inch map o f Edinburgh reproduced i n F i g . 6, and from 
the more d e t a i l e d plans below. Further, F i g . 6 i n d i c a t e s the 
extent t o which the S c o t t i s h c a p i t a l expanded i n the p e r i o d 1851 t o 1891. 
By 1851, the C i t y o f Edinburgh was already s o c i a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . 
With the b u i l d i n g o f the New Town s t a t u s areas had emerged as both the 
r i c h and those o f moderate means l e f t the cramped High S t r e e t closes 
f o r the l i g h t and a i r o f the n o r t h e r l y e x t e n s i o n . 1 To the south o f 
the Old Town a small but s e l e c t development had a t t r a c t e d the monied 
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a s . By mid-century a r c h i t e c t u r a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e areas 
were w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d . Nor were the l i f e s t y l e s of the i n h a b i t a n t s 
homogeneous. Indeed a greater c o n t r a s t could h a r d l y be imagined than 
t h a t between the customary d a i l y r o u t i n e o f a New Town lady and the 
d a i l y chores o f those wretches whom destiny had condemned t o the 
r a b b i t warrens o f the High S t r e e t . Between these two extremes there 
l a y a m u l t i t u d e o f i d e n t i f i a b l e s o c i a l groups whose l i f e chances and 
spheres o f contact were, i n some way, d i s t i n c t i v e . C e r t a i n 
o c c u p a t i o n a l l y based s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s can e a s i l y be i d e n t i f i e d . 
The i n d u s t r i a l a r t i s a n , f o r example, h e l d a s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n w i t h i n 
the working pop u l a t i o n , ~ f o r ~ i n h i s trade" he was~irr charge" o f ~aT small 
complement o f s e m i - s k i l l e d boys, apprentices and women. To these 
under-labourers the a r t i s a n was master, a member o f the 'respectable' 
working class and a man whose wages allowed him t o r e s i d e i n a 'decent' 
neighbourhood. 2 One could suggest many d i f f e r e n t schemes by which t o 
c l a s s i f y a p o p u l a t i o n s o c i a l l y . 
For an a n a l y s i s o f s t a t u s areas w i t h i n Edinburgh based on i n f o r m a t i o n 
from v a l u a t i o n r o l e s , see G. Gordon (1971) 
For an i n t e r e s t i n g discussion o f the l i f e s t y l e s o f t h i s "Labour 
A r i s t o c r a c y " see R. Q. Gray (1973) 
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Anthony K e i t h , f o r example, wrote i n 1908, 
Edinburgh s o c i e t y may be d i v i d e d i n t o f o u r classes, 
these being composed o f - (1) people who count i n 
the s o c i a l scale; ( 2 ) people who t h i n k they count 
i n the s o c i a l s c a l e ; (3) people who hope t o count 
i n the same; and (4) people who don't care a brass 
f a r t h i n g whether they count or n o t , so long as they 
are happy. 3 
Since our present concern i s w i t h r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i c t s , however, i t 
would merely be d i s t r a c t i n g t o continue the l i s t . The p o i n t o f t a l k i n g 
about s o c i a l groups at a l l i s i n order t o make easy reference t o 'types' 
of people. Further, c e r t a i n groups w i l l be r e l e v a n t and other 
i r r e l e v a n t t o the research t o p i c . The name one gives t o such a 
group i s o f l i t t l e importance f o r i t i s the shared c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
which are o f i n t e r e s t . I n the present study o f Edinburgh we r e q u i r e 
t o i d e n t i f y those s o c i a l groups which have r e s i d e n t i a l a s p i r a t i o n s and 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n common; i e . t o describe these p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . 
And t h e r e i s no b e t t e r way o f doing t h i s than t o explore the urban 
d i s t r i c t s i n question and examine the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e i r 
i n h a b i t a n t s . To describe the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n o f any group o f persons 
i s more i n f o r m a t i v e than even the most c a r e f u l attempt a t c a t e g o r i s a t i o n . 
There -are-two-main-questions-to-be~answered-s Seneral-ly-expressed 
these are: f i r s t , 'Why d i d t h i s type o f housing develop i n t h i s p a r t o f 
the c i t y ? ' 4 ; secondly, 'Why does t h i s group o f people ( w i t h these 
p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) r e side i n t h i s area ( w i t h these 
p a r t i c u l a r a r c h i t e c t u r a l and s p a t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) ? ' Before these 
questions can be answered d e t a i l s o f the ' p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ' 
would have t o be provided. I n each case, there w i l l be l i m i t s t o the 
answers.which can be given. I t may be t h a t a r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y 
3 A. K e i t h (1908) p.204 
4 'type o f housing' here should be taken as r e f e r r i n g not only t o the 
a r c h i t e c t u r a l features o f the b u i l d i n g , but t o the amenities t o be 
found w i t h i n i t and the d e n s i t y o f b u i l d i n g s i n the area as a whole. 
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was converted t o a commercial one (and t h a t t h i s i s an important 
'event' i n the h i s t o r i c a l account) but t h a t the present evidence 
gives us no clue about why t h i s was done. We must simply accept 
the f a c t o f the b u i l d i n g ' s t r a n s f o r m a t i o n and attempt t o make any 
subsequent development i n the area i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the l i g h t o f t h i s 
f a c t . We cannot e x p l a i n why the owner e f f e c t e d the change i f the 
documents give us no clue as t o possible reasons. This does not 
i n v a l i d a t e the h i s t o r i c a l account, i t only marks i t s l i m i t s . Louch 
says o f the h i s t o r i a n s ' method, 
Understanding the past i n these terms comes down 
t o o r d e r i n g events and p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n such a way 
as t o b r i n g a person or an episode i n t o c e n t r a l focus, 
and t o see i n t h a t mode o f d e s c r i p t i o n the way i n which 
other happenings f l o w from the actions of the c e n t r a l 
character or the c l i m a t i c episode. 5 
These happenings themselves, however, can be examined i n more or less 
d e t a i l , and a t each stage i n the analysis more puzzles are solved, more 
' d e t a i l s ' are made i n t e l l i g i b l e . The next s e c t i o n o f t h i s chapter i s 
intended t o i l l u s t r a t e the method, but taken t o i t s l o g i c a l extreme 
( i e . the l i m i t s imposed by t h e present evidence) the h i s t o r i c a l account 
thus produced would answer a l l the questions which could be answered by an 
h i s t o r i c a l researcher. 
I 
EDINBURGH IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY: 
We can now look a t the three selected areas o f Edinburgh i n t u r n . 
The h i s t o r i c a l account here w i l l i n v o l v e p a i n t i n g a p i c t u r e o f the 
character o f these areas and the l i v e s of t h e i r i n h a b i t a n t s . Contrast 
w i l l be an important p a r t o f t h i s account f o r the poor are poor i n r e l a t i o n 
A. R. Louch (1969) p.58 
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t o the r i c h e s o f the r i c h ; areas become undesirable when there i s 
something t o be desired. The aim i s t o make the r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n s 
o f various groups n e i t h e r unbelievable nor i n e v i t a b l e , but simply-
i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The closes o f the High St r e e t area around 1851: 
Amongst the many areas o f Edinburgh i n 1851 t h a t of the High S t r e e t , 
Cowgate and Grassmarket i s perhaps the most i n t e r e s t i n g and e n t i c i n g t o 
the urban geographer. This i s not only because the area i t s e l f was 
c l e a r l y separate from the r e s t o f the c i t y , both i n i t s character and 
the p a t t e r n o f i t s b u i l d i n g s and s t r e e t , but also because the present 
evidence i s s u f f i c i e n t i n q u a n t i t y t o persuade the researcher t h a t the 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n could be a f r u i t f u l one. I n e v i t a b l y , t h en, the present 
o u t l i n e w i l l concentrate on t h i s area and make use o f the many accounts 
o f r e s i d e n t i a l conditions and s o c i a l circumstances which have been preserved. 
The very existence o f h i s t o r i c a l documents r e l a t i n g t o the High S t r e e t 
area i n the mid-nineteenth century may i t s e l f seem c u r i o u s , f o r a decade 
e a r l i e r (and indeed i n t o the 1850s and 1860s) the more genteel i n h a b i t a n t s 
of the New Town and the southern extensions o f the City were l a r g e l y 
i g n o r a n t o f the condi t i o n s and goings on i n the High S t r e e t closes. 
C e r t a i n l y they never ventured there save out o f ne c e s s i t y , and then s o l e l y 
t o the business establishments o f the main thoroughfares. As l a t e as 
1866 an a r t i c l e i n one o f Edinburgh's evening papers b o l d l y s t a t e d , 
Much less i s known, we venture t o say, o f the abodes 
of the poor i n the closes o f Edinburgh than o f many 
pa r t s o f the i n t e r i o r o f A f r i c a . 6 
And there i s l i t t l e reason t o d i s b e l i e v e the j o u r n a l i s t s . A f t e r the 
C i t y had been extended t o both n o r t h and south, the High S t r e e t declined 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, Friday 26 October 1866. The a r t i c l e i s 
the f i r s t i n a series e n t i t l e d 'The Poor o f Edinburgh and t h e i r Homes'. 
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from i t s already decaying s t a t e t o become the reserve o f poverty 
and p e s t i l e n c e . The Old Town was the most densely populated area 
o f the c i t y , but few o f i t s i n h a b i t a n t s were l i t e r a t e . The closes 
and wynds were the centres o f v i c e , o f drunkenness and debauchery, 
and a venue e n t i r e t y u n s u i t a b l e f o r an i d l e s t r o l l . No sane gentleman 
would have ventured alone i n t o these dungeons a f t e r dark. I n the f i r s t 
h a l f o f the nineteenth century few were concerned w i t h the p l i g h t o f 
the u n fortunate i n h a b i t a n t s , and o f those who were, most were missionaries 
b r i n g i n g the j o i n t message o f C h r i s t i a n i t y and temperance. Even i n 1851, 
ignorance o f the nature o f everyday existence i n a High S t r e e t close was 
widespread. Yet over the next decade t h i s was t o become one o f the 
most f r e q u e n t l y I n v e s t i g a t e d 1 areas i n the C i t y . 
Why t h i s sudden i n t e r e s t by the p o p u l a t i o n a t l a r g e i n the misery 
o f the High S t r e e t dweller i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o say. But the e x p l o r a t i o n 
of the s t a t e o f the wynds and closes o f the Old Town made popular reading 
i n the 1850s and 1860s. Sympathy as w e l l as repugnance was aroused and, 
most important o f a l l , people s t a r t e d t o express the op i n i o n t h a t something 
ought t o be done about the c o n d i t i o n s found t h e r e . J o u r n a l i s t s and 
medical d o c t o r s , c l o s e l y escorted by the p o l i c e , went i n to-view t-he -
scene and then wrote a r t i c l e s and pamphlets conveying the h o r r o r o f what 
they saw t o anyone w i l l i n g and able t o read. Perhaps i t was, as a 
j o u r n a l i s t at the time suggested, t h a t "...the e v i l ( o f unmixed 
wretchedness and f i l t h ) became so i n t o l e r a b l e t h a t the whole press o f 
Edinburgh d i r e c t e d i t s a t t e n t i o n t o the s u b j e c t . " 7 At any r a t e , the 
p u b l i c i t y given t o the High S t r e e t area by these 'long communications 
from experienced correspondents' ensured t h a t the general ignorance 
would not long remain. 
Committ-ea o f the Working-Classes o f Edinburgh (1860) p. 13 
(Alexander Macpherson, secretary t o t h i s committee, wrote a s e r i e s of 
a r t i c l e s on t h i s area o f the C i t y f o r the Edinburgh News.) 
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Another f a c t o r which i n f l u e n c e d the spread o f i n f o r m a t i o n about 
the Old Town was the o f f i c i a l census o f 1851. This i s the f i r s t 
r e l i a b l e and comprehensive census o f the C i t y o f Edinburgh and i t 
allowed comparisons t o be made between the Old Town and the New Town. 
On 30 March 1851 the o f f i c i a l enumerators, covering every p a r t o f the 
urban area, attempted t o note down d e t a i l s of every man, woman and c h i l d , 
t h e i r names and t h e i r whereabouts. Questions were also asked about age, 
occupation and place o f b i r t h . 8 Before the end o f the year Thomas 
Thorburn published a s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s o f the Edinburgh census i n 
which he separated the numerical data f o r the Old Town from t h a t f o r 
the New Town.9 The c i t i z e n s were, f o r the f i r s t time, presented w i t h 
The 1851 census d i f f e r e d from the 184-1 census i n several respects. 
Experience had been gained by the 1841 enumerators ( t h i s was the 
f i r s t attempt a t a complete census o f Scotland). The i n s t r u c t i o n s 
given t o 1851 o f f i c i a l s were c l e a r e r and less l i a b l e t o cause confusion 
both i n those who wrote out the r e t u r n s and i n those who l a t e r abstracted 
the aggregate s t a t i s t i c s . The r e s u l t a n t increase i n the competence of 
the 1851 enumerators i s evident when examining the handwritten census 
books. Also the date chosen i n 1851, namely 30 March, i t s e l f suggests 
t h a t the r e t u r n s are a more r e l i a b l e r e f l e c t i o n of the usual p o p u l a t i o n 
o f " t h e c i t y than were the 1841 r e t u r n s . For on 6 June 1841 ( t h e date 
o f the census t h a t year) i t was found t h a t a considerable^ number^of ~ 
people had, by t h a t date, r e t i r e d t o sea-bathing or other country 
q u a r t e r s . 
Nevertheless the accuracy i s indeed questionable, e s p e c i a l l y i n an area 
such as the High S t r e e t . Some 'human e r r o r 1 i s i n e v i t a b l e and i n any 
census there w i l l be those who, f o r one reason or another, f a i l t o impart 
the c o r r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n . When the 'houses' i n question are mainly o f 
one room, w i t h no c l e a r address and a p r o p o r t i o n of the i n h a b i t a n t s are 
members o f the c r i m i n a l classes, i t would not be unreasonable t o assume 
some inaccuracy. That the census provides adequate general i n f o r m a t i o n 
on Edinburgh i n 1851, however, i s undeniable and t o t h i s extent the 
numerical data found t h e r e i n i s o f great value t o the h i s t o r i a n . 
T. Thorburn (1851) 
29fc. 
a comprehensive s t a t i s t i c a l account o f popu l a t i o n d i s t r i b u t i o n s w i t h i n 
the City. The V i c t o r i a n s appear t o have d e l i g h t e d i n s t a t i s t i c s . 
For the h i s t o r i a n s t a t i s t i c s must be incorporated i n the wider 
h i s t o r i c a l account. Even Thorburn appreciated t h a t some background 
d e t a i l was r e q u i r e d t o make the bare numbers i n t e l l i g i b l e . The 
s t a t i s t i c s t e l l us t h a t the popu l a t i o n of Edinburgh ( t h e Royalty plus 
St. Cuthberts and Canongate) increased by around 17% (from 133,4-96 t o 
160,627) between 1841 and 1851, but t h i s 'happening' cannot be made 
i n t e l l i g i b l e by re p e a t i n g the numbers alone. 
The urban geographer has t o use the census r e t u r n along w i t h 
the r e s t o f the present evidence when c o n s t r u c t i n g h i s account o f the 
character o f urban d i s t r i c t s and the changes which occurred. Presented 
w i t h the o r i g i n a l enumerators' books, however, some s e l e c t i o n has t o be 
made. For the purposes o f t h i s t h e s i s , a 10% sample o f the e n t r i e s f o r 
selected parishes was t a k e n . 1 0 The parishes chosen are three o f the 
o l d e s t parishes xn the Cxty ~ St. John's, New North ( o r West St. G i l e ^ ) 
and the Tron. A l l s t r e t c h from the south side o f the High St r e e t down 
the steep sout h - f a c i n g i n c l i n e t o the Cowgate. They include many o f 
the t y p i c a l - n a r r o w High St r e e t closes and, "in 1851, had few b u i l d i n g s 
under f o u r storeys high. Their p o s i t i o n w i t h i n Edinburgh can be seen 
from F i g . 6 , 1 1 and the d e t a i l s o f t h e i r s t r e e t p a t t e r n appear i n Figs.7-9. 
I f we wish t o know something o f t h e character o f an area one o f the 
most obvious s t a t i s t i c s w i t h which t o s t a r t i s t h e number o f persons i n 
This was considered p e r f e c t l y adequate given the r e s t r i c t e d use 
t o which the s t a t i s t i c s were going t o be put. A random 10% o f 
households does give us some idea o f the character o f the area 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i f , as i n the High S t r e e t , i t i s densely populated. 
Fu r t h e r , the sample was taken i n a c o n s i s t e n t manner according t o 
c e r t a i n standard r u l e s (see Appendix A). 
p.2S0 above 
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the area. There are sev e r a l computations which can be made. I n 
1851 the Old Town o f Edinburgh was c e r t a i n l y i n an overcrowded s t a t e 
and the census t e s t i f i e s t o t h i s : 
T o t a l Area o f Parish Density 
PARISHES Population ( i n acres) (Persons per acre)(sq.yards per person) 
TRON 3,602 6.62 544 8.9 
NEW NORTH 3,190 10.58 301 16.05 
ST.JOHN'S 3,068 7.32 419 11.54 
Fig.10 POPULATION DENSITIES FOR THREE HIGH STREET PARISHES, 1851 1 2 
Much o f the s i g n i f i c a n c e o f these f i g u r e s , however, can only be 
appreciated i n r e l a t i o n t o s i m i l a r f i g u r e s f o r other areas o f Edinburgh 
at t h a t time. Nevertheless the average density o f 544 persons per ground 
acre i n the Tron Parish i s s t r i k i n g l y h i g h . 1 3 And the other two parishes 
are not f a r behind. A glance a t the s t r e e t plan o f New North suggests 
t h a t the f i g u r e o f 301 may give a f a l s e impression s i n c e , w i t h the 
presence o f a la r g e number o f n o n - r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g s (eg. the law 
courts and St. Giles C a t h e d r a l ) , the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n must have been 
accommodated i n an area considerably less than t h a t o f the p a r i s h as a 
whole. To understand what these f i g u r e s meant i n human terms, a much 
cl o s e r look a t the nature o f l i f e i n the tenements i s necessary. Only 
by s e l e c t i n g p a r t i c u l a r households and examining accounts o f t h e i r 
existence can we b r i n g t o l i g h t the character o f t h i s area i n 1851, a 
character which the average census s t a t i s t i c s can only h i n t a t . 
The r e s i d e n t i a l d e n s i t i e s o f the popul a t i o n o f the Old Town, then, 
can be contrasted w i t h the spaciousness o f the New Town. The very 
1 2 Computed from the o r i g i n a l 1851 census r e t u r n s . A l l f i g u r e s are 
e i t h e r t o the nearest person or c o r r e c t t o two decimal places. 
This i s e s p e c i a l l y so i n comparison t o present day d e n s i t i e s . One 
o f the boasts o f the 20th century New Towns, f o r example, i s an average 
de n s i t y o f 15 persons per acre. 
comparison o f the l a y o u t o f the High Street parishes (Figs. 7-9) w i t h 
Craig's plan f o r the extension o f Edinburgh (Fig.5 p.263) suggests t h i s 
t o be the case, and i n the decade before 1851 the Old Town's population 
grew at a f a s t e r r a t e than t h a t o f t h e New Town. The composition o f 
t h i s p o p u l a t i o n i s o f some importance. 
Old Town New Iown T o t a l Burgh 
Nos. 16-60 y r s . i n c l . 16,464 18,067 34,531 
Born i n 6,512 6,737 13,249 
Parliamentary Burgh (39.4%) (37.2%) (38.4%) 
Born i n remainder 871 1,403 2,274 
of Mid-Lothian (5.2%) (7.8%) (6.8%) 
Born i n remaining 4,420 9,632 14,052 
counties o f Scotland (26.7%) (53.3%) (40.7%) 
Born i n I r e l a n d 4,711 295 5,006 
(28.7%) (1.6%) (14.5%) 
Fig.11 CLASSIFICATION OF ADULT POPULATION AS TO PLACE OF BIRTH, 1851 
From Fig.11 i t i s c l e a r t h a t the highest percentage o f I r i s h born persons 
l i v e d , i n 1851, i n the Old Town. F u r t h e r , i n St. John's and New North 
parishes over 40% o f the t o t a l a d u l t p o p u l a t i o n had been born i n I r e l a n d . 
Many o f these I r i s h f o l k had, i n the e a r l y years o f the century, f l e d from 
the famines i n t h e i r own country and come t o Scotland. The gangs of I r i s h 
labourers engaged f i r s t i n the canal c o n s t r u c t i o n and then i n the r a i l w a y _ 
c o n s t r u c t i o n were infamous, and t h e i r presence f r e q u e n t l y resented. Thus 
c e r t a i n o f the High S t r e e t closes became I r i s h ghettos being the only places 
i n the c i t y where the 'uncouth I r i s h ' could o b t a i n accommodation. The 
c o n d i t i o n , both m a t e r i a l and p h y s i c a l , o f these people was p i t i f u l . Like 
many o f the other i n h a b i t a n t s o f the wynds and closes few were other than 
d e s t i t u t e . But the I r i s h had t o bear the a d d i t i o n a l burden o f being set 
apart and m i s t r u s t e d by the r e s t . This a n t i - I r i s h f e e l i n g was widespread 
and shared even by Dr. George B e l l whose sympathy w i t h the s u f f e r i n g s 
of the High Street's i n h a b i t a n t s i s obvious from many o f h i s 
taken from T. Thorburn (1851) 
The d e t a i l e d t a b l e i s reproduced i n Appendix B 
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w r i t i n g s . 15 Witness the f o l l o w i n g , taken from a pamphlet published 
by him i n 1849: 
We l e a r n from the Report o f the Royal I n f i r m a r y 
f o r 1847-8, t h a t , on 19 September 1847 there were 
511 f e v e r p a t i e n t s i n the house, and t h a t 379 o f these 
were I r i s h . The number o f I r i s h admitted t o the Royal 
I n f i r m a r y t h i s year, f o r " a l l diseases", was 2,563. 
Each p a t i e n t , on average, costs £1.10/-; and thus the 
low I r i s h , who have nothing t o do i n Edinburgh, cost 
the i n f i r m a r y about £3,800 i n the year 1847-48. The 
migratory I r i s h are a p e s t i l e n c e as w e l l as a pest. 
This country both desires and deserves t o be p r o t e c t e d 
from them. 1 6 
And t h i s passage was w r i t t e n by another medical doctor i n 1852: 
There can be l i t t l e doubt t h a t t h i s increase ( i n p o p u l a t i o n , 
1841-51) i s , i n a great measure, t o be ascribed t o the 
i n f l u x o f I r i s h . Year a f t e r year, the receding t i d e o f 
harvest labourers leaves on our shores a large residuum 
o f I r i s h rags and poverty. I t i s t h i s class who w i l l be 
d r i v e n i n t o the holes and corners o f our c i t y , perhaps 
even d r i v e n o u t , by remodelling and cleansing the o l d 
houses; nor are there many o f th e i n h a b i t a n t s who would 
r e g r e t such a r e s u l t . Assuredly the b e n e f i t received 
from t h i s a d d i t i o n t o our p o p u l a t i o n , i s not of such a 
k i n d as t o induce anyone t o encourage t h e i r stay by o f f e r i n g 
comfortable accommodation We a f f i r m , and t h a t a d v i s e d l y , 
t h a t these people are not f i t t o l i v e i n o r d i n a r y houses. 1 7 
C l e a r l y there were many who thought the I r i s h a tremendous burden on the 
City, f o r the s t a t e o f h e a l t h of t h i s s e c t i o n o f the p o p u l a t i o n , exacerbated 
by the c o n d i t i o n s i n which they l i v e d , was s u b s t a n t i a l l y poorer than t h a t 
o f the r e s t . We know from the census o f 1851 t h a t the a d u l t working 
population ( i e . those between 16 and 60 years o f age) i n the Royal Burgh 
as a whole was, at t h a t date, 34,531 of which 5,006 or 14.5% were I r i s h 
born. Assuming t h a t the p r o p o r t i o n o f I r i s h persons had e i t h e r remained 
For example, a t a time when many supposed t h a t the i n a b i l i t y o f a 
member o f the male population i n these closes t o secure employment was 
due t o i d l e n e s s , intemperance or b o t h , Dr. B e l l s tates f o r c e f u l l y t h a t 
" I t i s a mockery t o t e l l men t o be i n d u s t r i o u s when there i s n o t h i n g f o r 
them t o do." He also reveals a considerable sympathy f o r the Highland 
paupers i n Edinburgh of whom, he p o i n t s o u t , seven-eighths were v i c t i m s 
o f e v i c t i o n . 
16 G. B e l l (1849) p.15 
R. F o u l i s (1852) p.31 17 
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s t a t i o n a r y or else r i s e n since 1847 1 8, i t can be seen t h a t the I r i s h 
were d i s p r o p o r t i o n a l l y represented amongst the i n f i r m a r y p a t i e n t s . 
I n the year 184-7-8, approximately 51.7% o f a l l p a t i e n t s were I r i s h 
and on the n i g h t o f 19 September 1847 an as t o n i s h i n g 74.2% o f t h i s 
h o s p i t a l ' s f e v e r p a t i e n t s were from I r i s h f a m i l i e s . I t i s n o t , then, 
s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Dr. B e l l and others saw the I r i s h as a burden on the 
C i t y , f o r they were a d r a i n on the C i t y purses. The general climate 
of m i s t r u s t and resentment which surrounded these f o r e i g n e r s had 
i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the l o c a t i o n o f t h e i r l i v i n g q u a r t e r s . Not only d i d 
economic necessity narrow t h e i r choices t o areas where r e n t s were low 
and t o be p a i d weekly, but the poor I r i s h were also dependent upon the 
go o d w i l l o f the l a n d l o r d , f o r many d i s c r i m i n a t e d against them. And I r i s h 
tended t o sub-let t o I r i s h , so t h a t by 1851 sever a l small ghettos had 
developed w i t h i n the High Street area. C e r t a i n closes became associated 
w i t h the I r i s h and f o r t h i s reason a t t r a c t e d other f a m i l i e s o f t h a t 
n a t i o n a l i t y . Even the 10% sample o f t h e census provides a u s e f u l 
i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s p a t t e r n o f r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n . I n Burnet's 
Close, New North P a r i s h , f o r ins t a n c e , three o f the fou r sample f a m i l i e s 
had I r i s h - b o r n headsy two of these being widows who described t h e i r 
occupation as 'costermonger' and the t h i r d being a general labourer. 
And i n Borthwick's Close, Conn's Close and Old Fishmarket Close a l l the 
households selected ( t h r e e , two and s i x r e s p e c t i v e l y ) were I r i s h i n 
o r i g i n . Of the heads o f these households, those l i v i n g i n Borthwick's 
Close gave t h e i r occupations as journeymen ( h a t t e r , t a i l o r and weaver), 
those i n Conn's Close as mason's labo u r e r s , and i n Fishmarket Close, two 
labou r e r s , two dealers i n o l d c l o t h e s , one shop p o r t e r and one h a i r teaser 
1 8 This i s a reasonable assumption, since the potato famine o f 1846 
had d r i v e n thousands o f I r i s h people from t h e i r own country across the 
water t o the B r i t i s h mainland. C e r t a i n l y many o f these came t o Scotland 
t o seek employment and save themselves from s t a r v a t i o n . And Thorburn 
(1851) suggests t h a t the 27% increase i n the po p u l a t i o n o f the Old Town 
over the decade 1841 t o 1851 can be ascribed t o the growth o f the r a i l w a y 
system which induced I r i s h labourers i n t o the c i t y . 
were t o be found. Yet again, i n t h a t p a r t o f the Cowgate f a l l i n g 
w i t h i n New North, e i g h t o f the twelve households examined had I r i s h -
born heads - two f i e l d l a b o u r e r s , a b r i c k l a y e r ' s l a b o u r e r , a grocer's 
p o r t e r , a costermonger, a journeyman c o t t o n spinner, a journeyman 
t a i l o r and a dealer i n o l d c l o t h e s . Elsewhere i n the same p a r i s h there 
were closes i n which few, i f any, persons o f I r i s h o r i g i n r esided. 
The p a t t e r n i s s i m i l a r i n both St. John's p a r i s h (where, i n one 
s t r e t c h o f the Cowgate, s i x o f the seven sample households had I r i s h - b o r n 
heads, yet o f the seven selected households l i v i n g i n the West Bow none 
was I r i s h ) and i n the Tron p a r i s h (where i n a s e c t i o n o f B l a c k f r i a r ' s 
Wynd a l l s i x heads o f the households noted had come from I r e l a n d w h i l s t 
i n Dickson's Close the sample o f seven revealed not one Irishman). No 
other group o f people i d e n t i f i a b l e by t h e i r place o r country of b i r t h 
formed such r e s i d e n t i a l concentrations i n these wynds and closes i n the 
middle years o f the nineteenth century. Nor had the I r i s h gathered 
elsewhere w i t h i n the C i t y . Their presence i n the High Sxreex area i s , 
t h e r e f o r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y noteworthy. 
I f the I r i s h , d e l i b e r a t e l y or otherwise, congregated i n small pockets 
withihMzhe t o t a l r e s i d e n t i a l p a t t e r n , i t was not because" they had nothing 
i n common w i t h the other r e s i d e n t s o f the Old Town. By 1851, the High 
S t r e e t and Cowgate had been v i r t u a l l y s t r i p p e d o f a l l members of the 
p r o f e s s i o n a l classes. Master craftsmen were few and f a r between and 
the populace, whether o f I r i s h o r i g i n or no, consisted mainly of journeymen 
( o f various t r a d e s ) , l a b o u r e r s , s t r e e t p o r t e r s , o l d clothes dealers, 
costermongers, scavengers and paupers. Moreover, many gave t h e i r 
occupation as 'keeping lodgers' where the premises were c l e a r l y not a 
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l o d g i n g house. 1 9 Only 8% o f the sampled households o f a l l three 
parishes kept servants; o f these less than 2% ( i e . 3 out of 163 sample 
households) kept more than one s e r v a n t , 2 0 and none kept more than two. 
The three households w i t h two servants (as i t happens, one i n each 
p a r i s h ) stand out as exc e p t i o n a l w i t h i n the area. They are: 
(1) St. John's Parish - r e s i d i n g a t 100 Grassmarket, a 
husband and w i f e both i n t h e i r middle f o r t i e s . The 
former's occupation i s given as a self-employed s t a b l e r 
and innkeeper. They have three c h i l d r e n , a daughter, 
13, and two sons, 8 and 5. The two servants, i t may 
reasonably be assumed, help run the i n n . 
(2) New North Parish - r e s i d i n g i n Parliament Square, we 
f i n d the t e l l e r o f the Union Bank who occupies premises 
w i t h i n the bank b u i l d i n g . This man, a bachelor o f 51 
years, l i v e s w i t h another unmarried and e l d e r l y r e l a t i o n . 
He keeps two servants (ages, 57 and 13). This i s a 
household o f good standing and i t i s l i k e l y t h a t the 
servants take care o f a l l domestic d u t i e s there being 
no 'lady o f the house'. 
(3) Tron Parish - r e s i d i n g at 102 South Bridge, a household 
headed by a widower o f 77 years, whose occupation i s 
described as 'a gentleman'. With him l i v e s h i s son ( 3 8 ) , 
hi m s e l f a clothes draper employing 150 men. Again the 
servants would be needed f o r domestic d u t i e s . 
Why these households had not l e f t the Old Town f o r the more fashionable 
p a r t s o f Edinburgh can only be guessed a t . The innkeeper had t o stay t o 
make h i s l i v e l i h o o d , the bank t e l l e r was provided w i t h lodgings by the 
Bank, and the gentleman who l i v e d on one o f the main thoroughfares, was 
perhaps not discontent w i t h the house he had i n h a b i t e d f o r many years. 
I t i s not these people, however, who give us a clue as t o the general 
The 1851 census gives no i n d i c a t i o n o f the size o f the household's 
accommodation. This can, however, be estimated from the number o f 
f a m i l i e s sharing the same address and the size o f the tenement i n h a b i t e d 
by them. Undoubtedly some f a m i l i e s and t h e i r lodgers shared one room 
w i t h a window plus a dark bed-closet. 
Some I r i s h f a m i l i e s are noted as having one servant. T h i s , however, 
would o f t e n be a young g i r l brought over from I r e l a n d whose 'employment' 
only saved her from s t a r v a t i o n . Not i n f r e q u e n t l y such g i r l s were r e l a t e d 
t o some member o f the household w i t h which they l i v e d . 
character o f the area, and the c o n t r a s t between t h e i r l i f e s t y l e and 
t h a t o f the more t y p i c a l 'low I r i s h ' can e a s i l y be imagined. 
We have described the area and t h e people as w e l l as can be done 
from the i n f o r m a t i o n o f the census. But how f a r has t h i s gone t o 
answering the question about why these people should, i n 1851, reside 
i n t h i s area? Amongst the r e s i d e n t s were the paupers, the beggars, 
the d e s t i t u t e and the s t r e e t urchins o f the Royal Burgh. Of those 
who d i d f i n d employment most received the weekly wage o f the common 
labourer. The employment i t s e l f was f r e q u e n t l y temporary, being subject 
t o seasonal v a r i a t i o n s i n demand, and the n e c e s s i t i e s o f l i f e ( food and 
r e n t ) had t o be p a i d f o r as and when money could be scraped together. 
These people i n h a b i t e d some o f the worst slums i n Europe. To make 
t h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i n t e l l i g i b l e , t o understand the s i t u a t i o n i n the mid-
nineteenth century c a p i t a l , there i s no b e t t e r source o f i n f o r m a t i o n than 
the r e p o r t s published i n the Edinburgh press between 184-9 and 1870. These 
were w r i t t e n by the j o u r n a l i s t s whose ex p l o r a t i o n s not only opened t h e i r 
own eyes, but brought the h o r r i f y i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f the wynds and closes 
to the a t t e n t i o n o f a reading p u b l i c whose ignorance i n t h i s matter had 
been complete. A s e l e c t i o n o f the contents w i l l ~ s u f f i c e t o i l l u s t r a t e 
the p o i n t . 
I n 1850, George B e l l declared o f B l a c k f r i a r ' s Wynd i n the Tron 
p a r i s h "...the l o c a l i t y i s from year's end t o year's end a d i f f u s e d 
d u n g h i l l " . 2 1 The only drop o f water i n the wynd a t t h a t time was i n 
one 'land', o f a comparatively new tenement, a t the t o p . There was 
no d r a i n i n the wynd w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t a l l the f i l t h o f t h e place 
remained on the surface. The absence o f drainage and the p r o v i s i o n o f 
G. B e l l (1850) p.7 
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water i s commented on by a l l who undertook e x p l o r a t i o n s o f the 
area, many o f whom were n e a r l y overcome by the stench. As one 
comments, 
At none o f the places we v i s i t e d i s there a 
receptacle f o r f i l t h outside and the r e s u l t i s t h a t 
the c loses, s t a i r s , passages and houses are f u l l o f 
abomination. Sometimes the ordure i s kept i n p a i l s 
on d i f f e r e n t landings when there i s room, but more 
f r e q u e n t l y the accumulations o f f i l t h , ashes and so 
f o r t h are placed under the bed, when there i s one, and 
i n other circumstances behind the door, or i n a corner 
of the room u n t i l the d u s t c a r t s come r o u n d . 2 2 
And on viewing two n o t o r i o u s dens i n the lower p a r t o f what had been 
Cardinal Beaton's Palace (see Fig.12), i n B l a c k f r i a r ' s Wynd, these 
j o u r n a l i s t s declared: 
Nothing can, we t h i n k , give a b e t t e r d e s c r i p t i o n o f 
the scenes enacted here than the f o l l o w i n g l i n e s from 
the " I n f e r n o " : -
Various tongues, 
H o r r i b l e languages and c r i e s o f woe; 
Accents o f anger, voices deep and h o a r s e . 2 3 
A l l are agreed t h a t the h o r r o r o f what they saw i n some cases d e f i e s 
d e s c r i p t i o n , f o r i t i s almost unbelievable t h a t human beings could be 
thus degraded. 
The ground f l o o r rooms reseirble c e l l a r s i n so f a r t h a t 
they have t o be descended t o by a step' and are t h e r e f o r e 
about a f o o t below the l e v e l o f the ground. They are 
mostly occupied by t h e worst and lowest c l a s s , and average, 
I b e l i e v e , one s h i l l i n g per week. Here i t i s no uncommon 
t h i n g t o see the grate t o r n out and the place d e s t i t u t e of 
a l l semblance o f f u r n i s h i n g , except an o l d sack f o r a bed. 
....Yet these are s t i l l above the very worst tenants o f the 
close. 2 1* 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, Friday 26 October 1866 
I b i d . Wednesday 28 November, 1866. B l a c k f r i a r s Wynd was, f o r over 
500 years, one o f the most a r i s t o c r a t i c d i s t r i c t s o f the c a p i t a l . Here 
l i v e d many a nobleman i n c l u d i n g the Earls o f Morton, St. C l a i r E a r l o f 
Orkney (whose lady i s reputed t o have been waited upon by seventy-five 
gentlewomen a l l c l o t h e d i n v e l v e t s and s i l k s ) , the Lords Home and Archbishop 
Beaton. Even i n the e a r l y years o f the eighteenth century i t housed two 
fashionable boarding schools. By 1850, however, i t s d e c l i n e was complete. 
A D i s t r i c t V i s i t o r (1867) p.15 
Fig. 12 CARDINAL BEATON'S PALACE, COWGATE, c.1855 
This early photograph was taken by the amateur photographer 
Thomas Keith. I t shows the building which was once the 
Cardinal's palace i n an advanced state of decay. 
The incidence o f disease and death i n these areas was much higher than 
i n other p a r t s o f Edinburgh. There were two great e v i l s o f the b u i l t 
environment; the f i r s t was the extremely f i l t h y s t a t e o f the closes; 
and the second, the over-hanging wooden house f r o n t s which i n some 
cases f i l l e d up the narrow thoroughfares so completely t h a t i t was 
impossible f o r l i g h t and a i r t o penetrate. Cant's close (Tron P a r i s h ) , 
f o r example, running from the High Street r i g h t down t o the Cowgate, 
was a mere 3^ f e e t broad w i t h houses o f s i x or seven storeys high on 
e i t h e r s i d e . The r e s t r i c t i o n s t h i s imposed on the f r e e f l o w o f a i r 
c e r t a i n l y aggravated the unhealthy s t a t e o f these narrow s t r e e t s . One 
o f the most p i t i f u l f a m i l i e s i n h a b i t i n g the area i n 1850 consisted o f a 
man, h i s w i f e and t h e i r three c h i l d r e n , l i v i n g i n a room on the g a r r e t 
f l a t o f a t a l l tenement: 
We were wrong i n c a l l i n g i t a room; i t was merely a s m a l l , 
dark, miserable h o l e , w i t h n o t h i n g but bare w a l l s . The w i f e 
was s i t t i n g a t the f i r e p l a c e w i t h an i n f a n t c h i l d , f i v e weeks 
o l d , on her knee, while the other c h i l d r e n were p l a y i n g 
together on the f l o o r . One o f the l a t t e r has a w h i t e - s w e l l i n g 
on her knee. The only a r t i c l e we saw i n the house was a ragged 
piece o f c a r p e t i n g , which seemed t o serve as a bed. The husband 
was o u t ; he i s a coal-heaver, but has been i n i l l - h e a l t h f o r 
some time. On Wednesday a l l he made was 4d, and h i s earnings 
never exceeded 6d a day. The smell i n t h i s house was almost 
s u f f o c a t i n g . I t b a f f l e s us t o describe i t . I t was a miscellaneous 
compound o f many poisons, loaded w i t h disease and death. Rent 
of house 7d per week. 2 5 
Such co n d i t i o n s and human misery and s u f f e r i n g were u s u a l , not unusual. 
I t i s t h i s f a m i l y r a t h e r than the gentleman, the innkeeper or the bank 
t e l l e r who were t y p i c a l i n t h i s area a t t h i s time. 
To t h e two e v i l s o f the b u i l t environment, the p h y s i c a l l a y o u t and 
the l a c k o f s a n i t a r y amenities, must be added a t h i r d - overcrowding. The 
census f i g u r e s show t h i s t o be an area w i t h a high d e n s i t y o f p o p u l a t i o n . 
from the S c o t t i s h Press newspaper, Edinburgh 1850 
By t a k i n g a c l o s e r look a t the s t a t i s t i c s and s e l e c t i n g p a r t i c u l a r 
examples o f overcrowding, i t i s e a s i l y seen how t h i s , combined w i t h 
the near ruinous s t a t e o f the b u i l d i n g s , produced an area a l l too 
l i k e Dante's I n f e r n o . I n A p r i l 1850, Dr. George B e l l counted 1,025 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n h a b i t i n g B l a c k f r i a r ' s Wynd. Since the 142 b u i l d i n g s 
i n the wynd contained 193 chambers (and a l l o w i n g 1000 cubic f e e t as 
the average cubic content o f each chamber), each i n h a b i t a n t must have 
had around 188.5 cubic f e e t as h i s share o f the space. And the doctor 
h i m s e l f pointed out t h a t , 
Even the felon's c e l l s , f o r separate confinement, 
i n modern p r i s o n s , c o n t a i n not less than 800 cubic 
f e e t each, and these are provided w i t h a p e r f e c t 
v e n t i l a t i n g apparatus. What a co n t r a s t t h i s i s 
w i t h the p r o v i s i o n f o r the p o o r . 2 6 
The f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t s from a r t i c l e s w r i t t e n i n the 1850s and 60s serve 
t o elaborate upon a c o n d i t i o n evident even from the bare s t a t i s t i c s : 
Almost a l l the dwel l i n g s we v i s i t e d were s i n g l e apartments. 
I n some o f these there was no room f o r an o r d i n a r y - s i z e d 
person t o stand u p r i g h t ; i n o t h e r s , the w a l l s were soaking 
w i t h damp; i n a l l the f l o o r s were more or less broken - some 
o f them being so d i l a p i d a t e d t h a t the boards sunk beneath our 
f e e t ; i n scarcely any was there s u f f i c i e n t l i g h t ; and i n none 
was there s u f f i c i e n t v e n t i l a t i o n . ... 
I n some o f these rooms the accommodation was less than i s 
afforded" by an"ordinary p i g - s t y e , and -the^breathing a i r much 
less savoury. I n two or three instances we found f a m i l i e s -
numbering f o u r persons i n one case, a t l e a s t - l i v i n g i n a t t i c 
rooms, the average breadth o f which was about 4 f t . , the l e n g t h 
12 f t . , and the height v a r i e d from 3-6 f t . 2 7 
These people were l i v i n g i n l o n g , low, narrow, dark and s t i n k i n g tunnels. 
The a d j o i n i n g a t t i c - a place about 12 f t . by 10 f t . -
contained a f a m i l y o f fo u r t e e n - i e . f a t h e r , mother, grand 
mother and eleven c h i l d r e n . Three o f these belonged t o the 
man who rented the pla c e ; e i g h t were the c h i l d r e n o f a 
br o t h e r l a t e l y deceased, who had been a s l a t e r , and was 
k i l l e d by a f a l l from the r o o f o f a house. His w i f e , a 
sad d r i n k e r , was then a l i v e very soon she ended her 
days - l i t e r a l l y drank h e r s e l f t o d e a t h . 2 8 
2 6 G. B e l l (1850) p.15, f o o t n o t e . 
2 7 Edinburgh Evening Courant Friday 26 October, 1866 
A D i s t r i c t V i s i t o r (1867) p.7 
Intemperance was a great problem i n the area and drunkenness 
a common offence. 2 9 The j a i l s of the High Street were rare l y devoid 
of such offenders. And a drunken street brawl was a much more 
frequent sight than the dust-cart. For some, alcohol must have been 
an escape from the misery of t h e i r surroundings and t h e i r daily l i v e s . 
For others i t had been t h e i r downfall and the reason f o r t h e i r present 
reduced circumstances. I t was not uncommon for a husband, who took 
to drink, to s e l l a l l his family's possessions. And with no weekly 
wage the household found i t s e l f condemned to scavengery and beggary. 
Women too, succumbed to the e v i l s of alcohol: 
The next chamber i s inhabited by a cinder-woman. 
She was a member of a respectable family; but she eloped 
with a sweet-heart, who deserted her. She subsequently 
married a shopkeeper i n Edinburgh. Her husband died, and 
she immediately took to drinking. As her business l e f t her 
she drank the harder: her f u r n i t u r e was pawned, and then her 
clothes - her a l l was converted to whisky. She was obliged 
to leave her house, and moving from one place to another, 
she ultimately s e t t l e d i n the wretched abode which she 
presently inhabits. What an abode! I t i s hardly six feet 
square, has no f i r e p l a c e , and i s li g h t e d by a small skylight. 
The f l o o r i s f u l l of holes, and the walls are creviced; and 
altogether i t i s such a place as an owl might inhabit f o r the 
sake of the mice and other prey which have domiciliary 
interest i n the tenement. There i s not a s t i c k of f u r n i t u r e 
in t h i s chamber; but i n one of the corners we observe some 
stones arranged so as to enclose a space, which" was f i l l e ~ d 
with straw and covered with an old mat. 3 0 
I t i s of no surprise then t h a t , i n Edinburgh, the cholera epidemics 
of the mid-nineteenth century ( i n 1848 and 1866) both started i n the Old 
Town and resulted i n more dead there than i n any other part of the City. 
Indeed the hazards of l i v i n g i n these wynds and closes claimed many l i v e s 
On one Sunday night i n November 1861 a t a l l tenement between B a i l i e Fyfe' 
Close and Paisley's Close, High Street, collapsed, k i l l i n g t h i r t y - f i v e 
As one j o u r n a l i s t commented at the time - from the toothless i n f a n t 
to the toothless old man, the population of the wynds drink whisky. 
Four out of every f i v e prisoners were drunk. 
G. B e l l (1850) pp. 7-8 
people and i n j u r i n g many more. And four years l a t e r , part of another 
tenement (Bishop's Land) at 129 High Street f e l l dislodging s i x t y - s i x 
people. The tenements were i n an appalling state of delapidation. 
These 'lands' were i n the proprietorship of " a strange f r a t e r n i t y of 
la i r d s whose business i s to l e t out rooms". 3 1 These were rapacious 
men, f o r they charged exorbitant rents and more often than not refused 
to do anything i n the way of repairing the property. Crombie's land, 
situated i n the middle of the West Port, f o r example, was,in the 1850s5 i n 
a shocking state. Notorious for the high incidence of cholera deaths, 
i t s cramped ce l l s were l e t out for rents of around l/6d a week. In 
1866 i t was found to be "one of the most degraded places i n town". 3 2 
And yet the greater part of the tenement had been b u i l t within the l a s t 
twenty years. The proprietor purchased the tenement, which was then 
i n a ruinous state and used as a dog-kennel, f o r the sum of £38. He 
then added two storeys (most of which he b u i l t with his own hands) and 
ensured an annual income of nearly twice that f o r his troubles. 
Throughout the area landlords erected flimsy p a r t i t i o n s and increased 
t h e i r own takings. 
In one dwelling we had the c u r i o s i t y to examine the 
material of which one of the p a r t i t i o n s was composed and 
we found that i t was simply made of canvas covered with 
paper, and so t h i n that a gentleman who accompanied us, 
while t e s t i n g the firmness of the w a l l , inadvertently 
put his walking-stick through i t ! 3 3 
J. Heiton (1860) p.247 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, Saturday 10 November, 1866 
The area to the west of the Grassmarket was the worst i n Edinburgh 
i n terms of infectious diseases. Hatter's Land, a tenement at the 
end of Burt's Close, was famous amongst the medical profession, f o r 
more fever and cholera had been taken to the Infirmary from that one 
.building than from another other building of i t s size i n the c i t y . 
Edinburgh Evening Courant, Wednesday 26 December 1866 
In another tenement, Crawford's Land i n the Grassmarket, the roof 
was p r a c t i c a l l y i n r u i n . The inhabitants had patched i t i n various 
places with paper towels and anything else that could be stuffed i n t o 
the holes to keep out the wind and r a i n . I n the bed recess, the roof, 
which was no more than a foot above the p i l l o w , was i n such bad 
condition t h a t , notwithstanding patching and s t u f f i n g , the wind blew 
i n strongly and r a i n often soaked the meagre bedding. No doubt the 
landlord did not worry as long as the rent of 1/- per week was paid 
regularly and i n advance. In properties such as these families were 
having t o f i n d rents of between 1/- and 2/- a week f o r one room with 
no amenities whatsoever. These were shamefully high, for they meant 
that the poor were paying, i n proportion, f a r more f o r t h e i r houses 
than any other section of the community. 
The most prominent features of the b u i l t environment of the Tron 
parish, New North parish and St. John's parish i n 1851 were the 
narrowness of the streets, the cramped l i v i n g conditions, the f i l t h and 
the stench. 3 4 The inhabitants were almost uniformly poor, scraping 
together what l i v i n g they could. Few saw any prospect of bettering 
themselves. Here l i v e d "the widows, "the a i l i n g , the i d l e , the" drunkards 
and the criminals of Edinburgh whom fortune had not treated kindly or 
who, through t h e i r own f o l l y , had been forced to take up residence i n 
the only d i s t r i c t where social standards meant nothing. In short, the 
sit u a t i o n i n the Old Town i n 1851 was almost as grim as could be imagined. 
Nevertheless, the seeds of change had already been planted. As much as 
eleven years previously a City minister had managed to persuade a group 
Dr. Robert Foulis (1852) reported, "The a i r i n these unwholesome 
places i s very unsafe, and produced retching and vomiting i n the 
o f f i c e r s who entered them i n search of notorious offenders." 
of public figures to form the Lodging House Association with the 
aim of providing 'model lodging houses' f o r the working classes and 
thus improving both t h e i r physical and s p i r i t u a l well-being. The 
Association was not e n t i r e l y philanthropic and the idea promoted, 
astutely, was that good homes could be provided f o r the working classes 
whilst s t i l l allowing ample remuneration f o r the proprietor. By 1851 
only one major project had been completed; namely a model lodging house 
in the Westport which had been opened i n 1844. Although another and 
larger project was planned, 3 5 progress was slow and support wanting. 
Thus the character and the condition of the High Street and i t s 
inhabitants remained largely unchanged over the next decade. 
Other areas of the mid-century c i t y : 
The more that i s known about the r e s i d e n t i a l conditions of the 
inhabitants of Edinburgh i n a l l d i s t r i c t s , the better the picture of 
the wynds and closes of the Old Town can be understood. Here we can 
outline some of the contrasts which existed i n 1851. The examination 
of other areas of the c i t y w i l l provide something against which the 
experiences of the High Street dwellers can be set, and the other areas 
can, i n t u r n , be seen i n t h e i r proper perspective i n r e l a t i o n to the 
d i s t r i c t we have already explored. Two areas have been selected f o r 
special mention. 
1. The l a t e s t extension of the New Town: 
One does not need to know much about the Georgian extension of Edinburgh 
to appreciate that the New Town and the Old Town were worlds apart, both 
This was the renovation of the notorious Hatter's Land and the creation 
of a 'Model Close'. Here respectable mechanics were to be accommodated 
i n superior working-class houses with water, gas, water-closet and 
bleaching green. A grocer's shop (where no s p i r i t s were sold) and a 
commodious coffeehouse and reading room were also t o be provided (with 
those who bought refreshments having free use of newspapers and a small 
l i b r a r y ) . 
i n a r c hitectural style and layout and i n the l i f e experiences of 
t h e i r inhabitants. To begin with many of the New Town houses had 
cost as much as £2,000 each to b u i l d - a very considerable sum at that 
time. In January 1851 the large tenement, 100 Princes Street, was 
being offered f o r sale at the upset price of £2,600.36 And i n the 
same year, an 'excellent and commodious family house' at 34 Great King 
Street was expected to fetch over £1,300 3 7, whilst a very superior 
dwelling at 31 Heriot Row had an upset price of £3,300.38 The contrast 
with the High Street area i s easily made. Whole tenements there were 
changing hands for well under £400. For example, a tenement of four 
storeys and a t t i c s , situated at the King's stables, Grassmarket and 
occupied by various tenants was, i n 1851, being offered f o r sale at 
an upset price of £250. 3 9 In the mid-nineteenth century i t was the 
New Town which housed the a r i s t o c r a t s , the lawyers, the doctors and 
the academics of the City. John Stuart Blackie, a scholar of 
considerable standing, held the Chair of Greek at the University 
around t h i s time. In the summer of 1860 he changed his place of 
residence from Castle Street to H i l l Street. His wife kept three 
maids to ensure the~~smoottr running^of ~ the - household~and to wait upon ~ 
t h e i r frequent guests, f o r "the spare rooms were seldom empty, and 
dinner-party followed dinner-party during the winter."* 0 
The dining-room was li n e d with books, for a large sum 
was yearly spent upon t h e i r acquisition, and they overflowed 
in t o corridors and bedrooms. This room served a double use, 
and was study as well as dining-room. I t opened int o Mrs. 
Blackie's domain, whose walls were panelled i n ivory and gold, 
with Greek mottoes fo r i t s cornice, and with dark crimson 
hangings and couches - a long, low room, f u l l of associations 
to a l l who knew i t and i t s treasures. 1* 1 
3 6 see The Scotsman, Wednesday 15 January, 1851 
3 7 see The Scotsman, Wednesday 2 A p r i l , 1851 
3 8 see The Scotsman, Saturday 15 March, 1851 
3 9 I b i d . The annual rent collected from t h i s tenement was £46.19/-
4 0 A. M. Stoddart (1896) p.223 
k l I b i d . , p.222 
34ft. 
Many of the New Town houses were b e a u t i f u l l y furnished inside to 
match t h e i r elegant exteriors. The layout and design of these 
buildings alone guaranteed t h e i r high r e s i d e n t i a l status which was, 
and i s , threatened only by a takeover by business concerns. Even 
i n the 1850s shops had appeared i n Princes Street and many off i c e s 
had been created i n the ground levels of houses i n the other New 
Town thoroughfares. The lawyer who combined both dwelling house 
and o f f i c e i n his property i n Charlotte Square was ce r t a i n l y not an 
exception. 1 + 2 But i n the main t h i s was s t i l l a r e s i d e n t i a l area 
and a highly desirable one, with pleasure gardens l a i d out f o r the 
exclusive enjoyment of the inhabitants. Ladies went v i s i t i n g i n 
private coaches and nursery maids could be seen pushing perambulators 
or negotiating the cobbled roadways with t h e i r diminutive but w e l l -
dressed charges. 
Yet the New Town was by no means completely homogeneous i n social 
character. 1 1' 3 Behind the elegance, the wealth and the spaciousness of 
the main streets lay the back alleyways. These were narrow and dark 
in comparison to the main thoroughfares. The buildings were i n f e r i o r 
i n q u a l i t y and design, had fewer amenities, and housed the servants and 
the tradesmen whose li v e l i h o o d depended upon the f r o n t - s t r e e t dwellers. 
Some basements were also l a i d aside f o r the use of household s t a f f . 
This mix of population, determined to a large extent by the o r i g i n a l 
layout of the streets and t h e i r function as conceived by the architect 
(see, f o r example, Craig's plan, p.263 above), i s an important feature 
4 2 Details of the lawyer's family are given i n "A Victorian Looks Back", 
The Weekly Scotsman, June-September 1939 
4 3 Gordon (1971) divides the housing stock of the c i t y i n t o f i v e grades 
according to value. (Grade I being the residences of highest value.) 
He finds t h a t , i n 1855-6, 68.8% of the grade I residences i n Edinburgh 
was accounted fo r by twenty-four of the main streets of the New Town, 
but that t h i s part of Edinburgh also contained 19% of a l l grade IV 
dwellings and 6.7% of the grade V houses i n the City. 
of the Edinburgh mosaic. The pattern set i n the l a s t h a l f of the 
eighteenth century s t i l l endured i n the 1850s. Further, the New 
Town had grown considerably since 1800. The Earl of Moray's estate 
had been b u i l t upon and r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation stretched down the 
northfacing slope as far as the Water of Leith. Stockbridge was 
developed around the middle of the century. Here dwellinghouses 
were provided f o r artisans, and workshops appeared i n some of the 
lanes. A few streets, such as St. James Street at the east end of 
the New Town and Jamaica Street behind Heriot Row, were already i n a 
state reminiscent of the High Street area. Even the best of the New 
Town houses suffered from less than perfect drainage, a si t u a t i o n 
remedied only slowly. And as Youngson points out, 
Most surprising of a l l , they were also l i a b l e to 
overcrowding, because sleeping accommodation was 
l i m i t e d by the undue amount of space taken up by 
dining-rooms and drawing-rooms, and the servants, 
of course, were crowded together i n odd rooms and 
closets, with the man-servant frequently huddled under 
the s t a i r c a s e . ^ 
For a few of the inhabitants, then, l i f e i n the New Town of Edinburgh 
i n 1850 was not so much d i f f e r e n t from that of t h e i r compatriots i n the 
'herringbone c i t y on the h i l l 1 . 
The strange contrasts which existed within the New Town i t s e l f 
are evident i n the census data of 1851. Nevertheless, the area as a 
whole was characterised by splendid architecture and occupied by wealthy 
people. Again the mid-century census i s a useful source of information. 
The 59.62 acres of St. Stephens parish cover much of the land of the New 
Town which, i n the 1850s, had most recently been b u i l t upon. There are 
three separate areas to t h i s parish, as can be seen i n Fig.13. Within 
the parish boundary, however, are some of the f i n e s t streets and houses 
A. J. Youngson (1966) p.271 
soo yds . 
— 1 1 «= = => = = P a r i s h boundary 
Fig.13 ST. STEPHENS PARISH, EDINBURGH, 1891 
St. Stephens Church stands on i t s own surrounded by the 
lands of the older St. Cuthberts parish. 
Source: Edinburgh and L e i t h Post O f f i c e D i r e c t o r y 1891 
i n Edinburgh. Certain aggregate s t a t i s t i c s computed from the 
census allow comparison to be made with the three High Street parishes 
previously examined. In 1851 there were 7,809 men, women and children 
l i v i n g i n St. Stephens parish and, i f the parish had been divided up 
equally amongst them, they would have enjoyed some 36.95 sq.yards each. 
The density of population, therefore, was 131 persons per acre, or less 
than a quarter of the population density then to be found i n the Tron 
parish. The very layout of the streets did much to ensure these 
r e l a t i v e l y low densities, f o r the main thoroughfares at least were 
of considerable breadth. Further, the layout of the area south of 
St. Stephens Church included several ornamental gardens fo r the 
recreation of the residents. Since the parish as a whole i s f a i r l y 
extensive, a few selected examples w i l l be quite s u f f i c i e n t i n the 
present context to i l l u s t r a t e i t s character. The elegance of Moray 
Place i s obvious even from the map extract of Fig.14 and i t i s not 
surprising that i n 1851 there was not a family there who did not keep 
servants. I n a 10% census sample, three of the selected households 
each had four servants l i v i n g i n , one (a husband and wife_on t h e i r own) 
had one servant, and the family residing at No. 2 Moray Place kept 
seven servants. The heads of these households included an annuitant, 
two c i v i l engineers and a master grocer. The story was much the same 
in Royal Circus where the majority of households kept three or four 
servants and where the census sample reveals a landed proprietor, a 
master confectioner and two Writers-to-the-Signet. Such streets were 
popular with the le g a l profession which was nowhere i n Edinburgh better 
represented than i n Heriot Row with i t s south facing houses overlooking 
Queen Street gardens (see Fig.15 below). Here, i n 1851, l i v e d the 
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several Writers-to-the-Signet. The sample from the census also 
includes a medical doctor, a teacher of music, and an annuitant. In 
nearby Northumberland Street, two more advocates, an accountant and a 
landed proprietor were to be found, and i n Great King Street another 
Writer-to-the-Signet, a s o l i c i t o r , a property and fund holder, an 
accountant and a teacher of book-keeping were amongst the residents 
of 1851. Most of these were monied people who could afford to 
purchase such desirable accommodation and whose way of l i f e was very 
f a r removed from the misery and wretchedness of the Old Town. 
Hidden away behind the elegant facades were the back streets 
such as Jamaica Street which a century l a t e r was to be condemned as 
the worst slum i n Europe. The position of Jamaica Street can be seen 
i n Fig.15. I n 1851 t h i s street housed the 'better working classes'. 
The buildings, however, were i n f e r i o r both i n qualit y and design to 
those of the f r o n t streets and the population density was one of the 
highest i n the New Town. In T h i s sxreex and i n the lanes immediately 
behind i t a t o t a l of 1,270 people resided, with the average density 
approaching 500 persons per acre. Twenty-one families were selected 
i n the 10% sample and none of these kept servants. Indeed several 
were themselves members of the household s t a f f of the lawyers, the 
doctors and the a r i s t o c r a t s , f o r they included f i v e coachmen, a nurse 
and a house servant ('in a gentleman's fa m i l y ' ) . Of the other 
breadwinners a l l were i n respectable employment, but only two (a 
master baker and a master shoemaker) could have been expected to earn 
more than a modest wage; the porters, the messenger and the journeyman 
cabinet-maker were the more t y p i c a l residents of Jamaica Street. The 
rents of t h e i r houses varied from £10 to £20 per year and most of the 
property was rented rather than owner occupied. Some families had to 
1 1 
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take lodgers i n order to pay these rents, and t h i s , combined with 
several households who had four or more children, meant a high area 
population density. According to the census of 1851, Jamaica Street 
contained f o r t y - f o u r f l a t s i n which resided 326 separate occupiers 
( i e . persons not of the same family). From these s t a t i s t i c s one can 
gain some idea of ju s t how densely populated t h i s street was. 
So the New Town of Edinburgh had i t s pockets of working class 
population. For t h e i r l i v e l i h o o d these people were heavily dependent 
upon t h e i r social superiors. They l i v e d where the architect intended 
that they should l i v e . Time had not yet changed his designs. 
Whatever the way i n which fortune had led the majority to t h e i r present 
employment as servants of the upper classes, the location of t h e i r 
housing and the character of the area i n which they l i v e d were a d i r e c t 
r e s u l t of such employment. For the employers themselves the New Town 
had many a t t r a c t i o n s , not least when compared with the old centre of 
the City. The amenities i t offered, i t s gardens and i t s be a u t i f u l 
public rooms where guests could be entertained i n grand s t y l e , and the 
reputation i t had gained.all over Europe as a superb architectural 
achievement made i t the most desirable area of the City i n which to 
r e s i d e . 4 5 There i s , then, no h i s t o r i c a l puzzle i n why the wealthy 
gentlemen of the Scottish c a p i t a l purchased houses i n the New Town. 
The h i s t o r i c a l narrative of t h i s period and t h i s area would involve 
giving as f u l l an account as the evidence allows of how the inhabitants 
I t s nearest r i v a l was the small development of George Square about 
hal f a mile south of St. Giles Cathedral. Houses i n t h i s square were 
certainly much sought a f t e r i n the mid-nineteenth century but, perhaps 
because of i t s size and the nature of the surrounding area, i t lacked the 
prestige associated with the grander styles of streets l i k e Moray Place 
and Royal Circus. 
of 1851 arrived at t h e i r present r e s i d e n t i a l locations. I n i t s e l f 
i t would be descriptive, f o r even the barest outline above provides 
some answer to the question why certain groups were i n certain areas 
of the New Town around 1851. I n t h i s part of the continuing narrative 
there appear t o be no puzzles and therefore no explanations to be given. 
2. The newer i n d u s t r i a l areas of Fountainbridge: 
The area around Fountainbridge formed an important part of Edinburgh's 
urban pattern i n the l a s t h a l f of the nineteenth century. I n 1851 i t 
was a new r e s i d e n t i a l area. Building had j u s t begun. The previous 
century had seen the enormous expansion of the City, and whilst t h i s 
was especially noticeable to the north and south, by the 1820s the 
movement of the population began to make i t s e l f f e l t to the west, i n 
Fountainbridge and l a t e r i n the lands of Dairy. I n 1851 Dairy House 
was within the City l i m i t s (as defined by the Reform B i l l of 1832). 
Nevertheless, i t s s i t u a t i o n was e n t i r e l y r u r a l and i t was reckoned a 
country house. "The mansion stood i n extensive and well-wooded grounds 
which extended southwards to Fountainbridge, from which there was an 
entrance." 4 6 The proximity of t h i s estate to the City centre-, however, 
made i t an object of commercial exploitation and by the 1850s a 
considerable amount of land around i t s eastern extent had already been 
sold, most notably to the Edinburgh and Glasgow railway company. From 
the beginning of i t s development, the area around Fountainbridge was 
i n d u s t r i a l i n character. Fountainbridge i t s e l f was a long established 
routeway and the construction of Port Hamilton and Port Hopetoun (the 
4 6 J. Smith (1935) p.27 
This i s an inte r e s t i n g account of Dairy House, i t s lands and i t s 
owners i n the l a t e r part of the nineteenth century. 
t e r m i n i i of the Union Canal 4 ) further encouraged many i n d u s t r i a l 
concerns to locate here. These ports were surrounded by coal yards 
and timber yards, since coal and timber were both transported by barge. 
Also i n t h i s area were the Edinburgh Slaughter Houses, the Hopetoun 
Iron Foundry, the shunting yards, goods sheds and passenger station 
of the Caledonian Railway, the Royal Hcrse Bazaar, St. Cuthbert's Poor 
House and a heterogeneous co l l e c t i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l accommodation fo r 
the employees of these establishments. The inter-mix of housing and 
workshops of one kind or another can be clear l y seen i n Figs. 16 and 17 
selected from the 1853 plan of Edinburgh. At t h i s time there was 
l i t t l e building west of Grove Street. 
The Fountainbridge area was a d i s t i n c t i v e u n i t w i t h i n the urban 
structure of Edinburgh, an i n d u s t r i a l area with i n d u s t r i a l housing. 
In 1851 i t marked the south-west extent of the b u i l t area of the City. 
I t s houses had none of the elegance of the New Town houses. In design 
they resembled the tenements of the Old Town, but they were s t u r d i l y 
b u i l t and functional. As one j o u r n a l i s t pointed out, "Fountainbridge 
i s a street which does nothing to enhance the beauty of Edinburgh. But 
~ it~has~very~formidable - c l a i m s ~ t x r u t i l i t y 7 " 4 8 Most o f - t h e working ~ 
classes were here because t h i s i s where they had found employment, and 
ends were invariably made to meet. This was also an area with a good 
deal of work f o r women and g i r l s . I t s tenements were crowded, but 
poverty was not specially oppressive. With such mixed land use, 
ove r a l l population densities reveal l i t t l e about the character of the 
The Union Canal, connecting Edinburgh with the more i n d u s t r i a l west 
of Scotland, was opened i n May 1822 at the cost of £400,000. I t was 
a major factor i n forwarding the prosperity of Fountainbridge and i n 
bringing i n t o being some of the more pleasant streets of the area, 
such as Gardners Crescent. I n the mid-nineteenth century there was 
even a ship-building industry here. 
W. McPhail (1911) p.185 
These a r t i c l e s o r i g i n a l l y appeared i n the Edinburgh Evening News during 

























r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i c t s . The 1851 census returns, however, do give 
some indication of who l i v e d there and of the s p a t i a l extent of t h e i r 
r e s i d e n t i a l t e r r i t o r y . I f we take St. Cuthbert's parish enumeration 
d i s t r i c t 50, f o r example, which i s 'Castle Barns from St. Anthony Place 
to Newport Street, including that street and Robb's Court', we f i n d a 
t o t a l population of 452 with 99 separate occupiers l i v i n g i n the 18 
individual houses or tenement blocks. I n t h i s small r e s i d e n t i a l 
enclave, then, the o v e r a l l population density was 282 persons per acre, 
or about twice that of St. Stephens parish i n the New Town and j u s t over 
h a l f that of the Tron Parish i n the Old Town. I n the neighbouring 
enumeration d i s t r i c t , 51 ('from Newport Street to Dewar Place inclusive, 
comprehending therein Orchardfield Court, Ladyfield Place, Wellington 
Lane and Tobago Str e e t ' ) , were 26 individual houses inhabited by 356 
persons. The census sample of these two d i s t r i c t s shows that heads 
of household included a d i s t i l l e r y labourer, a mason's labourer, a 
blacksmith, a coal weigher", a coal merchant's clerk, a j o i n e r , a railway 
pointsman, a house servant, a journeyman plumber and a carter. Nearby 
in Anthony Street a coachman, a v i c t u a l dealer and a boat builder were 
amongst those selected". "Few o f _ t h e residents i n the area kept servants 
and of those i n the sample who did none kept more than two. The contrast 
between t h i s area and Rutland Square and Maitland Street j u s t to the 
north can be appreciated even from a glance at these census returns, f o r i n 
the l a t t e r were to be found, f o r example, a r e t i r e d c i v i l servant of the 
East India Company and a surgeon, who both had f i v e servants under t h e i r 
roofs. And the S h e r r i f f of Aberdeenshire resided at No.24 Rutland Square 
where he had seven servants l i v i n g - i n . I n the mid-nineteenth century, 
the Fountainbridge area housed the more fortunate working classes, but 
none of these families had the fortunes of the gentlemen of Rutland Square 
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or Maitland Street or any other of the prominent New Town thoroughfares. 
I t s r e s i d e n t i a l streets and i t s i n d u s t r i a l concerns grew up around the 
transport a r t e r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the canal and the railway. The story 
of how i t was established and expanded, of how the d i s t r i c t became the 
happy hunting ground f o r a certain type of speculative builder, would 
be an important element i n any account of the urban structure of the 
City of Edinburgh - another piece i n the h i s t o r i c a l narrative. 
I I 
METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS: 
Enough has been said about Edinburgh i n the 1850s to give some 
impression of the character of three separate d i s t r i c t s , or parts of the 
urban pattern. To b u i l d up a picture of what i t was l i k e to l i v e i n an 
area such as the High Street at t h i s time is_ to provide some answer to the 
more; problematic of the two questions which prompted the methodological 
investigation of t h i s thesis. The question i t s e l f i s rendered redundant 
by the acquisition of h i s t o r i c a l knowledge, for i t i s not an h i s t o r i c a l 
question. I t arose from h i s t o r i c a l ignorance rather than h i s t o r i c a l 
puzzlement. This d i s t i n c t i o n between h i s t o r i c a l puzzles and non-puzzles 
i s an important one. What I wish to argue i s that a f a m i l i a r i t y with 
the social circumstances of a group of people w i l l i t s e l f prompt certain 
questions and dispel others. 'Why' questions only properly arise i n the 
context of a par t i c u l a r problem f o r , as Toulmin says, they are t i e d up 
with our p r i o r pattern of expectation. 1 + 9 I f we are ignorant of the 
r e s i d e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n and social characteristics of a certain group of 
4 9 The ways i n which an hi s t o r i a n can explain are discussed i n Ch.7 above. 
individuals we can have no p r i o r expectations of where they might l i v e . 
To ask "where?" and "why?", then, merely prompts a general h i s t o r i c a l 
investigation and i s a demand for information rather than explanation. 
For example, we might ask i f there were any I r i s h colonies i n mid-
nineteenth century Edinburgh and, i f so, where they were located. We 
might even ask why the High Street area was apparently favoured by the 
I r i s h . To know something of the economic condition of the I r i s h 
immigrants and of the character of the Old Town tenements and streets, 
however, immediately makes the I r i s h presence there i n t e l l i g i b l e ; to 
keep on asking "why?" would be senseless. There are other questions 
which could be asked, but once we know that t h i s was the only area of 
the c i t y where a few pennies could secure some semblance of accommodation 
for a week at a time and that t h i s was as much as the penurious I r i s h 
could a f f o r d , the location of t h i s group of people within the c i t y i s 
not at a l l puzzling. We might go on to ask more detailed questions 
about the concentration of t h i s ethnic group i n certain of the closes. 
The h i s t o r i c a l evidence may or may not allow us to answer these. Such 
'why' questions, i t should be noted, require a considerable background 
of h i s t o r i c a l knowledge before they can even be formulated. 
Other questions could be asked about the character of the urban 
area. For example, "Why, by 1851, had the wynds and closes of the Old 
Town been reduced to such decadence?" Here the 'why' question i s r e a l l y 
an appeal f o r information, i s , i n other words, a 'how did i t come about?' 
question. Such a question i s necessarily asked from a position of 
ignorance for i t i s not prompted by p r i o r expectations or puzzlement. 
I t i s answered d i r e c t l y by an h i s t o r i c a l account, an account of what 
happened i n the past. The h i s t o r i c a l puzzle only arises during the 
attempt to provide such an account. 
3 3 i . 
The h i s t o r i c a l puzzle: 
There are two sorts of occurrence which may puzzle the his t o r i a n -
f i r s t , where a piece of evidence appears to be i n c o n f l i c t with the 
received account, and secondly, where an event i n the past appears out 
of place i n the general flow of events. The former i s a puzzle about 
what actually happened (the new piece of evidence may cast some doubt 
on the accuracy of the received account), whereas i n the l a t t e r case 
the evidence i s not i n dispute and the puzzle concerns the very 
occurrence of the event and the circumstances which surrounded i t . (The 
puzzle here prompts the question "How?" or the question "Why?"50) Both 
these puzzles require an explanation. I n the f i r s t case i t i s the 
existence of certain evidence which must be explained. The problematic 
piece of evidence must either be shown to be other than genuine, or the 
received account must be appropriately amended to take account of the 
content of t h i s new evidence. Scientists amend s c i e n t i f i c theories i n 
much the same way i n the l i g h t of results of s c i e n t i f i c experiments and 
observations. Where there i s no received account there i s , of course, 
nothing to be amended. I n the case of Victorian Edinburgh, f o r example, 
there i s no accepted account of the urban pattern. There are, of course, 
many hist o r i e s of the City, but none which concentrates on the urban 
pattern per se. Nevertheless i t i s possible even i n such a si t u a t i o n f o r 
one piece of evidence to be apparently i n c o n f l i c t with the res t . I f we 
found, f o r example, a document which stated that some l o c a l philanthropist 
gave £50 per annum to each I r i s h family i n the Old Town of Edinburgh, and 
at the same time other sources suggested that the I r i s h l i v e d i n extreme 
poverty, we should naturally be puzzled. Immediately we would question 
the authenticity of the document. Whatever the solution, however, the 
urban geographer researching in t o the urban patterns of Victorian Edinburgh 
5 0 I t must be noted that i t would not be sensible f o r the hist o r i a n to 
ask t h i s of a l l events. 
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would have to address himself t o t h i s problem before he could construct 
an h i s t o r i c a l narrative. 
To ask how or why an event occurred i s similar i n one important 
respect to discovering what actually happened, for the question arises 
during the attempt to think h i s t o r i c a l l y about some unique concatenation 
of events. I t i s a question which arises natur a l l y i n the course of 
an individual's h i s t o r i c a l research. We might ask, "Why, during the 
1850s and 1860s did the press of Edinburgh turn t h e i r attention to the 
condition of the Old Town tenements and t h e i r inhabitants?" Before we 
can formulate t h i s question we must know that the Edinburgh press of the 
time did i n fact publish a r t i c l e s about the conditions to be found i n 
the wynds and closes. In other words, some h i s t o r i c a l knowledge i s a 
prerequisite f o r asking the question. Nevertheless a puzzle about an 
accepted occurrence i s l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from a puzzle about the evidence 
even i f the two are not infrequently associated. 5 1 And i t i s the former 
which i s methodologically the more problematic. Several points require 
to be made: 
1. Not a l l questions which can be asked legitimately i n the course of 
h i s t o r i c a l research are genuine puzzles. The question about the Edinburgh 
press, f o r example, i s not a puzzle f o r there are no p r i o r expectations which 
i t disappoints. I f on the other hand, we discovered that the popular press 
of many other c i t i e s had embarked upon such investigations a f u l l twenty 
years before the Edinburgh publications, the very lateness of the l a t t e r 
i n r e l a t i o n to the rest would be puzzling and require explanation. 
2. When we are puzzled by an event which does not appear to f i t i n with 
5 1 The h i s t o r i a n , puzzled by why a certain event should have happened as 
or when i t did, may begin to question whether indeed i t happened at a l l 
and proceed to examine the r e l i a b i l i t y of the evidence. This i n i t s e l f , 
however, i s l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t from the o r i g i n a l puzzle, f o r one necessarily 
questions the evidence whereas the other does not. 
the general scheme of things t h i s puzzlement can only be dispelled by a 
more detailed h i s t o r i c a l account. The puzzle arises because the 
occurrence of X i s not e n t i r e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e . I f Lord Provost Drummond 
had resigned at the height of his success i n l o c a l government thus 
endangering his cherished New Town plans, we should naturally ask why. 
The h i s t o r i c a l account which simply recorded t h i s as a fact would not 
be complete f o r i t would not have answered the 'why' question. A more 
detailed account which made clear Drummond's reasons f o r resigning would 
provide an explanation of the Provost's action, answer the h i s t o r i c a l 
question, and solve the h i s t o r i c a l puzzle. An h i s t o r i c a l puzzle, then, 
can arise when the h i s t o r i c a l account i s incomplete. 
3. An h i s t o r i c a l account may be incomplete i n one or more of three ways. 
F i r s t , there may be no evidence as yet discovered which can render the 
problematic event e n t i r e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e . Since the l i m i t s of the 
h i s t o r i c a l account are set by the existing evidence and those of the 
present h i s t o r i c a l account by the presently known evidence, the historian 
cannot be c r i t i c i s e d f o r r e s t r i c t i n g the scope of his account accordingly. 
I£,_,to continue the hypothetical example above, there i s no existing 
evidence to show why Lord Provost Drummond resigned, then we are l e f t 
with a genuine h i s t o r i c a l puzzle which nevertheless cannot, l o g i c a l l y , 
be solved. The second way i n which an account may be incomplete i s when 
the h i s t o r i a n • f a i l s to consider a relevant piece of known evidence. This 
i s a straightforward error on the part of the researcher who can be j u s t l y 
c r i t i c i s e d f o r his oversight. Thirdly, the incompleteness can be due to 
shortcomings i n the way i n which the h i s t o r i c a l account i s constructed 
from the evidence. Part of the s k i l l of the hist o r i a n l i e s i n assessing 
the relevance and importance of in d i v i d u a l pieces of evidence. The 
detective provides a useful analogy here f o r , l i k e him, the hist o r i a n has 
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to piece together the evidence. Sometimes, the significance of a 
certain clue i s not appreciated and, u n t i l i t i s , the reconstruction 
of what happened i s , at the very l e a s t , not as detailed as i t might be. 
Some historians, l i k e some detectives, have a remarkable f l a r e f o r 
spotting the missing piece. The more s k i l f u l the hist o r i a n the 
fewer h i s t o r i c a l puzzles w i l l be l e f t unsolved a f t e r he has examined 
the evidence and, therefore, the more complete the h i s t o r i c a l account 
w i l l be. 
The h i s t o r i c a l account i s an account of what happened i n the past, but 
an account which i s so arranged as to make the course of events i n t e l l i g i b l e 
and, where necessary, to dispel any puzzlement there might have been about 
the actions of a par t i c u l a r human agent or the occurrence of a par t i c u l a r 
event. 
Puzzles i n urban geography: 
The geographer with an interest in urban places i s no less an 
his t o r i a n . The fundamental nature and l i m i t s of his task are the same 
as those f o r any subject with i n the d i s c i p l i n e of history. The puzzles 
and-_problems x>f urban geography, then, must also arise i n the course of 
research in t o a p a r t i c u l a r place at a par t i c u l a r time. The general 
question, "Why did these people l i v e there i n mid-nineteenth century 
Edinburgh?" was misconceived f o r i t i s not a genuine h i s t o r i c a l question. 
I t could not be, since i t could plausibly be asked only by those who are 
ignorant of Victorian Edinburgh's r e s i d e n t i a l patterns. I t may prompt 
h i s t o r i c a l enquiry, but h i s t o r i c a l knowledge reveals i t to be a non-question. 
We can legitimately ask questions about the r e s i d e n t i a l location of a 
specific group of c i t i z e n s , but unless these are a di r e c t appeal f o r 
information they cannot be posed at the s t a r t of an urban research project. 
To have asked at the outset i f there was any relationship between 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n of social groups and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of house types 
has certainly influenced the direction of the subsequent h i s t o r i c a l 
research. I t i s not a question, however, which requires an explanation 
and only once we have detailed knowledge of the character of an area 
and i t s inhabitants can we formulate the appropriate 'why' questions 
which do. The urban geographer must then provide an answer from his 
knowledge of the evidence and construct an account of the urban pattern 
which incorporates i t . 5 2 Only i n t h i s way and on these occasions can 
the urban geographer be said to provide an explanation of the urban 
pattern. 
I l l 
THE CHANGING FACE OF EDINBURGH: 
Cities change over time; t h e i r r e s i d e n t i a l patterns change, the 
locations of t h e i r industries change and fashions change. Between 1851 
and 1891 there were many changes i n Edinburgh which affected the City's 
b u i l t form and the character of i t s r e s i d e n t i a l d i s t r i c t s . Some areas 
were altered, others were annexed; industry and population expanded. 
The 1891 urban structure i s to be understood i n the l i g h t of these 
changes. The presence of a certain group of inhabitants i n a pa r t i c u l a r 
Inevitably varying degrees of d i f f i c u l t y w i l l be experienced i n such 
an enterprise. In some cases the evidence w i l l be considerable, i n 
others, sadly lacking. In many cases the i n t r i c a c i e s of human 
motivation w i l l complicate the geographer's task. Nevertheless, 
whatever the extent of the evidence the urban geographer must make 
what he can of i t . 
area becomes i n t e l l i g i b l e once we know what has gone before. The 
task of t h i s section of Chapter 9, then, i s to provide an outline 
account of the changing face of late Victorian Edinburgh and i n so 
doing to demonstrate the way i n which the r e s i d e n t i a l pattern of 1891 
i s to be made i n t e l l i g i b l e . Once some detailed knowledge of Edinburgh's 
past i s acquired certain questions w i l l n aturally suggest themselves; 
most of these w i l l merely prompt the next step i n the narrative, a few 
may present genuine puzzles. The nature of such questions and the way 
in which they arise i s noteworthy. 
A sign of the times: 
On 6 A p r i l 1853, Henry Cockburn wrote: 
For the f i r s t time since the creation of the world, a 
Lord Advocate has delivered a popular lecture to a popular 
audience And a very good discourse i t seems to have 
been, consisting of a comparison, or rather contrast, of 
the f i r s t with the l a s t half of the current century, p o l i t i c s 
and r e l i g i o n excluded. 
The l e c t u r i n g of the upper ranks to the lower i s e n t i r e l y 
of modern, and indeed of very recent, growth, and i s a very 
useful n o v e l t y . 5 3 
No doubt several distinguished Edinburgians shook t h e i r heads i n dismay 
at such an innovation f o r i t marked a change i n social relationships 
which, although gradual, was also remarkable. The upper ranks were, 
fo r the f i r s t time, disposed to impart some of t h e i r worldly knowledge 
to those of lower standing and, i t seems, some of the lower ranks were 
well disposed to l i s t e n . Communication one with the other had begun. 
But, i f the Lord Advocate considered his audience to be generally lacking 
i n education, we may be sure that his own was not yet complete f o r , i n 
1853, the upper classes were s t i l l generally ignorant of the everyday 
l i v e s led by ordinary working men. The increased i n t e r e s t , not only i n 
the education of the working classes but also i n t h e i r l i v i n g and working 
5 3 H. Coekburn (1874), entry f o r 6 A p r i l 1853. 
conditions, was characteristic of the l a t e Victorian age. Further, 
the working classes themselves beganifco organise and effe c t improvements 
in t h e i r own conditions. The ambition of many an artisan was to own 
his own house. During the 1860s, the p o s s i b i l i t y of doing so became 
a r e a l one. 
On 31 December 1859 an a r t i c l e appeared i n The Builder which 
pointed out, 
House accommodation of a l l kinds i s at present scarce 
and dear enough i n Edinburgh, but none i s , we believe, 
more i n demand than such as i s suited f o r the families of 
the superior class of workmen.54 
And the good sense of supplying t h i s deficiency was the theme of the 
introduction to a lengthy report presented i n the following year by a 
Committee of the Working-Classes of Edinburgh. 5 5 'The most enlightened 
and p r a c t i c a l statesman' of the day, Lord Palmerston, had only a few 
months before, m a public address,contended that the f i r s t and most 
important step to the social improvement of the working classes i s to l e t 
them enjoy the comfort and happiness of a_ home. The Committee endorsing 
t h i s view went on to declare, 
The e f f e c t of even the smallest improvement i n t h i s 
d i r e c t i o n i s "indeed marvellous; and i t i s now a w e l l -
understood p r i n c i p l e i n social economy, that unless our 
working classes possess comfortable habitations, i t i s i n 
vain to endeavour to root out intemperance or extinguish 
crime. 5 6 
Since the 1820s, many of the ancient tenements of the City had been pulled 
down to make way f o r the railways or to be replaced by manufactories, 
public works, warehouses and workshops. The population grew but the 
housing stock did not. Indeed those houses whose rents were within 
the means of the working class population were greatly decreased i n 
5 4 see The Builder, 31 December 1859, Vol.XVII, p.861 
5 5 Committee of the Working-Classes of Edinburgh (1860) 
5 6 I b i d . , p.3 
i n number, u n t i l the effect came to be "overcrowding of the most 
undeniable and demoralising d e s c r i p t i o n " 5 7 . And as we have seen the 
e v i l became so intolerable that during the 1850s and 1860s, the whole 
press of Edinburgh directed i t s attention to the subject. This was 
an important step f o r the public interest was aroused, the condition 
of the poor became a popular topic of discussion and debate, and 
indi v i d u a l private citizens such as Dr. Robert Foulis and Mr. Peter Scott 
(both financed a model-close) no longer stood alone i n expressing the 
opinion that something had to be done. 
At the Masons' H a l l , Lyon's Close, 215 High Street on 17 A p r i l 
1861, a general meeting of masons resolved to form a Cooperative Building 
Company to be registered under the Limited L i a b i l i t y Company's Act. 
The c a p i t a l was l a t e r f i x e d at £10,000 i n £1 shares, but the amount 
actually subscribed at the f i r s t conference of the Edinburgh Cooperators 
was only £25. People were very cautious about the new venture and 
progress was slow. Nor did the Town Council take an active part i n 
t h i s project. Indeed one j o u r n a l i s t , appealing f o r the a l l e v i a t i o n 
of the miserable condition of the Edinburgh poor, roundly c r i t i c i s e d 
the Council for t h e i r indolence i n t h i s respect, concluding, 
I t has been impossible f o r us not to see that Edinburgh 
suffers a good deal from the con s t i t u t i o n of i t s municipal 
government. Much of the time of the Town Council i s taken 
up with noisy discussions upon theological subjects: i n the 
meantime the population i s perishing around them. 5 8 
Such c r i t i c i s m was not wholly j u s t i f i e d , for several i n d i v i d u a l members 
of the Council were i n the forefront of the e f f o r t to provide improved 
dwellings f o r the working classes. Francis Douglas Brown, f o r example, 
5 7 I b i d . , p.12 
5 8 see The Builder, 22 June 1861, Vol XIX, p.4-22 
(Lord Provost from 1859 to 1862) was one of an association of gentlemen 
who financed the P i l r i g Model Buildings, near Leith Walk. This scheme, 
completed i n the 1850s, was a considerable success with demand for the 
houses being at least s i x times greater than supply. 
In the l i g h t of the early model building projects which had 
revealed such a demand f o r decent low rent housing i t may seem surprising 
that the Edinburgh Cooperative Building Society did not receive more 
immediate support. To many of the High Street inhabitants the prospect 
of owning a home for l i t t l e more per week than they had been paying i n 
rent (probably f o r only one room) must have been a t t r a c t i v e . But people 
had f i r s t to be persuaded to take up the shares and suitable building land 
had t o be procured. Despite d i f f i c u l t i e s on both counts, the f i r s t street 
of co-operative dwellings, Reid Terrace i n Stockbridge, was completed by 
1853. This group of f o r t y self-contained houses, each having "a good 
supply of water, a sink and soil-pipe, and a water-closet", 5 9 was sold at 
prices ranging from £130 to £150. A £5 deposit and a loan from the 
Property Investment companies meant that the working man could now become 
his own landlord. Repayment was over fourteen years at £13 per annum 
(f o r a £130_house). This was only £2 more than the annual rent of these 
properties. By A p r i l of that year a l l f o r t y houses had been sold and 
the foundation stone l a i d f o r another s t r e e t , p a r a l l e l to the f i r s t , 
to be called Hugh M i l l e r Place. In the next two years the Cooperative 
Building Company continued to be active and by October 1865 had completed 
Committee of the Working-Classes of Edinburgh (1860) p.29 
In a sub-committee report these modern conveniences were said to be 
"the f i r s t and most indispensable feature of the houses" to be 
designed f o r working men. 
159 houses i n six streets valued at £34,710. This was an important 
step i n the movement to provide good houses f o r the working classes. 
In i t s e l f , however, the achievements of the Edinburgh Cooperators 
i n the early 1860s did l i t t l e t o change the si t u a t i o n of the Edinburgh 
working man. Homes were provided f o r 159 fami l i e s , but many thousands 
s t i l l suffered the miseries of the crumbling High Street tenements. 
Moreover the families who did take up residence i n the cooperative 
houses were cert a i n l y not from the lowest orders f o r whom regular 
payments were impossible. Indeed those who bought such property must 
have been amongst the best paid artisans of the City. I n 1860 the 
working man's weekly wage varied from around 15/- ( f o r firemen, guards, 
porters and signalmen on the railway, general labourers, carters and 
other unskilled workers) to around 35/- (earned, f o r example, by s k i l l e d 
workers i n heavy industry, printers and drivers on the railway). Clearly 
the labourer with an annual income of £38 ( i f he were not i l l i n the 
course of the year) could not afford t o pay out £13 of that on a house 
alone. 6 0 Further, not only were there few good class artisans residing 
i n the High Street area i n mid-nineteenth century, but the proportion 
of "bread-winners earning even 15/- per week regularly was also small. 
Most of those who were i n employment earned between 12/- and 15/- per 
week. Others (eg. cobblers and cheap boot and shoe makers) received 
between 9/- and 14/- f o r a working week of eighty or ninety hours. 
The rest were able to obtain only a precarious and irreg u l a r subsistence. 
The majority, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , knew nothing better and hoped f o r 
nothing better. I t was not with these people i n mind that the Edinburgh 
Cooperators had launched t h e i r venture. Unfortunately those whose 
finances allowed them to take advantage of the cooperative scheme were 
a very small minority, even of the working classes. A survey of l o c a l 
6 0 On top of t h i s a perpetual ground rent had to be paid. In Reid 
Terrace t h i s feu was 11/- per annum. 
workforces was carried out by the Committee of the Working-Classes of 
Edinburgh to discover what was considered a f a i r annual rent. In 
t h e i r findings the Committee endorsed the plasterers' conclusion t h a t , 
"The general impression i s , that L.6 or so, including taxes, i s enough 
for any working-man with average wages."61 The cheapest of the 
cooperative houses was more than double th a t . And by 1885 the 
Edinburgh Cooperative Building Society was no longer a purely working 
class organisation f o r , with a dividend of 15%, i t was a t t r a c t i n g money 
solely as a good investment proposition. 
Nevertheless, those who appealed f o r money for such cooperative 
ventures did much to promote the more general cause of housing and 
sanitary improvements, for they argued, persuasively enough, that the 
enormous benefit to society as a whole of good cheap accommodation f o r 
the working man would require l i t t l e or no sa c r i f i c e on the part of the 
investor. A Mr. George Lawson, f o r example, one of the leaders of the 
s k i l l e d Edinburgh artisans, wrote i n 1865, 
You w i l l f i n d a Cooperative Building Company a ca p i t a l 
monetary investment; and i t w i l l bring you a re t u r n , I 
am persuaded, that i s not to be put down i n figures, or 
entered in bank books - sobriety, earnestness, self-help, 
mutual confidence, honesty. Having these to add to your 
deposits you need not fear. Success would be ce r t a i n , 
and the return extraordinary. 6 2 
Public opinion was swayed i n favour of helping those who wished to help 
themselves. Not that such oratory alone could have been so efficacious 
but i t was one of a whole host of influences which characterised t h i s 
decade. Undoubtedly the publication of the 1861 census of Scotland 
aggregate s t a t i s t i c s was another. That census revealed that nearly 
Quoted i n Committee of the Working-Classes (1860) p.38 
see The League Journal, 11 March 1865, Glasgow 
one m i l l i o n Scottish people ( i e . nearly one t h i r d of the country's 
entire population) were l i v i n g i n so called houses either without any 
windows or of only one apartment. And Edinburgh did not have an 
exemplary record i n t h i s respect f o r nearly 10% of her t o t a l population 
i n 1861 l i v e d i n one-roomed houses. 13,209 families (some 66,000 
individuals) l i v e d i n single apartments, 1,530 of which had between 
six and f i f t e e n occupants. And 121 families i n the c a p i t a l were 
found inhabiting single rooms each without a window. The infamacy 
as well as the health r i s k which threatened a section of the community 
v i t a l to the City's economy, and therefore prosperity, worried more 
than a few of Edinburgh's more prominent citi z e n s . 
The f i r s t e f f e c t i v e o f f i c i a l step towards improving the condition 
of the Edinburgh working classes was taken i n 1862 when the Lindsay Act 
was passed. Under t h i s Act Sir Henry L i t t l e j o h n was appointed f i r s t 
Medical Officer of Health and became a leading figure i n the campaign 
fo r improved l i g h t i n g , cleansing, drainage, paving and water supply, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y f o r the Old Town.- In August 1865 he presented to the 
Town Council_a Report on the Sanitary Condition of the City of Edinburgh. 
The death-rate i n the Old Town he stated as: 
per 1,000 people - Abbey d i s t r i c t 37.1 
Canongate 31.15 
Tron 34.46 
St. Giles 28.8 
Grassmarket 32.52 
This (an average death-rate of 32,64), he contended, could be reduced to 
25.0 per 1,000 people. 6 3 National and l o c a l concern grew and two years 
l a t e r , i n 1867, the f i r s t Public Health (Scotland) Act was passed. I t 
6 3 The average death-rate f o r the City as a whole three years before the 
L i t t l e j o h n Report ( i e . when the Lindsay Act was passed) was 23.1 per 
thousand. And the death-rate f o r the New Town at t h i s period was 
less than ha l f that of the Old Town. 
added to the provisions of the Lindsay Act by giving the Council 
powers to appoint sanitary inspectors, but i t was also concerned with 
regulations f o r the provision of hospitals, the removal of infected 
persons for suitable treatment and the b u r i a l of the dead. In the 
same year the Edinburgh Improvement B i l l received Royal assent. Under 
t h i s Act an Improvement Trust was constituted to effect the redevelopment 
of central slum areas. Powers to purchase d e r e l i c t property were given 
to the Town Council and plans were set i n motion to widen, by strategic 
demolition, some of the existing High Street Wynds. On t h i s and other 
improvements (the creation of Jeffrey Street and Chamber's Street, f o r 
example) some hal f a m i l l i o n s t e r l i n g was subsequently expended. The 
effect of these improvements was to open up some of the closes to l i g h t 
and a i r and, by dislodging a certain number of the inhabitants, to 
reduce ov e r a l l densities. The Sanitary Reform Movement had gathered 
momentum and over the next three decades a considerable body of 
l e g i s l a t i o n (culminating i n the Housing the Working Classes Act of 1890) 
was brought i n t o being i n the attempt to make the c i t i e s of Scotland 
pleasant and healthy places to l i v e i n even f o r the lower classes. The 
powers and regulations embodies i n acts such as the Artisans and Labourers 
Dwellings Improvement (Scotland) Act, 1875 or the Edinburgh Municipal 
Police Act of 1879, were designed to ensure certain minimum standards 
of sanitary provision. These r e s t r i c t i o n s were added to the City's bye-
laws, and because of t h i s much of the l e g i s l a t i o n was l o c a l i n e f f e c t . 
In Edinburgh, the Dean of Guild Court was responsible for enforcing such 
regulations. The power and authority of t h i s court was greatly increased 
during t h i s period, f o r not only was machinery established whereby 
detailed plans of any intended building had f i r s t to be submitted f o r 
3m. 
approval but the 1879 Act increased the areal extent of i t s 
j u r i s d i c t i o n . 6 4 Much of the i n d u s t r i a l housing i n the Fountainbridge 
area, f o r example, was b u i l t at t h i s time and i t s dreary uniformity 
can be p a r t l y accredited to the imposition of these minimum standards. 
A house design was adopted which combined economy with some attention 
to the City's bye-laws and to which the builders adhered with 
unimaginative persistence. 6 5 
Other public health l e g i s l a t i o n followed the 1867 Act. I n 1870, 
Edinburgh led the way by paying fees to medical men for the n o t i f i c a t i o n 
of cases of infectious disease, such n o t i f i c a t i o n eventually being made 
compulsory under an Act of 1889. The provision of hospitals was also 
improved. A new Infirmary was opened i n October 1879 and six years 
l a t e r the Old Infirmary was taken over by the Municipality and occupied 
as a fever hospital. (Up u n t i l 1885 the accommodation set aside f o r 
the i s o l a t i o n and treatment of fever patients had been more or less 
makeshift.) The City had begun the b a t t l e against the epidemics which, 
throughout the century, had peri o d i c a l l y swept through the packed 
tenements of the Old Town leaving many hundreds dead. 6 6 Indeed the 
whole~bbdy of l e g i s l a t i o n passed" during the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth 
Previously, j u r i s d i c t i o n had not extended beyond the r e l a t i v e l y 
r e s t r i c t e d area of the old Royalty plus Canongate, West Port, Potterow 
and the Pleasance. In 1879 the Dean of Guild Court was given j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over the whole of the City area inside the parliamentary boundary. 
The i n d u s t r i a l housing/the Fountainbridge area continues the Scottish 
t r a d i t i o n of f l a t t e d tenements. A t y p i c a l "terement f l o o r , with four f l a t s 
or houses sharing a central staircase, i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n the Report of a 
Committee of the Working-Classes of Edinburgh (1860). This plan was one 
drawn up by the Committee as a recommendation of the type of housing 
badly needed i n the City. Subsequently, i t became something of a blueprint. 
The b a t t l e was f a r from won, however, and even with the addition of the 
new fever hospital accommodation fo r fever patients was l i m i t e d . During 
the smallpox outbreak of the 1890s, a temporary hospital had to be erected 
i n the Queens Park. 
century was designed to solve the pressing problems of t h i s part of 
the City - the decay of the buildings, the lack of the most elementary 
sanitary provisions and the t e r r i b l e overcrowding. In short, i t was 
a conscious, i f protracted, attempt to change the face of Edinburgh. 
Edinburgh around 1891: 
We have reached a point i n the account of Edinburgh's past where 
certain questions naturally present themselves. These are h i s t o r i c a l 
questions f o r they are prompted by a piece of h i s t o r i a l research. In 
1851 the Old Town of Edinburgh was i n a t e r r i b l e state. The next f o r t y 
years saw a concerted e f f o r t on the part of several groups of citizens 
(the artisan Cooperators, the elected representatives and the associations 
of gentlemen) to improve the condition of the area i t s e l f and the l i v e s 
of i t s inhabitants. We can now ask: Did t h i s concern and a c t i v i t y 
indeed lead to the desired improvements? Did the face of Edinburgh 
change and, i f so, i n what way? These questions give direction to the 
continuing narrative which must in turn be so constructed as to both make 
the relevant events i n t e l l i g i b l e and s a t i s f y the questioner. 
Perhaps the most_marked_change _in the Scottish -capital between 
1851 and 1891 was the vast increase i n population and the expansion of 
the Parliamentary Burgh to accommodate the i n f l u x . During t h i s time 
the City experienced a net immigration of nearly 100,000 persons, making 
i n 
the 1891 population 261,225. In 1883, 1885 and again/1890 the areal 
extent of the Burgh was increased by Act of Parliament. Edinburgh was 
growing rapidly. Transport improvements allowed easy commuting from the 
suburbs and thus fostered suburban growth. (The suburban railway had 
been opened i n October 1884 at a cost of £225,000). Previously outlying 
v i l l a g e s , such as Morningside, now became incorporated i n the built-up 
area of the City. I n d u s t r i a l expansion mirrored areal expansion. Some 
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of the t r a d i t i o n a l industries moved out of t h e i r cramped premises 
i n the Old Town to modern manufacturies i n more peripheral locations. 
And the commercial invasion of certain streets i n the New Town was 
well under way. The actual b u i l t form of the Old Town had been 
altered i n places with the formation of several new streets to replace 
the narrow wynds of 1851. And whole new areas of housing and industry 
at Fountainbridge, Stockbridge and London Road added to the urban 
pattern. Indeed the 1880s could be characterised as a decade of growth 
and progress i n Edinburgh. The telephone was introduced i n t o the City 
i n February 1880, the following year Princes Street and the North Bridge 
were l i g h t e d with e l e c t r i c i t y as an experiment i n i t i a t e d by the Town 
Council, St. Giles was restored as were the old Parliament House, the 
Argyle Tower and other buildings at the Castle, the gas companies' 
undertaking was purchased by the Town Council, the Braid H i l l s Park 
was formally opened to the public, and by the close of the decade the 
construction of the f i r s t Public Library i n the City, on George IV Bridge, 
was proceeding apace. Some of these schemes were paid f o r through the 
munificence of private individuals, others from the public coffers. 
The intention in" each"case", however, was to enhance the City i t s e l f 
and the l i v e s of i t s c i t i z e n s . 
Yet these changes meant more to some than to others; they affected 
various groups of inhabitants i n d i f f e r e n t ways. Edinburgh i n 1891 was 
s t i l l a c i t y of contrasts. Houses i n the New Town, such as the "large, 
superior and commodious self-contained house" at 27 Queen S t r e e t , 6 7 were 
being sold f o r upwards of £4,000 whilst f o r the same amount of money a 
substantial tenement forming nos. 20, 22, 24- and 26 Bread Street could 
This house, including the stable and coach house f r o n t i n g the meuse 
lane behind, was advertised f o r sale i n the Scotsman of Saturday 4 
January 1890. 
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have been acquired and l e t t o y i e l d £428 per annum to the fortunate 
p r o p r i e t o r 6 8 . In 1890, 33 Moray Place was offered f o r sale at the 
upset price of £5,500. This must have been amongst the most expensive 
family residences i n the City. At the same time, 14-9 Morrison Street -
a house more suited t o those with r e l a t i v e l y insubstantial resources -
could have been purchased f o r around £250. Both were to be occupied 
as family residences, but the differences i n the l i v e s of the occupiers 
must have been considerable. I f we slide further down the economic 
scale we f i n d 11 houses on the second and t h i r d f l o o r s of a tenement 
in the Lawnmarket s e l l i n g f o r around £575, the cost of one house being 
on average £52. Such property was l e t out to the poorest of Edinburgh's 
inhabitants, though the landlord could s t i l l expect an annual income of 
nearly £70 which i s a good 12% return on the o r i g i n a l investment. The 
City's housing stock displayed great variety both i n the size, style 
and qualit y of the buildings themselves and i n the price which the 
houses could fexch on the open market. I t may reasonably be supposed 
that i n the l a s t decade of the century the contrast between the l i v e s 
of the r i c h and the poor, the fortunate and the unfortunate, was s t i l l 
as marked as that between the "stately"New Town houses and the cramped 
tenement f l a t s of the Old Town. 
Not that the evidence might have led us to suppose otherwise. 
The l o c a l and national l e g i s l a t i o n of the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth 
century which was directed towards improving the l o t of the working classes 
and the poorer strata of society was ce r t a i n l y great i n volume. I t s 
aims, however, were l i m i t e d from the outset. I t r e f l e c t s the general 
concern of the time f o r the atrocious conditions i n which the urban 
working classes were condemned to l i v e , but was i n no way an attempt to 
provide a rad i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e . Some of the provisions of t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n 
6 8 This tenement was also offered for sale i n the Scotsman of Saturday 4 
January 1890. I t consisted of two shops, sixteen houses, and stable 
accommodation. Included i n the sale was ' s u f f i c i e n t ground to b u i l d 
a large h a l l ' . 
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were revolutionary - the compulsory purchase powers given to the 
Edinburgh Town Council, f o r example, meant that f o r the f i r s t time the 
authorities could act d i r e c t l y to ensure the clearance of slum properties -
most provisions were not. The specification of minimum standards i n the 
City's bye-laws could never have been expected to change the face of 
Edinburgh overnight. But what effec t did f o r t y years of active reform 
and widespread concern have on the Scottish capital? A b r i e f look at 
the 1891 census returns may give us a clue. 
In 1851 the slum property of Edinburgh was, with few exceptions, 
within a stone's throw of the High Street. I n 1891, the same was true. 
The few model close schemes had not changed the character of the d i s t r i c t 
as a whole. More charitable missions had congregated i n i t h e Grassmarket, 
with n i g h t l y lodging houses providing basic shelter for those who had 
none. A large colony of It a l i a n s , a smaller Jewish community, and an 
increased number of 'wild I r i s h ' had, through poverty and prejudice, 
also been condemned to t h i s slough i n the social and physical landscape 
of the City. I n the High Street area there were s t i l l those who had 
reached the _depths of human deprivation. Nevertheless, four decades 
with t h e i r accompanying l e g i s l a t i o n and expansion had not l e f t the area 
untouched. The f i r s t major change which can be detected from the 1891 
census i s the decrease i n population densities. (Fig.18 below can be 
compared with Fig.10, p.290 above.) 
TOTAL AREA OF PARISH DENSITY 
PARISHES POPULATION ( i n acres) (Persons per acre)(sq.yards per person) 
TRON 1,394 6.62 211 
NEW NORTH 1,952 10.58 185 
ST.JOHN'S 1,987 7.32 271 
Fig.18 POPULATION DENSITIES FOR THREE HIGH STREET PARISHES, 1891 6 9 
6 9 Computed from the o r i g i n a l 1891 census returns. A l l figures are either t o 
the nearest person or correct to two decimal places. 
Special d i f f i c u l t i e s were involved i n drawing up a table which was d i r e c t l y 
comparable to Fig.10 f o r enumeration boundaries had been changed since 1851. 
See Appendix A. 
I t i s notable that by t h i s time the Tron parish was not as densely 
populated as that of St. John's. In the middle years of the century 
the Tron had been widely known as the most overcrowded parish i n 
Edinburgh. The Lord Provost made reference to i t i n his speeches 
on City improvements: 
The most densely-peopled d i s t r i c t i s that between 
Niddry Street and St. Mary's Wynd, ch i e f l y belonging 
to the Tron Church parish; here the proportion of 
population to each acre i s 646, which i s alleged t o 
be scarcely paralleled i n any town i n Europe. 0 
This was the area i n which sanitary reform was most needed and, perhaps 
because of t h i s , the attention of the reformers was focused on i t . 
Blackfriar's Wynd was widened to form Blackfriar's Street and several 
dilapidated tenements were demolished, displacing scores of people. 
The r e s u l t was an absolute decline i n the number of inhabitants of the 
parish. As the o f f i c i a l enumerator pointed out i n a note attached to 
his census returns, the east side of South Bridge contained, i n 1891, 
only two s t a i r s where persons resided, xhe resx a l l being business 
premises. Niddry Street was f u l l of leather warehouses with one or two 
shops and, again, only two s t a i r s occupied as dwelling houses. Halls 
Court, Cowgate, was nearly^ isolated with only one - -stair "occupied, the 
rest having been closed by order of the au t h o r i t i e s . Whilst, then, 
conditions f o r those who remained i n the parish had changed l i t t l e i n 
h a l f a century, fewer souls now suffered the hardships of these wynds 
and closes. 
Nor were the small concentrations of I r i s h such a s t r i k i n g feature 
of the 1891 r e s i d e n t i a l pattern. With the notable exception of the 
Grassmarket, i t was by t h i s time single tenements rather than whole 
closes or part of them which were given over to I r i s h occupants. The 
I r i s h were s t i l l amongst the very poorest of the area's inhabitants, 
however, frequently having large families and uncertain employment. A 
7 0 W.Chambers (1866) p.13. This address was given to the Architectural 
I n s t i t u t e of Scotland by the then Lord Provost of Edinburgh, William 
Chambers. 
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10% sample of the 1891 census returns f o r the three High Street parishes 
revealed no Irish-born heads of household i n s k i l l e d employment. Most 
described themselves as labourers, but there were also several porters, 
a f i s h hawker, a gardener, a slipper maker, a wireworker and a washer-
woman. Some admitted to being unemployed. Only one of these 
families occupied more than two windowed rooms; several l i v e d i n only 
one room. A single apartment at 17 Borthwick Close, New North Parish, 
f o r example, was occupied by a widow, her daughter and son-in-law, 
two other daughters and two grandchildren; and i n St. John's Parish, 
at the West Bow, a labourer, his wife and f i v e children l i v e d i n one 
room with a window. Overcrowding was s t i l l a tremendous problem and 
a hazard t o health, but by 1891 most of the Irish-occupied "houses' 
gave some access to both l i g h t and a i r . For the City as a whole, the 
1891 census records 13,691 one-roomed dwelling houses with a t o t a l 
population of 33,378 individuals. (This was j u s t over ha l f the number 
recorded i n the 1861 census). In t h i r t y years the proportion of 
Edinburgh's population occupying single-apartment dwellings had been 
reduced from 10% to j u s t under 13%. 
We know that i n the 1860s and 1870s there was a large and steady 
increase i n the population of the Scottish c a p i t a l , as i n other Scottish 
c i t i e s . 7 * Yet during t h i s time the population of the High Street area 
actually declined. Those who were dislodged by the improvement schemes 
must have taken up residence i n other parts of the City and the next 
step i n the account of l a t e Victorian Edinburgh would be to answer the 
question, "Where did they move to?" By looking b r i e f l y at the other 
two d i s t r i c t s of Edinburgh with which we have been concerned, an indication 
7 1 The i n d u s t r i a l c i t i e s of Glasgow and Dundee.experienced an even more 
marked r i s e i n t h e i r populations. 
of how the account i s to proceed can be given. 
By 1891, St. Stephen's parish was almost completely b u i l t - u p . 
Not that t h i s represented a substantial change from f o r t y years e a r l i e r , 
but with the creation of Perth Street the largest plot of land vacant 
i n 1851 had been b u i l t upon. The extent of t h i s development i n the 
most northerly section of the parish can be seen i n Fig.6 above. 
The population of the parish, however, decreased minimally over the four 
decades with the increase engendered by Perth Street being counter-
balanced by a noticeable decrease i n the main thoroughfare of Dundas 
Str e e t / P i t t Street and i n Heriot Row. (A few shops had replaced 
dwelling-houses i n the former streets and o f f i c e premises had started 
to appear i n the l a t t e r ) . Might those who l e f t the High Street area 
have chosen to take up residence i n t h i s New Town parish? Well, i f 
they did we can be sure that they did not move into the fashionable 
Moray Place, Heriot Row or Royal Circus, unless by the back entrance 
as one of the servants. The Glasgow widow who l i v e d on 'private means' 
i n a twenty-four roomed residence i n Moray Place certainly had not 
recently removed from a cramped Old Town tenement, although one of her 
three" servants may have. St / "Stephen"'s~ paristT~s"till contained some-of 
the most desirable and substantial residences i n the City and i t was 
only ladies and gentlemen of means, writers-to-the-signet, general medical 
p r a c t i t i o n e r s , dentists, r e t i r e d leather merchants and the l i k e who could 
afford to occupy them. The contrasts to be found within the parish, 
not 
however, had/lessened i n these f o r t y years. Jamaica Street remained 
the most overcrowded street and i t s character was unchanged. The 
population of the street and i t s back lanes had f r a c t i o n a l l y decreased 
but the average density remained close to 500 persons per acre. Very 
few households enjoyed the comforts of even three rooms each with a window. 
Many more l i v e d i n single apartments, though the majority of Jamaica 
Street's inhabitants occupied two-roomed ' f l a t s ' or shared houses. 
Not one of the families selected i n the 10% census sample kept servants, 
though three kept lodgers. The heads of these households included 
coachmen, shoemakers, t a i l o r s , a woolknitter, a vanman and a shop 
porter. One or two of those displaced from the wynds and closes may 
have found a job and a house here, but Jamaica Street was already so 
crowded that i t could not possibly have accommodated a larger i n f l u x . 
Nor are there any other areas of St. Stephen's parish which might have 
been a possible r e s i d e n t i a l option to the unskilled working-man on an 
unskilled working-man's wage. I f we want to know where the High Street 
population went we need to look not at the well-established Edinburgh 
New Town, but at a more rapidly expanding area and an i n d u s t r i a l area 
which could provide both work and accommodation f o r the migrant. 
The Fountainbridge d i s t r i c t , i n the 1870s, had experienced the 
f u l l vigour of the general building boom. Heavy industry had become 
established here and the demand fo r labour and housing was then at i t s 
peak. In the years up to 1891 many working-men were persuaded of jthe 
advantages of l i v i n g on the western outskirts of the City where reasonably 
secure and reasonably paid employment could be obtained. Of those who 
moved i n , a good proportion came from the wynds and closes of the Old 
Town. This was an expanding area of the City, but the expansion did 
not change the character of the area as a whole. Monotonous rows of 
working class tenements were to be found cheek by jowl with i n d u s t r i a l 
concerns, warehouses and workshops. Accommodation was s t i l l cramped but 
most of the inhabitants had access to the basic amenities (water-closet, 
soil-pipe and running water.) I t was also an area i n which the 
unskilled could obtain work. Coachmen, railwav workers (guards, porters 
and c l e r k s ) , general labourers, lorrymen, t a i l o r s , coal carters, wood 
carters and shoemakers were a l l s t i l l to be found i n t h i s area. 1 1 
In addition, the 1891 census reveals a number of brewery workers and 
rubber workers employed by two industries which had established 
themselves i n the d i s t r i c t since 1851 and both of which had large 
workforces. Throughout Fountainbridge there were very few households 
whose l i v i n g accommodation wab greater Than three rooms; the norm was 
two, but the sample recorded three concentrations of single-apartment 
dwellings ( i n Freer Street, St. Cuthberts Lane and Morrison Street) 
as well as other one-roomed 'houses' scattered throughout the area. 
Fountainbridge had remained a d i s t i n c t i v e piece i n the urban pattern, 
though by 1891 similar d i s t r i c t s had grown up i n other parts of the 
extended City. The urban mosaic was becoming steadily more complex 
as other pieces were being added to the pattern. 
The h i s t o r i c a l account which has been outlined above t e l l s us 
about Edinburgh. I t deals with the specific and the unique, not the 
universal. The account i t s e l f would provide answers to the many 
-questions which arise-as-the research progresses and which give 
direction to the e f f o r t s of the researcher. Inevitably some questions 
w i l l remain unanswered f o r , even i f the evidence i s not lacking, the 
answer may l i e outside the period chosen f o r study. History i s 
continuous and one period i n the past leads into another. Nevertheless 
to describe the way things were (the character of the r e s i d e n t i a l areas 
These occupations are taken from the 10% sample of the 1891 census 
and are remarkably similar to those selected i n the sample of the 
1851 returns. 
and the economic and social condition of the inhabitants), the ways 
i n which they changed, and how these changes came about (through 
the actions of individuals, new l e g i s l a t i o n or social 'movements') 
i s to provide an understanding of the urban structure of Edinburgh 
at that time. I t i s i n t h i s way, and only i n t h i s way, that the 
re s i d e n t i a l patterning of the late Victorian capital of Scotland i s 
to be rendered i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
So have we answered the question which gave impetus to the 
h i s t o r i c a l research, the question why the inhabitants of Edinburgh 
l i v e d where they l i v e d i n the l a t e r part of the nineteenth century? 
I t must be admitted that here we f a i l e d , but that the f a i l u r e l i e s not 
i n the absence of an answer but i n the u n c r i t i c a l acceptance of the 
question i n the f i r s t place. The information we have gleaned about 
Edinburgh and i t s inhabitants may have prompted several questions, but 
we are not l e f t wondering why on earth these people l i v e d where they 
did. There i s no such general puzzle. The question with which we 
started was misconceived, a non-question. The presence of the I r i s h 
i n the closes of the High Street or the lawyers i n Heriot Row i s 
pe r f e e t l y - i n t e H r g i b l e and can ~be-seen~to be neither necessary nor 
accidental. We can understand these r e s i d e n t i a l choices without 
seeing them as part of an ove r a l l design or as some inexplicable 
accident. We are l e f t with no feeling of puzzlement; there i s no 
problem to be solved. 
In the explor ation of the changing structure of late Victorian 
Edinburgh there are, indeed, few genuine h i s t o r i c a l puzzles i n need of 
resolution. To be sure, the influences upon the developments and 
changes within the urban area were many and varied but none appear as 
extraordinary. Nor was there one i n f l u e n t i a l person whose contribution 
to moulding the City's form was so great as to require p a r t i c u l a r 
and careful consideration. Much did happen i n and to Edinburgh i n 
the late nineteenth century. These were the years of the great 
Improvement Schemes throughout B r i t a i n . As Briggs says, 'improvement' 
i s a word "which can f i t t i n g l y be applied as a label to a whole age". 7 3 
The s p i r i r of improvement also v i s i t e d Edinburgh and new standards 
were introduced which took into consideration both private comfort 
and public accommodation. The energies and time of many citizens 
were directed towards improving Edinburgh and we have seen, b r i e f l y , 
the effect of these e f f o r t s i n the High Street area. In t h i s we 
touched on a genuine h i s t o r i c a l puzzle, although the evidence relevant 
to i t s solution l i e s outside the chosen period. Despite four decades 
of active reform which had changed the face of several Old Town closes, 
the overcrowded areas of the New Town remained untouched. This fact 
i s especially surprising when one considers that i t was i n the New Town 
that most of the Town Councillors themselves resided, and t h e i r apparent 
blindness to overcrowded streets (such as Jamaica Street) within a stone's 
throw of t h e i r own homes certainly c a l l s f o r explanation. The oversight 
-is unexpected because-we—know"that the character of-Jamaica- Street, f o r 
example, was similar to that of parts of the Old Town, and there i s no 
immediately apparent reason why one should have been overlooked and not 
the other. Therefore, being unexpected given what we know of Edinburgh 
at t h i s time, t h i s i s an h i s t o r i c a l puzzle. I f we were to continue 
the h i s t o r i c a l narrative beyond 1891 i t would provide a possible theme 
with research directed towards solving the puzzle. I t may be that we 
could only provide a p a r t i a l explanation, f o r the evidence may be 
fragmentary and suggestive rather than conclusive. Indeed the story 
of Jamaica Street as a forgotten street continues u n t i l i t s demolition 
3 A. Briggs (1968) p.226 
i n the 1960s and documents wr i t t e n at that time give us an insight 
i n t o why i t had remained so long i n an overcrowded state. Such an 
h i s t o r i c a l puzzle presents a special challenge to the urban geographer, 
but there are f a r fewer genuine puzzles, or problems, than i s commonly 
supposed. 
I f evidence from the twentieth century can help the urban 
geographer i n his task of providing an h i s t o r i c a l account of nineteenth 
century r e s i d e n t i a l patterns, then the opposite i s also true. The 
present day form of the c i t y has inherited much from the Victorian age. 
The tremendous increase i n the population of the B r i t i s h Isles between 
1851 and 1891 was accompanied by the creation of new suburbs i n a l l the 
major c i t i e s of the country and i t was these developments which set 
the r e s i d e n t i a l patterns of the 1900s. The legacy of the late 
nineteenth century i s important to the understanding of the urban 
structure of today. And i t i s the d e t a i l s , the uniqueness, of s i t e 
and situation which must be explored i f we are to understand the urban 
patterns of a p a r t i c u l a r c i t y . As Dyos and Wolff put i t , 
The configuration of the ground, the prevailing wind, 
the means of locomotion, the location of the gas-works, 
the precise whereabouts of cemeteries, golf-courses 
schools, hospitals, parks, sewage works, f a c t o r i e s , 
railway sidings, and shopping centres - a l l amenities 
whose d i s t r i b u t i o n tended to be se t t l e d at an early stage 
of urban growth - are ineradicable influences on subsequent 
patterns of urban l i f e . 7 4 
Edinburgh was no exception. The character of each of the three City 
areas examined i n t h i s chapter has changed since 1891, but the changes 
themselves are perfectly i n t e l l i g i b l e i n the l i g h t of what we know about 
Edinburgh's nineteenth century. The Fountainbridge area i s s t i l l 
i n d u s t r i a l with several larger industries having expanded and others 
H. J. Dyos and M. Wolff (1973) p.894 
having disappeared since the closure of the Union canal. The 
tenement f l a t s are showing the signs of a century of constant use 
and less than thorough maintenance. Most are occupied by the 
families of unskilled and semi-skilled working men. Fig.18 shows 
part of Murdoch Terrace today. This s t r e e t , at the western end of 
Fountainbridge, i s typical of the area as a whole. Some streets 
nearer the City centre have already been demolished. Most of the 
buildings i n the parish of St. Stephens, as might have been expected, 
reveal no such signs of decay. The changes there have rather been 
connected with proximity to the commercial and business centre of the 
ca p i t a l . Shops, offic e s and hotels have taken over many of the 
stately houses, although t h i s i s s t i l l an exclusive r e s i d e n t i a l area. 
A glance at the part of Royal Circus pictured i n Fig.19 gives some 
idea of the enduring character and grandeur of these streets. Lastly, 
and possibly the most changed of the three c i t y areas, the High Street 
today contains forgotten slums, a tremendous variety (both i n kind and 
quali t y ) of commercial concerns and a number of buildings the arch i t e c t u r a l 
merit of which has only recently been recognised and which, having been 
carefully renovated, now-appear i n the City guide—books-.— A-few of the 
l a t t e r which have not been converted to museums or monuments are s t i l l 
occupied as dwelling houses, but as period pieces with twentieth century 
amenities,these have once again become fashionable. As for the rest of 
the narrow closes, the decay and the poverty remain. The population 
has greatly declined and continues to decline as tenements become 
unsafe and have to be pulled down. Some closes are thus accidentally 
the 
widened, but piles of rubble add to/general appearance of delapidation, 
(see.Fig.20). Disadvantaged by physical layout, streets such as the 
Cowgate are now being given over to car parks, warehousing and the l i k e . 
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Fig.20 BISHOPS CLOSE, HIGH STREET, in the 1970s 
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Fig.21 THE COWGATE and GEORGE IV BRIDGE i n the 1970s 
F i g . 2 1 shows t h e s p l i t - l e v e l r o a d s common i n c e n t r a l E d i n b u r g h . Most 
o f t h e b r i d g e s were b u i l t i n t h e l a t e e i g h t e e n t h and e a r l y n i n e t e e n t h 
c e n t u i i e s a n d had an i m p o r t a n t e f f e c t on t h e subsequent development o f 
t h e l o w e r l e v e l s t r e e t s w h i c h t h e y overshadowed. 
I n a l l t h i s t h e r e i s n o t h i n g a s t o n i s h i n g . These changes i n t h e 
S c o t t i s h c a p i t a l a r e n e i t h e r u n i n t e l l i g i b l e n o r p r o b l e m a t i c and, 
a l t h o u g h more d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n m i g h t be s o u g h t , t h e f a c t s themselves 
do n o t demand e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e r e i s n o t h i n g unexpected a b o u t them. 
Nor does t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s e t h r e e areas o f E d i n b u r g h t o d a y appear 
as an i n e v i t a b l e - r e s u l t o f t h e i r p a s t h i s t o r i e s . I n each case t h i n g s 
c o u l d have been o t h e r w i s e . The E d i n b u r g h Town C o u n c i l m i g h t have k e p t 
t o i t s o r i g i n a l i n t e n t i o n o f making Dr. L i t t l e j o h n ' s a p p o i n t m e n t as 
f i r s t M e d i c a l O f f i c e r o f H e a l t h a t e m p o r a r y one, b u t i t d i d n o t . More 
by C o u n c i l i n a c t i o n t h a n p o s i t i v e p o l i c y Dr. L i t t l e j o h n i n f a c t h e l d 
t h i s a p p o i n t m e n t f o r f o r t y - s i x y e a r s and d i d much d u r i n g t h a t t i m e t o 
f u r t h e r t h e cause o f s a n i t a r y r e f o r m . N e i t h e r p r e d e t e r m i n e d n o r 
c o m p l e t e l y o u t o f t h e b l u e , t h e f l o w o f e v e n t s forms t h e s u b j e c t o f a 
c o n t i n u o u s n a r r a t i v e w h i c h makes t h e e v e n t s themselves - t h e p a s t o f 
t h e C i t y o f E d i n b u r g h - u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . T h i s i s u r b a n geography. 
36?. 
I n p a r t 3 o f t h e t h e s i s we have examined some o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l 
m a t e r i a l o r p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e r e l e v a n t t o t h e e v e n t s o f t h e l a t t e r h a l f o f 
t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y i n t h e c a p i t a l o f S c o t l a n d . The purpose o f so d o i n g 
was t o p r o v i d e an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h e way i n w h i c h r e s e a r c h i s d i r e c t e d a t 
each s t a g e by t h e h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e i t s e l f , w i t h h i s t o r i c a l problems o r 
p u z z l e s a r i s i n g f r o m h i s t o r i c a l t h i n k i n g r a t h e r t h a n g i v i n g r i s e t o such 
t h i n k i n g . The above accoun t o f E d i n b u r g h i s b u i l t upon what C o l l i n g w o o d 
c a l l s t h e 'dry bones' o f h i s t o r y w h i c h , a r r a n g e d i n a c e r t a i n way, p r o v i d e 
t h e framework o r o u t l i n e f o r t h e h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e . I t i s t h i s w h i c h g i v e s 
c o n t e n t and c o n t e x t t o t h e p u r s u i t o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l arguments. Dry bones 
may become h i s t o r y a c c o r d i n g t o C o l l i n g w o o d , "when someone i s a b l e t o 
c l o t h e them w i t h the f l e s h and b l o o d o f a t h o u g h t w h i c h i s b o t h h i s own and 
1 
t h e i r s " . I t i s o n l y t h e a t t e n t i o n t o d e t a i l and, i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e 
e l u c i d a t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g f u l n e s s o f a c t i o n s and e v e n t s i n t h e human w o r l d 
w h i c h i n v o l v e s t h e d i s c i p l i n e d t h i n k i n g n e c e s s a r y t o produce an h i s t o r i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e . I n t h e a c c o u n t p r e s e n t e d i n c h a p t e r 9 t h r e e areas o f E d i n b u r g h 
were c o n s i d e r e d , and some i d e a o f what i t was l i k e t o l i v e i n each o f them 
g i v e n . T h i s was done by o r d e r i n g t h e e x i s t i n g e v i d e n c e t o b r i n g o u t t h e 
c o n t r a s t w h i c h e x i s t e d i n t h e b u i l t f o r m , t h e more g e n e r a l e n v i r o n m e n t , and 
and t h e s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and l i f e - s t y l e s o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t s . Only 
when t h i s i s done can t h e m e a n i n g f u l a c t o f moving i n t o ( o r o u t o f ) one o f 
t h e s e areas be made c o m p l e t e l y i n t e l l i g i b l e . The account i s n o t an a c c o u n t 
o f a l l t h e a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e and i s n o t t h e r e f o r e a complete h i s t o r i c a l 
n a r r a t i v e . I t s purpose i s n o t so much t o r e l a t e what happened as t o 
i l l u s t r a t e t h e k i n d s o f e v i d e n c e w h i c h t h e u r b a n geographer w o u l d have t o 
t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n and what i s t o be made o f i t . Man}' d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f 
e v i d e n c e were c o n s i d e r e d . The census s t a t i s t i c s o f 1851 and 1891 p r o v i d e d 
1 
R.G.Collingwood C1970) p.3o5 
v a l u a b l e n u m e r i c a l d a t a and a l l o w e d b o t h t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f area d e n s i t i e s 
and t h e d e t e c t i o n o f changes i n t h e a r e a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p o p u l a t i o n . 
The o r i g i n a l census r e t u r n s g i v e i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e o c c u p a t i o n and p l a c e o f 
b i r t h o f i n d i v i d u a l s ' w h i c h a l l o w s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s o c i a l groups and 
s o c i a l a r e a s . The d e t a i l e d s t r e e t p l a n s a r e a n o t h e r s o u r c e o f e v i d e n c e w h i c h 
can be used t o i d e n t i f y areas w i t h i n t h e C i t y , and i n f o r m a t i o n a bout t h e 
l a y o u t o f s t r e e t s , houses and gardens adds t o t h e d e s c r i p t i o n and 
a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s e a r e a s . I n 1851 p h o t o g r a p h y was s t i l l 
i n i t s i n f a n c y ; n e v e r t h e l e s s t h e p h o t o g r a p h e r s o f E d i n b u r g h l e f t a 
v a l u a b l e r e c o r d o f houses and s t r e e t s t h r o u g h o u t t h e C i t y . T h i s p r o v i d e s 
i m p o r t a n t v i s u a l e v i d e n c e f o r t h e account o f what t h e s e s t r e e t s were l i k e . 
The d e l a p i d a t i o n o f C a r d i n a l Beaton's p a l a c e , f o r example, i s e v i d e n t a t a 
g l a n c e . The t e c h n i c a l advances wh i c h made i n d o o r p h o t o g r a p h y p o s s i b l e had 
n o t t h e n been a c h i e v e d . Thus f o r e v i d e n c e o f c o n d i t i o n s i n s i d e t h e houses 
i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o t u r n t o o t h e r s o u r c e s . The newspaper accounts o f t h e 
l i f e - s t y l e s and l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e h i g h S t r e e t d w e l l e r s were p u b l i s h e d 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e p e r i o d and p r o v i d e d a n o t h e r s t o r e o f i n f o r m a t i o n f o r t h e 
h i s t o r i c a l s k e t c h o f c h a p t e r 9. O t h e r memoirs p r o v i d e d e t a i l s o f l i f e i n t h e 
New Town. A l l t h i s s o r t o f e v i d e n c e can be used t o d e t e r m i n e t h e n a t u r e o r 
c h a r a c t e r o f t h e areas o f E d i n b u r g h , and t o - a s c e r t a i n how t h e y changed o v e r 
f o u r decades. A complete n a r r a t i v e must a l s o a c c o u n t f o r changes i n t h e b u i l t 
f o r m , and t o do t h i s o t h e r e v i d e n c e i s needed. Deeds o f o w n e r s h i p , f e u i n g 
c o n t r a c t s , d e t a i l s o f b u y i n g and s e l l i n g p r i c e s , 'model c l o s e ' and o t h e r 
s p e c u l a t i v e b u i l d i n g schemes, t h e a c t i o n s and r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e Dean o f G u i l d 
S o u r t , government l e g i s l a t i o n and t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e Town C o u n c i l , were a l l 
b r i e f l y c o n s i d e r e d above . A f u l l h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t w o u l d r e q u i r e a more 
l e n g t h y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f such e v i d e n c e , f o r i t p r o v i d e s i n f o r m a t i o n about 
t h e m e a n i n g f u l a c t i o n s o f i n d i v i d u a l s o r groups w h i c h have an e f f e c t on t h e 
b u i l t s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c i t y . I t i s such a c t i o n s a l o n g s i d e and i n t h e i r 
r e l a t i o n t o t h e c h a n g i n g r e s i d e n t i a l l o c a t i o n s o f t h e i n h a b i t a n t s which must 
be t h e c e n t r a l concerns o f t h e u r b a n geographer. To n o t e t h e changes and t o 
d e s c r i b e t h e areas i s t o p r o v i d e some ac c o u n t o f why, and t o where, p e o p l e 
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moved a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . And t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s i s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
changes i n t h e s p a t i a l p a t t e r n i n g o f s o c i a l areas w i t h i n t h e C i t y . 
I t i s f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e changes o f i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e u r b a n 
geographer can be i n f e r r e d , and i t i s t h e c o n t i n u m r h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e 
w h i c h can be s a i d t o e x p l a i n t h e changes. The n a r r a t i v e i t s e l f , a l t h o u g h i t 
must be d e t a i l e d enough t o p r e s e n t some e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e e v e n t s i t c o v e r s , 
can be more o r l e s s d e t a i l e d . We c o u l d , f o r example, have t r a c e d t h e 
r e s i d e n t i a l s h i f t s o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s . I n s t e a d o f a n s w e r i n g t h e 
q u e s t i o n "Where d i d t h o s e who l e f t t h e H i g h S t r e e t a r e a go?" i n a g e n e r a l 
manner, we c o u l d have a t t e m p t e d t o t r a c e t h e movements o f p a r t i c u l a r 
p e o p l e by u s i n g t h e census r e t u r n s . T h i s i s n o t an easy t a s k , b u t i t i s a 
2 
p o s s i b l e one. I t would r e s u l t i n a more d e t a i l e d a c c o u n t o f i n t r a - u r b a n 
m i g r a t i o n s . As Mandlebaum p o i n t s o u t , h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t s can be p r e s e n t e d 
a t many d i f f e r e n t s c a l e s . L i k e t h e c a r t o g r a p h e r and t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l t e r r i t o r y 
he r e p r e s e n t s on a map, " . . . . t h e s e r i e s o f ev e n t s w i t h w h i c h t h e h i s t o r i a n 
3 
d e a l s i s an i n f i n i t e l y dense s e r i e s " , and t h e s c a l e o f t h e a c c o u n t w i l l 
d e t e r m i n e t h e amount and n a t u r e o f t h e d e t a i l t o be i n c l u d e d . H i s t o r i c a l 
a c c o u n t s a t d i f f e r e n t s c a l e s b u t o f t h e same s e r i e s o f e v e n t s w i l l be r e l a t e d 
t o each o t h e r as maps o f t h e same ar e a a t d i f f e r e n t s c a l e s a r e r e l a t e d . A l l 
can be seen as c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o a whole - t h e n a r r a t i v e o f what happened i n 
t h e p a s t c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e . 
H i s t o r i a n s must be s e l e c t i v e f o r , b e i n g m o r t a l , t h e y can o n l y hope t o 
c o n t r i b u t e a s m a l l p i e c e t o t h e whole. I n o r d e r t o choose what t o s t u d y , t h e 
i n d i v i d u a l r e s e a r c h e r must have some c r i t e r i o n on w h i c h t o base h i s c h o i c e . 
2 
E.A.Wrigley, ed. (1973) c o n t a i n s d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n s o f many o f t h e problems 
e n c o u n t e r e d when a t t e m p t i n g t o t r a c e f a m i l y c o n n e c t i o n s o r i d e n t i f y 
i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e V i c t o r i a n census r e t u r n s . 
3 
M.Mandlebaum (1977) p.15 
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The c r i t e r i a t h emselves w i l l n o t , however, be d i s t i n c t i v e l y o r u n i q u e l y 
h i s t o r i c a l . Any s u b j e c t m a t t e r t h a t may be t r e a t e d h i s t o r i c a l l y w i l l a l l o w 
t h e e x e r c i s e o f h i s t o r i c a l t h o u g h t . The t h o u g h t i t s e l f w i l l n o t be any more 
o r l e s s h i s t o r i c a l w h e t h e r t h e s u b j e c t be t h e N a p o l e o n i c Wars o r a 
boundary f e u d o v e r a garden w a l l . The f o r m e r i s c e r t a i n l y more i m p o r t a n t 
t h a n t h e l a t t e r b u t t h i s i m p o r t a n c e i s one we a s c r i b e t o t h e e v e n t s 
themselves i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f how t h e y a r e t o be s t u d i e d . The e v e n t s o f 
h i s t o r y a r e t h e eve n t s o f t h e h i s t o r y o f mankind, and i t i s by v i e w i n g them 
t h u s t h a t we can judge t h e i m p o r t o r s i g n i f i c a n c e o f i n d i v i d u a l h a p p e n i n g s . 
To be s u r e , t h e r e w i l l always be room f o r d i s p u t e . Not a l l e v e n t s w i l l be 
o b v i o u s l y t r i v i a l o r o b v i o u s l y i m p o r t a n t . F u r t h e r , some a p p a r e n t l y t r i v i a l 
e v e n t may be p a r t o f a s e r i e s o f e v e n t s i t s e l f o f g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e . Only 
a f t e r an e v e n t can be viewed i n i t s f u l l c o n t e x t and a l o n g s i d e i t s 
consequences o r r e p e r c u s s i o n s can i t s i m p o r t a n c e be p r o p e r l y j u d g e d . T h i s i s 
one o f s e v e r a l reasons f o r s u p p o s i n g t h a t h i s t o r y must be o f t h e p a s t r a t h e r 
t h a n o f t h e p r e s e n t , f o r , i f t h e h i s t o r i a n i s i n c l i n e d t o t h e s t u d y o f t h e 
i m p o r t a n t r a t h e r t h a n o f t h e t r i v i a l , enough t i m e must have e l a p s e d s i n c e 
t h e e v e n t f o r him t o j u d g e i t s p r o p e r s i g n i f i c a n c e . 
A d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l mode op u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s t h a t 
t h e knowledge a c q u i r e d i s i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e p r e s e n t l y e x i s t i n g e v i d e n c e . Thus 
h i s t o r y i s d i f f e r e n t f r o m f i r s t - h a n d a c c ounts such as a r e f o u n d i n 
newspapers. These may be used by h i s t o r i a n s as e v i d e n c e b u t must be p l a c e d 
w i t h t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e . The w o r t h o f any i n d i v i d u a l a c c o u n t can o n l y be 
j u d g e d a g a i n s t t h i s o t h e r e v i d e n c e w h i c h may o r may n o t c o r r o b o r a t e i t . 
W r i t i n g f r o m t h e memory o f e v e n t s c o u l d n e v e r be h i s t o r y n o t because t h e 
memory i s f r e q u e n t l y u n r e l i a b l e , b u t because t h i s c o u l d n o t be knowledge 
i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e . An h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t i s an a c c o u n t o f e v e n t s 
w h i c h t o o k p l a c e i n t h e p a s t and i t i s o f t e n s a i d t h a t t h e r e must, t h e r e f o r e , 
it 
I t w o u l d be p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l o c a t i o n o r p a t t e r n o f c h a i r s i n a 
room by t h i n k i n g h i s t o r i c a l l y and c o n s t r u c t i n g an a c c o u n t f r o m t h e p r e s e n t 
e v i d e n c e o f how t h e y came t o be where t h e y a r e . The a c c o u n t , however, 
w o u l d n o t be g e n e r a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g o r i m p o r t a n t . 
be a t e m p o r a l d i s t a n c e between t h e s c h o l a r and h i s s u b j e c t , t h a t " t h e 
o b s e r v e r and t h e observed a r e n e v e r contemporaneous i n h i s t o r i c a l 
g e o g r a p h y " . 5 C e r t a i n l y enough t i m e must have e l a p s e d s i n c e t h e e v e n t f o r 
t h e r e t o be e v i d e n c e o f t h e e v e n t a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r e s e a r c h e r . T h i s i s a 
m i n i m a l r e q u i r e m e n t . Undoubtedly t h e more e v i d e n c e t h e r e i s t h e more 
complete t h e h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t w i l l be. I n d e e d , i t i s f r e q u e n t l y t h e 
l a c k o f e v i d e n c e t h a t makes t h e s t u d y o f t h e more d i s t a n t p a s t 
i m p o s s i b l e . The s t u d y o f t h e most r e c e n t p a s t can, however, be e q u a l l y 
p r o b l e m a t i c . Where t h e h i s t o r i a n h i m s e l f remembers t h e e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n 
he must g u a r d a g a i n s t t h e memories p r e j u d i c i n g t h e i n f e r e n c e s he draws f r o m 
t h e e v i d e n c e . The memory o f what happened must be t r e a t e d o n l y as a n o t h e r 
\ 
p i e c e o f e v i d e n c e , and n o t be t a k e n t o b e , a p r i o r i , any more r e l i a b l e t h a n 
6 
t h e f i r s t - h a n d a c c ounts o f o t h e r s . T h i s s a i d , as l o n g as t h e m i n i m a l 
r e q u i r e m e n t i s f u l f i l l e d h i s t o r i c a l knowledge o f contemporary e v e n t s 
( i . e . e v e n t s w i t h i n l i v i n g memory) i s p o s s i b l e . The advantages o f g r e a t e r 
t e m p o r a l d i s t a n c e would be a b s e n t , b u t i f t h e a c c o u n t e x h i b i t s h i s t o r i c a l 
t h i n k i n g t h e n i t i s a p i e c e o f h i s t o r y . 
I n u r b a n geography t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y i s t h e p a t t e r n o r d i s t r i b u t i o n 
o f c e r t a i n u r b a n phenomena. C i t i e s a r e c r e a t e d by human a g e n t s and t h e i r 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s r e s u l t f r o m m e a n i n g f u l human a c t i o n . To u n d e r s t a n d t h e o b j e c t 
t h e geographer w i l l r e q u i r e t o e x p l o r e such a c t i o n s , b u t i t i s always t h e 
d i s t r i b u t i o n and n o t t h e a c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s w h i c h i s h i s p r i m a r y c o n c e r n . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e geographer s t a r t s w i t h a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ( a d i s t r i b u t i o n ) 
and t h e n examines t h e e v e n t s o f w h i c h i t i s t h e outcome. There can be no 
g e o g r a p h i c a l s t u d y b e f o r e t h e outcome i s known, f o r t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y must 
be chosen b e f o r e t h e s t u d y can b e g i n . The h i s t o r i c a l account must t h e n 
5 
D.W. Moodie and J.C. Lehr (1976) p.133 
6 
I t i s o n l y i n t h i s way t h a t t h e h i s t o r i a n can a c h i e v e t h e o b j e c t i v i t y 
n e c e s s a r y t o h i s t o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . P e r s o n a l i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e 
e v e n t s b e i n g s t u d i e d makes t h e t a s k o f e n s u r i n g o b j e c t i v i t y t h a t much 
more d i f f i c u l t . 
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r e n d e r t h i s s t a t e o f a f f a i r s ( t h e chosen o b j e c t o f s t u d y ) i n t e l l i g i b l e as 
t h e outcome o f a c e r t a i n sex o f p a s t e v e n t s . The c h a n g i n g n a t u r e o f t h i s 
o b j e c t i s a p o t e n t i a l s o u rce o f m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n f u s i o n . 
I n any academic s t u d y w h i c h adds t o human knowledge by i n c r e a s i n g o u r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and hence o u r a b i l i t y t o e x p l a i n , t h e r e must n e c e s s a r i l y be 
some o b j e c t o f s t u d y t o be u n d e r s t o o d . I n t h e t h i r d p a r t o f t h i s t h e s i s 
we t o o k E d i n b u r g h as t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y , and i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t E d i n b u r g h , 
w h i l s t r e m a i n i n g E d i n b u r g h , a l s o changed o v e r t i m e . Between 1851 and 1891 
new s t r e e t s were b u i l t , o l d tenements were d e m o l i s h e d , and p a t t e r n s o f 
s o c i a l o c c u p a t i o n changed. Our knowledge o f t h e s e changes comes f r o m 
e x a m i n i n g t h e same areas o f t h e c i t y a t d i f f e r e n t t i m e s o r d a t e s . T h i s 
u n d e r l i n e s an i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f t h e n o t i o n o f change, namely t h a t i t 
r e q u i r e s t h e comparison o f two s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s w h i c h comprise t h e same 
o b j e c t a t two d i f f e r e n t t i m e s . Thus change, a l t h o u g h dynamic i n t h e sense 
t h a t i t i n v o l v e s t h e p a s s i n g o f t i m e , l o g i c a l l y e n t a i l s t h e comparison o f 
two s t a t i c p i c t u r e s . T h i s i s t h e o n l y way t h a t change can be apprehended. 
I f we f i n d Johnny's b i c y c l e i n t h e k i t c h e n we can o n l y know t h a t i t s l o c a t i o n 
has changed i f we know t h a t i t was n o t t h e r e when we l o o k e d b e f o r e , o r i f 
we know t h a t i t was somewhere e l s e . To ask q u e s t i o n s about l o c a t i o n i s , and 
must b e, t o ask q u e s t i o n s about a s t a t e o f a f f a i r s a t a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n 
t i m e , and t h i s does n o t i m p l y a s t a t i c v i e w o f something w h i c h i s i n r e a l i t y 
dynamic. I n w r i t i n g h i s t o r y and t h e r e f o r e u r b a n geography, i t i s t h e s e l e c t i o n 
o f s t a t i c p i c t u r e s f o r comparison t h a t i s i m p o r t a n t , f o r some comparisons 
w i l l l e a d o n l y t o t h e d e t e c t i o n o f t r i v i a l changes. I n e v i t a b l y a l s o , as 
a p p r e c i a t e d by Darby, "... t h e d i f f e r e n t e lements t h a t make up the 
7 
landscape do n o t change a t t h e same r a t e n o r a t t h e same t i m e " . Many 
changes w i l l c o n t i n u e a f t e r t h e p e r i o d chosen f o r s t u d y . Urban c e n t r e s a r e 
8 
ne v e r complete b u t r a t h e r c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g i n many d i f f e r e n t ways. Much 
7 
H.C.Darby (19 5 3 ) pp.5-6 8 Darby s u g g e s t s i s o l a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l e lements o f t h e landscape f o r s t u d y as 
' v e r t i c a l themes'.Even t h i s does n o t a v o i d t h e comparison o f s t a t i c 
c r o s s - s e c t i o n s , a l b e i t h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e ones. 
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o f t h e debate between t h o s e who advocate t h e dynamic s t u d y o f change and 
t h o s e who f a v o u r a ' s e r i e s - o f - s t a t i c - p i c t u r e s ' approach has a r i s e n , i t 
seems, because o f a m i s t a k e n n o t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f such changes, i e . o f 
9 
t h e n a t u r e o f h i s t o r i c a l p r o cesses . When Darby e n t r e a t s us "... n o t t o 
s t u d y a s t a t i c p i c t u r e , b u t a p r o c e s s t h a t i s c o n t i n u i n g and s e e m i n g l y , 
10 
ne v e r e n d i n g " , he assumes t h a t we do i n d e e d have an o p t i o n i n t h e m a t t e r . 
B u t , as Baker, Hamshere and Langton p o i n t o u t , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e 
11 
s t a t i c and t h e dynamic i s an a r t i f i c i a l one. As soon as we embark on a 
s t u d y o f a p a r t i c u l a r l andscape p a t t e r n ( i e . as soon as we a t t e m p t t o g a i n 
a knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i t ) we a r e i n v o l v e d i n e x a m i n i n g t h e way 
i n w h i c h i t came i n t o b e i n g ( i e . i n l o o k i n g a t change o v e r t i m e ) . 
C o n v e r s e l y , we cannot s t u d y 'change' i n a v o i d , b u t o n l y p a r t i c u l a r changes 
i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e comparison o f t h e same p a t t e r n a t two d i f f e r e n t d a t e s . 
The o n l y p r ocesses o f change i n urban geography a r e t h e a c t u a l changes as 
and when t h e y o c c u r r e d and i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s one t o a n o t h e r . 
The d e s c r i p t i o n o f a p a t t e r n o r d i s t r i b u t i o n a t one p o i n t i n t i m e i s n o t 
a p i e c e o f h i s t o r y , f o r n o t h i n g i s u n d e r s t o o d . "A s i n g l e c r o s s - s e c t i o n 
12 
does n o t en a b l e us t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e course o f change" . I t i s , 
- -however, a n e c e s s a r y p a r t o f any subsequent account o f t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n . 
To examine t h e census r e t u r n s f o r 1851 and compare t h e s e w i t h t h e r e t u r n s 
f o r 1891 i s n o t t o w r i t e h i s t o r y , b u t i t i s t o c o n t r i b u t e t o a ne c e s s a r y 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f an o b j e c t o f s t u d y and t h e changes w h i c h a r e e v i d e n t i n i t . 
The two d a t e s p r o v i d e t h e t e m p o r a l l i m i t s f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n o f e v i d e n c e , 
e v i d e n c e w h i c h must f i l l o u t t h e l i m i t e d s t a t i s t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n and 
9 
T h i s p o i n t was d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t 2. See pp. 190-196 above. 
10 
H.C.Darby, op. c i t . , p.7 
11 
see A.R.H.Baker, J.D.Hamshere and J.Langton (1970) p. 13 
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H.Prince (1971) p.9 
r e n d e r t h e changes themselves i n t e l l i g i b l e , e v i d e n c e o f , f o r example, t h e 
a c t i v i t i e s o f t h o s e who sought s a n i t a r y r e f o r m i n E d i n b u r g h , i n n o v a t i o n s 
i n t r a n s p o r t , t h e s t a t e o f t h e b u i l d i n g i n d u s t r y , t h e g r o w t h and d e c l i n e 
o f o t h e r i n d u s t r i e s and t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e Town C o u n c i l . I n t h e human w o r l d 
t h e c o n n e c t i o n between e v e n t s i s f r e q u e n t l y i n t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e agent 
a l o n e ; one e v e n t l e a d s t o a n o t h e r o n l y i n s o f a r as i t p r o v i d e s t h e human 
agent w i t h a reason f o r a c t i n g i n a p a r t i c u l a r way. For example, t h e s t a t e 
o f t h e O l d Town o f E d i n b u r g h ( t h e o v e r c r o w d i n g and t h e c o l l a p s e o f s e v e r a l 
tenements) i n t h e f i r s t h a l f o f t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y can be conn e c t e d 
w i t h t h e b u i l d i n g o f t h e New Town j u s t because i t p r o v i d e d t h e Town C o u n c i l 
w i t h a good, i n d e e d p r e s s i n g , r e a s o n f o r e x p a n d i n g t h e a r e a l e x t e n t o f 
p 
t h e C i t y . I n h i s r e s e a r c h t h e geographer must d i s c o v e r t h e most i m p o r t a n t 
o f such c o n n e c t i o n s i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e an h i s t o r i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
u r b a n phenomena. Whatever h i s theme and w h a t e v e r t h e s c a l e o f s t u d y , t h i s 
i s t h e d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e o f t h o u g h t o r mode o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g he must 
13 
employ. There i s no o t h e r way i n w h i c h we c o u l d be s a i d t o g a i n a 
knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e s p a t i a l s t r u c t u r e o f V i c t o r i a n 
E d i n b u r g h . 
The theme o r i g i n a l l y chosen f o r r e s e a r c h was t h a t o f s o c i a l groups 
and t h e i r c h a n g i n g s p a t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s . I n d u s t r i a l l o c a t i o n s o r t h e 
c h a n g i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r e t a i l o u t l e t s m i g h t e q u a l l y w e l l have been 
chosen. The theme i t s e l f may d i c t a t e t h e s c a l e a t w h i c h t h e e n q u i r y 
i s c o n d u c t e d . I t i s t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e s e a r c h e r who must j u d g e t h e 
r e l e v a n c e , i m p o r t a n c e and s i g n i f i c a n c e o f p i e c e s o f e v i d e n c e t o h i s 
theme, s t u d i e d a t a p a r t i c u l a r s c a l e . And i t i s he who must p i n p o i n t 
q u e s t i o n s w o r t h y o f d i s c u s s i o n . He may, o f c o u r s e , be m i s g u i d e d i n 
what he c o n s i d e r s i m p o r t a n t , j u s t as he may g i v e t o o much w e i g h t t o 
a s i n g l e p i e c e o f e v i d e n c e . These w o u l d be p r o p e r grounds on w h i c h t o 
c r i t i c i s e h i s w r i t i n g s , and i t i s p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s way t h a t h i s t o r i c a l 
a c c o u nts a r e s u b j e c t t o t h e s c r u t i n y o f f e l l o w h i s t o r i a n s b e f o r e t h e y 
become e s t a b l i s h e d o r a c c e p t e d as h i s t o r y . T h i s , however, i s t h e 
conce r n o f h i s t o r i c a l p r a c t i c e r a t h e r t h a n o f h i s t o r i c a l method. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
That geography i s a f i e l d o f knowledge w h i c h 
i s concerned t o know and u n d e r s t a n d i n d i v i d u a l 
cases f o l l o w s d i r e c t l y f r o m i t s f u n c t i o n as t h e 
s t u d y o f p l a c e s . The concept o f p l a c e , l i k e 
t h a t o f p e r s o n o r e v e n t , i s i n i t s essence a 
concept o f t h e s p e c i f i c . 
R. H a r t s h o r n e (1960) p.157 
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The s k i l l w h i c h t h e urban geographer must d e v e l o p i f he i s t o 
s t u d y u r b a n p l a c e s i s t h e s k i l l o f t h e h i s t o r i a n . I t i s h i s t o r y as 
a d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e o r mode o f t h o u g h t w h i c h i s a p p r o p r i a t e t o 
t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a l f o r m o f a c i t y . K i r k a s k s , "Do 
we t h i n k and work g e o g r a p h i c a l l y , r a t h e r t h a n t h i n k and work on 
g e o g r a p h i c a l m a t e r i a l s ? ' 1 ^  The answer must be no. The urban geographer 
i s r e q u i r e d t o t h i n k h i s t o r i c a l l y f o r i t i s o n l y i n t h i s way t h a t he can 
u n d e r s t a n d t h e c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s o f any u r b a n a r e a . There i s no 
d i s t i n c t i v e l y g e o g r a p h i c a l mode o f t h o u g h t . Urban geography i s a 
s u b j e c t and i s , t h e r e f o r e , d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e o b j e c t o f s t u d y . As 
H a r t s h o r n e says ( a b o u t what he c a l l s ' h i s t o r i c a l g e o g r a p h y ' ) , " . . . t h e 
t e s t o f g e o g r a p h i c q u a l i t y i s i n t h e purpose and f o c u s o f i n t e r e s t . " 2 
Urban geography i s urban h i s t o r y w i t h t h e f o c u s o f i n t e r e s t b e i n g on 
th e ' p l a c e ' , on t h e s e t o f e v e n t s which have moulded i t s p h y s i c a l f o r m 
and i n f l u e n c e d i t s c h a r a c t e r . T h i s i s t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n 
o f t h e t h e s i s . 
I n a c c e p t i n g such a c o n c l u s i o n one must f o r s a k e s e v e r a l methods o f 
a n a l y s i s w h i c h a r e p r o m i n e n t i n t h e urban l i t e r a t u r e . I t has been t h e 
t a s k o f t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s above t o demonstrate- t h e e r r o n e o u s 
n a t u r e o f t h e models and t h e o r i e s produced by such methods. I f t h e 
arguments a r e c o r r e c t , t h e y l e a d i r r e v o c a b l y t o t h e s t a t e d c o n c l u s i o n 
and t o f i v e s u b s i d i a r y m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s w h i c h a r e as f o l l o w s : 
1 . Urban geography i s concerned w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h e u n i q u e . 
U n d e r s t a n d i n g i s sought a t t h e l e v e l o f p a r t i c u l a r c i t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r 
e v e n t s and even, on o c c a s i o n , p a r t i c u l a r p e o p l e . The p a t t e r n s f o u n d 
1 W. K i r k ( 1 9 6 3 ) p.361 
2 R. H a r t s h o r n e (1960) p.103 
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w i t h i n t h e c i t y a r e t h e outcome o f t h e d e c i s i o n s o r c h o i c e s o f many 
thousands o f i n d i v i d u a l human b e i n g s and, a l t h o u g h i t i s o n l y i n e x c e p t i o n a l 
c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t t h e a c t i o n s o f a s i n g l e p e r s o n w i l l a f f e c t t h i s p a t t e r n 
( i t s e l f a b s t r a c t e d f r o m t h e c i t y m o s a i c ) , any a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e 
c h a n g i n g urban s t r u c t u r e must r e c o g n i s e t h e agency as a human one. I n 
t h i s c o n t e x t t h e c h a r a c t e r o f c i t y areas and t h e b e h a v i o u r o f r e l e v a n t 
s o c i a l groups i s i m p o r t a n t . Any approach w h i c h f a i l s t o a p p r e c i a t e 
t h e n a t u r e o f human agency and t h e f o r m o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g and e x p l a n a t i o n 
a p p r o p r i a t e t o i t c a n n o t , l o g i c a l l y , produce v a l i d t h e o r y o r m e a n i n g f u l 
o b s e r v a t i o n s . 
2. S c i e n t i f i c method i s i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e s t u d y o f human b e h a v i o u r 
and, t h e r e f o r e , t o u r b a n geography. The s o r t s o f q u e s t i o n t h e s c i e n t i s t 
m i g h t ask about t h e b e h a v i o u r o f gases o r e l e c t r o n s and t h e v o c a b u l a r y he 
would use a r e q u i t e d i f f e r e n t t o t h e q u e s t i o n s we m i g h t ask about human 
b e h a v i o u r and t h e language we would use t o d e s c r i b e and e x p l a i n such 
b e h a v i o u r . Gases do n o t have r e a s o n s , m o t i v e s o r i n t e n t i o n s , and i t 
w o u l d be n o n s e n s i c a l t o e x p r e s s m o r a l condemnation o f a gas w h i c h had 
j u s t e x p l o d e d . F u r t h e r , h i s t o r i c a l t i m e i s i m p o r t a n t t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g 
- o f human a c t i o n s and, because o f t h i s , t h e r e can be no u n i v e r s a l ( a n d 
t i m e l e s s ) d e s c r i p t i o n i n t h e s o c i a l s c i e n c e s . We cannot u n d e r s t a n d 
human b e h a v i o u r s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . T h i s h i g h l i g h t s t h e c o n t r a s t w h i c h 
can be made between s c i e n c e and s o c i a l s c i e n c e . 
3. I n urban geography t h e s e a r c h f o r g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n s o f any g r e a t 
substance must be abandoned. The s e a r c h i t s e l f was i n i t i a t e d and 
encouraged by t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e s c i e n t i f i c p a r a digm w h i c h became p r o m i n e n t 
a t t h e t i m e o f t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e r e v o l u t i o n . There a r e no u n i v e r s a l s 
i n t h e human w o r l d . G e n e r a l s t a t e m e n t s can be made b u t t h e most 
g e n e r a l a r e a l s o t h e most t r i v i a l l y t r u e . I f we a r e t o u n d e r s t a n d 
a p a r t i c u l a r human a c t i o n o r s e t o f a c t i o n s we must l o o k a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
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c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h i t t o o k p l a c e . We may be h e l p e d i n t h i s by 
some g e n e r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a c t i o n s o f t h i s s o r t g a i n e d , f o r example, 
t h r o u g h f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h o t h e r s who have a c t e d i n a s i m i l a r way. The 
s c i e n t i s t can e x p l a i n t h e i n d i v i d u a l case by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e u n i v e r s a l 
d e s c r i p t i o n o f a s c i e n t i f i c l a w . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e g e n e r a l 
and t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n s o c i a l s c i e n c e i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . A knowledge 
o f t h e range o f a c t i o n s w h i c h m i g h t come under t h e d e s c r i p t i o n ' a t t e m p t e d 
s u i c i d e ' may h e l p i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l ' s 
a t t e m p t t o k i l l h i m s e l f - on t h e o t h e r hand i t may n o t . S o c i a l 
s i t u a t i o n s may be s i m i l a r b u t t h e y a r e n e v e r t h e same, and i t i s because 
o f t h i s t h a t t h e s e a r c h f o r such g e n e r a l models and t h e o r i e s as a r e 
f o u n d i n t h e s c i e n c e s i s m i s p l a c e d . 
4. The s t r u c t u r e o r f o r m o f an u r b a n area cannot be e x p l a i n e d by 
a p p e a l i n g t o t h e o p e r a t i o n o f ' u n d e r l y i n g f o r c e s ' . I n most cases an 
a p p e a l o f t h i s s o r t i n v o l v e s t h e g r o s s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l e r r o r o f d e n y i n g 
t h e e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r . People do n o t a c t 
l i k e i r o n f i l i n g s (however s i m i l a r t h e " a t t r a c t i o n r a t e s " o f v a r i o u s 
c i t i e s a r e t o t h o s e o f m a g n e t i c p o l e s ) f o r , o f c o u r s e , i r o n f i l i n g s do 
n o t - a c t % t h e y have no u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e i r movements . -And even where -
t h e c h a r a c t e r o f human a c t i o n i s r e c o g n i s e d b u t e x p l a n a t i o n i s sought i n 
t e r m s o f t h e ' p r i n c i p l e s ' i n v o l v e d , t h e s t u d y o f p a t t e r n s i n t h e human 
landscape c o u l d be no more f r u i t f u l . L e a v i n g a s i d e t h e i m p l a u s i b i l i t y 
o f t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t e v e r y o n e , i n e v e r y t h i n g t h e y do, a c t s f r o m a 
d e s i r e t o reduce t h e e f f o r t t h e y expend t o a minimum, we have no way o f 
t e s t i n g such a c l a i m . I f a l l a c t s a r e , by d e f i n i t i o n , examples o f t h e 
l e a s t e f f o r t p r i n c i p l e t h e n t h e p r i n c i p l e i t s e l f c o u l d n e v e r be e s t a b l i s h e d 
s i n c e i t i s u n f a l s i f i a b l e . And, i f i t c o u l d n e v e r be shown t o be e i t h e r 
t r u e o r f a l s e , i t must be vacuous. The same may be s a i d o f t h e m a r x i s t 
analyses which a t t r i b u t e r e s i d e n t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n to the 'forces 
of capitalism'. 3 
5. Urban geography i s not a p r a c t i c a l subject. The realm of history 
can be contrasted with the realm of practice, f o r the hist o r i a n i s not 
concerned to relate the past t o the present. There i s no favoured 
state of a f f a i r s i n r e l a t i o n to which the hist o r i a n judges the past as 
does the p r a c t i c a l man. In Oakeshott's words, the past of the 
histor i a n " i s without the moral, p o l i t i c a l or the social structure which 
the p r a c t i c a l man transfers from his present to his past."1* The 
h i s t o r i c a l narrative i s essentially descriptive. I t s function i s to 
make past events i n t e l l i g i b l e , not to j u s t i f y them or c r i t i c i s e them. 
The hist o r i a n does not make the past speak to the present. And the 
urban geographer has no message to give t o , no lesson to teach, the 
planner of today. Urban geography i s not applied geography. 
Together these f i v e principles sketch the major features of urban geography 
as a subject within the d i s c i p l i n e of history. 
Inevitably any indi v i d u a l attempt to reconstruct the past of a 
par t i c u l a r c i t y w i l l be more piecemeal than systematic. Nevertheless, 
-the—historical account i s neither undisciplined nor untheoretical. History 
3 D. Harvey i n R. Peel et a l (1975) p.368 claims t h a t , "Residential 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s produced, i n i t s broadest lineaments at least by 
forces emanating from the c a p i t a l i s t production process and i s not to be 
construed as the product of the autonomously and spontaneously a r i s i n g 
preferences of people." I t i s not people's preferences which create the 
actual r e s i d e n t i a l patterns i n a c i t y , of course, but the choices they 
make about where to l i v e . Such choices are constrained i n a way that 
preferences are not. One constraint on the choice of where to l i v e i s 
an economic one. A working man's wage w i l l not buy a palace. To 
recognise t h i s i s i n no way to be committed to a marxist analysis i n 
which t a l k of 'forces' raises more questions than i t answers. 
h M. Oakeshott (1962) p. 154-
i s a d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e of thought and i t does involve the 
construction of theories even though these are quite unlike the 
theories of science. The h i s t o r i c a l theories of urban geography have 
no universal content but are, rather, attempts to reconstruct a unique 
past from evidence existing at the present time. The account thus 
constructed i s an hypothesis which can, according to standard c r i t e r i a 
of v a l i d i t y , be accepted or rejected. I t s acceptance would establish 
i t as a theory. Only i n t h i s way could we b u i l d up a body of urban 
theory which could then be amended or improved upon. Such theory 
would have neither p r a c t i c a l application nor general reference outside 
the p a r t i c u l a r place and period of i t s concern. The evidence on which 
urban theory must be based i s evidence of the unique. This evidence 
may be found i n documents, i n the present day structure of the p a r t i c u l a r 
c i t y , i n photographs of i t s past, or i n s t a t i s t i c a l material from the 
census and other surveys. Whatever the form of the evidence, however, 
i t s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n as evidence i s merely a f i r s t srep i n the h i s t o r i c a l 
research, f o r the urban geographer i s required to 'make something' of 
the evidence. This i s frequently forgotten by those with an interest i n 
s t a t i s t i c a l patterns. Census-data, as much "as "any other evidence, i s a 
source of information. The emphasis throughout geography i n the l a s t 
twenty years has been on quantification and a warning against single-
mindedness i n t h i s respect i s perhaps timely. Dyos and Baker put 
s t a t i s t i c s i n t h e i r proper place: 
After even the most elaborate programming of data through 
a computer i t s output w i l l simply be a re-arrangement of 
the raw data i n t o a more i n t e l l i g i b l e pattern and cannot 
be regarded i n any sense as the end of the l i n e of research. 
I t i s indeed only the end of the beginning. 5 
5 H. J. Dyos and A. B. M. Baker i n H. J. Dyos (1968) p.88. I t should 
be noted that not i n every case does such a re-arrangement prove more 
i n t e l l i g i b l e than the raw data. 
The s k i l l of the urban geographer must l i e i n the interpretation 
of the evidence and not i n s t a t i s t i c a l manipulations. 
The arguments of the thesis lead us to these conclusions. We 
do not set out to explain i n urban geography, though puzzles may arise 
i n the course of research which do require an explanation. I n each 
case There w i l l be l o g i c a l l i m i r s T O The complexeness of xhe answer 
and these may or may not allow a satisfactory explanation to be given. 
Urban research involves describing how present urban patterns came 
about, how they evolved. Genuine puzzles are prompted by t h i s research 
and must be solved before the h i s t o r i c a l narrative can be continued. 
Such puzzles do present a problem to the urban researcher, but his main 
concern i s s t i l l the provision of an h i s t o r i c a l account. The purpose 
of urban geography i s not to explain, but to make the course of events 
i n t e l l i g i b l e . 
The enterprise of t h i s thesis has been a c r i t i c a l analysis of 
the way we think about the phenomenon of urban geography - the c i t y . 
Throughout, I have t r i e d to i l l u s t r a t e the way i n which the ideas of 
other geographers have contributed to the conception of urban geography I 
advance, and to point out how certain prominent methodological ideas 
f i t i n and why others must be rejected. The conclusion, baldly stated, 
i s hardly new. H i s t o r i c a l method, though f o r some time unpopular, has 
and continues to have i t s protagonists within geography. The singular 
contribution of t h i s thesis t o the subject of geography, then, l i e s not 
so much i n the advocation of h i s t o r i c a l method i n the study of urban 
places, but i n the arguments advanced i n support of t h i s conclusion and 
i n the spelling out of what exactly they imply f o r the study of urban 
and human geography. Further, by dwelling upon the many methodological 
issues raised during the discussion, we can perhaps go some way towards 
answering other methodological questions. The now entrenched d i v i s i o n 
between physical and human geography which Hartshorne condemns as 
detrimental to the purpose of geography, can be seen, i n the l i g h t 
of the d i s t i n c t i o n between the world of human a f f a i r s and the natural 
world, as necessary to the advancement of the subject. The d i v i s i o n 
i t s e l f , however, would not be quite as i t i s so frequently conceived. 
We must understand what geography i s and how i t i s properly to be 
studied before we can engage i n p r o f i t a b l e research. In t h i s , the 
methodological arguments of t h i s thesis have, I hope, contributed 
to the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of problems of mutual concern. 
Geomorphology, f o r example, would seem to f a l l p a r t l y i n t o the 
di s c i p l i n e of history and p a r t l y into the di s c i p l i n e of science. 
We could not, therefore, have a neat physical/human di v i s i o n coinciding 
with the use of s c i e n t i f i c / h i s t o r i c a l method. The divisions within 
geography are more complex than t h i s . 
APPENDIX A 
Census Data and Sampling 
10% Sample of the Census Enumerators' Handbooks f o r Central Edinburgh, 
1851 and 1891 
The sample was taken i n a systematic manner as follows: 
Every 10th household was selected. 
i e . i n d u s t r i a l , commercial and h a l f - b u i l t properties were ignored. 
Each f u l l y ruled o f f schedule was regarded as a household, and -
(a) where two (or more) schedules had been used, but the household 
had been divided properly by intermediate shorter lines between 
each enumeration schedule, concluding with a longer l i n e , a l l 
the inhabitants were regarded as members of one household. 
(b) where a household had not been ruled o f f at the bottom of a page, 
the next u n i t s t a r t i n g at the top of a new page was, nevertheless, 
regarded as a separate household provided i t had a separate 
schedule number. (Except where the address was precisely the same.) 
Persons on the second or t h i r d schedules withi n a household were treated 
as lodgers of the family on the f i r s t schedule, 
unless 
Where there was at least one other i d e n t i f i a b l e family unit (either a 
married couple or an adult with at least one c h i l d of his or her own), 
regardless of whether or not they had been l i s t e d on a separate enumeration 
schedule from that of the 'head of household's' family, then the households 
were regarded as sharing. (Except where such a family u n i t was d i r e c t l y 
related to the head of household or JListe_d_ as servants.) 
Only persons actually l i s t e d as servants were taken to be such. 
V i s i t o r s were ignored i n the calculation of population numbers and area 
densities. 
Note on the Comparability of the 1851 and 1891 Enumerators' Returns 
f o r Central Edinburgh 
In 1851, enumeration d i s t r i c t s were sub-divisions of parishes. By 
1891 t h i s had been changed and enumeration d i s t r i c t s had been reorganised 
as sub-divisions of parliamentary wards. 
The c o l l e c t i o n of parish based data f o r 1891 i s , therefore, the more 
complicated. Two related d i f f i c u l t i e s arise: 
(a) Since parish boundaries do not coincide with ward boundaries and 
since any one parish may be divided between as many as three d i f f e r e n t 
wards, the collect i o n of parish data f o r 1891 involves the selection 
of enumeration d i s t r i c t material from individual enumeration books 
which are not i n sequence i n the arrangement of census returns f o r 
the c i t y as a whole. 
(b) Since the boundaries of some of the enumeration d i s t r i c t s themselves 
were altered between 1851 and 1891, i t i s only by the use of accurate 
boundary maps and the c o l l e c t i o n of data for each household w i t h i n 
the 1851 boundary that parish based s t a t i s t i c s f o r 1891 can be 
obtained. Where such boundary maps are not s u f f i c i e n t l y detailed 
there are frequently no guidelines f o r determining whether some new 
build i n g , f o r example, does or does not l i e within the parish. 
Some error i s l i k e l y , therefore, i n the 1891 parish data. This, however, 
w i l l be minimal i n the context of a 10% sample. 
The extra information contained i n the 1891 census (eg. the number of 
windowed rooms per household) has, of course, no counterpart i n the more 
basic 1851 returns. 
APPENDIX B 
S t a t i s t i c a l Table and Diagram from 
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